

THE TRIAL

OF

THE MOST NOTABLE LAWSUIT

OF

ANCIENT OR MODERN TIMES

*The Incorporated Scientific Era Protection Society v.
Paul Christman and others*

IN THE COURT OF COMMON REASON

*Before LORD PENETRATING IMPARTIALITY
and a Special Jury*

ISSUE: "DID CHRIST RISE FROM THE DEAD?"

Verbatim Report by a Shorthand Writer

PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

MANY matters are in various ways more or less earnestly debated in these our busy days—on the platform, in the press, in Parliament, on the battlefield. All of them are of more or less serious significance to the combatants, and those whom they represent. But, in the nature of things, none of them, in vital consequence to men and nations, can approach the issue debated herein, if by any possibility it be decided in the affirmative. The debate is put into the form of a trial, with more or less of parable running through it, that the reader may be enticed, and that the bearings of the matter may be thoroughly exhibited. The reader is invited to ponder the issue, and make himself a party to the trial on that side on which he may feel his sober judgment to be enlisted.

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**Devil's Counsel.*

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TENTH SITTING

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TWELFTH SITTING

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His Lordship addresses the Jury—Defines the power of the Court to deal with the inflictors of injury on society—Asks the Jury to be sure the injury is proved, and is of a final character—Points out that the utmost discrimination must be exercised—Enquires what are the facts?—

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In the Court of Common Reason

Before Lord PENETRATING IMPARTIALITY and a
Special Jury.

*The Incorporated Scientific Era Protection Society v.
Paul Christman and others.*

Counsel for the Plaintiffs—Sir Fossil Coldsharp Partialfact Unbelief, D.C., assisted by Mr. German Mysticism, Mr. British Protoplasm, Mr. Lover-of-the-present-world, and Mr. Dontwanto Believeanyhow.

Counsel for the Defendants—Sir Noble Acceptor of All-truth, assisted by Mr. Discerner of Facts, Mr. Well-wisher-of-Mankind, and Mr. Ardent Hope-for-a-reason.

This was an action to restrain the defendants from propagating a belief, or doctrine, alleged to be hurtful to the public interest, viz., a belief in the resurrection of one, Jesus of Nazareth, who was put to death by the lawful authorities of his own age, as a pestilent fellow.

The trial excited immense interest and was attended by all classes of the public to an extent beyond computation.

As the case was of a character affecting all classes, it had been considered desirable that the jury should com-

prise as great a variety of representative men as possible. Consequently a large number of gentlemen had been summoned. Many of them were of long and reputable standing. The names, however, included some of a questionable character. His Lordship having taken his seat,

The Clerk of the Court (MR. NEUTER CLEARVOICE), called upon the jury to answer to their names as follows: — Mr. Christadmirer, Mr. Honest-doubter, Mr. Shilly-shally, Mr. Science-dabbler, Mr. Dissipation-follower, Mr. Smart-sophist, Mr. Disdain, Mr. Sheer Stupidity, Mr. Hopeful, Mr. Observer-of-facts, Mr. Lover-of-truth, Mr. Indignant-at-shams, Mr. Pleasure-hunter, Mr. Waster-of-time, Mr. Actor-out-of-his-convictions, Mr. Diligent-in-everything, Mr. Total Indifference, Mr. Worshipper of Protoplasm, Mr. Befogall, Mr. Hearty-in-everything, Mr. Promoter of Political-Improvement, Mr. Eye-to-Number-one, Mr. Hater-of-lies, Mr. Appreciator-of-beauty, Mr. Flasetongue, Mr. Shallow-brains, Mr. Believer-of-evidence, Mr. Candour, Mr. Prejudice, Mr. Mammon-worshipper, Mr. Care-for-reputation, Mr. Fearer-of-God, Mr. Enthusiastic-in-good, Mr. Frivolous, Mr. Sublimity, Mr. Avarice, Mr. Critical, Mr. Trier-of-dreams, Mr. Toady-to-the-rich, Mr. Eye-to-the-ridiculous, Mr. Slugg, Mr. Cloudy-thoughtful, Mr. Lover-of-debate, and Mr. Sneer-at-faith.

Several of the jury failed to answer to their names, to wit: Mr. Waster-of-time, Mr. Total Indifference, Mr. Frivolous, Mr. Slugg, Mr. Disdain, Mr. Sheer Stupidity, and Mr. Sneer-at-faith.

His Lordship ordered the usual penalties.

The Clerk of the Court: Any objections to the gentlemen whose names have been called must be made before the Jury are sworn: otherwise, they cannot be entertained.

His Lordship: Have Counsel for the plaintiffs or defendants any objections?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: My Lord, the Jury are rather numerous: but there is a proverb among the old school to the effect that in the multitude of counsellors is safety. I do not see any special ground of objection to any of them. With slight exceptions perhaps, they seem to me a very respectable body of gentlemen.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I am sorry I cannot be so complaisant as my learned friend. I do not object to the multitude of counsellors, but there is a limit to everything. I do not see that we want such a crowd of gentlemen to decide a very simple issue like that which has to be tried to-day.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: It is not so simple an issue as you imagine.

Mr. British Protoplasm: The issue is simple enough, but it is likely to suffer at the hands of an unscientific Jury, like the one huddled together near the box at the present moment.

Mr. Juryman Lover-of-Science: Have mercy upon the Jury, Mr. Protoplasm.

Mr. B. Protoplasm: I beg pardon. I did not apply my remarks to you.

Mr. Juryman Honest-doubter: It ought not to be applied to any of us.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I was interrupted in my remarks. Although I do not think so large a Jury necessary for the trial of this case, still I should not object to the number of them if there were no exception to be taken to the quality of some of them. Several of the gentlemen whose names have been called, are in my opinion, unqualified to take part in a trial of this nature. Their interests are too notoriously at stake to allow of their giving an unbiassed verdict. I submit my objection to the Court.

The Clerk: Which of the Jury do you object to?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I object, first of all, to Mr. Eye-to-Number-One. It is notorious that this gentleman is incompetent to give an impartial verdict in this case. His interests hang on the issue of the trial to a large extent. He is in the employ of the plaintiffs who give him a large *quid pro quo* for his services; and a verdict in favour of the defendants would be too manifestly to the detriment of his prospects to allow of our expecting him to consider the evidence with an unbiassed mind. He is well known for his habit of following and promoting and advocating those things only that lead to his personal advancement.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: My friend ought to be charitable. He ought to practice the virtues of the school to which he belongs. I do not see why he should object to Mr. Eye-to-Number-One. If Mr. Eye-to-Number-One looks after his own interest, it is only what we all do; and for the matter of that, it is a highly creditable thing. I consider it the primary virtue of the social system. When each unit looks after itself, we have a guarantee that the whole will be looked after. Besides, is not personal advancement my friend's great doctrine? What does this preaching of Christ mean but the advising of men to look after their own personal interests?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I admit that a man serves his personal interests in the highest sense by embracing our doctrine; but I do not admit there is any parallel between the case of a man serving his personal interest in this way and the case of Mr. Eye-to-Number-One.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Why not?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Because Mr. Eye-to-Number-One seeks his own interest alone, and that only which he can see to be immediately such, and to this he instinctively, even if unconsciously, subordinates every other consideration. Whereas he who seeks his personal interest in the faith and service of Christ does so by engaging to obey Christ who commands him to love his neighbour and to govern himself by probity, candour and truth. He cannot, under Christ, secure his personal interest except by the exercise of mercy and truth. And therefore in his very self-seeking in this direction, if my friend please to consider it such, we have a guarantee of trustworthiness, whereas in the self-seeking of Mr. Eye-to-Number-One, we have guarantee just the other way.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I have no particular partiality for Mr. Eye-to-Number-One. Still, he is a respectable and useful man, and quite as well-fitted to judge of his own interests as any other man.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Yes, but not of other people's interests. That is my objection. Other people's interests are vastly involved in the issue the Jury are called

upon to decide; and Mr. Eye-to-Number-One's interests are all on the other side, and my contention is that he would instinctively veer to that side.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Well, I wont press the matter. I don't admit your argument. Still, I don't want to spend a whole day over one Juryman. I understand you object to some others.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I object to Mr. Mammon-worshipper. Such a man would not be likely to bring in a verdict favourable to a movement which condemns the worship of Mammon.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: The worship of Mammon! that is altogether too loose. What do you mean by the worship of Mammon.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: You surely do not require me to give you an exposition of that subject?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: No: I hope you will spare us: But upon my word, it is too vague an objection against any man's competency of judgment to say he is a Mammon worshipper.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I mean to say that a man who admires wealth in the vulgar sense of Mammon-worship—who is captivated by the flare and the blare of fashionable life—who imitates the ostentation of the rich so far as his means allows, and whose great aim is to be reckoned as high among them as possible, however good a judge he may be in common matters, is already steel-clad against all argument in favour of a doctrine and a system of things which condemn the mode of life that is most congenial to his soul. I press my objection.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Of course, you will press your objection; but I did expect that we should at least have some charity from the champion of the Christian cause.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I demur to the imputation of uncharity. It is the characteristic of Christian charity to "rejoice in the truth." It is never an unkindness to any man to speak the truth. If the truth bear hardly on him, it is the fault of the man and not of the truth.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: We are not here to listen to a sermon.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I am answering your complaint of uncharity.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Who do you object to next?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I object to Mr. Dissipation-follower; to Mr. Pleasure-hunter, to Mr. False-tongue, to Mr. Shallow-brains,—

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: You take my breath! you had better object to the whole Jury at once.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I object only to those who are objectionable. The gentlemen I have mentioned are notoriously unfitted to judge of the matters in dispute. I should have thought you would have admitted as much.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: You object to Mr. Shallow-brains?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Yes, to Mr. Shallow-brains.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I am surprised.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I am surprised you should be surprised.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I thought the shallower a man's brains, the better a believer he made?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: That is a popular mistake. It is considerably from lack of brains that there are so many unbelievers.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Don't be insulting.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I have no desire to wound your feelings, but I give utterance to my conviction.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Your conviction is opposed to notorious fact. You must know that the ranks of scientific scepticism represent the brains and culture of the country everywhere, and that if you want to get amongst dullness and mediocrity and mental vapidness, you have only to join some evangelical sect.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I must admit that the state of society lends but too much colour to your view of the case. But I still maintain that in the present state of circumstances, it requires more brains to be a believer than to be an unbeliever. The situation is so confused that the ordinary mind cannot reconcile its elements. He sees a system that passes universally current for Christianity;

he sees on the other hand the discoveries of modern science at utter variance with that system in some of its leading principles. Being sure of the truth of science in its demonstrated parts, he decides at once that the system inconsistent with it is a myth. While his decision is logical enough and true enough as regards the popular Christian system, it does complete violence to a third element in the case, and that is, the Bible itself, which requires for its proper estimate a far deeper insight and a more extensive range of knowledge, than the common run of men possess. The superficial view ties the Bible and the popular Christian system together, and in rejecting one, rejects both, whereas they are two totally distinct things. The Bible is the complement of science in that department of futurity and destiny which science can never touch: it is not inconsistent with science either in its doctrine of human nature or the creation of heaven and earth, while with popular Christianity the case is notoriously otherwise. Now what I say is, that it requires more brains to discriminate co-ordinate truth in apparently conflicting departments than to adopt and profess the violent negations involved in the hypotheses of scientific scepticism.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Your presumption amazes me!

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Perhaps it is something else than presumption.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Well, we need not argue it. Who next falls under your Pontifical censure?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: You need not be offensive. I am but in the exercise of a constitutional right.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Doubtless, but you bring such mighty airs to it.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I simply press cogent reasons.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Well, which of the respectable jurymen do you object to next?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I object to Mr. Critical.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Mr. Critical! you still more surprise me. He is the one man I should say above all others who is qualified to sit on a jury like this. I

shall certainly insist on Mr. Critical keeping his place. I appeal to his Lordship.

Sir N. Acceptor of Alltruth: My objection to Mr. Critical is a perfectly valid one. I contend that a man whose distinguishing intellectual characteristic is a propensity to criticize, is not qualified to act the part of a judge in a matter requiring a verdict in accordance with positive evidence. Mr. Criticism loves criticism for criticism's sake. He likes to indulge in it. It affords him pleasure, like a dog gnawing a bone or tearing a rag. He has no office in any other direction. When there is nothing to find fault with, he is listless and uninterested. He will find fault if he can, and if there is no fault to find, he snuffs and is silent. I say such a man is a dangerous man in the decision of a positive issue. You are, of course, aware that there is nothing under the sun which unfavourable criticism cannot make appear in a wrong light. There is no truth but what can be made to appear false in the hands of clever gentlemen of this sort. I object to his presence on the jury.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Then I insist on his presence. I say we want critical men to try professions of so extraordinary a character as those involved in this trial. If there had been more of the critical temper at the commencement of this matter, it would never have grown to the proportions it has. It is precisely because men are not critical that they are so easily gulled. I say a man is bound to refuse anything until it is proved: and it is precisely men of this stamp of Mr. Critical who do so.

Sir N. Acceptor of Alltruth: Unfortunately they do not see when a thing is proved. A man may be very critical and yet lacking in logical perception. He may have an eye to faults and flaws while incapable of taking in the general drift of a matter, and perfectly unconcerned to know its truth. Besides, I object to the proposition of my friend, that we are bound to refuse everything until it is proved. We have, as a matter of fact, to accept a good deal that is not proved. We accept most things on the strength of a general probability. If men did not do so, society could not be carried on for a day. Who, for ex-

ample, could be perfectly sure that the glass of water handed to him in his thirst is not poisoned? Who can be perfectly sure that the letter brought by a messenger is not a forgery? Who can be sure that the latest telegram is not a fabrication? Are we to refuse a cheque sent to us by post until it is proved? Are we to refuse to take a journey by the railway until we have examined the machinery of the locomotives and the axletrees of the carriages, and the rails and sleepers of the entire line? Are we to refuse our groceries, our milk, our vegetables, and every article of ordinary use till we have proved them genuine?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Now, now! my friend is going too far. He is carrying it to the point of absurdity. We shall never get the case commenced if we go on speechifying in this style.

Sir N. Acceptor of Alltruth: I am only showing the reasonableness of my objection to Mr. Critical. It may seem absurd, but I say it is what Mr. Critical's principle would come to if applied to common life. He would receive nothing but what he himself had authenticated. Many things are proved by a concurrence of considerations too broad and yet too subtle for his capacity. He may be sharp to see a point; but the point has to be very visible and very near his nose. His range of vision is narrow; his sight short. He can see a blade of grass, but not a landscape; and having to look so close, his blade of grass seems larger than it is, and a disproportion strikes where none exists. I say that Mr. Critical is totally unfit to sit in judgment on a matter involving so many wide and far-reaching facts as belong to the issue to be tried. I press my objection.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I must leave it to his Lordship. I do not see why Mr. Critical should be excluded from the jury. In my opinion he is a very respectable and capable gentleman. I have already said I consider him peculiarly qualified to sift a case of imposture—or at least a misrepresentation of facts—such as I believe this to be. Nothing would suit me better than to have the jury box packed with gentlemen of Mr. Critical's talent and temper.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I must ask his Lordship's decision.

His Lordship: I do not think the case will suffer from the absence of Mr. Critical. I do not say, with such a highly respectable body of gentlemen as have been summoned, that it could suffer from his presence. Still, there is some weight in the arguments advanced against him, and if Mr. Alltruth insists, I must allow his objection.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I hope we have got through the objections now.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Nearly. I must object to Mr. Eye-to-the-Ridiculous. He cannot be at home in a matter so peculiarly calling for gravity and solid thought. I should think he would be glad to be relieved from a duty that must be irksome to him.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I do not see why Mr. Eye-to-the-Ridiculous should go. True, he is a little fond of fun; but I suppose we all are at times. I presume Mr. Eye-to-the-Ridiculous can be sober enough when he likes. He looks grave enough to-day.

Mr. Eye-to-the-Ridiculous: That is so. I don't feel very jolly this morning. I had a writ last night—(laughter).

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I am sorry our friend has been so unlucky. It would be cruel to aggravate his misfortune by sending him out of Court with a stain on his character, as it were.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I have no desire to attach a stain to his character; but I must insist upon his unfitness to take part in this trial. He may be sober enough just now; but it is the mere demureness of personal trouble. It is the sobriety and mental habit which the present task calls for. His habit is to deal in the ridiculous. He delights in it. He has no relish for plain and serious matters. He only properly wakes up when there is a good joke. When he forgets his writ, his native propensity will assert itself; and he will not be in the box ten minutes before he sees something funny in the proceedings.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I should think that rather an advantage. We have a dreary enough case in

hand; and I should think my friend would be thankful to have it lit up with an occasional sparkle.

Sir Acceptorof Alltruth: There is a time for everything, as my friend very well knows. I submit that wit is entirely out of place in the consideration of the solemn issue we have to try to-day.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: When should you say wit was in place?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: This is not the time to enter upon abstract disquisitions.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: It is you that have raised the point.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Negatively, perhaps: I say this is not the time. If I were called upon to say when wit is in place, I should say that it is always out of place when acting as a naked faculty. It is a power or tendency of mind intended to act in combination with other faculties, to give cheerfulness and grace—to act as a sort of underglow in the mental composition. The faculties intended to lead are those of the intellect and moral nature. Wit in combination with these give light and beauty; acting by itself, it is like the oxygen of the atmosphere when set free as a separate element: it burns and destroys. It is intended, like oxygen, to be an element in combination with others. It is not fit to act alone. When it stands out and works by itself, it is an abnormal phenomenon.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Then all I can say is, there is a good deal that is abnormal amongst us.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Unhappily, that is the case. Wit is cultivated at the expense of wisdom. Society is a desolation in consequence.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I don't see much desolation. Wit has the opposite tendency. It spreads cheer and brightness and drives away gloom—or desolation, as you call it.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: By desolation, I do not mean gloomy feelings. I mean the absence of that sound sense and wisdom that takes pleasure in the great and serious laws of existence.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: That sounds rather desolate, I must say.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: It does to those whose minds have been desolated by wit.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I pray you, spare me, of your clemency.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I am much disposed to be merciful in all personal applications; but we must not cloak facts. Your remark illustrates what I submit to the Court in objection to Mr. Eye-to-the-Ridiculous, that where wit is in the ascendant, it occasions a mental indisposition to deal with and look at and weigh, as they ought to be weighed, the great and serious problems of life. There is a disrelish which amounts to aversion. Mr. Eye-to-the-Ridiculous is a constant reader of *Punch* and other forms of comic literature. What is the result? His native tendency becomes more and more developed until he can scarcely speak in a rational way about anything. He strains after smart and witty ways of speech. There is none of the quietness of wisdom that gives comfort to all around. He has an entire aversion to sensible things. His mind is, in fact, out of balance. His habit settles down into a kind of chronic foolery in whose company wisdom seems to fly away. How is such a man capable of judging the momentous matters we have to discuss to-day?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: We do not ask him to judge. We merely ask him to join in a verdict as to facts. Surely any man can form an opinion as to facts.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: It depends upon the nature of the man and the nature of the facts. It is written in our books, "Wisdom is too high for a fool." You may object to the Authority, but you cannot object to a maxim so trite and self-evident. The matters we have to investigate are of a nature and in a position requiring a grave attention and a logical insight; and it is not in the nature of a mind desolated by the continual combustion of folly, to give the one, or exercise the other.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Combustion of folly!

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I cannot claim originality for the saying. It is Solomon who likens "the laughter of fools" to "the crackling of thorns under a pot."

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: With all respect to Solomon, I do not admire his simile. What he calls the laughter of fools, is well enough in its place. It is only a variety of Nature's activity.

Sir Acceptorof Alltruth: Granted: so is fire: so is cholera. You would not tolerate one or other in your house, although forms of Nature's activity.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: There is no comparison.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: The things differ, but the principle is the same. A punster's wit is a form of Nature's activity out of its place. It has no business shooting and flaming on its own account. It works desolation among other faculties. Its place is in their helpful combination.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Well, we may carry this on all day. I do not see that you have made out a case against Mr. Eye-to-the-Ridiculous. Still, we shall have enough without him. Let us get on.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: You can have no wish to retain Mr. Avarice and Mr. Prejudice?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Why should I let them go? Mr. Avarice is a respectable man; and as for Mr. Prejudice, although he has a bad name, I am inclined to think it is founded on a misconception.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Whatever may be the general opinion of one or the other, I submit they are clearly out of place on a jury empanelled to try this case. It is well known that Mr. Avarice is inaccessible to any sentiment or consideration that interferes with getting or saving; and he cannot be expected to deal impartially with the claims of a case which forbids those who identify themselves with it, to labour to be rich, or to lay up treasure.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I consider habits of prudence and thrift a credit to any man; and I would sooner trust the verdict of a man given to such habits, even if he carried them to an extreme, than of a man of loose and improvident ways.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Do not suppose I advocate improvidence. The precepts of Christ enjoin diligence

and wisdom in all practical ways—so much so that they forbid the feeding of a man who is idle. But there is a difference between providence and hoarding. The law of Christ forbids hoarding. It is notorious that Mr. Avarice is a hoarder; and therefore I say it is not to be expected that he could feel kindly or deal fairly with a system that goes against his dearest practice.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Do you say he is dishonest?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Not exactly; not in the common sense of the term.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: If you do not say he is dishonest, I do not see why you should object to him.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: While I do not say he is dishonest in the ordinary sense—(that is, I do not say he would steal your purse, or tell a down-right lie), still, in another sense, I would not be so sure. A man may be dishonest without knowing it. That is, his mental inclinations may work so powerfully in a given direction, that he is incapable of seeing in an opposite direction. He cannot turn his mind round, so to speak. He thinks he is honest, because he speaks according to his feelings; yet, actually, he is in reality dishonest, because his feelings prevent him from giving in to the claims of truth. He is a little conscious of the fact, but not distinctly so. It is what I understand by a man being blinded by his interest. The Scriptures speak of it as being blinded by the god of this world. Mr. Avarice's is distinctly a case of this sort. His habits are all in one direction, and the cause we are to try just looks in the other direction.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: You give us quite a lecture or moral philosophy. I wish we could have a little more common sense.

Sir Acceptorof Alltruth: I fancy I am not dealing in much else than common sense.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Oh, of course; the common sense is all on your side.

Sir Acceptorof Alltruth: Many a truth spoken in jest.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Now, be merciful. What have you to say to Mr. Prejudice?

Sir Acceptorof Alltruth: I say Mr. Prejudice is not a thinker but a feeler; and we want thinkers to try this case.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I should have thought Mr. Prejudice was a pretty strong thinker.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Well, in a certain way, perhaps. He has strong thoughts—or rather let me say, strong mental impressions, in his head; but they are not the result of the process of thinking; they are not the effect of the exercise of reason; they are not mental perceptions; they are, as I have said,—impressions:—they are ideas and opinions formed under the bias of the powerful feelings that control him. Now, ideas of this sort are fixed; they cannot be altered by argument or by evidence; you might as well try alter the colour of a man's hair.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: There are hair dyes.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Yes; but unfortunately there are no dyes for a man's thoughts.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: The colour of our thoughts is altered by facts.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Yes, where there is the capacity to be susceptible to their effect.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Do you mean that Mr. Prejudice lacks this susceptibility?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: That is just what I do mean.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: You must be mistaken there. Do you mean to say that if this building were to go on fire, Mr. Prejudice would not have the colour of his thoughts altered and disappear though the door as quickly as the rest of us?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: To palpable facts of that character, no doubt Mr. Prejudice is quite accessible. My argument relates to higher facts—facts which do not force themselves on the attention like a fire—but which require some mental keenness to discern them, and some courage to own to the discernment. We are about to try a matter which runs counter to all Mr. Prejudice's convictions; and the evidence to be submitted is not of a character, with a mind like his, to overpower convictions.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: You mean you have a weak case?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Far from it. The case for the defence is the strongest I have ever had to do with; but it will not carry conviction with the unconvincible. I say Mr. Prejudice belongs to the unconvincible class as regards the higher action of the logical faculties. His strong feelings unfit him for a place on the jury.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: If strong feelings is to be made a ground of unfitness, I am afraid very few of us would be considered fit. Why your own clients show the strongest feelings ever exhibited in the history of mankind. I don't know anyone so controlled by strong feeling as your genuine believer in Christ.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: You misapprehend me. I do not object to strong feeling *per se*. If Mr. Prejudice has strong judgment as well as strong feelings, I should not have a word to say against him; but strong feeling disjoined from sound judgment is not to be trusted in the determination of matters involving the weighing of evidence. It is like a high steam pressure in a poor machine. Give us a right machine, and you may have as much steam as you like: the more the better. Feeling is a noble element in human character when allied with controlling judgment. In fact it is indispensable to true efficiency of character. All the noble and efficient men of history have been men of strong impulses regulated by powerful minds.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I did not expect a lecture on metaphysics.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I am answering your arguments.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Very well; let Mr. Prejudice go. I hope you are now ready to go on with the case. We have had enough of objection surely.

Sir Acceptorof Alltruth: I object to Mr. Toady-to-the-rich.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Do let us know where we are. It seems to me you will object to the whole of the jury before you are done. I must really appeal to his Lordship. Give me a list of your further objections.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I have only two more

names, besides Mr. Toady-to-the-rich—Mr. Shilly-shally and Mr. Sheer Stupidity. This will exhaust my objections. We ought not to be long over these. You cannot wish to retain Mr. Sheer Stupidity, for example.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I don't know that. He is an honest man. He is stupid; but perhaps there is an advantage in that it will be a protection to him against your refined hair-splittings. What we want is a common-sense verdict upon plain facts; and I should think Mr. Sheer Stupidity would be quite equal to that.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: It strikes me you misapprehend the nature of the investigation upon which we shall be engaged. I have already contended in the case of Mr. Shallow-brains that it requires more discernment to be a believer than an unbeliever. I will not go over the ground again. Unbelief is natural to ignorance, and ignorance is natural to us all at the start. In the circumstances of the present century, it is more difficult to believe than to deny. It takes a higher exercise of mind. Stupidity will naturally be on the side of unbelief.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I am surprised at your argument. You are notoriously in opposition to facts. Stupidity is always on the side of the priests. Go into any agricultural village, and where do you find the open-mouthed gullibles? Is it not among the stupid? If there is a bit of smartness in the place, you always find it on the side of those who are known among the villagers as "infidels." For once, Mr. Alltruth has made a mistake. Mr. Sheer Stupidity is clearly a friend of his. I am astonished he would object to him. In fact, on reconsideration, he ought to withdraw his objection.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I do not withdraw my objection. I admit the apparent force of your observations: but they do not touch my argument. I admit that where popular theology is in the ascendant, as in a parson-ruled country-side, it is natural to find the stupid with the clergyman. But you do not find the stupid called upon to settle controversies that may arise in the parish. In times of controversy, the stupid stand by incapable, even in small matters: they are of no use. How much less are

they fit to decide upon the great issue involved in the present action.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: You give up your argument about stupidity naturally inclining to unbelief?

Sir Acceptorof Alltruth: By no means. I still contend that stupidity is naturally unbelieving because naturally ignorant. I say that the belief you attribute to them is a mere conventional conformity which the same class would exhibit in any country in connection with any faith.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: What you call conventional conformity, I call the inevitable credulity of ignorance.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I admit ignorance is credulous in relation to that which is established and pressed upon the attention by circumstances of prosperity; but I must deny that this is the tendency of stupidity towards that which is obscure, difficult and opposed.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I insist upon Mr. Sheer Stupidity.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I need not say more. I leave it to his Lordship.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: We will take his Lordship's decision.

His Lordship: I should have preferred if you could have agreed. Mr. Sheer Stupidity does not appear to me particularly qualified to assist either side. On the other hand, I do not know that he will much impede the case anyway. As the world is constituted, there must always be a certain amount of sheer stupidity brought to bear in the discussion of all public questions. Mr. Sheer Stupidity seems an honest well-meaning sort of man. I do not see, on the whole, that we shall gain anything by objecting to him.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: We have not yet disposed of Mr. Toady-to-the-Rich and Mr. Shilly-shally. My objection to Mr. Toady-to-the-Rich is somewhat the same as I have urged in one or two other cases. His bias is on the side of the plaintiff, with whom it is his habit to curry favour. A man of his character has not much capacity of discernment at any time; but what discernment he has

is completely neutralized in a case like this by the strong body of wealth and respectability that has always been arrayed against the claims of Jesus of Nazareth. His propensity to be on their side disqualifies him for an impartial consideration of the evidence.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I have no particular admiration for Mr. Toady-to-the-Rich. Still, if it were not that we had already consumed so much time with the discussion of objections to the jury, I should have something to say on his behalf.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: You give him up?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I do not insist upon him to-day.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Nor Mr. Shilly-shally?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Mr. Shilly-shally is a very harmless sort of person.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: We want a verdict with a backbone.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I hope we shall have it—on our side, of course.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Then you had better let Mr. Shilly-shally go. He is not a man that can make up his mind robustly one way or other.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I do not dislike him for all that. I call him pleasant company. He takes care not to hurt anybody's feelings.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: That would be my objection. Somebody's feelings must be hurt in the decision of this case; and we want those who are prepared with fortitude to go wherever the truth leads, whatever sacrifice of feeling may be involved.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Let him go.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Now we are through, so far as I am concerned.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: High time, too. There are several gentlemen on the jury that I ought really to object to; but we have already consumed so much time that I feel inclined to give way. I should have objected to Mr. Christ-admirer, Mr. Fearer-of-God, Mr. Enthusiastic-in-good, Mr. Believer-in-Christ, Mr. Paul-brother,

and some others. I should have contended that they could scarcely be considered impartial. However, I am not so uncharitable as my friend. I believe, on the whole, they are honest men, and will give a verdict according to the evidence.

Sir N. Acceptor of Alltruth: I am glad you do not press your objections. I should certainly have contended for the entire fitness of all these gentlemen to be on the jury. They are each of them characterized by clearness of mental vision, and sound probity of character. The very predilections they may have are the result of evidence operating in their minds.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: You need not dilate upon their superiority. I am going to be magnanimous and withhold the objections which I had thought of urging. I have nothing to say against the gentlemen personally. In fact, I believe they are highly respectable gentlemen; but I think it would have been better taste not to have summoned them.

Sir N. Acceptor of Alltruth: I take leave to differ with you there. However, we need not argue the point.

His Lordship: I understand you now agree upon the constitution of the Jury.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Yes, my Lord.

His Lordship: I hope you will equally agree with their verdict.

Sir N. Acceptor of Alltruth: I for one will agree with their verdict, if it be a right one.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Oh, just so; a verdict for your clients would be a right one, of course. My friend is always so very charitable.

Sir N. Acceptor of Alltruth: It would be hypocrisy in me to pretend that a verdict for the plaintiffs could be a right one.

* * *

The Jury were then empanelled in the usual way, and the Court adjourned for lunch.

SECOND SITTING

On the re-assembling of the Court, the Clerk of the Court read the information filed against the defendants on behalf of the Incorporated Scientific Era Protection Society. It set forth that

The Defendants

PAUL CHRISTMAN	AQUILA FEARLESS
CEPHAS WARMHEART	LUKE PHYSICUS
TITUS WORKFELLOW	MARY ATTENTIVE
TIMOTHY FAITHSON	AMPLIAS AGAPEE
JOHN WORDOFLIFE	URBANE HELPFUL
JAMES FAITH-WITH-WORKS	JUDE EARNEST-CONTENTION
BARNABAS CONSOLATION	HEBER HOLDFAST-TO-HOPE
GAIUS HOSPITABLE	JOSEPH ARIMATHEA
PERSIS MUCHLABOUR	BENJAMIN ASSURANCE, AND
PHOEBE SUCCOURER	EMMANUEL AMEN

were ringleaders of a sect or party believing in the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, crucified by Pontius Pilate; that they were active preachers of the doctrine that this Jesus was now alive, and was coming again to the earth, and had authority from God to judge mankind at his coming in accordance with the commandments he delivered while on earth; that the said doctrines were operating hurtfully among the people; and if the activity of the defendants were not restrained by law, great harm would ultimately accrue to the community.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief, D.C.: May it please your Lordship and Gentlemen of the Jury: I have the honour to appear in this case on behalf of The Incorporated

Scientific Era Society, to ask the Court to issue an injunction against a number of persons, whom we describe as Paul Christman and others, restraining them from certain proceedings which we contend are hurtful not only to themselves, but to society in general, of which the Scientific Era Society have become the special guardians. It will not be necessary for me to detain the Court very long in stating our case, as the facts will mainly be admitted by the defendants. The case will mainly turn on the admissibility or otherwise of the defendants' plea in justification. They allege certain things to be facts which we contend are the idle illusions of a heated brain. The leading features of the case are notorious to all the world. The defendants are decent enough people in themselves. I have nothing to say against their characters except in so far as they are narrowed and embittered by the doctrines they have espoused with such zeal. They are well-meaning enough. What we complain of is, their incessant efforts to propagate a doctrine which logically, carried out, would stop the entire machinery of human life as now conducted.

That doctrine, as the Court is aware, relates to one, Jesus Christ, whose name has obtained much celebrity in the world. As with the defendants, his followers, so with Christ himself: I have nothing to say against him in a moral sense. He was an exemplary character who flourished for a short time in the reign of Tiberius Cæsar, when the Roman Empire was in its highest glory. If he had confined himself to those excellent maxims which are associated with his name, there would have been no need for us to appear here to-day. But, unfortunately, along with perhaps the noblest conceptions of morality that have ever been published to the world, there was blended certain fanatical convictions of a personal character, which have done more than anything else to estrange man from man, and to infuse bitterness into the relations of mankind everywhere. Besides teaching the purest ethics, Jesus Christ gave himself out to be of higher origin than ordinary men. He put himself forward as a man having a personal mission with regard to futurity. He taught

the doctrine of a personal God in its intensest form, and he gave himself out as the son of God. He taught his disciples that he had come down from heaven in some mystical sense; that he had come in some way to give life to the world; that the sacrifice of his life was necessary to the accomplishment of this mission; that after his death he would rise again, and depart to heaven from whence he had come, and that he would return again to the earth at some long future time; and that when he should so come, he would raise and glorify the bodies of his deceased friends, and erect, in conjunction with them, a government which would incorporate all other governments within itself, and rule all mankind in some beatific manner that would introduce an age of glory. We must, of course, admit that this Utopian programme has something magnificent in it, and reflects the benevolence and mental splendour of its illustrious author of Nazareth. As a poetic conception, we cannot but admire it; but as practical men, we are here to-day to look at the practical bearing of things, and what I have to submit to the Court is that this fine conception, while magnificent enough as an abstraction for an ideal mind to contemplate in private, becomes a positive public evil when it is promulgated as a matter of practical truth, and preached as an affair for the regulation of private conduct. I must ask your Lordship to look at the working of the thing. I am prepared with evidence on this point. I shall call witnesses who will tell you how entirely the reception of this doctrine has changed good and useful men into morose fanatics, and have drawn them aside from that friendly commerce with their kind which constitutes the basis of the social compact in all directions.

His Lordship: I do not see, on the first blush of the thing, why it should have any such effects.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: It is in this way, your Lordship. The founder of Christianity has offered to those who believe in his personal pretensions a personal share in his beatification when, as he has said, he should return. He offered to give them an immortal nature, as I understand it, and a position of authority in the king-

dom which he said he would establish at his return. This, of course, is a powerful motive where such a fantasy is earnestly entertained; and here is where it operates injuriously: the founder of Christianity required of all who should receive his doctrine that they should consider themselves a separate caste among mankind. He said he did not belong to the world himself, and that his followers equally were to consider themselves not of this world. In a celebrated prayer of his, he did not exactly pray that they might be taken out of the world (though I think that would have been a consistent prayer). He prayed that they might be kept separate from it, or something of the sort. The men who became his apostles caught up the same doctrine and taught it in a very decided manner. Peter was the foremost of them, I understand, and he told his fellow-believers that they were strangers and pilgrims, and that they were to pass their time among other men, not in the sociality and joviality which in reasonable measure is the charm of life, but "with fear." Paul, another of them, recommends sobriety and gravity, and nonconformity and peculiarity, and tells them they have no continuing city, but seek for one to come. I am not exactly quoting, but I give you the substance of their words. We have to be thankful that the better sense of the vast majority of professed believers neutralizes the effect of such teaching, otherwise there would be no such thing as living in Christendom. Unfortunately, however, there are cases of a different sort—cases in which every friendly sentiment towards mankind is extinguished, and a harsh and sterile fanaticism established in its place, amounting to hatred of their kind. This is the case with the defendants. It is no uncharity, but a simple conformity with truth, to describe them as man-haters. I am aware that this is no new charge. It was brought against the Christians, I believe, in the days of Nero, and other early Roman reigns. Of course it was resented on their behalf, but, I believe, unjustly so. It seems to me the logical result of their principles. If they look upon you, my Lord, and myself, and men in general, as so much rubbish at the bottom apart from their special craze, it

seems to me to be an inevitable result—they should hate us. They may disclaim such a result at the outstart, but sooner or later, such principles must lead to such a result. Nay, their master, with all his excellence, inculcates it. He tells his disciples that they cannot serve two masters,—meaning himself and the world,—that if they hold to the one they must hate the other; and as above all things he tells them to hold to him, it follows that it was agreeable to him that they should hate the world. In fact, one of the apostles plainly says that if a man is a friend of the world, he is the enemy of God, and that friendship with the world is hatred with God, and *vice versa*, or something to that effect.

His Lordship: Is it not the principles of the two systems that are in question in those cases?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I think not, my Lord. The cases I have to submit to your Lordship are cases in which the men embracing the doctrines of the defendants have not only given up the principles of the world, but have given up the world itself.

His Lordship: Do you mean they have retired to monasteries?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: No, my Lord, they have not given up the world in that sense: but they might as well have done so. They have ceased their connection with the world in a variety of ways. They used to take prominent part in public affairs; now they are never to be seen at public meetings of any kind. They used to be useful men at election times—nobody more useful. They would be met in the committee rooms, or in the streets hunting up voters, and doing all that in them lay to secure the return of the candidate who in their enlightened judgment was most calculated to benefit the country by his services. Now, they simply stay away and leave all the hard work to those whom they vulgarly style "the Gentiles." They used to be seen at entertainments of all sorts with their fellow-men—those many innocent recreations by which the overwrought and jaded minds of men in various ways are relaxed and re-invigorated. Now they make it a virtue to refrain. You never see them on

the race-course; you never meet them at the club meeting; you never see them at the lodge; you cannot get them to the social glass; they are scarcely to be met with even at concerts; and as for the theatre—an institution, my Lord, which I need not observe, has done more than anything in our day to teach virtue by example—you might as well expect to meet them at the bottom of the Atlantic as expect to meet them there. This is not all, my Lord. Their abstention from the duties of social life is more complete—more astounding I was about to say—than will be inferred from these facts. They actually go so far as to refuse to vote, or to serve as special constables. They even refuse to join their fellow-townsmen in the commonest civic duties; and it is with them a settled principle that even in the case of the invasion of her Majesty's* dominions, they would refuse to take up arms. They are, in fact, in as complete isolation in the community, as it is possible for a man to be, without absolutely retiring to the desert.

Now, my Lord, and Gentlemen of the Jury, I cannot think it necessary that I should point out to you at any length, how completely inconsistent such an attitude is with the commonest duties of life. You are well aware that society is one vast co-operative society, and that if any section of the community refuse to do their part, there must come a paralysis of the machinery of life. Where would all our advances in political improvement have been,—where all our social development,—where our scientific progress,—where, in a word, all the advantages and enlightenment for which our age is celebrated,—if the principles of the defendants were to obtain a footing? I need not say that we should have stagnation; and worse than stagnation; we should have disorganization and chaos and ruin; every form of public good would be neglected; every reform postponed; every grievance unredressed. The lower and the baser elements of society would obtain the upper hand; order and civilization must needs come to an end, for I omitted to remind your Lordship that it is

*The original edition was published in 1882 and this reference was to Queen Victoria.—*Publisher.*

a principle of these misguided people not to use coercive measures of any kind, either with regard to their own people or strangers. They act implicitly on the advice given by their founder. They resist not evil; they regard it as their duty when one cheek is smitten to turn the other also: it is a maxim with them not to go to law. If all were to accept their principles, we should have no police, no law courts, no military establishment. Nay, my Lord, we should not even have the useful civilizing institution of a State Church, which, much as I disagree with it in some things, I venerate, as a bulwark of our liberties, and humanizer of the harshness that more or less characterize all men in their primitive state. The whole fabric of society would crumble to ruins under the action of such principles as the defendants are propagating; life would be robbed of its grace and its charms; and civilization would be helplessly exposed to the assaults of the lawlessness that lurks more or less at the basis of all society in all countries.

I contend that we are justified, in our capacity of guardians of the interests of this Scientific Era, in seeking the aid of the law to stop this mischief. We do not ask the defendants to give up their views; we ask the Court to direct and enjoin them to desist from all further endeavours to impose their views upon others. This we have a right to ask in the interests of society. The mischief will die of itself if it is once isolated like the small-pox, or boycotted like an Irish landlord, my Lord—an allusion, you will allow, peculiarly suitable to the crisis that has been harassing the Government for some time past. The present believers of the doctrine we oppose will, of course, soon die out; and if they are prohibited from extending their views, it is very certain that no one will take them up of their own accord, and thus the movement will be effectually checkmated.

His Lordship: I understand you to contend that the defendants are not justified in holding the doctrines they advocate?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Yes, my Lord; we do not propose to ask the Court to forbid them holding the doctrines, but to restrain them from propagating them.

His Lordship: But what you say is that the founder of the Christians had no authority to enjoin these commandments which you object to, upon those who might believe in him?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: We admit the founder of Christianity was a great moral reformer, but we do not admit that he had any authority to make his principles binding.

His Lordship: You say he was an impostor?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: We do not like to put it in that way exactly. He was not an impostor in the vulgar sense. We think he was a self-deceived enthusiast.

His Lordship: You think he did no miracles?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: We have no doubt he performed some wonderful cures which created a public impression and led to the idea of miracles; but we do not believe that he performed real miracles.

His Lordship: You say he did not rise from the dead?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: We do not believe he rose from the dead.

His Lordship: If it could be proved he rose from the dead, would it alter your estimate of the proceedings of the defendants?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: We should, of course, have a new problem to consider; but I apprehend, my Lord, that such a hypothesis can never arise.

His Lordship: I merely wish to see the nature of the issue before me. You ask that these defendants may be restrained from propagating a certain doctrine on the ground that the doctrine is hurtful in its effects on society. I do not at present say whether it is hurtful or not. I place before you the hypothesis of the doctrine being true to elicit your views as to how your proceeding will be affected in that case.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I confess, my Lord, I have not considered the case in that light. I assume that such a view of the case is out of the question.

His Lordship: I do not see that we can leave it out of the question. It is possible the defence may proceed on that line.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: Yes, my Lord; that will be our defence. I will contend not only that our doctrines are not hurtful to society, but that they are true, and that as the authority of Christ overrides all human law, the defendants have no alternative but to pursue the course from which the plaintiffs would restrain them.

His Lordship: The question, then, is really, whether there is evidence of Christ having risen?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: That, I apprehend, will be the issue.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Such a narrowing of the issue will tie the hands of the plaintiffs considerably. We take it for granted that the resurrection of Christ is out of the question, and that the only issue to go before the Jury is whether or not, the proceedings of the defendants are calculated to inflict harm on the community.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I apprehend my friend is mistaken in his mode of viewing the case. It will doubtless be competent for him, if he can, to show that our proceedings are hurtful to society; but he cannot leave out of the purview of the case the far more material question whether we are justified in our proceedings by a higher consideration than even the welfare of society, so considered.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I say that all other considerations, higher or otherwise, are outside the province and competence of the Court. The Court has no power to go outside the question of society's welfare.

His Lordship: But surely the resurrection or non-resurrection of Christ is a question affecting the welfare of society; suppose his resurrection is a fact, will it not follow that what Mr. Partialfact Unbelief styled the "utopian programme" associated with Christ's doctrine, may be realized? Will not, in that case, the welfare of society be promoted in the highest degree, and would not the restraining of the defendants be an interference to some extent with the realization of that welfare?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I confess, my Lord, I had not looked at the matter in that light.

His Lordship: Would it not be well to take it into your consideration, and conduct your case with a view to it?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I can of course adopt that course since your Lordship thinks it advisable; but I had not come to-day to do more than to show cause for the injunction, in the hurtful nature of the defendants' proceedings.

His Lordship: You can proceed with that part of the case, and by to-morrow, you may be ready to follow the defendants in the plea they may set up on the other.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Very well, my Lord. I call my first witness.

P. C. STEEPLE, 666.

Examined by Mr. Dontwanto Believeanyhow: Steeple, you are a member of the Police Force, I believe?—Yes; the most respectable part of it.

You mean the international police?—Not exactly the international police, but the all-nation police—everywhere.

That is how you describe it, is it?—That is how as it is; we are everywhere to keep the peace. You may see us on hills and valleys, town and country, all through the world.

Well, never mind; only answer the questions.—That is all very well, if you ask the right questions. Our force requires to be treated with respect.

I will see to that; just you give your evidence in a proper manner.—I always do. I belong to the Steeple police as has kept the world in wonderful good order for a long time. My number is 666. It is considered a bad number by such folks as them there defendants as you have got in the box; but in my opinion it is the respectablest number that ever came out of my old grandmother's arithmetic book. It is a neat, square, even, level, equal number. It frightens the folk on my beat, I can tell you.

Mr. Dontwanto Believeanyhow: I am afraid the witness is under the influence of liquor.

Sir N. Acceptor of Alltruth: No doubt he is. He is famed for his fondness for the wine of the Old Mother's cup.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: What do you mean?

Mr. British Protoplasm: Our friend is Apocalyptic in

his allusions. I am afraid it will not throw much light on the subject.

Mr. Dontwanto Believeanyhow: Now, witness, you must give your evidence in a proper manner. You must leave your drink for the moment and let us have the facts.—Facts! I will let you know some facts. You don't want facts; I don't deal in anything but facts, real celestial facts, by the Blessed Peter. You talk of drink: I am as sober as a judge, begging your pardon. I haven't had anything to-day, especially since morning. Of course I had a drop from the landlady of the Keys and Sceptre, but it wouldn't hurt a three-and-a-half-year old. Everybody has a drop o' that every day everywhere. Them defendants says as how the world is drunk with it: its just as true as I'm drunk. I tell you I will give you the facts. You ought to lock up those scoundrels. You'll never have peace till you does. They're always a-blazing about and setting folk by the ears.

His Lordship: Is it worth while going on with this witness?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I doubt it, my Lord: we can dispense with him. I called him to prove his acquaintance with the defendants and the nature of their proceedings. I can get it from another witness.

Mr. Dontwanto Believeanyhow: Witness, you may step down.

Witness: How's that? You haven't done with me, have you? I could tell you such a lot about them fellows.

Mr. Dontwanto Believeanyhow: We don't want it to-day.

Witness: Oh, another day? Very well; good morning, gentlemen, and be sure and stop them fellows or we'll never have a bit o' peace.

The Clerk: Who do you call next?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Mr. Town Gossip.

MR. TOWN GOSSIP.

Examined by Mr. Dontwanto Believeanyhow: Mr. Gossip, I believe you are a retired tradesman?—Yes, sir.

Living in the town of Babelton?—Yes, sir.

I believe, when you were in business, you followed the trade or occupation of——?—Well, sir, general dealer, sir; nothing came amiss, sir.

But your principal occupation was—hair-dressing, I believe?—Yes, sir; I did a bit of hair-dressing, and a bit of most things, sir. I had what is called a general shop. I kept baths and sold papers and general fancy articles. Then I opened the shop next door as a general outfitting place, and the place next door the other way as a refreshment bar and a high-class confectionery. I used to get up parties, and do a little bit of undertaking, sir, as it came in my way.

You were rather an enterprising man?—Well, yes, sir. I tried to do my best.

And as a matter of fact you were a successful man as well as an enterprising man?—Well, sir, I did fairly well. I have nothing to complain of.

I believe you were a member of the board of Guardians and held a seat on the Town Council?—I believe so, sir.

Did your position in the town bring you into contact with all classes of people?—Yes, sir; I have seen a good many people in my time.

Were you, as a matter of fact, acquainted with most people in the town?—Well, yes sir; I think I knew something about most of them.

Did you know the defendants?—I knew some of them, sir; I cannot say as I knew all.

Which of them did you know?—Well, sir, I may say I knew most of them in a general way, but I did not know them particular, like. I knowed most of their fathers. My boys went to school with some of them.

That must be a long time ago?—Yes, sir; it is a goodish while.

Well, what do you know about them?—They are very decent sort of people.

Decent sort of people?—Yes; I've knowed worse people than them, a deal.

Are they the sort of people that suit you exactly in all ways, then?—Well, I don't know about that.

Well, come, let us know about it. We want to know what you think?—I don't think much wrong of them.

Did they used to come to your refreshment bar?—Oh, yes; at one time they used to come reg'lar.

Did they give up coming, then?—Yes, they gave up coming at last.

Were you well pleased they gave up coming?—Well, of course, it would ha' been better for me if they'd a kep' on.

That is what I want you to come to.—Oh.

Why did they give up coming?—Well, I suppose they took some notions in their head.

That is what I want you to tell us about, man.—Oh, I see. Something or other spoilt them. They took to meetin' and preachin' and them sort o' things. It was said in the town they went crazy.

Do you know why it was said in the town they went crazy?—Well, they changed their ways so.

Tell us how they changed their ways.—Well, there's Paul Christman—the head of the lot; he used to be a reg'lar go-ahead in everything. When there was anything going on, you didn't catch him indoors, I tell you. He was first man runnin' and boatin' and cricketin'. In fair time, he was up to all the jinks out; he'd bet with the biggest at the races. At election times there was no holdin' of him. He went reg'lar wild with a lot of fellows, shouting "for ever" on the streets and getting people to vote. I have heard him make a speech or two at such times.

Yes, anything else?—Well, he was a reg'lar jolly good fellow; everybody liked him.

And doesn't everybody like him now?—Not so much as they used to.

How's that?—Well, I suppose he isn't exactly as he used to be.

How is he now?—He's quiet, like, and has taken to different ways. He doesn't go out among the folks as he used to. He stops at home a good deal and reads, and when he goes out, it is to have a quiet walk or to go to see somebody that's unwell or poor, or perhaps to a meeting, or to distribute tracts, or something of that sort. He's

not sociable as he used to be. I believe they say it's softening of the brain that is the matter.

What do you think is the matter?—Nay, I cannot tell. I don't believe, to tell the truth, that softening of the brain has anything to do with it. I believe it's them notions.

What notions?—Well, about Christ. I believe he thinks Christ is coming and that the world is going to end, or something of that sort.

You don't let such notions trouble you, Mr. Gossip?—No; I believe it's best to leave such things alone, and do the best you can for yourself and your neighbour. I don't see the good of being so very unsociable.

Well, now, that is about Paul Christman; can you tell us about any of the others?—Well, there is Joseph Arimatea. I used to know a good deal about him.

What did you know about him?—He was what I should call a real gentleman. He is a handsome fellow, as you can see. His father was a handsome fellow before him. He was one of our magistrates, and at one time was mayor of the town. I can remember him very well. The family property, I am sorry to say, has changed hands since then. The family lived in the outskirts, and moved among the very highest folks.

Come to Joseph himself.—Joseph was a very nice young man, but fond of hunting and gaiety—not that he took too much, or anything of that sort, but he was always in company and liked it, and the company liked him I do believe—he was so very lively and smart every way—a good story teller and could make a capital joke. Everybody knew him in town. Everybody was his friend, and he was the friend of everybody. He had no particular taste for books: still, he went to church occasionally.

Well, what has happened to him?—Well, there's nothing particular happened, barrin' these notions.

What have the notions done for him?—They've changed him considerably. He's not the lively joking fellow he used to be. He is much more serious—too serious by half. He does not go into company as he used to do. He works a deal with Paul Christman. I cannot make out exactly what is between them, but they stick very close together.

Do you know anything else about him?—I don't know as there is anything else particular. He sold his horses and took to spending a lot of money in books and meetin's and poor people and such like.

Is he as useful a man in the town as he used to be?—Well, I cannot say as how he was ever particularly useful, but certainly he is not so much about town as he used to be. His friends cannot get him to be with them as he used to. He has taken to another lot of people altogether, which it is a wonder he could mix with such people—people far below him every way. I cannot see what he gets doin' with such people for. It's a surprise in the town altogether, but folks has got accustomed to it.

You think the notions have not agreed with him?—I should say the notions have spoiled him, quite.

Can you tell us anything about the others?—There's Luke Physicus; he was a very promising rising man. He was none of your harem-scarems, but a real steady, respectable young man, going in for the medical profession.

Well, what about him?—His friends say these notions have been his ruin. He might have been riding in his carriage by now. He is a young man of great talent. He might have been at the head of his profession, but he has completely lost his way. These notions have fair spoiled him. Instead of attending to his business, he has taken to going about preaching and writing—always about this craze they have got.

Can you tell me about the others?—I don't know very much about the others. Other witnesses know more about them. I only know this, that all of them are what I call good people spoiled—completely spoiled—a thousand pities. There wasn't a finer set of people anywhere before this come to them: and they are fine people now, in a way—only they're not hearty to folks as they used to be

Cross-examined by Mr. Hopefora Reason: You say the defendants are good people spoiled?—Yes, sir.

Have they become bad?—Not exactly that, sir: they're not sociable like.

Do you mean they are unsociable among themselves?—

Oh, I don't know about that, sir. They say they are very chummish among themselves.

You mean they are not sociable among the folks they used to be sociable with?—Aye, that's about it.

What sort of people did they used to be sociable with?—Oh, all sorts.

Drinkers?—Well, not people as got drunk, exactly. They'd have a sup with anybody in a friendly way.

People that smoked and sang?—Well, yes.

And went to theatres?—Yes: I don't see as there's any harm in going to the theatre, so as it's a well-conducted place—respectable, like—none of your low places.

Did they used to be friendly with sporting fellows?—Not sporting fellows particular: all sorts, like—respectable people—all sorts. In fact, they were free and pleasant people that did as other folks did, and went everywhere and anywhere in a free and friendly way.

In fact, they were on good terms with the world in general?—Yes, they were nice worldly people themselves and did not much mind who they took to.

And now you say it is different with them?—Yes, sadly different. They are quite mopish. They don't seem to have any heart for things.

Do you know what has changed them so?—Their notions, I suppose.

Do you know what their notions are?—Not exactly; something about Jesus Christ.

Do you know about Jesus Christ?—Not much I am afraid. I hear about him in church sometimes.

Have you ever taken the trouble to ascertain what those notions about Christ are which have taken such powerful possession of these good people?—No; I leave these things to the parsons.

Don't you know they expect great good from Christ by and bye?—I suppose they do in some way or other.

Don't you know that they think Christ is now living?—I suppose they do.

And that he is coming to earth again to put everything right?—I suppose so.

Don't you know that they expect him to make them

strong immortal happy men when he comes?—I have heard strange things like that.

Do you think it is true?—Ah! I don't know. Such things are above me.

If it is true, wouldn't it make you think better of the change that has come over these old friends of yours?—I don't see that they need mope about and make themselves unsociable.

But suppose Christ requires his friends not to make friends with the world and to be sober, steady, and grave?—I should think Christ would never want us to be unsociable.

Do you know what Christ has required?—I don't know very much about it, I must confess.

Very well; we'll leave that. Do you think the defendants have been spoiled in any other way?—I don't know as they have, particular.

Are they worse men in any way?—No: they bear very good characters, as regards honesty and such like.

Aren't they kind men?—They're not very sociable.

Aye, but wouldn't they do a good turn if you were in want, or anything of that sort?—Oh, I daresay they're very well for that.

Are they disorderly at all?—No: the very opposite—a little too orderly, I should say.

Have they always been as kind and orderly as they are now?—I cannot say that they have. They used to be up to a bit of a spree sometimes.

Should you trust them pretty well?—Yes; I should trust them—as regards money, you mean?

Well, yes: or truthfulness?—I believe they are very honest men.

Were they quite as steady and trustworthy in the former days you speak of?—Well, I could hardly say that. Of course, they were like the rest—off and on, like—sometimes better and sometimes worse, but tidy sort of people for all that.

Then it seems to me that instead of being good people spoiled, they are middling people improved?—It is according as how you take it, sir.

Re-examined by Mr. Dontwanto Believeanyhow: You have no doubt, Mr. Gossip, that the defendants are quite spoiled for all purposes of good fellowship and sociality?—Not a bit of doubt of it, sir.

My friend has asked about their honesty, kindness, and so forth: I understand you to say they were always kind, steady, honest men?—Oh, yes; always. I should always have trusted them any day.

Quite as much as you would now?—Quite.

You do not say that they are improved at all?—Not as I see, sir.

You stick to it that they are good people spoiled?—I stick to that. Of course, other folks has a right to their opinion.

Well, that will do. Call Mr. Shrewd Observer.

MR. SHREWD OBSERVER.

Examined by Mr. Loverofthe Presentworld: I believe you are a fellow-resident with the last witness in Babelton?—Yes, sir.

And, like him, retired from business?—No, sir; I am in business.

Oh, I beg pardon; I thought you had retired?—No, sir; but I am as good as retired.

Ah, I thought so—I am partner in a concern which is carried on by another man.

Ah, quite so—a sleeping partner?—No, sir; not a sleeping partner: I take part, but not a very great part. My partner attends to matters principally.

Well, you are, in fact, a person of leisure?—Yes; I have time to attend to matters. I take some interest in politics.

You take a leading part in the political affairs of the town?—I do.

In that capacity you have the honour and pleasure of a tolerably large acquaintance?—I believe so.

Amongst other people you know the defendants?—I know some of them very well.

Which of them do you know most about?—I know Persis Muchlabour and Timothy Faithson and Urbane

Helpful, and perhaps Titus Workfellow, and something of Heber Hold-fast-the-hope, and Gaius Hospitable.

The rest you do not know so much about?—I know a little about them all, more or less.

What do you know of them?—I have a high opinion of them.

A high opinion of them?—Yes.

How am I to understand you?—Well, I think they are all excellent men.

Should you apply that expression of opinion to their views and opinions?—I do not agree with their opinions.

You are aware it is their opinions and the effect of them that are in question on this trial?—I am so aware.

You say you do not agree with their opinions: what is your opinion as to the tendency of those opinions?—I think their effect is hurtful.

And yet you think the defendants are excellent men?—I discriminate between a man and his opinions.

Oh, I see: but I do not see how you can do that very well. Don't a man's opinions form part of the man? And by their influence on his attitude, do they not determine the quality of the man?—To a certain extent, no doubt it is so: nevertheless, a man may be better than his opinions. His opinions have to do with how outside matters strike him, while his character has to do with what he is in himself.

But may not his impressions of external matters affect his conduct and therefore his character?—I do not quite see it.

Well, suppose they were to take it into their heads that you were a tiger, do you think that would affect their attitude towards you?—(smiling) I should call that a hallucination.

Whatever you should call it, would it not affect their conduct towards you?—I suppose so.

They would try to shoot you, of course: and should you not consider that very questionable conduct?—Perhaps.

You would not call them excellent men?—I don't know.

Thus a wrong opinion or impression would produce wrong conduct or character?—I do not see there is any parallel.

Parallel on no parallel, it would be a case in which you could not separate between a man's character and opinions?—If they thought me a tiger, they would be justified in shooting me.

Should you be justified in being shot?—That is another side of the question.

That is the side we have to consider to-day. Are you not aware that the doctrines of the defendants lead them to regard the world as an evil thing?—Yes: I am sorry it is so.

And are you not aware that as a result of that opinion, they have virtually forsaken the world?—It is too true.

Deprived the world of the value of their good offices and all of us of the comfort of their friendship?—Yes, sir; I am sorry to say it is the case.

Well, now, we want you to give the Court the benefit of your knowledge in the case. You say you know certain of the defendants better than others?—Yes.

I think you mentioned the names of six?—Yes.

Take the first—Persis Muchlabour: what do you know about him?—He is a young man of great business talent and of large prospects, or at least, opportunities.

Have you seen much of him?—I used to see a good deal of him. I have often met him at private parties. He used to be very pleasant company. He is handsome and of agreeable manners, and possessed of a fund of humour and information on all subjects. He has a very wide circle of acquaintance. He has a clear business intellect and unbounded opportunities from the position to which he stands related through his family. There is no position to which he might not rise.

I understand you to say there has been a change?—Yes; there has been a great change.

What has been the nature of the change?—Well, he has practically retired from society. Nobody meets him now at pleasure parties. He is never seen at the theatre. He conducts his business as ably as ever but with greatly moderated ideas. He has lost ambition. He is content to carry on in a very limited and hum-drum sort of way. We consider him as good as lost. He has thrown

himself away upon an obscure lot of people. He used to cultivate the highest society.

How do you account for the change?—Well, I believe he has embraced the doctrines of Paul Christman.

He believes in the resurrection of Christ?—Yes, and the other fantasies associated with that notion.

Apart from these doctrines, you have no reason to doubt that he would be as useful a member of society as ever?—Oh, I have no doubt of it. His head is clear as a silver bell, as it ever was, and he has no purpose to serve whatever by his present erratic course. It is these doctrines that have spoiled him. I am sorry for him. I respect him as highly as ever I did, apart from these doctrines.

Now, what about the defendant Faithson?—He is a man of a different sort. I have never known him intimately, but I know a good deal about him; and I have had some transactions with him. I may say he has never, in my knowledge, been anything else than an active member of the Christman party. In fact, he is one of its out-and-outest members. He is always at it. I should call him an enthusiast, only there is a good deal about him that does not exactly belong to the enthusiast. He is clear-headed and able, and, on everything apart from Christmanism, he is a thoroughly sensible man—a friendly, honest, zealous man, that would be very useful and welcome to any party.

You have had business dealings with him?—Yes, occasionally.

And that has given you the opportunity of knowing and judging of the man?—Yes. I have often wished he could be disabused of this fanaticism, as I consider it, about Christ. I have tried, but you might as well speak to Mount Etna.

Why have you particularly desired to disabuse him of the fanaticism?—Well, because he would be such a useful accession to society every way—especially in local politics. I have often talked it over with the secretary of our association. We have often said he might make his mark if he could be cured of Christmanism.

Would you tell the Court in what way Christmanism interferes with his usefulness in the sense you mean?—Well, he is so over head and ears with this crotchet that he cannot be got to attend to anything else. He won't come to our meetings. He regularly declines our parties; at election times he stands absolutely aloof; we cannot even get him connected with town affairs; why, even at a lecture or a concert it is a very, very rare occurrence to see him. It is a downright pity to see so fine a fellow so completely spoiled.

You have no hope of curing him?—I don't see any ground to expect it. There is a tenacity of conviction and what I should call a setness in the mode of his intellectual operations that preclude me, at all events, from entertaining any hope of change.

Is he likely to lead others into the same state?—Oh, he is doing so right and left every day. It is perfectly astonishing the numbers of people he has brought to his own way of thinking. Several of my own friends are going fast.

What should you think the best way of dealing with the case?—Oh, I must leave that to you, gentlemen.

What should you think of our proposal to obtain an injunction to restrain these people from the agitation they are keeping up?—Well, as a politician in a liberal age, I am, of course, averse to all measures of coercion; but I confess I do not see any other way of closing their mouths.

Their mouths could be stopped by argument, of course?—I am not so sure about that. It is a difficult matter answering them.

You have tried?—Well, of course, I have had a good deal of conversation with them.

If they cannot be answered without difficulty, do you not think that the method we propose would be the most effectual?—It would doubtless be effectual in a certain way.

In what way do you doubt its efficacy?—Well, I look to the working of the thing in past times. A powerful effort to stop their doctrine by law was made in the first century, and in succeeding centuries at various times,

but the thing only seemed to spread the more actively.

But probably not to the extent it would have done if there had been no repression?—Perhaps not. It is difficult to tell.

At all events, you have no objection to its being made an illegal thing to preach the resurrection of Christ?—In view of the hurtful effects I have witnessed from the preaching, I must confess myself, though with some reluctance, in favour of judicial repression.

Take the next case: I think you said you knew something of Heber Hold-fast-the-hope?—Yes, I have known him very well.

You have known him better than the others?—I think I may say I have.

What do you know about him?—He is a tradesman of rare capacity, and was a politician.

A Politician?—Yes; he took an active part in all our elections, and in the political affairs of the borough generally. He was a man whose opinions carried quite a weight with them. He was quite a man of promise in the line of things. I should not have been surprised if some day he had been returned to parliament himself. I have watched him from the beginning, and was quite interested in him. Nay, I will say I entertained a strong personal friendship for him. We were very intimate, and our views ran in exactly the same channel in all political matters. There was no greater disappointment to me than when the change came over him that led to his identification with the defendants.

What change was that?—He imbibed their ideas. He imbibed them strongly. There is no firmer believer in the ranks of Christmanism than Heber Hold-fast-the-hope. I respect him highly. I deeply deplore the circumstance of having to appear against him to-day.

His imbibing the ideas of the defendants brought about a change in his attitude, I understand you to say?—Quite so.

What change did it produce?—Well, he gradually fell away from us. We first noticed that he absented himself from the meetings of the party. Then he slacked off

his interest in various little matters of party business. Any little matter we might ask him to attend to he did not take the usual interest in it, but did it in a half-hearted way. Then his subscription became irregular. At last we heard strange rumours that his opinions had undergone a complete change. By and bye, we had a letter of resignation. I then went and saw him, and discovered to my great regret that he had gone over heart and soul to Christmanism. Oh, I was so sorry. I tried to reason with him, but it was no use. He was like a rock. I had not given particular attention to the matter that had captivated him, so I was unable to meet him.

Since then you have not found him the useful man he was before?—I have seen very little of him since. I occasionally meet him and pass the time of day in a friendly way: but there is none of the intimacy there used to be. There could not be, of course. He mentions his hobby now and then: but I cannot follow him, and there it stops. He has backed out of all our political affairs. He says he has got new politics. He certainly takes a deal of interest in foreign affairs, which I must say is strange to me: for from all ideas I have been able to gather about Christ, his affairs belong to altogether another world.

As to matters of business, does he continue as enterprising as he was?—He attends to business as he ever did: but there is a certain kind of slackening off which is difficult to describe. He was aiming at a fortune: but now he seems to be content to get along in a jog-trot middling kind of way. When I twit him about it, he quotes the New Testament to me, "Having food and raiment, be content," or something to that effect. He certainly does not put the push and spirit into it that he used to do. It is impossible he could: for he gives an amount of time and attention to meetings and readings, and is so connected with the Christman craze that it would be enough to ruin his business.

You consider him a spoiled man?—Undoubtedly, from our point of view at all events? Mind, I have nothing to say against him in a moral sense. I think as highly of

him as ever. His very engrossment in this matter is part of that fidelity to conviction that I have always admired him for.

But it spoils him for all practical purposes?—I am sorry to say it does.

You don't consider fidelity to a fantasy a very admirable feature?—It is unfortunate.

And mischievous?—Well—

You are very tender about it?—Well, I cannot help admiring clearness of mind and truthfulness of life.

But, brought to bear in a bad cause, they become bad things don't they?—Perhaps. I wish I could either see with the defendants, or see the defendants back into the right position, as I at present think it.

Perhaps you will join them?—I am afraid not. If I could see they were right, perhaps I might.

Well, we won't follow that: Which of the defendants can you next tell us of?—Well, there is Titus Workfellow. I have known him for a good many years. I knew him before he had compromised himself with Christmanism.

What have you to say to him?—A more unblemished man I never knew. I have heard him called an angelman; and I am partly inclined to agree with the description.

How do you suppose that is going to help our case?—I don't know about that, but what I say is the truth.

How do you reconcile his angelhood with his position in the defendant's box?—Well, as I said before, I discriminate between a man and his opinions.

It is his opinions we are here to try?—Well, his opinions are those of the rest of the defendants. He believes that Christ rose from the dead, and that he is coming again to the earth, and that he will take the whole world in charge, and establish an improved age.

You do not share those opinions?—I do not.

Do you consider that those opinions have improved him?—They have not deteriorated him in a moral sense.

It is the practical bearing of the thing we want to hear about?—Well, practically, the effect has been the same as in the other cases.

Spoiled him?—Well, in a sense. He used to be at the head of a considerable body of respectable people, who paid him liberally for the luxury of intellectual discourses; and intellectual discourses they were. He is a very talented speaker and an able man. His language is in the choicest taste and the purest diction. A more chaste use of words was perhaps never exemplified. He was a very high-spirited man, and moved among high-spirited people, to whom his society was the pleasantest. He was appreciated and sought after. I would not give you the idea that he in any sense led a fast life. On the contrary, he was chaste and sober; but with his sobriety, he was refined and cultivated, and his mental composition was dashed with a vein of humour which made him very pleasant company. Along with this, I must admit there was an underlying sadness which savoured somewhat of his present turn of mind: a liking for the Bible which was out of keeping with the society in which he moved. I suppose to some extent it is to this that is to be attributed his present unhappy position.

You speak from personal knowledge?—I do. I was one of an admiring circle of friends. I would have given anything to have kept him in his position.

He is no longer in the position you have described:—No. When he embraced the tenets of Christmanism, he left us.

And consorted, I believe, with a low and worthless people?—I don't know much about the people he now goes amongst. All I know is that he is to be seen no more with us.

You deplore the fact?—I do sincerely deplore the fact—for his own sake, for ours, for his family's.

Has he injured his family?—I fear so. He gave up a liberal income when he left us; and I have not heard that he has been able to make it up from other sources.

The friends he united himself with are not so liberal with him as you were?—Oh, no; it is not in their power. They are poor people. Besides, I believe it is against their principles to "hire" a man, as they phrase it, to speak for them.

You think his family fare hardly in consequence?—I do not see how it could be otherwise. I have heard as much. I deeply sympathize with them. I have appealed to him on their behalf; but it is of no sort of use.

What does he say?—Well, he answers me in a way that is satisfactory to himself, I doubt not.

What is it like?—He asks me if I would have him disobey God for the sake of bread and cheese, or something of that sort.

That is part of the fanaticism?—Quite so. I take it in that light, though I cannot help feeling sorry so much consistency should be thrown away.

You consider his a case of a good man being spoiled?—Quite so, in the sense I have expressed. He is certainly spoiled for the present world. Christmanism is on his mind day and night. If there is any truth in the "splendid Utopianism" of his faith, as I think some of you gentlemen called it,—I mean his expectation of Christ coming to set up a kingdom on earth—he deserves a high place in it.

But you have no idea, of course, that there is anything in it?—No, I wish I had.

What do you mean?—I mean I wish such a good expectation as his faith gives him were a true one.

Not being true, you of course regard such a faith as nuisance—a something to be put down?—No doubt it would be well if it could be put down.

Do you see any better way of putting it down than by stopping the activity of the defendants?—I cannot say that I do. Confutation by argument would not be successful.

You have no doubt about that?—I have no doubt about that. I have tried it.

You have tried it with Mr. Workfellow, perhaps?—Yes; as I have said, I have often attempted to bring him to reason, but it only makes matters worse.

Does he make himself active in the propagation of the hurtful faith?—Oh, yes; nobody more so, though I believe it is a principle with these people that they are all bound to propagate their faith. I believe they regard it as Christ's will that they should do so.

We won't go into that: You spoke of others you knew?—Yes.

Urbane Helpful?—Yes, I know him.

What have you to say of him?—The same as the rest, except that there is some offset by way of improvement.

What do you mean?—Well, he has been improved on some points by the change to Christmanism.

Never mind the improvements: we want to know where he has been spoiled?—Well, his career has doubtless been arrested. He started with good opportunities and fair prospects, and every chance of getting on, both as regards friends and business; but I am afraid there is an end to it all.

Through the effects of the doctrine?—Doubtless, the doctrines are the cause. They have had the usual effect where they are earnestly received. They have made him morose and unsociable, and have led him to neglect his professional duties to a great extent, and to give attention to matters of not the least advantage to anybody in the world.

It is the same story as in other cases?—Quite so.

Gaius Hospitable, I believe you mentioned his name?—Yes.

You knew him?—I did.

Before he got smitten with Christmanism?—Yes.

What was the character of his case at that time?—Good every way; an excellent young man, prominent position in business, lots of friends, no position that he mightn't have got to

How it is now?—Well, there is not so much change in some ways, but, on the whole, he is seriously damaged. He maintains his business position, but he has not quite so many friends, and I am afraid his way is blocked. Indeed I know it for a fact. It is impossible for any man to get on with such notions as he has taken up with. Influential people, through whom advancement is to be secured, will not look at a man with such crazed ideas as they are considered; and then all motive is taken away to getting on and up. He used to be quite a thrifty, saving man, and would soon have put by enough to retire on;

but since he took to these notions of Paul Christman, he has quite changed. He spends money freely on meetings and circulating books, and helping poor people, which, of course, is all very well in its place, but not when it is carried to such an extent. I have spoken to him about it, but it is of no use. You cannot answer such impracticable people.

He gives the same answers as Titus Workfellow?—Not exactly. He is a quiet man, but he will slowly get out some question which a man that is not acquainted with these things cannot deal with on the spur of the moment.

Can you give us an example?—Well, if I tell him he ought, in justice to his family, to do the best he can for himself, as he used to do, he will ask me what I think Christ meant when he said, "Lay not up for yourself treasures upon earth." Or, if I tell him it will be his ruin if he persists in his connection with Christmanism, he will ask if I have ever considered Christ's words, "He that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." There is no getting round them.

You can get round them, surely, by saying their Bible is all nonsense?—Not even then. They will have some awkward questions and arguments about the Bible.

Well, we won't go into that. Have you anything more to tell the Court about Gaius Hospitable?—Nothing, except I highly respect him as a genuine, true-hearted man, whose mistakes of the head I am sorry for.

He is like the rest, I suppose, very active in the spreading of his opinions?—Yes; he won't let you call them his opinions. He insists upon it that they are facts.

Never mind, he spreads them?—Yes.

You agree that it would be polite to prevent him doing so?—I have said that I should agree to it as an unhappy necessity.

The Clerk of the Court: Have Counsel for the defendants any questions to put to this witness?

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: Yes, my Lord: but the cross-examination of this witness will probably take considerable time. I could not hope to finish before the rising of the Court. I should propose that we adjourn now,

and I will be prepared to proceed with the cross-examination at the next sitting.

His Lordship: What do the other side say?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I have no objection, my Lord to the adjournment. The lighter we make this heavy case the better.

The Clerk of the Court: Go by easy stages.

His Lordship: Very well: the Court will adjourn till tomorrow morning.

Court adjourned.

THIRD SITTING

MR. SHREWD OBSERVER (Re-called).

Cross-examined by *Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth:*
Mr. Observer, you supplied the Court yesterday with some interesting information concerning the defendants, particularly with regard to Messrs. Muchlabour, Faithson, Workfellow, Hold-fast-the-hope, Helpful and Hospitable. As I understand, you have nothing to say against their characters?—I have said so.

You say you discriminate between a man and his opinions?—Quite so.

You have come to the conclusion that the opinions of these men are baseless opinions?—Yes, sir.

Suppose their opinions were to turn out true opinions, would it not somewhat alter your estimate of the course of conduct arising out of them?—No doubt it would make a difference.

If Christ is a living power in the universe, with whom the futurity of the earth is bound up, and if he has offered to men a participation in that futurity—permanent futurity—a glorious futurity—on condition of obeying his commandments, you would not think it a reprehensible or a strange thing that the defendants should try to comply with that condition?—There is, of course, but one answer to that question. I should consider such an endeavour entirely reasonable and commendable. I do not, however, see that the claims of morality, such as I assume to be involved in Christ's commandments, require

men to isolate themselves from the world as the defendants do.

That is a separate matter: assume for the purpose of my question that the course pursued by the defendants is the very course required by the commandments of Christ; would not their conduct in that case, on the hypothesis of Christ's existence, be the only conduct that could be expected of them?—Doubtless.

Then it is a question of the ground of their action rather than the action itself?—I cannot dissent from that proposition.

If Christ rose from the dead, you have no objections to urge against the defendants?—Ah! "if": there is much in an "if."

Quite so: but I am putting it in the abstract: if Christ rose—?—Well, it would make all the difference of course.

You do not think Christ rose from the dead?—I wish I could say I did.

You would join the defendants in the box?—Very likely.

How do you account for the conviction of the defendants on the point?—I do not know that I can quite account for it.

You have no doubt of the sincerity of their convictions?—None whatever. It is impossible I could doubt it in view of what I know of their characters, and in view of the manifest conflict there is between their convictions and their interests.

A man does not give up an income and accept the drawbacks of poor society, and a reduced mode of life, for something he is doubtful about?—I should think not.

Still less for something he knows to be unfounded?—Quite so.

A man does not moderate his ambitions in life and decline the occupation of pleasure, and the society of cultivated men and women for something he does not believe?—It would be very unlikely.

Would it be possible?—I could scarcely conceive it possible.

Did you ever know a case?—I never did.

You have informed us, in answer to my friend, that the defendants, some of them at all events, have done all these things?—Yes.

You accept the fact as proof of the sincerity of their convictions?—Oh, unquestionably. I have always said they are sincere men—men whom I respect highly for their fidelity to conviction. Of course I think they are mistaken in their convictions.

Have you ever considered the reasons which induce them to entertain those convictions?—Not very particularly.

Have you given any attention to the subject at all?—Not in a critical way. Of course I have read a little on the subject.

Have you read both sides?—Yes, I think I may say I have.

But probably you have read more against, than for, the faith of Jesus Christ?—Perhaps so—though I don't know—I have read a good deal in its favour.

Do you not think the argument in its favour is a strong one?—There is a good deal, of course, that is very pithy; but I cannot get over the unbridgable contradiction there is between our common experience and what we are asked to believe about Christ, especially the contradiction between the Bible and science.

Let us take one thing at a time: let us take what you call the unbridgable contradiction between common experience and Christ; What is the contradiction?—Well, there is so much of miracle—so much that is out of the ordinary way—walking on the water; feeding thousands with a few loaves of bread; raising dead men and such like. I cannot in my own mind reconcile such things with my own experience, and the experience of all men I have ever met. Besides, I don't see what they have to do with religion. I believe in the moral precepts of Christ as much as any Christian, but I don't see that they depend upon miracles at all.

Wait a moment: let us understand you. Do you say you do not believe in the miracles of Christ because you

have never seen one?—Well, that is not it exactly: they are so out of the way of ordinary experience that I cannot conceive them possible.

If they were in the way of ordinary experience, you would receive them?—I could not help receiving them, of course, in that case; but you see they are not so.

Well, but suppose they were in the ordinary experience of other men, if this could be shown, you would not urge your lack of experience against the possibility of their occurrence?—Ah! “if” again.

It is useful sometimes to deal in “ifs.” Men deal largely in “ifs” before they do business?—If you could only take the matter beyond the region of “ifs—”

I shall do so before this trial is over. Meanwhile, I put it to you in this way: Would you urge your lack of experience of miracles against the possession of the experience of miracles on the part of other men?—Of course I am bound to say I should be a fool to do such a thing.

Some men, you are aware, do this?—Yes, I am aware of it.

You admit their position is untenable?—Well, of course it is absurd for a man to insist upon seeing a thing for himself before he will believe in it. I never saw Napoleon I. but I believe there was such a man. I have never seen certain comets and stars that only appear once in centuries, but I believe in their existence.

You believe because of reliable testimony to their existence?—Quite so.

Although you have never “experienced” them?—Quite so.

Very well, it comes to this: did other men have experience of miracles?—Ay, that is the question. You will find it hard to settle.

Perhaps not so hard as you think.—I cannot help feeling that they are in a different position from the stars and comets I have spoken of. Stars and comets that I have not seen are not inconsistent with my experience, but miracles are.

How do you mean?—Well I have seen stars and comets, but I have never seen miracles.

Do you really mean that you believe in nothing but what you have seen a specimen of?—I don't exactly put it in that way.

Put it in any way you like: I want to see your position.—What I say is that it is in accordance with my experience that stars and comets are to be seen, and sometimes that have never been seen before. Therefore, I can easily believe the testimony of those who may have seen stars that I have not seen; but when a man tells of a miracle, he tells me of a thing that is not only not within my experience, but contrary to my experience.

In what way?—Well, it is contrary to my experience that a few loaves of bread can be divided so as to feed a multitude, or that the dead can be restored to life again, or that a man can walk on the water. If I try to walk on water, I sink, and so does every one else.

But does that go to show that what is impossible in your experience is impossible in the experience of every one else?—It establishes a strong presumption.

Does it amount to proof?—Almost.

Would you like to say altogether?—Nearly.

If so, what do you say to the electric telegraph?—I do not quite understand you.

Well, you are aware that a message can, by the electric telegraph, be sent three thousand miles along the bottom of the ocean in five minutes or so?—Yes, I am happy to be acquainted with that wonderful scientific triumph.

Are you aware that two hundred years ago such a thing was unknown?—Yes, I suppose it was unknown. Of course it was unknown.

Two hundred years ago such a thing was contrary to everyone's experience?—It was not within experience.

But wasn't it contrary to experience?—In what way.

Well, didn't men send messages in those days?—I suppose so.

Could they have sent a message along the bottom of the ocean if they had tried?—If they had tried the right way.

Granted: but not knowing the right way was it not entirely contrary to their experience that such a thing could be done?—It was not according to their experience.

Wasn't it contrary; wasn't it opposed to what they found to be the best and quickest way of sending a message across the ocean?—I suppose I must allow it was.

Would a man have been believed who had predicted the transmission of invisible messages through the bottom of the ocean as quick as lightning?—I suppose not.

In that case people would have disbelieved a true prophecy merely because they couldn't see how the thing prophesied could be. Now suppose we put the matter historically, so as to be parallel with the present case. In our day, we have the telegraph, the telephone, the electric light, and other equally inscrutable marvels. Suppose that by one of those cosmic cataclysms which some scientific men tell us have happened in the past, the dry land were to be suddenly sunk in the ocean, and all vessels wrecked in the accompanying tempest, and the human race, with all their experience and all their records, were to disappear in the bottom of the sea: and suppose, at some later age, through evolution or spontaneous generation, or any other of the wonderful ways scientific men have of accounting for the existence of the human race, that the human race were to come into existence again; and suppose, while they were as ignorant of electric messages, etc., as we were two hundred years ago, some one were to exhume from the rocks documentary evidence—say a petrified pile of newspapers belonging to the old age, and which he should by diligence learn to decipher—that in that bygone age, messages were sent like a flash of lightning through the ocean from one continent to the other; my question is, would not the people of that new time be justified, on your principle, in refusing to believe in what you at this moment know to be true, because contrary to their experience?—The case is altogether so purely hypothetical that you can scarcely expect me to give an opinion upon it.

The case ought not to be inconceivable to you on scientific grounds?—It is of course not inconceivable, though entirely out of the range of probability.

Being not inconceivable, try and imagine it for a moment, and tell me if you do not think it likely that the

people of the new age would disbelieve in the wonders of the telegraph of our age merely because so entirely out of the range of their experience?—I think it is probable.

And yet the disbelief and the experience would be on the wrong side?—Unquestionably.

And the incredible history would be the truth?—It would be so.

Very well, may it not be so with miracles—that although they are not among our current experiences, they may be true, notwithstanding?—But there is no parallel. Electrical phenomena are operations of the powers of Nature: but miracles are—

Are what?—Well, as I understand, violations of Nature.

What do you understand by violations of Nature?—Well, things done in opposition to the laws of Nature, outside and in defiance of the laws of Nature.

To whom are you indebted for that conception of miracle?—Well, I don't know that I can give you chapter and verse: but I presume most people are agreed on that subject.

Do not assume such an agreement. We may find another view of miracle—that miracle is only a higher operation of the power that is incorporate in Nature?—That will be something new to me.

The electric light is new in this age of the world, but true?—True.

Well, let me see; give me a case of miracle that you think a violation of Nature?—Well, take the walking on the water; that I should think is a violation of the laws of Nature. Those laws would make a man sink in the water, and not walk.

Let us be quite sure on that point. You have, of course, heard of Captain Boyton, who makes himself as much at home on the water as on the land, walking and sitting and lying down, and taking his meals; do you consider his not sinking a violation of the laws of Nature?—By no means; it is in harmony with the laws of Nature.

How so? I thought you said the laws of nature would make a man sink in the water?—Yes, if no other law of

Nature is brought to bear. Captain Boyton wears an air-filled dress.

Very well, because Captain Boyton wears an air-filled dress, you would not describe his not sinking as a violation of the laws of Nature?—Clearly not.

But suppose you had seen Captain Boyton on the water without knowing anything about an air-filled dress, you would have thought it very strange, would you not?—Very likely I should; I should be for asking the explanation.

Quite so; very well, do you think an air-filled dress is the only thing that will enable a man to walk on the water?—I should not like to say that.

There may be some other staying power besides air confined in clothes?—There may be.

Cork for example?—Yes, cork.

And India-rubber?—Yes, India-rubber.

And other things?—Very possibly: but I do not understand you to suggest that Christ availed himself of any means of that sort.

No: but I am leading you up to a recognition of this fact that it is possible to counteract the law that makes a man in ordinary circumstances sink in the water, without violating or setting aside that law?—But in the cases you suppose, it is one law acting in place of another.

Yes: and when Christ walked on the water, it was one law acting in place of another?—I do not understand it so.

How do you understand it?—Nay, I do not profess to understand it. I cannot understand it. I know of no law which would enable a man to walk on the water without artificial appliances of the sort you have referred to.

Would you say that you know all the laws there are in the Universe?—Nay, I would not be such a fool as that.

Would you say you know all the laws that govern the sea, and the atmosphere of our earth?—You would not, of course, expect me to say such a thing.

Very well, if it be credibly testified, as I shall show it is in a great variety of ways, that Jesus walked on the water, why should you make your ignorance of the way

it was done a reason for not believing?—There is some force in your question.

Suppose there is a law by which the action of gravitation on the molecules of the human body could be regulated, so that gravitation should have a light hold or a heavy hold, according to the application of the law under the will of the operator, would it not be conceivable in that case that a person having control of such a law could as easily walk on the water, or ascend in the air, as we walk on the ground or climb a mountain?—Anything is conceivable in that way of putting it; but still, even then, it does not appear to me that the difficulty would be removed. Such a person would only be a natural operator after all—on a higher plane of knowledge it might be, than ordinary men, but still a natural operator, whereas as I understand the claim put forward on behalf of Christ, he is above Nature and outside Nature.

That is a distinction of words merely, and embodies the loose conception of those who have learnt Christ from the schools, and not from the Scriptures. What is claimed for Christ is that as the power of God incarnate, he has control of Nature. This control does not mean that he is outside Nature or above Nature, but rather that he is in Nature in the sense of being related to the inner force by which Nature subsists, and can, therefore, manipulate that force for the accomplishment of specific results. It is we who are outside Nature in so far as we are shut up within ourselves, and cannot, except by mechanical contrivance, control Nature in the least. Nature is in God, according to the testimony of the Scriptures, "In Him we live, and move, and have our being"; and again, "Of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things." Consequently, a man who could say as Christ said, "The Father is in me," was a man who could counterwork gravitation without arresting it, by a counteragent more potent than air-bags, cork, India-rubber, or any created substance, viz., the primordial force of all Nature—the Spirit of God which God gave to Jesus without measure (John iii. 34).

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: My friend is delivering a lecture. He is not examining the witness.

Sir N. Acceptor of Alltruth: I am elucidating the idea which I am placing before the witness.

The Witness: The idea is quite new to me.

Does it not dispose of the difficulty you alleged to be in the way of receiving the testimony concerning Christ?—It places the matter in a new light I must say.

If miracles are merely a higher form of the work we see performed every day before our eyes in Nature, would not the recognition of the fact reduce the difficulty which you experience in receiving the testimony of them?—It would doubtless have some effect in that way. But I do not see how you can apply that principle to the feeding of the multitude with a few loaves, and the raising of the dead.

Nothing easier: Jesus produced bread sufficient for the feeding of the multitude. The only difference between the bread so produced and ordinary bread was in the way it was made. When made, the one was the same as the other. Both were equal marvels when looked at rightly. The bread naturally produced was slowly manufactured from invisible elements in the light, rain, soil, etc. Because slowly conducted, the process does not strike us; but it is in itself as wonderful as any miracle. In the bread that Jesus produced, the elements were gathered and combined instantaneously, that was all the difference—a great difference truly, and one beyond the power of man, but still a difference more of mode than of essence. The mode is divine and wonderful in both cases, but in the one it is slow, and in the other quick. The quickness was necessary to show undoubtedly the presence and operation of divine power. This you will find to be the case in all miracles. By the way, you said you did not see what miracles had to do with religion?—I believe I said something of that sort.

In what way do you disconnect them?—I do not disconnect them. They are already disconnected as I apprehend. I say they do not seem to be connected. I regard them as two separate things.

Let me understand you: what do you say religion is?—According to my understanding of the matter, religion is that which has to do with the moral nature of man.

Do you admit the Bible as the source from whence a true conception of religion is to be derived?—I believe the Bible is one of many books yielding conceptions of the subject.

But there is a great difference between the Bible and other books. If Christ rose from the dead, you would be disposed to admit the divinity of the Scriptures in the sense of his endorsement of them?—It might alter my view of the subject somewhat.

You are aware that the Bible makes an exclusive claim among all books to be divine?—I am aware of it.

And the resurrection of Christ you would regard as a proof of that claim?—It would, of course, go a long distance in that direction.

Very well, assume for a moment that Christ has risen, and that the Bible is consequently a divine book; let me now discuss with you your idea of religion. My object will be to show you that so far from religion having nothing to do with miracles, you cannot have religion without it?—If you can show that, you will show me something quite foreign to my usual thought. My usual thought is that religion is that which concerns our obligations in matters of duty, benevolence, conscience, and such like, with which I cannot see that miracle can have any connection.

Suppose we start with your definition: how are we to know our obligations in matters of duty, etc.?—I assume we ascertain these in the way we ascertain everything else: by investigation and study.

Where shall we investigate to ascertain our duty. Would you recommend the study of the stars?—Not exactly.

The rocks?—No.

Plants and animals?—You cannot be serious.

I want to know your point of view?—A man must study his own nature before he can discover his duty.

Can he discover it in that way?—I should think so.

Do you know whether, as a matter of fact, it has ever been discovered in that way?—I apprehend so.

Would you be definite, and mention illustrations?—Well, the moral philosophers of every age I should take to be illustrations.

And every country?—Yes, and every country.

Are you aware that moral philosophers of every age and country differ one from another as to the nature and foundation of duty?—There is doubtless a little want of absolute uniformity.

Take typical men: Socrates or Aristotle, among the Greeks; Confucius, of the Chinese; Zoroaster, of the Persians; Goethe, Schiller and Paul Jean Richter, among the German mystics; Hamilton, of Scotland; Comte, the Positivist; Thomas Carlyle and Professor Tyndall. Would you say their teachings are identical?—Not exactly.

Are they anything like the same?—I must allow there is considerable differences among them.

How do you account for the differences, if duty is discoverable by subjective investigation?—They were different men of course.

Do you say duty is a different thing for different men?—I should not like to say that.

Then if duty common to all is discoverable by investigation and study, how do you account for the widely differing results of that investigation and study by different men of capacity?—I don't know that I can quite account for it.

Now, do you include Jesus Christ and his apostles among moral philosophers?—They were either that, or, if your contention be correct, they were something much higher.

Let us take them at the lower estimate first: are you aware that they had a poor opinion of the so-called moral philosophers of the world?—I suppose so.

Perhaps you are not aware how complete their repudiation of them was?—I am not very thoroughly acquainted with the Christian writings.

Are you aware that Paul calls the wisdom of this world, "foolishness with God"?—I have some recollection of that sort.

And that any man passing current for a man of wisdom according to the world's standard had to become a fool in order that he might be truly wise?—Yes.

Do you know that Jesus Christ thanked God that he

had "hid these things from the wise and prudent, and had revealed them unto babes"?—I do not specifically remember those words but I have no doubt he said something of that sort.

Do you know that he said that the world had not known God (John xvii. 25)—I suppose he did.

Do you know that Paul declared that "Christ was the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. i. 24); and that, "in him were hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge" (Col. ii. 3)?—I have no recollection of the words.

Do you know that he spoke desparagingly of philosophy as a vain and mistaken thing, and said that God had made foolish the wisdom of this world (Col. ii. 8; 1 Cor. i. 21)?—I will admit generally that Bible writers had a great contempt for the learning of other nations.

Well, here is the point: if duty is discoverable "by investigation and study," and all the investigators are at loggerheads one with another, does it not show that many of them must be mistaken?—That would seem a fair inference.

And that the Jewish investigators, as you regard them, have just as much chance to be right as the rest?—As much chance—Yes—perhaps.

Are you aware that the Jewish investigators, as you consider them, have repudiated the authorship of the views they have put forth?—I do not understand you.

Are you aware that they claim revelation for what they advanced?—I do not know that they do so particularly.

They do so particularly.—Oh! I should like to be informed.

Paul says (1 Cor. ii. 8, 11), speaking of the wisdom of God, "which none of the princes of this world knew. . . . As it is written, eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him. But GOD HATH REVEALED THEM UNTO US BY HIS SPIRIT. . . . The things of God knoweth no man but the Spirit of God."—That looks a little like what you say.

Still more specifically in Gal. i. 11, "I certify you, brethren, that the gospel which was preached of me is not

after man, for I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it, but BY THE REVELATION OF JESUS CHRIST."—Yes, that is pretty strong.

And again, "If any man among you think himself to be spiritual, let him acknowledge that *the things that I write unto you are THE COMMANDMENTS OF THE LORD*" (1 Cor. xiv. 3, 7).—Yes.

And Peter says (2 Pet. i. 21) that what the prophets wrote "came not in old time by the will of man, but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit."—I suppose I must admit that divine inspiration is claimed for the Scriptures.

Very well, now, suppose they were right (and you have admitted they have as much chance of being right as Aristotle, Zoroaster, Comte and Co.) does it not follow that revelation, and not investigation and study, furnishes the standard of right, duty, etc.?—Ah, if they were right.

I am putting it in that way.—To put it in that way is one thing: to prove it is another.

I will prove it if I prove the resurrection of Christ.—Another "if" you see.

The "ifs" are useful. They are the rounds of the ladder by which we shall climb to the top of the rock.—I shall be glad to see you perform the feat.

We have got so far, viz., that if the Jewish moral philosophers, as you call them, were right (which they are if Christ rose from the dead), then it is to revelation, and not to investigation that we are to look for information on questions of duty.—Very well, suppose I grant it.

Then my question is, how can you have religion (according even to your definition of religion) without miracle? Is not revelation a miracle?—Oh, I see where you are.

Well, what have you to say?—There are so many "ifs" is your questions that I don't exactly know what to say. Of course, if religion is a matter of miracle, then you can not have it without miracle, that is clear enough. All I can say is, it is contrary to all the ordinary established notions on the subject.

Never mind that: you admit the logic of my train of

reasoning:—It is logical enough; but logic is worth little without demonstrated premises.

We shall demonstrate them by and bye. One step at a time. And now let me take you one step further. I have hitherto argued on your own hypothesis as to the nature of religion. Let me now invite your attention to the fact that it is not a true hypothesis:—You surprise me by the novelty of your suggestions.

They may appear novel: they are not at all so, in fact, as you will presently begin to perceive.—They are new to me.

Perhaps so, but they may be true?—Perhaps.

You defined religion to be that which concerned the moral nature of man, or something of that sort. Do you not think the term "religion" of itself goes deeper than that?—In what way?

I mean the etymology of the word: does it not suggest a deeper meaning?—I do not at present catch your idea.

Well, you probably know that the word religion comes from a Latin root signifying to bind?—Yes, *ligare*, to bind: hence ligature, a sinew or binding.

Quite so: well, if in *ligion* we have a binding, what have we in *re-ligion*? You know the force of "re"?—Yes: "again."

Would not *religion* mean a binding again?—Evidently.

That being so, does not the word suggest a binding or healing over of that which has been ruptured?—That is the etymological significance of the word.

I have now to ask in what way your conception of religion would answer to that derivation?—There you place me in a dilemma. I never thought of that bearing of the matter.

The moral philosophers of the world do not recognize that God and man have ever been sundered?—I believe not.

They assume that man has progressed from a low to a higher state?—Quite so.

They hold and teach the universal "Fatherhood of God"?—Most of them, a doctrine I must say which has a great charm for me.

But a doctrine that cannot yield the idea of *re*-ligion, as a binding together again?—I don't know: perhaps a return to right ways would contain the idea.

But there are multitudes of persons that never have been in right ways, and therefore, cannot *return* though they may come to them?—It would not apply individually in those cases, though we might take it generally.

You are aware that the Scriptures supply the elements of a perfect conception on the point?—I suppose they do.

They teach that in the start, our race was in friendship with God; but that, through the disobedience of Adam, separation and alienation and death ensued?—Yes, I believe that is the idea, an idea which I have been unable to receive.

And that religion is the institution which God has appointed for a restoration to friendship in the cases of those submitting to it, and, therefore, a binding together of God and man?—Yes, that fits in very well.

Very well now, supposing the Bible conception is the true conception for the various reasons I have already hinted at, tell me how you can maintain that religion has nothing to do with miracle?—Oh! I see you come back to that point again.

I do. If religion is a divine institution for the reconciliation of man with God, is it not apparent that the very first step towards the establishment of such an institution must be communication or revelation from God defining and declaring it?—In the way you put it, it must be so of course.

Would not such revelation be miracle?—Doubtless.

Does it not, therefore, follow that miracle is involved in the very idea of religion?—I appreciate your argument so far: but I do not see what walking on the sea, and feeding of multitudes with a few loaves and fishes, and other such like things, have to do with communicating a system of religion or reconciliation.

That is easy to be seen if you admit that proof would be necessary to show that the system introduced to notice was in reality God's own system?—I should say the introducing would be proof of itself

How so? Take the preaching of the apostles; how were men to know that what they preached was divine? The apostles might know: but how were the multitudes to know?—I see the point.

The New Testament account is that the miracles were wrought as God's attestation of the word preached: God's confirmation of the divine character claimed for it (Mark xvi. 20; Heb. ii. 4). If this were their character, were they not an essential part of the process of the establishment of religion?—I cannot deny the cogency of your questions. If I grant your premises, I am bound to admit that my idea of religion and miracle being unconnected, was somewhat superficial.

You will find the case on this point grow stronger as it is investigated. I will just throw out a hint which you can follow out or not as you please. The religion of Christ comes before us in the preaching of the gospel. Men are asked to honour God in the belief of the gospel. The gospel consists of the declaration of God's beneficent intentions towards the human race. It is called gospel because the disclosure of those intentions, is good news, which is the meaning of the term gospel. Now, if this be so—if true religion consists of the gospel, and the gospel is the revelation of God's good purposes—how can there be such a thing as religion without revelation?—I again say that if your premises are granted, your case is strong.

I shall establish the premises before I have done. We will now take another point. You spoke of the incompatibility between science and the Bible as a reason for your want of faith in the platform of the defendants?—Yes.

Are you quite sure of this incompatibility?—I think so.

Where does it lie?—Well, I need nothing more than the Bible history of the creation of the world. It teaches that the world began 6,000 years ago, whereas science has brought to light undoubted evidence that the earth has been in existence for an incalculable period.

Are you sure the Bible teaches that the world began 6,000 years ago?—I think so: "In six days God created

heaven and earth;" so Moses says. I presume that statement applies to 6,000 years or so.

Doubtless the statement applies to about 6,000 years ago; but the question is, what does the statement mean?—There does not appear to be much doubt about its meaning.

What do you understand it to mean?—Why, that previous to 6,000 years ago, the earth had no existence.

If that be the Bible meaning, of course the Bible generally would agree with that meaning?—I apprehend it does.

Let us see: before the work of what is called creation began, we are told (Gen. i. 2) "The earth was without form (or order) and void (or empty of life), and darkness was upon the face of the deep." Does not this show the earth in existence?—I do not exactly know what to say to that.

Of course it shows the earth in existence; for how could the earth be empty if there was no earth to be empty? and how could there be darkness on the face of the deep if there was no deep?—I admit the force of that. I had not thought of it.

In Job, there is a recognition of this pre-Adamic state, where God asks Job where he was "when I made the cloud the garment of the sea, and thick darkness a swaddling band for it?" (Job xxxviii. 9). Now, if the earth existed chaotically at the epoch of the Mosaic creation, where is the contradiction between the Bible and science?—It does not appear to me you can get over it so lightly as that. There is the word "create"—that heaven and earth were "created" six thousand years ago.

How does that bear on the point?—Well, create, as I take it, means to make out of nothing.

That is the conventional meaning, but if you will look into it, you will find it is not the Bible meaning?—All I know is, what you call the conventional meaning.

But in the trial of an immense issue like this, it is unsafe to trust to a conventional meaning?—What other meaning is there?

Well, it comes out in the statement that "God *made*

man of the dust of the ground": here the word *made* is the same in the Hebrew as the word create—BARA. If BARA means to make out of nothing, it is a contradiction to say Adam was BARA-ed *out of the dust*?—There is some force in that.

There are several instances of the same thing in the course of the Scriptures. The radical significance of the word is to arrange or put in order. With such a meaning in view, there is nothing in the Mosaic narrative inconsistent with the scientific view. The earth may have been re-arranged six thousand years ago for aught that science can show to the contrary?—But that is not the whole difficulty.

What is there besides?—Well, there are the fossil remains of extinct animals that must, from their position in the strata, have existed ages before 6,000 years ago.

How does that constitute a difficulty?—According to the Bible the animals were made 6,000 years ago.

Doubtless the animals that were made 6,000 years ago were made 6,000 years ago, but in what way is that inconsistent with the fact of there having been animals on the earth previously to that?—The Mosaic account says the earth was void at that time, or empty as you have expressed it. If it was empty, I presume it would be empty of animals as well as everything else.

True, at that time, it would be; but my question relates to time previous to that?—What time?

Any time—say ten thousand years if you like. May there not have been animals on the earth ten thousand years prior to the Adamic era, although the moment before the arrival of that era there were none?—I am afraid that is a speculation to suit the facts.

It cannot be a speculation in view of the fossil proof to which you have referred, of the existence of such animals. The animals found in the fossil state do not exist now. Consequently there must have been a break. If there has been a break, there must have been something to be broken—that is, a line of previous animal existence.—Yes, but you see you are indebted to science for a knowledge of that previous existence.

That may be: but why am I to refuse the knowledge the Bible does give me because of what it does not give me?—I do not quite understand you there.

Well, you are objecting to the Bible account of the start made 6,000 years ago, because it does not give us an account of what was before that start was made?—I apprehend it does not in any way recognize what science has shown existed before then.

It leaves room for it. It shows us the earth submerged in water and enveloped in darkness at the crisis of the Adamic "BARA"-ing, or re-ordering, commonly called creation. It does not tell us how long it had been in that state. That it must have been, at one time, in that state, every stone and stratum and fossil shows. Consequently, instead of contradiction between the Bible and science on this point, there is agreement. The Bible taught it before science had discovered it.—I am afraid that is a piece of special pleading.

Do you consider the endeavour to reconcile two demonstrated truths special pleading?—I do not see the two demonstrated truths in the case. Scientific truth is demonstrated.

I grant that, to a certain extent: but this trial will show the resurrection of Christ, and, therefore, the truth of the Bible, is demonstrated truth also. You are standing up for one demonstrated truth against another; is it not wiser to accept both?—A plausible proposal certainly.

You have no objections to it?—I am prepared, of course, to accept all demonstrated truth.

Very well, why do you bring forward the pre-Adamic fossils to discredit the Mosaic narrative which does not exclude them?—It does not mention them?

It does not contradict them?—It would have been more satisfactory if it had taught them.

What should you say to a man objecting to a school book on English history because it does not go back to the Egyptian dynasties?—That is not my position in this case.

I am afraid it is pretty much like it. The Bible professes only to give us an account of things from the Adamic beginning: and you are objecting to this account

because it does not go back further and portray the cosmic revolutions, and the natural history of the earth in the prior ages?—It never occurred to me to think of it in that light.

Perhaps you will think it over, and join the defendants after all?—I am afraid not. You have only skimmed the difficulty. It is not only the animals: it is man himself. The Bible teaches man's appearance upon the scene 6,000 years ago, whereas, according to the latest researches of science, man must have been upon the globe for 50,000 years at least.

We are ready for that difficulty also?—You have a wonderful facility for getting over the difficulties. I prefer accepting them, and not getting over them.

Nay, nay, Mr. Observer, do not say so. You are not unacquainted with the practice of getting over difficulties in science. There are some strange chasms and contradictions in science, you know?—I think not, sir.

Are you aware that the ascertained velocity of sound is 174 feet per second greater than it ought to be according to the calculation of Sir Isaac Newton, accepted by all scientists?—I suppose that is the case: but it is susceptible of explanation.

Still you must admit it is a difficulty and a contradiction, that the ascertained rate at which sound travels should be 174 feet per second quicker than it ought to be according to the theory of the transmission of sound by air-vibration, entertained by most scientific men?—It was a difficulty until its explanation was found out.

Has its explanation been found out?—I think so.

Are you not aware that what has taken place has been simply this, that a theory has been invented to account for it?—It is a theory that agrees with the facts.

Is it a demonstrate theory?—It is not capable of demonstration.

The theory is that heat is generated by the transmission of sound, and so accelerates its speed?—I believe the explanation is something to that effect.

Isn't it a mere getting over of a difficulty?—I apprehend it is more than that.

Are you not aware that a scientific man in America has exploded the usually received scientific theory of sound altogether?—He has tried to do so.

Hasn't he succeeded?—I think not.

Have you answered him?—I am not capable.

Has anybody else answered him?—He will no doubt be answered in due time.

I advise you to read his book, and you may think differently on that point. It is an affair of experiment and calculation—facts and figures—by which he exposes the utter absurdity of the theory of the generation of heat by the transmission of sound. However, I am digressing. I introduced this merely to show you that scientific men are not unaccustomed to the process of getting over difficulties, of which you seem to think so little in the case of the Scriptures. I might cite other instances, but this must suffice for the present. I go back now to the human-race-fifty-thousand-years-upon-the-earth difficulty. I said we were prepared for that?—So you did, to my surprise.

In the first place, are you prepared to maintain that the theory of human remains so ancient is established beyond a doubt?—I take it so. Of course, I am not a scientist myself. I am merely a general reader.

In your general reading you may have come across the discovery that some of the facts upon which the theory of the antiquity of the human species is founded, have turned out to have another meaning?—I cannot summon memory on the point.

You may have heard of bricks being found at a great depth in the delta of the Nile?—Yes.

And, of course, you have seen the argument that these bricks must be 50,000 years old, because it is supposed it would take that time for such a thickness of the river deposit to be formed over them?—Yes; the argument strikes me as a forcible one.

Have you heard that is has now been found that there was an excavation once, at the spot where the bricks were found, I think in the reign of one of the Ptolemies, who tried to connect the Nile with the Red Sea, by a canal or something of the sort, and that the bricks found their

way to the bottom of the excavation only 2,200 years ago, and the excavation being abandoned, was of course soon covered up?—Now that you mention it, I think I have heard of something of the sort. It had escaped my memory.

Is not that a case justifying my remark about facts turning out to have a different meaning?—It justifies it in that case, but I apprehend there are many facts which cannot so be disposed of.

Perhaps not yet: but if one fact has melted away, may not others by-and-bye? And does it not show that it is unwise to rely on the fallible deductions of human reason as against a book proved divine in so many ways?—There are some deductions about which there can be no mistake.

Granted: but if your application of them brings you into collision with truth in some other direction, does it not suggest caution and even suspicion in the reception of them? Does it not suggest the wisdom of waiting for another explanation?—If there is a real collision with truth.

That is my point: if the Bible is shown to be true (as we shall show it is), there must be some mistake in the applications of science that would reduce it to a lie?—We don't say it is a lie exactly.

You would not use that word perhaps, but that is what it comes to?—Undoubtedly, the reliability of the Bible cannot be maintained, if some of the scientific views of the present day are correct.

Are you aware that scientific views, on almost all subjects, are constantly changing hue, so much so that a man who drops scientific reading for ten years, is out of the running?—Doubtless, there is much progress.

Ah, but I don't mean progress: I mean change—a going from one theory to another, and sometimes going back to an old theory?—I must, of course, allow that there is little fixity in scientific theory—not so much as stable men would prefer; but that is inevitable from the recent origin of true science. Nature is so vast and subtle, and human faculty so superficial, that change is inseparable from the progress of scientific knowledge.

Very well, my question is: ought not that fact to make a wise man pause much and long before he throws the Bible overboard at the bidding of a scientific theory that may turn out to be wrong?—There is some force in that: at the same time, we cannot shut our eyes to facts. Facts make their own impression, whether we will or no. It seems to me there are facts that cannot be explained, except by a much greater antiquity to the human race than the Bible teaches.

Very well, we will take the matter in that way. I was coming to that. We will admit, for the sake of argument, that a great antiquity must be conceded to the remains (apparently human) found at various depths on the earth's surface. I am now going to call your attention to the fact, that even in that case, scientific truth, if it be truth, is not inconsistent with the Bible account?—I shall be surprised if you can show that.

In the first place, let me ask in what way, according to your conception of the matter, does science conflict with the Bible on this point?—The Bible teaches that the human species were placed upon earth about 6,000 years ago, and science says 50,000 years at least. That strikes me as a considerable conflict.

It looks like it; but suppose we admit both the 50,000 years' and the 6,000 years' appearance of man, where would the conflict be then?—But you cannot do that.

Let us see. First, with regard to the race of Adam, there can be no doubt that the Bible teaches that it appeared upon the earth about 6,000 years ago; and I think you will be compelled to allow that that is in harmony with mathematical science, at all events?—In what way?

Have you ever realized the simple fact that the population of the earth is on the increase?—I should think it requires no great profundity to recognize that rather notorious fact. The newspapers make us aware of that from day to day.

Quite so. Very well, if there is a process of increase, it is simply a matter of calculation to ascertain how long ago it is since the process began?—Oh, I see your idea.

Invert the ratio of the increase in the earth's population,

and will it not follow that we shall get back more or less approximately to the starting point?—It would be rather a difficult calculation.

Granted. It could not be carried out accurately; but you must allow we should get at rough results more or less reliable?—They would be rather rough.

With regard to England and some other countries, they would not be so rough. We have accurate census returns to go by?—Ay, but they don't go far back.

They go far enough back to give us an average rule to work by. For example, the population of Great Britain has doubled in less than a hundred years?—Yes, but you cannot make Great Britain a rule for all the world. There have been special circumstances favourable to increase in Britain. The increase is not all what would be called natural increase.

True, but allowing for that, do you know how far back, on mathematical principles, you could carry the population of Great Britain?—I have never thought of working out such a problem.

Should you be surprised to be informed that you could not carry it back much further than the commencement of the Christian era?—Yes, I should be rather surprised.

Should you be prepared to controvert the fact?—No, not without looking into it.

Should you be inclined to go into it?—Not particularly.

You may take it as the fact that at the rate of increase now going on before our eyes in the population of the British Isles, calculating the process backwards, you could not carry it back more than 2,000 years, after allowing for the ravages of disease and war?—It would be rather an abstruse calculation.

Not so abstruse as it looks. Take it thus. If the population has doubled in a hundred years, and the population in 1881 be 40,000,000, putting it roughly, then in 1781 it would be 20,000,000, in 1681, 10,000,000, and so on?—But then the rate of increase was not so rapid in ancient times.

I am allowing for that. If we didn't allow for that we should find there would be no population at all in the

early centuries of the Christian era?—It is rather curious. I never thought about it.

I have spoken about Great Britain for the sake of example, but the same thing holds good as to other countries, with this exception, that other countries have been more exposed to destruction of life by war, and tempest, and pestilence, and consequently the population of the present hour cannot be taken as representing the full increase. Making allowance for this, it is a matter of simple calculation to find out how long ago the present process of increase began; and I say that on that simple principle, you cannot carry back the human race to an antiquity of even 6,000 years?—Then, the calculation must be wrong, even according to the Bible, for the Bible requires it to have begun 6,000 years.

That is a mistake—Is it?

The Bible tells us of the flood which swept away the human race between 1,000 and 2,000 years after Adam's day?—Oh yes: I had forgot.

That would make a new start in the work of increase?—Yes, I see.

The point is this, that taking the population of the earth at 1,400,000,000 (which is the accepted estimate at the present hour), and noting the rate of increase going on, and working the process backward, after making allowances for all decimations of the species by war, pestilence, and disaster, you cannot carry the existence of the human species further back than the Bible puts it?—I never saw the matter put in that way.

That is what I mean by the Bible account being in harmony with mathematical science on the subject of human antiquity?—I see the point.

And now have you ever considered what the population of the world must have been at the present moment, if the speculation of the scientists be true, that man has been upon the earth for, say even 50,000 years?—I confess I never thought about that.

It could be worked out?—I suppose it could.

Would you like to do it?—It would scarcely be in my line.

Would you like to have it done for you?—I should be curious to know the result.

I have gone through it?—I have no doubt you have got a big figure.

What do you think?—I have no idea.

If we have got 1,400,000,000 in 4,500 years, more or less, how many ought we to have in 50,000 years?—But I don't think that is putting it fairly.

Why not?—Because it is not to be supposed the human race would increase so steadily or so rapidly in its earliest stages (supposing, that is, it has been on the earth all that time), as it does in our own time.

What rate of increase would you claim for the early epochs of human generation?—Oh, I don't know.

If the human race doubles itself in a hundred years (and, mind you, that is lower than the actual present rate), should you say 200 years would be too much to reckon for doubling in the early times?—Really, I cannot tell.

Think! 200 years would be plenty of time to give to two persons to become four?—Well, yes, it would seem so.

If they did not increase at that rate, they must soon have ceased to exist, must they not, if they only lived an average of 70, like ourselves?—Well, I suppose you must be right. They must, of course, have doubled themselves in 200 years.

Very well, now, in my working out, I anticipated this very objection, about the early rate of increase not being so great as the present rate, and I gave modern ideas of antiquity the fairest of fair play. I allowed it a far wider margin than it could claim on any possibly reasonable hypothesis. I allowed 500 years for the race doubling itself at any time during the last 50,000 years?—You allowed them a wide berth certainly.

And now, working it out in that way—supposing the human race has only doubled itself once every 500 years, and that it has been on the earth for 50,000 years, what ought the present population to be?—I cannot guess.

2,535,301,200,456,458,802,993,406,410,752?—You amaze me. I cannot follow these figures.

I have a difficulty in naming them myself. They repre-

sent Two QUINTILLIONS, five hundred and thirty-five thousand, three hundred and one QUADRILLIONS, two hundred thousand, four hundred and fifty-six TRILLIONS, four hundred and fifty-eight thousand, eight hundred and two BILLIONS, nine hundred and ninety-three thousand, four hundred and six MILLIONS, four hundred and ten thousand, seven hundred and fifty-two. That is the arithmetical result of an increase of the population of the earth at the rate of twice in every 500 years for 50,000 years. Instead of fourteen hundred millions—the present estimated population of the earth—it is *countless myriads of billions!*—I should think there must be some mistake. It does not seem to me possible that doubling the population once in 500 years could come to such an amazing total.

There is no mistake about it. It is the simplest calculation in the world. You start with 2, of course. In 500 years they become 4; in another 500 years these become 8; and in another 500 these become 16; and so on, doubling your total every 500 of the 50,000. When you get to the end of the process, you find the regiment of figures I have given you?—I must say I am astonished.

Now upon that I have to ask whether the state of facts upon earth is not more in harmony with the Bible account of the beginning of man 6,000 years ago, than with the scientific speculation—for it is a mere guess as yet) that man was on the earth at least 50,000 years ago?—I see your drift. I must, of course, admit that there is considerable force in that presentation of the matter. I have never thought of it in that way before. But I understood you to say that the 50,000 years' way of it was right as well as the 6,000 years' version? You puzzled me there, I confess.

I did not exactly say the 50,000 idea was right; what I said, or intended to say, was, that supposing it could be shown that man was upon the earth 50,000 years ago, it would not interfere with the truthfulness of the Bible account, which is in harmony with the amount of population upon the face of the earth at the present time?—But if man was upon the face of the earth 50,000 years ago, what about the astounding total you have worked out?

Well, it would come to this, as there is no such astounding total upon the earth at the present time, but the merest infinitesimal fragment of it; if man was upon the earth 50,000 years ago, there must have occurred some break in the process of generation—some destruction of the species—some catastrophe like the flood without an ark and a Noah in it with his family—some prolonged suspension of human existence upon earth—some wide, dark interval of chaos?—How could you make that agree with the Bible?

Most easily; the Bible requires, yea, necessitates, some such idea. We have already seen that Genesis teaches the pre-Adamic existence of the earth for indefinite ages. You may find also that there are hints of a pre-Adamic race?—That is news to me.

Perhaps so, but it may be true, for all that?—Of course. I do not say I know all truth.

You have not been a student of the Bible, I think you said?—Not exactly.

You will be the less diffident, therefore as to the question of what it does, or does not, teach?—I have a general knowledge of what it teaches.

Have you observed what was said to Noah after the earth had been cleared of its pre-Noahic population by the flood: “Be fruitful, and multiply, and *replenish* the earth” (Gen. ix. 1)?—Yes, I have observed it.

What do you think was meant by telling Noah to “replenish” the earth?—To fill the earth, I suppose.

Wouldn't it mean, fill *again*?—As a matter of fact, that would be the meaning in Noah's case.

Have you noticed that the same command was addressed to Adam: “Be fruitful, and multiply, and *replenish* the earth” (Gen. i. 28)?—I am aware of these words; I had not thought of them particularly.

If “replenish” meant “fill again” in the case of Noah, what objection to its meaning the same in the case of Adam?—I see your suggestion.

Does it not point to there having been a previous occupancy of the earth, terminated in some way not made known?—But the Hebrew word *mullaoo* does not mean “fill *again*”; it simply means “fill.”

Its Hebraic use determines its meaning as a Hebrew term. It may not etymologically contain the idea of repetition, but its use in the case of Noah shows it may be used conventionally to express that idea?—Your argument is rather weak for once, Mr. Alltruth.

It is at all events favoured by the translators in their using *re*-plenish to express the idea of the Hebrew verb?—There is something in that, though I don't know: even replenish, I am told, in the days of King James, did not have the idea of "fill again," but simply "to fill."

I do not rest my argument wholly on the verb translated "replenish." I am but paving the way for other allusions in the Scriptures, which somewhat more specifically favour the idea of a pre-Adamic habitation of the earth?—I should like to see them.

They are not numerous, and they are not very explicit, but they bear sufficiently in that direction to show that anything that true science might demonstrate on the point, has a possible place in the Bible?—"A possible place:" you don't put it strongly.

I am putting it just as strongly as the facts admit?—Well, that is all an honest man could wish.

The first allusion is by Peter, who, in enumerating illustrations of judgment on rebels, before mentioning the flood, says, "God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell (*tartaroo*, the bowels of the earth), and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment" (2 Peter i. 4). There is a similar allusion by Jude (verse 6), who states the nature of the sin of the angels: "They kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation." Paul also alludes to the same matter, in asking concerning the future dignity of the saints: "Know ye not that we shall judge angels?" (1 Cor. vi. 3).—But that refers to "angels." I understood you to speak of "man." The geologic remains are human remains.

Quite so; but men are only "a little lower than the angels" (Heb. ii. 7) and made in their image; and, therefore, supposing the pre-Adamite inhabitants of the earth were "the angels" spoken of by Peter, Jude and Paul, their remains, if found, would be human remains to all appearance?—Extraordinary suggestion, I must say,

It may appear so to you; but it is at least in harmony with the evidence in the case. And it is not so extraordinary as the idea that man should have been on the earth for 50,000 years without even multiplying at even so low a rate of twice in every 500 years, and without being able to carry his history back more than 4,000 years?—There are difficulties, of course, on both sides.

I do not admit the difficulties on the Scriptural side. The Scriptural side exactly suits the scientific supposition that there was a human habitation of the earth ages ago; and it accounts for the interruption of that habitation, which science does not. It shows us a divine interference with the inhabitants, after the manner of the flood, and a new start 6,000 years ago, which harmonizes with the state of history and the extent of the earth's population. Science is obliged to assume a continuous habitation for 50,000 years, at the least, and is, therefore, face to face with the inexplicable fact that while an increase for that period at the paltry rate of twice in 500 years would give a population of billions of billions—which the earth would not hold,—the actual population is only fourteen hundred millions. I say the difficulties are all on the side of science?—You put it strongly.

Not more strongly than the facts warrant?—I do not suppose you think so.

Of course, when I speak of all the difficulties being on the side of science, I mean false scientific theories—science falsely so-called. True science will never conflict with truth in any department. Science of the other sort creates difficulties. The notion of human generation commencing 50,000 years ago, and never stopping, and having now only produced a population of fourteen hundred millions, is an illustration?—You seem disposed to make the most of that.

I make a good deal of it. It is a downright confutation of the most pretentious and widely received scientific speculation of the day. It cannot be answered in any way. It is astonishing how glibly men will launch an impossible notion, and how easily it is taken up and sent round with the most sublime assurance, when a moment

or two's arithmetical reflection is all that is necessary to expose the astonishing imposture. It reminds me of an objection to resurrection which used to pass round unchallenged, till a pinch of mathematics acted like dynamite and blew the preposterous notion into the air?—What was it?

It used to be said, even on the Bible hypothesis, resurrection was an impossibility, because the dead were so numerous that, if raised, there would not be standing room for them in the entire globe—that they would have to stand upon one another's heads in several tiers?—I have heard the objection. How has it been disposed of?

Disposed of? Why, it has been shown to be an impertinent imposture of the highest dimensions?—Strong language.

Not a bit stronger than the case calls for. It has been shown that all the men that have ever lived since the days of Adam to the present day could find standing room in Ireland alone?—Ireland?

Yes, Ireland!—I should have thought is impossible.

It is a very simple calculation. In the first place, ascertain the number of square miles there are in Ireland. Then find how many men will stand in a line a mile long. Multiply this number by itself, and you get the number of men that will stand on a square mile. Multiply this total by the number of square miles there are in Ireland, and you have the number of men Ireland will hold standing together. Now, find the number of people that have lived since the days of Adam. Work it out in the most liberal manner; give to every generation since Adam the number now living, 1,400,000,000, more or less; reckon four generations to a century, and sixty centuries as the time since Adam, and you will find your figures come pretty close to Ireland's standing capacity?—You are quite expert in the manipulation of figures.

There is no great expertness needed for these simple calculations. They effectually dispose of the no-room-for-the-dead objection. But the objection is further and most seriously reduced by the doctrine taught in the Bible that only a small proportion of the human race, viz., the responsible part of them, will rise from the dead.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: My lord, I rise to order. We are getting into theological disquisitions, and all sorts of irregularities. We have had enough of this sort of thing; my friend has been wandering entirely beyond Counsel's licence for quite a considerable time back. I have not stopped him, hoping we should soon get to the end of it, but, really, I must now protest. We are listening to a series of lectures on all kinds of imaginable topics. If my friend will confine himself to the cross-examination of the witness, I can have nothing to say, however dreary the performance may be: but if we are to be treated to lectures on fanciful mathematics, and theological dogma in general, I must appeal to your Lordship. My friend's duty is to keep himself within the purview of the examination-in-chief, instead of which he has introduced no end of new matter, which, if we are to follow up, will extend this trial beyond the duration of our lifetimes. The question is, are the doctrines of the defendants hurtful to society? The witness has deposed to a variety of unmistakable illustrations on this point. So long as my friend endeavoured to shake the witness's evidence by eliciting admissions personally favourable to the defendants, he was in order, but when he treats us to a farago of irrelevant calculations and scientific mystifications, prying into the witness's private opinions, and all that sort of thing, I submit we are entitled to the protection of the Court.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: If my friend had only been patient for a minute or two, he might have spared us this uncalled-for interruption. However, I will relieve him from further endurance. I had a question or two more to put to Mr. Observer, but I will waive them. I can get answers from the other witnesses. I cannot admit, however, my Lord, that my questions have either been irrelevant or mystifying.

His Lordship: They have certainly been lucid enough.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: And I humbly submit, my Lord, they have been to the point.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: They have been to a point, but not to *the* point. The point is, are the defend-

ants hurting themselves and society, or not, by their doctrines? What has the arithmetical labyrinth our friend has dragged the witness through to do with that question?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: It has to do with the question whether the defendants are justified in their course or not. His Lordship distinctly indicated at the opening of the case that the question of justification was within the purview of the enquiry now before the Court, and my friend undertook to address himself to that part of the case.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: His lordship hinted that I might call witnesses to rebut the idea of Christ's resurrection: but what has geology or population or impossible theories of impossible miracles to do with that?

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I am afraid my friend's logical penetration is somewhat at fault, or he would see that the matters he sneers at have a most material bearing on the question. I apprehend that he feels this himself, and is growing impatient at the process by which his own witness's evidence is being sifted away.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I protest against my friend's insulting observations. I am not objecting to any legitimate process of cross-examination, but for Counsel to trail a witness all over the world, and up and down the ages of antiquity in the manner of my friend's questions, I say it is mystifying the witness, and wasting the time of the Court.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I am perfectly satisfied with the answers I have elicited from the witness. I had a further question or two, but I have no desire to inflict further torture on my friend. He may proceed with his re-examination.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I have no further questions to put to this witness. Our friend has so mystified us all, we scarcely know where we are.

His Lordship: You call your next witness.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I had several other witnesses to speak to the demoralizing effect of the doctrines of the defendants; but in view of my friend's tactics, I think I will serve the interests of my clients best in not

calling them. They would only strengthen the evidence already given

His Lordship: They would introduce no new element?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: No, my Lord. They would confirm the statements of Mr. Town Gossip, and Mr. Shrewd Observer, as to the disastrous effects of the Christman doctrine wherever it is received, but, as I understand, they would speak to no new facts. And if I were to put them into the box, I should only expose them to my friend's embarrassing and impertinent Jesuitries.

The Clerk of the Court: Scarcely Parliamentary.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I don't mind. It relieves my friend's mind, who is evidently distressed.

His Lordship: What course do you propose?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I propose, my Lord, to act on your Lordship's suggestion, and to call a couple of witnesses who will most effectually prove the legendary character of the central dogma of the defendants' system of faith—the resurrection of Christ.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: We court the issue, my Lord.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Oh, of course. Some men are prepared to prove black white any day.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I am afraid that is what the plaintiffs are trying to do in this case.

His Lordship: You do not call your witnesses now?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I am prepared to call them now, but perhaps your Lordship would prefer to take them after lunch?

His Lordship: Yes.

The Court adjourned for lunch.

FOURTH SITTING

On the re-assembling of the Court,

His Lordship: I understand the plaintiffs have completed their case so far as the hurtfulness of the defendants' doctrine is concerned, and you now call witnesses to show its untruthfulness

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Yes, my Lord; and I feel it to be a little awkward to have to attempt to prove a negative; but your Lordship expressed a wish that I should make the attempt.

His Lordship: It will certainly strengthen your case against the defendants if you can show that the doctrine they promulgate is not only a hurtful doctrine, but a false doctrine as well.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: I apprehend, my Lord, it is essential that the falsity should be made out before the case for the plaintiffs can stand; because if a doctrine be a true doctrine, its hurtfulness cannot be a reason for stopping it. Its hurtfulness in such a case would only be seeming. It would be a hurtfulness in limited relations, like the hurtfulness of an amputation.

His Lordship: I think it is necessary the falsity should be made out.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Very well, my Lord. It is an unusual course; but I bow to your Lordship's decision. I call

MR. BAD LAUGH.

(*Mr. Bad Laugh objects to be sworn.*)

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: It is immaterial. I do not think it would add to the value of this man's evidence in any way to have him put upon oath.

Witness: You keep your indecent tongue to yourself.

The Clerk: Order, order.

Witness: I shall not be insulted by any man. I know my constitutional rights, and I shall stand up for them if I have to do it over the bodies of every man in this honourable Court.

His Lordship: Order, witness. If you do not behave with proper decorum, I shall commit you for contempt of Court.

Witness: I shall behave with proper decorum, but I shall not put up with insult.

The Clerk: No one wants to insult you.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: My friend's observation was somewhat insulting.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: I simply stated a fact, which the witness himself proclaimed to the world.

Witness: I have done nothing of the sort.

Sir N. Acceptorof Alltruth: He says the oath does not bind his conscience, and, therefore, does not add to the value of his evidence. That is all I say. I say more. I think it adds to the value of no man's evidence. I think it a barbarous state of things altogether that a man's word should not be supposed reliable unless he goes through a solemn cabalistic ceremony in open Court. It is called a Christian oath; but I am sure it has nothing to do with Christ. Christ forbade the taking of oaths.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: We are not here to discuss the abolition of oaths. You object to be sworn, Mr. Bad Laugh?—I do.

You and our friend are pretty well agreed, it would seem?—You well say "seem."

Well, we will not pry into it further. You are not called to speak to the question of oaths. You are called to give the Court the benefit of your evidence on the

subject of the Christman doctrine of the resurrection of Christ?—I understand so.

You know something of the subject?—A little.

You have given it some attention?—Yes, I have studied, and written, and lectured, and debated on it.

You have gone into the matter carefully and thoroughly?—I have.

And what is your impression with regard to it?—That it is a piece of unmitigated humbug.

In what way do you arrive at that conclusion?—In every way in which such a conclusion could be arrived at.

Be more specific?—Well, I look at it first in itself. The idea of a dead man coming to life again is an absurdity on the face of it. It is more: it is an impossibility. Life requires a warm and fluid state of the blood; it requires an elastic and vital state of the tissues; it requires, above all, electrical conductivity in the nerves which have been called the electric wires of the animal system. Now, in the case of a dead man, all these conditions are suspended, and what is worse, they become more and more impossible every moment; for as every man in this Court is aware, the moment vitality is at an end, the fluids and tissues of the body commence to decompose directly. By the third day, putrefaction sets in. And any man who tells me that a body in that state can come to life again, I say he makes a fool of me. It don't stand to common sense or reason, or anything else. It is a cock and bull story, like Jonah swallowing the whale, or something of that sort.

How do you account for the defendants believing it?—Heigh! I don't know. I am not called upon to say. There are plenty of people in the lunatic asylum now-a-days, and plenty out of it that ought to be in.

You are aware, of course, that they base their faith principally on the New Testament account?—It is astounding what people can base their faith on.

You do not think that account is reliable?—I should think not.

As the result of your study of the matter, you have come to the conclusion that it is to be discarded?—Utterly.

Perhaps you will indicate to the Court the grounds on which you have reached that conclusion?—Well, any book that tells me a cock and bull story like the resurrection, I should consider that quite a sufficient ground for refusing to believe, without anything else.

But you have something else?—Oh yes, lots.

Perhaps you will favour the Court with an indication?—Well, there is no evidence that the book was written at the time it professes to have been written. You cannot take it back further than the middle of the second century, at the very furthest; I am not sure if I don't go too far in allowing so early a date as that.

You think there are grounds for believing that the apostolic story was compiled then?—Undoubtedly. It was the age of literary forgeries of all sorts. Even the Christians themselves allow that. They have an apocryphal New Testament, I believe, which they admit belongs to that age.

You have no doubt that it belongs to the ecclesiastical forgeries of that age?—I would not like to call it a forgery exactly; I believe it was a literary production of that age—an age of romance and fable—an age more prolific of ecclesiastical fiction than any age before or since.

As a literary production, you believe it to be a work of fiction?—As regards its main complexion, I do.

Its main complexion?—Yes. By that I mean its principal incidents and doctrines. I have no doubt that there was a man called Jesus Christ, who lived earlier, and who was remarkable in some ways; and I believe an attempt was made in the middle of the second century to put into literary shape such traditions as were in circulation about him.

And the New Testament is the result?—The New Testament is the result. I believe there is a slight foundation of historical truth in the account, but that it is mainly compounded of legend and myth built upon this foundation. I do not say the writers were bad men, but that they were misled by their zeal, and became victims to the deception which ignorant men practice upon one another in all ages. A slight ingredient of historical

truth has been outraged and distorted and smothered in fact, in a mass of mythical incrustation.

You have examined the New Testament, of course?—Very thoroughly in my time.

And you have satisfied yourself as to the character you impute to it?—Oh, undoubtedly. It is not merely that the Four Gospels cannot be shown to have been in existence at all before the year A.D. 150, which is 120 years at least after the alleged date of the death of Jesus: but even supposing it was proved that they were written at the time they profess to have been written, you have a whole mass of contradictions in the history of Jesus, which are irreconcilable with the idea of its being a true story—quite apart from the story of resurrection. Besides, we have to take the Old Testament into account. The New and the Old are bound up together, and they are both accepted by Christians as the word of God. I believe it is a favourite argument with some of them that they stand or fall together. It is impossible to even glance into the Old Testament without seeing the absurdity of calling it a divine revelation. It is full of contradictions and absurdities. It is inconsistent with science and inconsistent with itself. The acts of the God it professes to reveal are inconsistent with the character it imputes to that God. The legislation it represents as having emanated from Him is simply inhuman.

You consider the Old Testament also a literary fiction?—Not exactly a literary fiction. I have never contended, and do not know any decently educated man who does contend, that it is the work of ignorant and designing men, intended to deceive the people. On the contrary, I believe the Bible, like many other books, is a collection of the works of different men in different ages, many of the earlier books being simply collections of, or collections founded on, the works of earlier writers, differing from the ages out of which they grew, and with the men whose ideas, more or less accurately, we get in some of them; added to, curtailed, interlined, abbreviated, and augmented according to the fashions and whims and myths and superstitions of the different ages through which they have come down to us.

You do not admit that there is any room for the claim of a divine character which is put forward for them?—Not for a moment; it is a self-evident absurdity. The book is a literary outgrowth of a dark age and a narrow-minded people, full of their blunders when they blundered, full of their crimes when they were criminal—having their poetry if they were poetical, but simply expressing the men and the age out of which it came.

You are prepared to swear—at least, not to swear—I believe you object to swearing, Mr. Bad Laugh?

Sir N. Acceptor of Alltruth: Not when it serves his purpose.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Don't interrupt.

You are prepared to maintain, Mr. Bad Laugh, and tender your assurance to the Court as an expert in the matter, that the contents of the Bible, in both its Old Testament and New Testament departments, justify your representations as to its character?—Undoubtedly. I am prepared with chapter and verse, and all the particulars, if necessary.

We will not trouble the Court with them at present.

—

Cross-examined by Mr. Discerner-of-facts.

I have a few questions to put to you, Mr. Bad Laugh?—I shall try to answer them.

You have spoken of the doctrine of Christ's resurrection as "a piece of unmitigated humbug"?—Yes.

What do you mean by that?—I should have thought you would have known.

I must trouble you to explain?—"Humbug," I take to mean sham, delusion, that which pretends to be true and isn't; "unmitigated" I understand to be unmixed.

Does not humbug convey the idea of intentional deception for sinister ends?—Perhaps it does.

Do you attribute intentional deception for sinister ends to the men who originally propagated the doctrine of Christ's resurrection?—I don't know anything about the man who originally propagated the doctrine.

There were such men, of course?—It is not for me to say.

Have you no opinion on the point?—My opinion is that we don't know anything about such men.

Do you think the idea of Christ's resurrection started without anybody to start it?—If the thing started with a book written in the middle of the second century, it would start with a book to start it, and in that case, without anybody to start it.

Do you say that the idea of Christ's resurrection started in the middle of the second century?—I don't know when it started. You cannot take it further back than the middle of the second century.

May it have commenced at that time in the way you suggest—with the writing of a book pretending to have been written a hundred years earlier?—It may and it may not.

If you say it may not, do you mean that it may have commenced earlier than the middle of the second century?—It does not matter what I mean, I have given you my answer.

It matters everything what you mean, Mr. Bad Laugh. We are here for the purpose of considering meanings very particularly. We are in a Court of law: we are not on a debating platform; and it will be His Lordship's duty to see that you define your meanings very precisely?—Very well, what do you want to know?

Do I understand you to give it as your opinion that the doctrine of Christ's resurrection may have commenced earlier than the middle of the second century?—You cannot take it back further than that.

I am not asking how far we can take it back: we shall see about that directly. I am asking what your opinion is about it?—I have no particular opinion.

You must have some particular opinion, or else you insult the Court in asking us to accept your judgment as an expert, as my friend called you?—I say it may have begun in the middle of the second century, and it may not.

It may not?—Yes, it may not.

Then it may have begun earlier?—It may have begun later.

Oh no: that could not be: you admit that we can take

the New Testament back to that time?—Well, what of that?

Well, it must have begun at that time at the very latest, according to your own admission?—Very well.

Then it may have begun earlier?—We have no evidence of an earlier beginning.

Never mind what we have evidence of just now: the question is, does the evidence, as you estimate it, exclude an earlier beginning?—I am not going to help you by saying what it does or what it does not exclude.

You must not be impertinent. You must answer the question. His Lordship will tell you that you are bound to answer the questions?—I will answer the questions as far as I can follow you.

Do you mean to say that you cannot follow this simple question, whether or not, so far as you know the evidence, the doctrine of the resurrection of Christ may have originated earlier than the middle of the second century—I tell you I don't know.

Very well: we will accept that answer. No doubt it represents the truth. It is ignorance, and not knowledge, that opposes the truth in this matter.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Don't make speeches.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: I know my duty. Now, Mr. Bad Laugh, are you not aware that there were Christians long before the middle of the second century?—Yes; we can trace them as Essenes before even the alleged date of the death of Christ.

Ah, but as Christians! Never mind the Essenes just now. Were there not Christians long before the middle of the second century?—Yes, and Essenes.

Never mind the Essenes?—We must mind them—we must mind facts!

I want you to keep your mind on the Christians, just now?—And I keep my mind on the Essenes.

Were the Christians and the people you call Essenes the same?—I think there is tolerable evidence that the one developed from the other.

I should prefer to be relieved of the complication of the Essenes at present?—Perhaps you would, but I don't choose you should.

Don't be impertinent, witness. Answer the questions.—I am answering them.

Were there believers in Christ before the second century?—How can I tell. I was not alive then.

Are you ignorant of the evidence?—It is not for me to produce your evidence.

Do you not know that in A.D. 112, Pliny the Younger, Roman governor in Asia Minor, wrote a letter (now extant) to the Emperor Trajan, asking what he was to do with the Christians on account of their multitude and the tenacity of their convictions?—I think the letter of Pliny is a fairly historic document.

And are you not aware that Josephus, in his *Antiquities*, quotes a writing of the Roman author Tacitus, who lived in the reign of the Emperor Nero, to the effect, that Nero ascribed a certain fire that broke out in Rome, to the Christians, whose founder, he says, was "Christ, who, in the reign of Tiberius, was brought to punishment by Pontius Pilate"?—I am inclined to think the quotation from Tacitus is liable to impeachment.

Oh, I daresay you are inclined to think everything liable to impeachment that favours the cause of Christ?—Thank you. I am in the habit of impeaching everything I choose to think impeachable, and I generally do it successfully.

On what ground is the quotation from Tacitus to be impeached?—Because it is not found anywhere out of Josephus's writings.

Are you not aware that we are indebted solely to Josephus's writings for the knowledge of the existence of many other ancient writings—such as Manetho, the Egyptian; Berosus, the Chaldean, etc.?—He quotes those men.

And is it not a fact that but for his quotation of them, the world would never have known of their existence?—So I have heard it argued.

Is it not a fact?—What has it to do with the case?

Much; Josephus quotes Tacitus, who tells us there were Christians in Rome so early as A.D. 60, and that their founder was Jesus Christ, who was executed, 30 years previously, in Jerusalem?—It is too important a docu-

ment to accept on the unsupported evidence of Josephus.

Can you disprove the evidence of Josephus that Tacitus wrote the passage in question?—It is not my business to disprove.

Are you not aware that the writings of Tacitus have in recent times been discovered in a fragmentary form?—I have heard something to that effect; but I don't see that it amounts to proof. Somebody may have invented the fragments.

Nobody invented Josephus?—I suppose not.

You cannot disprove him?—It is not my business.

You say you cannot accept him unsupported, and when the support it brought forward, you doubt it?—I doubt everything till it is proved.

Out of your own mouth, I prove Pliny and Josephus (and, therefore, Tacitus). Proving them, I prove the existence of believers in Christ in multitudes, both at the beginning of the second, and at the middle and end of the first century. How do you reconcile that fact with your suggestion that the belief in Christ's resurrection perhaps originated in the middle of the second century?—I say we can trace the New Testament back to the middle of the second century, but no further.

You do not answer the question?—I answer it in the best way I can.

Very well; we will take your answer as the best you can give. No doubt it is so. You see the lion in the street, and you naturally get down a bye-lane?—I am not very frightened at your lion.

Why don't you charge at him then?—I say we have no certain knowledge of the Christians of the first and second centuries.

Then you say what is contrary to the evidence produced and admitted. The evidence, even apart from the New Testament, gives us certain knowledge of their existence in great numbers before the end of the first century. Even if we hadn't Tacitus, Pliny would be sufficient. In A.D. 112, Pliny speaks of "many of every rank and of both sexes" being Christians, and says their faith had "spread like a contagion, *not only into cities and towns,*

but into country villages also." He also speaks of the Roman idolatry having been "LONG intermitted." Such a state of things could not have been brought about in a few years in the slow, crude days of the first century. Consequently, Pliny's statements, written in A.D. 112, is proof of the existence of a numerous body of Christian believers well back into the first century. It is a matter of "certain knowledge," which you say we have not?—I have a right to my own opinion.

Oh, no doubt: I am only showing what your opinion is worth?—Thank you.

Now let me draw your attention to another point. Can you tell me whether or not the Christians were a popular sect in these early times!—I suppose you know all about that. You don't require to ask me.

I am testing your theory of "unmitigated humbug," and you must answer?—No sect is popular at the first, I suppose. The Secularists are not popular.

Are you aware that the Christians were persecuted?—Yes, I suppose the Secularists would be persecuted if the Christians had the power.

Are you not aware that they were hated, despoiled of their goods, and deprived of liberty and life?—There have always been such things.

I don't ask for generalities. I wish to confine you to specific facts?—I shall not be confined any more than I like.

You must answer the questions. Are you not aware that Pliny in the letter already referred to—a letter written A.D. 112, as everyone admits, and as even you are compelled to admit—I say, are you not aware that in that letter, Pliny exhibits the facts that it was a common thing for Christians to be executed?—I should prefer the words of Pliny.

Very well, here they are: "I have taken this course about those who have been brought before me as Christians. I asked them whether they were Christians or not. If they confessed that they were Christians, I asked them again, and a third time, intervening threatenings with the questions. If they persevered in their confessions, I

ORDERED THEM TO BE EXECUTED; for I did not doubt, but, let their confessions be of any sort whatsoever, this positiveness and inflexible obstinacy deserved to be punished." These are the words of Pliny?—Very well, I have said that Pliny's letter is a fairly historical document.

Do they not show that it was a common thing, at the beginning of the second century, for Christians to be executed?—The words speak for themselves.

I am content with that answer. The words do speak for themselves. Now I ask your particular attention to the application of these facts?—I know nothing about applications.

Wait a little: you said this doctrine of the resurrection of Christ was humbug, and you adopted my definition of humbug as "intentional deception for sinister ends." Will you tell me what sinister end was served by either the preaching or the believing in the resurrection of Christ at a time when it was death to do either?—Well, I suppose some people like to be martyred.

Oh, that is your answer, is it?—Yes: I think it is a very good answer. It is notorious that there was a rage for martyrdom in the time of Ignatius, as his epistles show; that would be at the beginning of the second century.

Do you think people like to be martyred for the sake of the thing?—I have no doubt there are people vain-glorious enough to go through the thing for its own sake.

Did ever you know of people willing to encounter poverty, imprisonment, and death, from the motive of vain glory?—I am happy to think that such a race of fools is well nigh extinct.

Then your theory is somewhat inconsistent with your "experience"?—Not altogether. I have met vain-glorious persons.

I have no doubt of it: but you have not found vain-glorious persons possessed of the kind of courage that would lead them to death for the sake of a principle? They are generally the most cowardly of men where self-sacrifice is involved?—That is not an universal experience.

It is certainly general experience?—There were cer-

tainly vain-glorious persons among the martyrs of the first centuries.

That I do not deny as a probability: but the question to consider is, what was the leading motive in the "rage for martyrdom," to which you have referred? Was it not the conviction that it would secure the advantage proposed in connection with the preaching of Jesus Christ?—I have no doubt there was something of that sort in it.

Was not that an advantage connected with another life?—Such as the poor dupes looked forward to—yes.

Was not their submission to death, therefore, an evidence of very earnest conviction on their part?—Oh, that I do not deny.

Then, so far as they were concerned, it was no affair of "humbug"?—Oh, I daresay they thought they were all right.

You admit that the crowds spoken of by Pliny, many of whom he ordered to be executed, believed in the truth of the resurrection of Christ?—I suppose they did.

Is there any doubt about it?—I suppose not, but that don't prove the resurrection of Christ. Every faith has its martyrs: but that don't prove that every faith is true.

Stop a bit. One step at a time. We are getting on very nicely. We have made considerable progress. We now have it that the faith of Christ existed long before the middle of the second century; that crowds in various wide-lying provinces of the Roman Empire believed in it at the end of the first century, and believed in it so earnestly that they allowed themselves to be put to death, in the expectation of advantage that Christ would afterwards bestow upon them. We also have it, that so far as they were concerned, the doctrine of the resurrection of Christ was no matter of "humbug," but of earnest conviction, leading them to a course producing no present benefit, but the reverse—the loss of all that is dear to men. I now return to my first question: Do you attribute intentional deception for sinister ends to the original propagators of the doctrine?—I don't know who they were, and how can I tell?

How can you tell? You have "told." You distinctly

stated in answer to my friend, that the resurrection of Christ was a piece of unmitigated humbug. We have found that it was no humbug on the part of the believers of it in the end of the first century; and therefore if it is humbug at all, it must have been so on the part of its original propagators only. And now you say you cannot tell, because you don't know who they were?—Oh, it is very easy to sum it all up so. I say that speaking generally, ecclesiastical miracles are humbugs, and of course, the resurrection of Christ was the first.

That won't suit me at all. We must have no "speaking generally" now. We must have speaking particularly. We are dealing with facts and not with fancies. We have got to a point, and to that point I mean to stick until we get to a clear settlement, either that the case is one of unmitigated humbug as you say, or that your verdict is the blatant recklessness of a man who does not know what he is talking about?—Thank you. You are very polite, I must say.

Never mind the politeness. Let us stick to the point. I ask again, do you mean to say that there was intentional deception for sinister ends on the part of the original propagators of the resurrections of Christ?—I have no doubt, if we knew who they were, we should find there was something of that sort.

Don't you know who they were?—No.

Why not?—Because we have no information.

Do you consider the New Testament narrative no information?—Aye, but you cannot carry that back further than the middle of the second century.

What do you mean?—I mean there is no corroborative evidence of its existence before that date.

What do you call corroborative evidence?—Mention of it by contemporary writers.

May a book not exist without mention by contemporary writers?—Possibly, of course.

Do you believe in the authenticity of the writings of Homer?—Of course.

And Herodotus?—And Herodotus.

Can you produce any mention of their works by con-

temporary writers—writers who lived at the time these works were produced?—I don't know that I can. They are too ancient for that.

How do you "carry them back" to the date of their origin?—Well, there is the uncontradicted reputation of the thing; that is sufficient in a case where there are no special claims involved.

Are you not aware that there is an uncontradicted reputation in the case of the New Testament?—No, I am not aware of that. I contradict it.

Since you didn't live to know the facts in the first century, or in the middle of the second, when you say the New Testament may have been produced, what is the value of your contradiction?—That every man must judge for himself.

Might not I contradict Homer in the same way?—You might.

Would it in any way detract from your conviction of the authenticity of Homer?—No. You could have no reason for such a contradiction.

Very well, it is your reason, and not your contradiction we have to do with. I again ask why you consider we are not to receive the New Testament as information concerning the original propagators of the doctrine of the resurrection of Christ?—And I again say, because you cannot carry it further back than the middle of the second century.

Let us see if we cannot. You admit that the existence of the book can be carried back to A.D. 150. On what ground do you believe it existed at that time?—It is not for me to supply you with evidence.

It is for you to answer the questions?—I am not bound to answer a question of that sort.

You are bound to answer any question I may put in this trial, as his Lordship will tell you.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I object. I submit my friend has no right to put the question. He has a right to ask the witness what his opinions and conclusions are; but he has no right to go into the grounds upon which the witness may have formed those opinions.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: I differ entirely from my friend there. The opinions of the witness would be of very little value unless we were at liberty to test the grounds of them. They would be of great value to my friend, but not to us. We wish to test the competence of the witness to form the opinions he has placed before the Court: and I cannot do this unless we have the fullest liberty.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Fullest liberty! At the rate this trial is going on, we shall get through by next Christmas, perhaps.

His Lordship: I think the witness is bound to answer the question. His opinions cannot suffer if the grounds of them are good.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: Now, witness, answer the question. On what grounds do you admit that the existence of the New Testament can be carried as far back as A.D. 150?—Mention by contemporary authors will carry it as far as that.

Give me the contemporary authors that carry it as far back as that?—I don't see that I am bound to do that.

Yes, you are bound to answer the questions. His Lordship has so decided?—You are so pertinacious. You tie a fellow down most indecently.

Mention to me the author I ask for?—I don't see what you want that for, seeing you claim an earlier existence.

I am going to show that the evidence that carries it to A.D. 150 carries it much further as well?—Oh, that is it, is it! Then I don't see that I am entitled to help your case.

Don't waste the time of the Court. I may have to ask for your committal if you do not answer the questions?—You are mistaken if you think that will frighten me. I am the wrong man to be intimidated.

I do not wish to frighten or intimidate you. I wish you to answer the questions?—I am answering them to the best of my ability.

On what author do you rely as proving the existence of the New Testament in A.D. 150?—I do not rely on any one in particular. I rely on the general drift of contemporary literature.

That is not definite enough. Contemporary literature is made up of particular books; I must have particular books?—Well, you may take it that I mean the ecclesiastical writers in general of that age—the writers of any account, I mean—generally known as the Christian fathers.

Names please?—Why everybody knows their names.

You must mention them?—Well, there is Clement, of Alexandria; Irenæus, of Lyons; Justin Martyr, and perhaps Papias.

There are others, are there not?—One or two others; they are known to every scholar; Tertullian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, etc.

Why do you fix on A.D. 150?—I do not fix on that date in a hard and fast sense. I say, that generally speaking, we are safe in saying that these writers show the New Testament existing at that date.

Now let us see if they do not prove a much earlier date than that. Take Irenæus, the Christian bishop, who settled in Gaul. He was born early in the second century. You know what he says in his book, "Against Heresies"?—I cannot charge my memory.

Well, writing in the middle of the second century, he speaks thus:—"Matthew, among the Jews, wrote a gospel in their own language, while Peter and Paul were preaching the gospel at Rome. After the death of the fore-named apostles, Mark, the disciple and interpreter of Peter, delivered to us in writing the things that Peter had preached. Next Luke, Paul's companion, put down in a book the gospel preached by Paul. Lastly, John, the beloved disciple, published his gospel while he was dwelling at Ephesus." You may also be aware that he mentioned by name thirteen of Paul's epistles, and quotes copiously from them in the course of his argument against heresy. Now, upon that my question is this: Do you think is possible that a man, writing in the middle of the second century, could speak of, and use in this way, a book just written by some anonymous person (according to the theory you have placed before the Court), a book that nobody had heard of before, that nobody knew anything of?—There is no saying what people can do

Irenæus quotes the New Testament in his argument against heresies: would he have quoted as an authority a book that nobody knew anything of?—He might have done so.

You think he would found an argument on a book that nobody recognized, and that had only just been concocted?—He might.

Did you ever know of such a case? Did you ever know of a person in some dispute, quoting, as an accepted authority of some standing, a book only just invented?—What has that to do with it?

A good deal, and you feel that it has, or you would answer?—A man hard up in an argument is glad to use anything. A drowning man catches at straws.

You think Irenæus deliberately quoted from a book that he had never heard of before, and that nobody knew anything about, in settlement of points of doctrine, for which there was no recognized standard? and that he gave familiar information about the origin and authorship of the books of the New Testament, of which nobody had heard anything before?—He may have invented it himself for aught I know.

And then quoted it as proof of his arguments?—And then quoted it as proof of his arguments.

How do you imagine he could expect such a mode of proof to have any weight?—Oh, that is not my business.

Is not his appeal to the New Testament an evidence that at that time the New Testament was known and recognized as an authority?—I cannot see it.

Do you know of any other case in which appeal is made to an authority that is not recognized, and that nobody knows anything about?—That has nothing to do with it.

Is not such a thing a moral impossibility?—If Irenæus did it, it is not impossible.

Are you not aware that there is evidence of the existence and currency of the New Testament at that time, independently of Irenæus?—It is not for me to produce your proof.

Did Irenæus know Polycarp?—I suppose he did.

Is there any doubt about it?—Personally I don't know anything about it.

Are you not aware that Irenæus wrote a letter to one Florinus, which is extant to the present day, in which he says: "I saw you when I was a boy in the Lower Asia, with Polycarp; and you were then, though a person of rank in the Emperor's service, very desirous of being approved of by him. . . I can describe the very spot in which Polycarp sat and expounded, and his coming in and going out, and the very manner of his life and the figure of his body, and the sermons which he preached to the multitude, and how he related to us his converse with John, and with the rest of those who had seen the Lord; how he mentioned their particular expressions, and what things he had heard from them of the Lord, and of his miracles, and of his doctrines. As Polycarp had received from the eye-witnesses of the Lord of Life, he told us all things agreeable to the Scriptures"—Very well, suppose Irenæus did know Polycarp.

Do you know when Polycarp was born, and how old he was when he died?—Very likely you will be able to enlighten us.

Are you aware that he was born in the very first century itself, viz., A.D. 80, and lived to the age of 87?—Well, what of it?

Do you know that such a man, whose life overlapped that of the Apostle John himself, has left writings in which he recognizes the existence of the New Testament, and appeals to it in the same way as Irenæus?—I am not aware of it.

Very well, listen to this; they are extracts from an epistle he wrote to the Philippians: "Do we not know that the saints shall judge the world *as Paul teaches*" (chap. xi.). "Neither I, nor any one like me, can come up to the wisdom of the blessed PAUL, *who wrote to you a letter*" (chap. iii.). "Remember what the Lord said: Judge not that ye be not judged; forgive and ye shall be forgiven" (a quotation from Matthew). Are not these allusions to the apostolic writings, which we know as the New Testament?—It is not for me to say.

Do you not know that the words quoted by Polycarp in these sentences are in the New Testament?—They may be.

Are you ignorant of the fact?—I am not so ignorant as you suppose.

If a man who lived 20 years contemporarily with the Apostle John, and who travelled among the various congregations of the Christian community, quotes the New Testament as an authority, is it not a proof that the New Testament was in existence among them in the end of the first century?—You may think so.

Can you show it is not a proof?—It is not for me to prove a negative. Besides, the end of the first century is not soon enough for your case. You hold it was produced in the lifetime of the apostles.

I have not done yet?—Oh.

And even if I could carry it no further than the end of the first century, that would be quite sufficient. A book in circulation as a recognized authority at the end of the first century, must have originated and obtained that position many years before. But I take it further. You spoke of Ignatius, in connection with your theory about people having a liking for persecution. Do you know when Ignatius lived?—It is not for me to say.

Will you contradict me if I say he was born only a year-and-a-half after the crucifixion of Christ, and lived out the first century, dying in martyrdom at the age of 72, A.D. 107?—If that is so, you cannot of course expect me to contradict it.

Is it not so?—I suppose so.

Is there any doubt about it?—I suppose not.

Do you know he wrote seven epistles which are extant to-day?—So it is said.

Don't you know it to be the fact?—Very well.

Now, are you aware that in the course of these epistles there are incidental recognitions of the existence of the New Testament?—Very likely you will give us them.

In his epistle to the Ephesians (to whom Paul also wrote) he speaks thus, in section 12: "You are the companions of St. Paul, who, *throughout his whole epistle to you, mentions you with praise.*" (This is the fact, as may be seen by reading Paul's epistle to the Ephesians in the New Testament). He likewise quotes many times the

words of the New Testament without giving the reference, for example: "The tree is known by its fruits" (to the Eph. xiv.); "Be wise as serpents and harmless as doves" (to Polycarp 2); "Christ was baptized of John to fulfil all righteousness" (to Smyrna). All these words are in the New Testament?—Very well.

Very well: do you not see the conclusion arising from the fact of a man who lived 30 or 40 years contemporarily with the Apostle Paul, referring to Paul's epistle to the Ephesians, and quoting the words, of the New Testament?—I am not here to construe conclusions for you.

Does it not prove the existence of the New Testament a long way into the first century?—You may think it does.

Don't you?—It doesn't matter what I think.

I admit that. Now, do you know that there is further evidence still; that Hermas, who flourished before the end of the first century, wrote a book called *The Shepherd*, in which there are some fifty quotations from the New Testament, without naming the books; that Clement, of Rome, born A.D. 30, died A.D. 100, wrote an epistle to the Corinthians, in which he says: "Take into your hands the epistle of Paul, the apostle, and see what he wrote to you" (chap. xlvii); and, finally, that the epistle of Barnabas (extant in the first century, as proved by the allusions of other writers to it) quotes from Matthew, Luke, Acts, Romans, Corinthians, Ephesians, Hebrews, 1st Peter, and Revelations?—As to Hermas, and Clement, and Barnabas, there were so many forgeries in the early centuries (admitted by your Christian writers to have been so) that we have no evidence that they were genuine productions at all.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, I allow that these three were forgeries?—It would make a considerable difference, I should think.

Not a particle of difference?—Not a particle of difference whether a book is genuine or a forgery?

Not a particle: they were in circulation in the first century, and whoever wrote them, they could not have quoted the New Testament if the New Testament had not existed at that time?—Your logic is an India-rubber logic;

you can twist it any way to suit yourself. You first say books are true, and then that if they are not true, it don't matter. If that isn't blowing hot and cold, I don't know what is.

I am afraid you are dull?—I am sharp enough to see that, any how. You don't catch me swallowing books whether they are true or not true, just as you choose to imagine.

The authorship might be pretended: but the books themselves are a fact, and speak for themselves. They are proved to have been extant in the first century, and the argument is that they could not have quoted from the New Testament if the New Testament had no existence. If you cannot see that, how can you expect the Court to accept you as an expert in the matter?—That is for the Court to decide.

And the Court will decide. And now, Mr. Bad Laugh, have you made yourself familiar with the contents of the New Testament?—I should think I have.

You know it thoroughly?—Thoroughly.

And knowing it thoroughly, you are deliberately of the opinion that it was not written by the men by whom it purports to have been written, by whom all the world for all ages has believed it to have been written, and against whose authorship not a whisper has ever been raised in the heart of the Christian community from the day it was placed in their midst to the present day?—I have a right to my opinion. It will not be the first time one man has been right and all the world wrong.

I do not deny your right to your opinion: I am asking if that is your opinion?—I have already expressed my opinion.

Not very definitely, I think?—Definitely enough for my views.

Have you realized that the New Testament is mainly composed of letters written to communities?—Suppose I have?

You are aware there is a long letter addressed to the Christian community at Rome: two long letters to the Christians in Corinth: one to the Christians in Galatia;

one to the Ephesians; one to the Philippians; one to the Colossians; two to the Thessalonians?—Very well, what of that?

Have you considered how difficult it would be to palm off a book of the sort as an authentic book, if it were not so?—How do you mean?

You have spoken of forgeries and spurious writings in the early centuries?—Yes, there were lots of them.

Very well; if the New Testament was one?—I have not said so.

You withdraw the suggestion?—I withdraw nothing.

You must either withdraw or stick to what you have said?—I stick to all I have said.

Very well: you said distinctly enough, in answer to my friend, that the New Testament was the result of an attempt, in the middle of the second century, to put into literary shape the various Christian traditions, or something to that effect?—Very well.

Would not that be a forgery, if the writer pretended to write letters by Paul, which Paul never wrote?—It is according how you take it.

Well, I repeat my question: have you considered the impossibility of floating a fictitious book of that character?—I don't know about impossibility. It is no new thing for a fictitious book to be floated.

It is difficult to float a fictitious book of even a private authorship: sometime or other it is sure to get contradicted; but here is a book to which many public bodies were parties?—What do you mean by private authorship?

I mean this: a man publishes a book under a certain name; he knows the true authorship; nobody else may; and it may come before the public without anybody else being able to tell whether the authorship is genuine or not. In such a case, a fictitious book may get into circulation, though, even then, the truth is liable to leak out somehow. But suppose a man were to publish a book consisting of communications falsely purporting to have been addressed to various corporations and public bodies, would not the imposture be detected and exposed in a moment?—It depends.

The corporations would know whether the communications had been addressed to them; and if there were thirteen corporations with an average of 50 members each, there would be 750 persons, besides the author, who would know the truth of the case. Would it not be impossible to float such a deception?—I don't know.

Take for example the collected speeches of John Bright, which have just been published, or the collected speeches of Earl Beaconsfield, which are about to be published; if those speeches had never been delivered, would not the fact be known and proclaimed at once by the various towns where they professed to have been delivered?—Absurd question.

But suppose someone were to simulate the style of Beaconsfield and issue a tale purporting to be of his authorship, there being nobody but one knowing the truth, such a book might obtain credence as a production of Beaconsfield?—Nobody would be so mad as to do such a thing.

Now, in the case of the New Testament, whose currency we have traced to the very age of the apostles themselves, the Christians at Rome knew whether they had received such a letter from Paul; the Christians or Corinth knew whether they had received such a letter from Paul; the Christians at Ephesus, Colosse, Thessalonica, and so on, all knew whether they had received such letters from Paul as the newly-compiled New Testament represented, and the knowledge would be transmitted from generation to generation. How is it possible, in the face of these considerations, to maintain the idea that the New Testament was a private literary forgery, committed in the middle of the second century, or at any other time?—I have a right to maintain whatever commends itself to me as truth.

Does an impossibility commend itself to you as truth?—That is my business.

Very well: we will pass on. Have you considered the contents of the New Testament?—You don't suppose I have lectured and debated on the New Testament without having considered its contents.

Having considered its contents, are you of opinion that they are consistent with the idea of the book having been the work of a literary forger?—I have already given you my opinion.

Let me invite your attention to some specimens of its contents—

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: My Lord, it is evident that this cross-examination will extend to a great length. My friend said he had a few questions to put to the witness. It is evident he is going to take us over the whole field of the Christian evidences.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: My questions would be very few, if your witness were candid.

Witness: I am not going to be insulted by you or anyone else. I appeal to the Court.

His Lordship: I think it would be advisable for Counsel to withhold their opinions of the evidence.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: I was merely accounting for the length to which my questions have gone.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I propose we take an adjournment till to-morrow morning, as it is getting late.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: I do not object.

The Court adjourned.

FIFTH SITTING

MR. BAD LAUGH (Re-called).

Cross-examination by *Mr. Discerner-of-facts* resumed: Mr. Bad Laugh, I was asking you, when the Court adjourned yesterday, whether you considered the contents of the New Testament consistent with the idea that they were the production of a literary forger. I think you said you did?—I said nothing of the sort.

What did you say?—It is not my business to refresh your memory.

His Lordship: Be respectful to the Court, witness.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: What did you say?—I say I know the contents, and I have my own opinion.

And what is your opinion?—I am of opinion that you have no evidence who they were written by.

You are giving us your theory, and I am testing your theory?—You can test it as much as you like.

Your theory is that the New Testament was not written by those by whom it purports to have been written. Now, my question is, whether its contents are of a nature consistent with a false authorship?—Of that I judge for myself.

But some others have to judge on this occasion, and I put these questions to you that they may judge. I invite your attention to a few specimens of the contents. Here is an extract from Paul's letters to Timothy: "Do thy diligence to come shortly unto me. For Demas hath forsaken me, having loved this present world, and is departed unto Thessalonica; Crescens, to Galatia; Titus,

unto Dalmatia. Only Luke is with me. Take Mark and bring him with thee, for he is profitable to me for the ministry. And Tychicus have I sent to Ephesus. The cloak that I left at Troas with Carpus, when thou comest, bring with thee, and the books, but especially the parchments. Alexander, the coppersmith, did me much evil: the Lord reward him according to his works. Of whom be thou ware also; for he hath greatly withstood our words. At my first answer no man stood with me, but all men forsook me. I pray God it may not be laid to their charge. Notwithstanding the Lord stood with me and strengthened me, that by me the preaching might be fully known." Do you think it likely that a literary forger would have introduced these personal and circumstantial details?—Not having any acquaintance with forgers, I cannot say.

Writing to Titus, he says: "There are many unruly and vain talkers and deceivers, specially they of the circumcision, whose mouths must be stopped, who subvert whole houses, teaching things which they ought not, for filthy lucre's sake." Do you think it likely that a forger would write like that?—I don't know.

Writing to the Hebrews, he says: "I beseech you, brethren, suffer the word of exhortation; for I have written a letter to you in few words. Know ye that our brother Timothy is set at liberty, with whom, if he come shortly, I will see you. Salute all them that have the rule over you and all the saints. They of Italy salute you." Would a forger be likely to write that?—I don't know.

James writes thus: "From whence came wars and fightings among you?—Come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members? . . . Ye adulterers and adulteresses, know ye not that the friendship of the world is enmity with God? Whosoever, therefore, will be a friend of the world is the enemy of God. . . Draw nigh to God and He will draw nigh to you. Cleanse your hands, ye sinners; and purify your hearts ye double-minded. Be afflicted, and mourn, and weep. Let your laughter be turned to mourning, and your joy to heaviness.

Humble yourselves in the sight of the Lord, and he shall lift you up." Could a forger write in that strain?—I don't know.

Peter writes: "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ who, according to his abundant mercy, hath begotten us again unto a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, to an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven for you, who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed in the last time, wherein ye greatly rejoice; though now for a season if need be, ye are in heaviness through manifold temptations, that the trial of your faith being much more precious than the gold that perisheth, though it be tried with fire, might be found unto praise, and honour, and glory at the appearing of Jesus Christ, whom not having seen, ye love: in whom, though now ye see him not, yet believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory." Is it morally possible that a forger could write these words?—I don't know.

Paul writes to the Corinthians: "For though I would desire to glory, I shall not be a fool: for I will say the truth, but now I forbear lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth me to be, or that he hearth of me. And lest I should be exalted above measure through the abundance of the revelations, there was given to me a thorn in the flesh, the messenger of Satan to buffet me, lest I should be exalted above measure. For this thing, I besought the Lord thrice, that it might depart from me. And he said unto me, My grace is sufficient for thee, for my strength is made perfect in weakness. Most gladly, therefore, will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me. Therefore, I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses, for Christ's sake; for when I am weak, then am I strong. I am become a fool in glorying; ye have compelled me; for I ought to have been commended of you, for in nothing am I behind the very chiefest apostles, though I be nothing." Do you think the forger of a fictitious Paul's letter could have written these words?—It is not for me to say.

Paul writes to the Corinthians (1 Cor. iii. 1): "And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal, even as unto babes in Christ. I have fed you with milk and not with meat; for, hitherto, ye were not able to bear it, neither yet now are ye able. For ye are yet carnal; for whereas there is among you envying and strife and divisions, are ye not carnal, and walk as men? Who then is Paul and who is Apollos but ministers by whom ye believe, even as the Lord gave to every man?" Is it possible that these words can have been written by a forger?—It is not for me to say.

Paul writes to the Philippians (Phil. ii. 1): "If there be, therefore, any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of love, if any fellowship of the Spirit, if any bowels and mercies, fulfil ye my joy that ye be like-minded, having the same love, being of one accord, of one mind. Let nothing be done through strife or vainglory, but in lowliness of mind, let each esteem other better than themselves." Are these the words of a forger?—I don't know.

Writing to the Romans, he says: "What shall we say then to these things? If God be for us, who can be against us? He that spared not His own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with Him also freely give us all things? Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth; who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that died, yea rather that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us. Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation or distress or persecution or famine or nakedness or peril or sword. . . . Nay, in all these things, we are more than conquerors through him that loved us. For I am persuaded that neither death nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present nor things to come, nor height nor depth, nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." Do you think it possible that these are the words of a forger?—It is not for me to say.

Now, let me direct your attention to the words of Christ as exhibited in the gospel narratives, and let me

ask you if the idea of those words being a forgery is not absolutely impossible to conceive?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: We must really have some limits to this. My friend may as well read the whole New Testament at once.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: I have nearly done with this part of my cross-examination. I am not needlessly taking up the time of the Court.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: That is just what I think you are doing.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: I am illustrating the baselessness of the theory of the plaintiffs—that the Christian writings are a literary forgery. It is not possible to do this more effectually than by reading extracts from these writings. They speak for themselves.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: There may be two opinions about that.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: There always are two opinions about everything, but there is a right opinion, for all that: and the way to form a right opinion is to have the materials for it before you.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I cannot see what reading a whole book has to do with the question of whether the opinions and practices of the defendants are hurtful.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: You will see before the trial is over. Now, Mr. Bad Laugh, do you think it possible that a forger could have written these words: "You have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I sav unto you that ye resist not evil; but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him thy left also. And if any man will sue thee at the law and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain. Give to him that asketh thee: and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away. . . . Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you, that ye may be the children of your Father who is in heaven, for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good." Do you think that reads like a forgery?—Perhaps not.

What say you to this: "The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses's seat. All therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do, but do not ye after their works: for they say and do not. For they bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne, and lay them on men's shoulders, but they themselves will not move them with one of their fingers. But all their works they do for to be seen of men. . . . They love the uppermost rooms at feasts, and the chief seats in the synagogue, and greetings in the market, and to be called of men, Rabbi, Rabbi. But be not ye called Rabbi, for one is your master, even Christ, and all ye are brethren. . . . Woe unto ye, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites: for ye make clean the outside of the cup and platter, but, within, they are full of extortion and excess. . . . Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, for ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and of all uncleanness. Even so, ye also outwardly appear righteous unto men, but, within, ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity." Do you think a forger would be likely to write these words?—There is no saying what men can write.

Very well: the Court will judge. I had prepared other extracts, but these will sufficiently illustrate the point. Now, sir, are you not aware that the authenticity of the New Testament is admitted in all the best literary circles?—I have nothing to do with what is admitted in literary circles—best or otherwise.

I am asking as to a matter of fact. Of course you may be ignorant of it. If so, you can say so. Is it not the fact that all men of scholarly attainments, whatever may be their opinions as to the contents of the New Testament, are agreed that the authenticity of the New Testament is beyond doubt?—It depends upon what you mean by "scholarly attainments." I haven't much opinion of scholarly attainments myself.

Very likely; but is it not the fact that the literary world are agreed that if the authenticity of any book is established by evidence, it is the authenticity of the New Testament?—How can I speak for the literary world?

Very well, Mr. Bad Laugh; you don't like the question, evidently, and the Court will judge as to the reason. I will put it in this way: Are you prepared to allege that the literary world does not believe in the authenticity of the New Testament?—I am part of the literary world.

Oh, well, that is information?—You need it, too; you mustn't suppose that you know everything!

Well, you are the only part of the literary world that rejects the authenticity of the New Testament?—I don't reject it. I say you have no evidence of an earlier authorship than A.D. 150.

Oh, you don't reject it?—No, I have never pretended that the book was an out-and-out forgery. I say you have no evidence of the contrary. I place the onus of proof on you.

And we accept the onus, and have produced the evidence, or rather a small part of it?—And I say your evidence don't convince me, if it convinces other people.

Can you tell us why evidence that convinces all the world doesn't convince you?—Because it don't. Besides, it don't convince all the world. There are others besides me that don't admit the authenticity.

But are they not chiefly those who are led by you?—I don't know about that. I suppose they have minds of their own?

Now, Mr. Bad Laugh, is it not the fact that your chief objection to admitting the authenticity of the New Testament lies here, that if it is admitted, we, then, have the evidence of eye-witnesses to the resurrection of Christ, whose capability is shown by the quality of the writing, and whose honesty is attested by their self-sacrifices?—Nothing of the sort. You don't think I would be such a fool as to admit such a thing?

I don't know about that?—Then I object to your comments. I will not be insulted.

I have no wish to insult you. I wish to get at the facts of the case?—Then stick to the facts.

I am doing so. I ask if the New Testament is not a written eye-witness to the resurrection of Christ?—How can a book be an eye-witness?

You know what I mean: the evidence of eye-witnesses?
—You should say what you mean.

I will make my meaning apparent by a few extracts.

Sir F. D. Partialfact Unbelief: More extracts, my Lord.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: Yes. They are essential to the case. However, they are not extensive this time. Peter, in his 2nd epistle, makes use of the term “eye-witness.” He says: “*We have not followed cunningly-devised fables, when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were EYE-WITNESSES of his majesty*” (2 Pet. i. 16). That this eye-witness embraced his resurrection will appear from the following statements: Peter speaks, “*This Jesus God hath raised up, WHEREOF WE ALL ARE WITNESSES*” (Acts ii. 32). “*Him God hath raised from the dead, WHEREOF WE ARE WITNESSES*” (Acts iii. 14). “*The God of our fathers raised up Jesus, whom ye slew and hanged on a tree. Him hath God exalted with his right hand to be a prince and a Saviour. . . We are HIS WITNESSES of these things*” (Acts v. 29). “*We cannot but speak the things which we have SEEN AND HEARD*” (Acts iv. 19). “*To whom (his disciples) Christ showed himself ALIVE after his sufferings, by many infallible proofs being seen of them forty days*” (Acts i. 3). “*We (Peter and the rest of the apostles) are WITNESSES of all things which he did, both in the land of the Jews and in Jerusalem, whom they slew and hanged on a tree: him God raised up the third day and showed him openly, not unto all the people, but unto WITNESSES chosen before of God, even to US, WHO DID EAT AND DRINK WITH HIM after he rose from the dead*” (Acts x. 39).

These are casual allusions in the speeches of the apostles in the course of their apostolic work; but now consider the formal narrative of the resurrection of Christ in what are called the gospels. These are the narratives of personal witnesses in some stage or other of the resurrection. Take the account by Matthew, one of the twelve disciples:—

“When the even was come, there came a rich man of Arimathea, named Joseph, who also himself was Jesus’

disciple: he went to Pilate, and begged the body of Jesus. Then Pilate commanded the body to be delivered. And when Joseph had taken the body, he wrapped it in a clean linen cloth, and laid it in his own new tomb, which he had hewn out in the rock: and he rolled a great stone to the door of the sepulchre, and departed. And there was Mary Magdalene, and the other Mary, sitting over against the sepulchre. Now the next day, that followed the day of the preparation, the chief priests and Pharisees came together unto Pilate, saying, Sir, we remember that that deceiver said, while he was yet alive, After three days I will rise again. Command therefore that the sepulchre be made sure until the third day, lest his disciples come by night, and steal him away, and say unto the people, He is risen from the dead: so the last error shall be worse than the first. Pilate said unto them, Ye have a watch: go your way, make it as sure as ye can. So they went, and made the sepulchre sure, sealing the stone, and setting a watch. In the end of the Sabbath, as it began to dawn towards the first *day* of the week, came Mary Magdalene and the other Mary to see the sepulchre. And, behold, there was a great earthquake: for the angel of the Lord descended from heaven, and came and rolled back the stone from the door, and sat upon it. His countenance was like lightning, and his raiment white as snow: and for fear of him the keepers did shake, and became as dead *men*. And the angel answered and said unto the women, Fear not ye: for I know that ye seek Jesus, which was crucified. He is not here: for he is risen, as he said. Come, see the place where the Lord lay. And go quickly, and tell his disciples that he is risen from the dead; and, behold he goeth before you into Galilee; there shall ye see him: lo, I have told you. And they departed quickly from the sepulchre with fear and great joy: and did run to bring his disciples word. And as they went to tell his disciples behold, Jesus met them, saying, All hail. And they came and held him by the feet, and worshipped him. Then said Jesus unto them, Be not afraid: go tell my brethren that they go into Galilee, and there shall they see me.

Mark's account is thus:—"Now when *Jesus* was risen early the first *day* of the week, he appeared first to Mary Magdalene, out of whom he had cast seven devils. *And* she went and told them that had been with him, as they mourned and wept. *And* they, when they heard that he was alive, and had been seen of her, believed not. *After* that he appeared in another form unto two of them, as they walked, and went into the country. *And* they went and told *it* unto the residue: neither believed they them. *Afterwards* he appeared unto the eleven as they sat at meat, and upbraided them with their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they believed not them which had seen him after he was risen."

Luke supplies the most striking incident in the whole episode, thus: "And, behold, two of them went that same day to a village called Emmaus, which was from Jerusalem *about* threescore furlongs. *And* they talked together of all these things which had happened. *And* it came to pass, that, while they communed *together* and reasoned, *Jesus* himself drew near, and went with them. *But* their eyes were holden that they should not know him. *And* he said unto them, What manner of communications *are* these that ye have one to another, as ye walk, and are sad? *And* the one of them, whose name was Cleopas, answering said unto him, Art thou only a stranger in Jerusalem, and hast not known the things which are come to pass there in these days? *And* he said unto them, What things? *And* they said unto him, Concerning *Jesus* of Nazareth, which was a prophet mighty in deed and word before God and all the people: *And* how the chief priests and our rulers delivered him to be condemned to death, and have crucified him. *But* we trusted that it had been he which should have redeemed Israel: and beside all this, to-day is the third day since these things were done. *Yea*, and certain women also of our company made us astonished, which were early at the sepulchre; and when they found not his body, they came, saying that they had also seen a vision of angels, which said that he was alive. *And* certain of them which were with us went to the sepulchre,

and found *it* even so as the women had said: but him they saw not. *Then* he said unto them, O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken: ought not *Christ* to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory? *And* beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself. *And* they drew nigh unto the village, whither they went: and he made as though he would have gone further. *But* they constrained him, saying, Abide with us: for it is toward evening, and the day is far spent. *And* he went in to tarry with them. *And* it came to pass, as he sat at meat with them, he took bread, and blessed *it*, and brake it, and gave to them. *And* their eyes were opened, and they knew him, and he vanished out of their sight. *And* they said one to another, Did not our heart burn within us, while he talked with us by the way, and while he opened to us the Scriptures? *And* they rose up at the same hour, and returned to Jerusalem, and found the eleven gathered together, and them that were with them, saying, The Lord is risen indeed, and hath appeared to Simon. *And* they told what things *were done* in the way, and how he was known of them in breaking of bread. *And* as they thus spake, *Jesus* himself stood in the midst of them, and saith, Peace *be* unto you. *But* they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they had seen a spirit. *And* he said unto them, Why are ye troubled? and why do thoughts arise in your hearts? Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself: handle me, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have. *And* when he had thus spoken, he showed them *his* hands and *his* feet. *And* while they yet believed not for joy, and wondered, he said unto them, Have ye here any meat? *And* they gave him a piece of a broiled fish, and of an honeycomb. *And* he took *it*, and did eat before them. *And* he said unto them, These *are* the words which I spake unto you, while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled, which were written in the law of Moses, and *in* the prophets, and *in* the Psalms, concerning me. *Then* opened he their understanding, that

they might understand the Scriptures, and said unto them, Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day; and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations, beginning at Jerusalem. And ye are witnesses of these things."

John's account has touching features peculiar to itself: "But Mary stood without at the sepulchre weeping; and as she wept, she stooped down, and looked into the sepulchre, and seeth two angels in white sitting, the one at the head, and the other at the feet, where the body of Jesus had lain. And they say unto her, Woman, why weepest thou? She saith unto them, Because they have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him. And when she had thus said she turned herself back, and saw Jesus standing, and knew not that it was Jesus. Jesus saith unto her, Woman, why weepest thou? whom seeketh thou? She, supposing him to be the gardener, saith unto him, Sir, if thou have borne him hence, tell me where thou hast laid him, and I will take him away. Jesus saith unto her, Mary. She turned herself, and saith unto him, Rabboni; which is to say, Master. Jesus saith unto her, Touch me not; for I am not yet ascended to my Father: but go to my brethren, and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father, and your Father; and to my God, and your God. Mary Magdalene came and told the disciples that she had seen the Lord, and that he had spoken these things unto her. Then the same day at evening, being the first day of the week, when the doors were shut where the disciples were assembled for fear of the Jews, came Jesus and stood in the midst, and saith unto them, Peace be unto you. And when he had so said, he showed unto them his hands and his side. Then were the disciples glad, when they saw the Lord. Then said Jesus to them again, Peace be unto you: as my Father hath sent me, even so send I you. And when he had said this, he breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost: Whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained. But

Thomas, one of the twelve, called Didymus, was not with them when Jesus came. The other disciples, therefore, said unto him, We have seen the Lord. But he said unto them, Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe. And after eight days again his disciples were within, and Thomas with them: then came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst and said, Peace be unto you. Then saith he to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands; and reach hither thy hand, and thrust it into my side; and he not faithless, but believing. And Thomas answered and said unto him, My Lord and my God. Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed: blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed."

I will not trouble you at this time with the case of Paul, who says (1 Cor. xv. 8), "Last of all, HE WAS SEEN OF ME ALSO." I will simply ask you if the New Testament, by the few extracts I have read, does not prove the resurrection of Christ, if its authenticity is admitted?—I don't know about that. Suppose I admit the authenticity: you have a story by Matthew, Mark, Luke and John: how do we know it is true?

I am coming to that. You remember what you said about "unmitigated humbug?" You admitted that humbug was intentional deception practiced for sinister ends. Will you please inform the Court what sinister ends, in your judgment, were served by the testimony of Christ's resurrection on the part of the apostles?—I don't see that I am called upon to answer that question.

You can answer it or not, just as you please?—I say a false story must be told for sinister ends.

Quite so: and if the testimony of the apostles was false, there must be some sinister ends manifestly promoted by that testimony?—I don't know that. We may not know the ends served, although we may know the story false.

Do you admit, then, that you know of no sinister ends served by the apostolic testimony?—I don't admit anything of the sort.

Do you say that you do know of minister ends served by the apostolic testimony?—I am not called upon to say.

I think you are?—Then I differ in opinion with you.

Do you not know, sir, that the testimony of the apostles cost them all that is dear to men?—My opinion is that we don't know anything about it.

Do you mean that Pliny's letter does not prove the Christians to have been wholesale sufferers of persecution and death?—What if it does?

Do you mean that that experience on the part of believers in Christ did not begin in the days of the apostles, as exhibited in the authentic narrative of their acts in the New Testament?—What if it did?

What if it did? Why then does it not prove that the apostolic testimony cost them all that is dear to man?—That may be your opinion.

Let me read to you, sir, the words of the apostle Paul on this subject:—"For I think that God hath set forth us the apostles last, as it were appointed to death; for we are made a spectacle unto the world, and to angels, and to men. We *are* fools for Christ's sake, but ye *are* wise in Christ; we *are* weak, but ye *are* strong; ye *are* honourable, but we *are* despised. Even unto this present hour we both hunger, and thirst, and are naked, and are buffeted, and have no certain dwelling place; and labour, working with our own hands: being reviled, we bless: being persecuted, we suffer it: being defamed, we in-treat; we are made as the filth of the world, *and are* the offscouring of all things unto this day."

Now, sir, if the testimony for Christ's resurrection brought loss and infamy, and death, on the apostles and their fellow-labourers, and if they persisted with that testimony in the face of such results, is it not evidence that they themselves believed that testimony?—Well, what a wonderful argument to be sure! Ha! ha! A crazed man believes he is the Prince of Wales: therefore it is true! I don't know where we shall get to directly.

Do you say the apostles were crazed?—I don't see how they could have been otherwise,—believing in the possibility of a dead man coming to life.

Is that the only evidence of craze on their part you can produce?—I don't know. Perhaps I could produce others if I were to look into it a little.

Looking into it little or much, can you produce any other evidence of craze besides their belief in the resurrection of Christ?—They don't at all strike me as sane men.

You consider yourself, of course, a perfect judge of insanity?—I know that when a man tells me a cock and bull story, he is not exactly square; of course, I cannot help other people believing it.

Now, sir, I must keep you to the point. I must have your answer, "Yes" or "No." Are you prepared to ad-duce any other evidence that the apostles were crazed, than their belief that Christ rose from the dead?—I tell you I think that, generally, they exhibit the aspect of men not sane.

I don't ask your opinion: we all know the worth of that. I ask for evidence?—Then I shall not give evidence or anything else if you make insulting observations.

Never mind the observations: Have you any other evidence?—It is my opinion you don't know evidence when it is produced.

Well, Mr. Bad Laugh, as you would unquestionably produce other evidence if you had it, we may take your answers as a confession of inability to do so. And now as the truth of the resurrection of Christ is the matter in question, it is certainly rather a considerable begging of the question to put forward the apostolic belief in it as evidence of insanity. You might as well call the defend-ants insane, and a few more of us, who have come to entertain the same conviction, in the same way, that is, as the result of evidence?—You had better not ask my opinion as to you and others.

I don't. I ask about the apostles, and I ask whether the writings and speeches of the apostles are such as in-sane men could write. For example, let me read you his speech before Felix: "Forasmuch as I know that thou hast been of many years a judge unto this nation, I do the more cheerfully answer for myself: because that thou

mayest understand, there there are yet but twelve days since I went up to Jerusalem for to worship. And they neither found me in the temple disputing with any man, neither raising up the people, neither in the synagogues, nor in the city: neither can they prove the things whereof they now accuse me; but this I confess unto thee, that after the way which they call heresy, so worship I the God of my fathers, believing all things which are written in the law and in the prophets: and have hope toward God, which they themselves also allow, that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust. And herein do I exercise myself, to have always a conscience void of offence toward God, and toward men. Now after many years I came to bring alms to my nation, and offerings. Whereupon certain Jews from Asia found me purified in the temple, neither with multitude, nor with tumult. Who ought to have been here before thee, and object, if they had ought against me? Or else let these same *here* say, if they have found any evil doing in me, while I stood before the council, except it be for this one voice, that I cried standing among them, Touching the resurrection of the dead I am called in question by you this day." Do you call that the speech of a crazed man?—I have my own opinion.

Read his brief speech to Festus when the Jews, having laid a plot for Paul's murder on the road, Festus asked him if he would have his cause heard at Jerusalem. "I stand at Cæsar's judgment seat, where I ought to be judged: to the Jews have I done no wrong, as thou very well knowest. For if I be an offender, or have committed anything worthy of death, I refuse not to die: but if there be none of these things whereof these accuse me, no man may deliver me unto them. I appeal unto Cæsar." Do you think these practical words of prudence and common sense are the words of a crazed man?—I tell you I have my own opinion.

Take his speech before Agrippa: "I think myself happy, king Agrippa, because I shall answer for myself this day before thee, touching all the things whereof I am accused of the Jews: especially *because I know* thee

to be expert in all customs and questions which are among the Jews: wherefore I beseech thee to hear me patiently. My manner of life from my youth, which was at the first among mine own nation at Jerusalem, know all the Jews: which knew me from the beginning, if they would testify, that after the most straitest sect of our religion I lived a Pharisee. And now I stand and am judged for the hope of the promise made of God unto our fathers; unto which *promise* our twelve tribes, instantly serving *God* day and night, hope to come. For which hope's sake, king Agrippa, I am accused of the Jews. Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you, that God should raise the dead? I verily thought with myself, that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth. Which thing I also did in Jerusalem: and many of the saints did I shut up in prison, having received authority from the chief priests; and when they were put to death I gave my voice against *them*. And I punished them oft in every synagogue, and compelled *them* to blaspheme; and being exceedingly mad against them, I persecuted *them* even unto strange cities. Whereupon as I went to Damascus with authority and commission from the chief priests, at midday, O king, I saw in the way a light from heaven, above the brightness of the sun, shining round about me and them which journeyed with me. And when we were all fallen to the earth, I heard a voice speaking unto me, and saying in the Hebrew tongue, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? *It is* hard for thee to kick against the pricks. And I said, Who art thou Lord? And he said, I am Jesus whom thou persecutest. But rise, and stand upon thy feet: for I have appeared unto thee for this purpose, to make thee a minister and a witness both of these things which thou hast seen, and of those things in the which I will appear unto thee; delivering thee from the people, and *from* the Gentiles, unto whom now I send thee, to open their eyes, *and* to turn *them* from darkness to light, and *from* the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins, and inheritance among them which are sanctified by faith that is in me. Whereupon, O king

Agrippa, I was not disobedient unto the heavenly vision: but showed first unto them of Damascus, and at Jerusalem, and throughout all the coasts of Judæa, and *then* to the Gentiles, that they should repent and turn to God, and do works meet for repentance. For these causes the Jews caught me in the temple and went about to kill me. Having therefore obtained help of God, I continue unto this day, witnessing both to small and great, saying none other things than those which the prophets and Moses did say should come: That Christ should suffer, *and* that he should be the first that should rise from the dead, and should show light unto the people, and to the Gentiles.

"Festus (with a loud voice): 'Paul, thou art beside thyself: much learning doth make thee mad.'

"Paul: 'I am not mad, most noble Festus, but speak forth the words of truth and soberness. For the king (Agrippa) knoweth of *these things*, before whom also I speak freely, for I am persuaded none of these things are hidden from him: for this thing was not done in a corner'" (verse 26).

Do you think this episode in open court exhibits Paul in the light of a crazed man? Does it not rather show him in the possession of a cool, clear-headed, well-mannered, courteous, logical mind?—That may be your opinion, it is not mine.

Now I take you to one or two passages in his writings on the same subject, and for the same purpose. I read to you from his Epistle to the Galatians:

"I certify you, brethren, that the gospel which was preached of me is not after man. For I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. For ye have heard of my conversation in time past in the Jews' religion, how that beyond measure I persecuted the church of God and wasted it: and profited in the Jews' religion above many my equals in mine own nation, being more exceedingly zealous of the traditions of my fathers. But when it pleased God, who separated me from my mother's womb, and called me by his grace, to reveal His Son to me, that I might preach

him among the heathen; immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood: neither went I up to Jerusalem to them which were apostles before me; but I went into Arabia, and returned again unto Damascus. Then after three years I went up to Jerusalem to see Peter, and abode with him fifteen days. But other of the apostles saw I none, save James, the Lord's brother. Now the things which I write unto you, behold before God, I lie not. Afterwards I came into the regions of Syria and Cilicia; and was unknown by face unto the churches of Judæa, which were in Christ: but they had heard only, That he which persecuted us in times past now preacheth the faith which once he destroyed. And they glorified God in me."

Again: "Are they ministers of Christ? (I speak as a fool) I *am* more; in labours more abundant, in stripes above measure, in prison more frequent, in deaths oft. Of the Jews five times received I forty stripes save one. Thrice was I beaten with rods, once was I stoned, thrice I suffered shipwreck, a night and a day I have been in the deep; *in* journeyings often, *in* perils of waters, *in* perils of robbers, *in* perils by mine own countrymen, *in* perils by the heathen, *in* perils in the city, *in* perils in the wilderness, *in* perils in the sea, *in* perils among the brethren; in weariness and painfulness, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold and nakedness. Beside these things that are without, that which cometh unto me daily, the care of all the churches." Now, sir, does not that alone (even if it were not supported from a thousand historical sources) prove that the possibility of serving any sinister end is absolutely excluded from the whole case of the apostles?—Keep your temper. I have a right to my opinion.

Very well, there I leave the point. I safely do so in the hands of every disinterested listener at this trial?—Of course, they are all disinterested that agree with you.

Do you consider what I have read is the emanation of a crazed mind?—I have already answered. You need not ask me again.

I should not ask you these questions at all, if I had only you to consider. I should not think it worth while

to say one word to you about it, but I wish to bring the facts of the case before the Jury?—Then I shall not answer any more questions.

I am not quite done with you yet?—I have done with you, if you haven't done with me.

You must answer a few more questions before we part?—I object to your incessant insult. I shall not answer any more questions.

You will have to answer whatever question I may think it necessary to put. As I said before, you are in a Court of Law: you are not on the platform of a Secular Society?—I appeal to the Court.

It is no use appealing.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I think my friend ought to be rather more sparing of his personal commentaries.

His Lordship: It would not hinder the case if they were omitted.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: I have endeavoured to keep my patience with this witness as much as possible: and I trust your Lordship may be of opinion, that, in view of the nature of his answers, I have succeeded pretty well.

His Lordship: His answers have certainly not helped you much.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I apprehend, my Lord, that a witness is at perfect liberty to answer the questions in his own way?

His Lordship: In a certain sense that is true: but if a witness chooses to oppose a dogged resistance to all attempts to elicit the evidence, he cannot be surprised if counsel should grow a little testy under the process.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: Now, Mr. Bad Laugh, just a question or two more. I had intended reading you one or two further extracts from Paul's letters: but probably those I have read will sufficiently answer my purpose?—Thank you.

There are one or two other matters of which you spoke to my friend in your examination-in-chief. I think you spoke of "a whole mass of contradictions" being discoverable in the history of Christ contained in the New Testament?—I did.

Can you give us some of these contradictions?—Oh, very quickly.

Let us have them?—Which will you have first?

Anyone you like?—Well, take the number of the women said to have been at the grave of Christ on the morning of the resurrection.

Which is the contradiction?—According to John's gospel, there was one woman; according to Matthew, there were two; and according to Mark, three; and according to Luke, any number. That, I call, a considerable contradiction.

Which way?—If you don't see that, its no use my telling you.

Does John say there was one *only*?—What if he doesn't?

Then in what way would the statement that one was present be a contradiction to the statement that there were two?—One is not two.

No, but if there are two, there is one in the two isn't there?—Ah, that is a quibble.

If I say there is one man in the Court this morning, do I not speak the truth?—No, you don't; there are hundreds.

Aren't you here?—Don't be insulting.

Aren't you one man?—I'm not a hundred.

But you are one, and you are here, and if I say one man is here, this morning, I speak the truth, although there are hundreds besides. If I were to say there is *only* one man here, then I should not speak the truth. Now, I repeat my question: does John say that only one woman came to the sepulchre on the morning of the resurrection?—I suppose you know what John says without me telling you.

I do know what John says, and I know he does not say "only," and therefore I want to know how his statement, that there was one woman, is inconsistent with the statement of the other writers that there were more?—I hold it is a contradiction.

Well, that is your opinion?—I have a right to my opinion.

I don't say you haven't, but I am entitled to show that your opinion is not a true one?—You cannot do that.

I have done it. I show that you fail to make out a contradiction between one and two, because two includes one, though two would be inconsistent with "one only"; or between two and three, because three contains two, though three would be inconsistent with "two only," or between three and any larger number: because a larger number contains three, though a larger number would be inconsistent with three *only*. None of the evangelists specify an exclusive number. They mention certain persons as present on the occasion, according to the aspect in which the matter appeared severally to them, and according to the incidents they selected for narrative. They vary their accounts without contradicting one another. A variance of that sort is not contradiction. I call a variation of that sort an evidence of truth, instead of a proof of falsehood. Tellers of a concocted story make their accounts tally exactly. Witnesses of the various stages of a matter speak to different facts, or to the same facts in a different way without contradiction. What other contradiction do you allege?—There is the discrepancy between Acts and Luke as to how long Christ was with his disciples after his resurrection. Acts says forty days; Luke and Mark say one day; and if that is not a contradiction, I don't know what is.

Let us look at it. No doubt, the narrative of the Acts states "forty days," but where does Mark or Luke (and remember that Luke was the writer of the Acts)—where do they say "one day only"?—I did not say anything about "only."

Your allegation of contradiction requires that "only" be understood because, of course, Christ was one day with them, if he was forty?—Forty isn't one.

But where does it even say *one* day?—You cannot make it anything else. You will find the story in Luke as distinct as possible: first, the journey to Emmaus, "They rose up the same hour, and returned to Jerusalem," where they found the eleven gathered together: then Christ appears, and after talking to them, he led them out to Beth-

any, and there ascended. That is corroborated by Mark xvi., which says, that when Jesus was risen early the first day of the week, he appeared unto two of them, and afterwards to the eleven. "So then, after the Lord had spoken unto them, he was received up into heaven, and sat on the right hand of God." If that don't mean one day, language is not of much use.

Language is of great use when properly employed and understood. If it is said "one day," there would be a difficulty?—If it don't say one day, it means one day by any decent interpretation.

It depends upon what is a "decent interpretation." I call that a decent interpretation which finds a place for the definite in the indefinite?—Matthew, Mark, and Luke are not indefinite.

They are, on the point of time?—I say they are not.

Can you point to a statement of time?—The time is indicated.

Are they not indefinite as to time?—I think not.

Can you produce a statement as to the time occupied by the events they narrate?—Not in so many words.

Very well, but the statement in Acts i. 3 is definite—forty days?—Yes.

Are you aware that Luke is the author of the Acts of the Apostles?—It is said so.

Is there any doubt about it?—I don't know.

Are you not bound by the commonest canon of literary criticism to find a place in Luke's indefinite mode of putting the matter for the definite? That is, must you not make room in Luke xxiv. for the forty days of Acts i. 3?—It may suit you to do such a thing, but it don't suit me.

As a matter of fact, is there not such room between verses 49 and 50 of Luke xxiv.?—It don't look like it.

Never mind the appearance?—Appearances go for something sometimes.

But now we are dealing with facts precisely. Verse 49 finishes the remarks made by Christ to the eleven, on the occasion of his first interview. Verse 50 tells that "he led them out as far as to Bethany:" what is there to show the time between the one and the other?—It shows no time.

What is there to show there was no time?—I say it shows no time.

What is there to show that the one was immediately after the other?—The word “and.”

Does the word “and” mean immediately after?—The thing comes immediately after.

In the order of narrative, admitted: but what is there to show that Luke meant that the going to Bethany was immediately at the close of the first interview?—I have already told you.

Is it not, in fact, a simple conclusion of the narrative in which details and times are indefinitely “slumped” in four concluding verses?—That is not my opinion.

Well, Mr. Bad Laugh, the Jury will judge?—Other people can judge as well as the Jury.

Your judgment is that because the events narrated in Luke xxiv. appear all to be compressed within one day, although there is evidence to show they extended over forty days, therefore, we are to reject the authentic account of Christ’s resurrection, in spite of the overwhelming evidence otherwise in its favour?—I do not admit the overwhelming evidence.

Very well, we will pass on. What other contradictions are there?—Well, the New Testament tells us that Christ was the son of Joseph, and yet that he wasn’t the son of Joseph, but the Son of God.

Do you see a contradiction in that?—I should rather say so.

Where does it lie?—You must be rather stupid if you want me to point that out.

I must trouble you to do so?—How can a man be a son of Joseph and not a son of Joseph at the same time?

In the way the New Testament exemplifies. Jesus, the Son of God, was the son of Mary, and because Mary was the wife of Joseph, in whom she was legally merged as “one flesh,” Jesus could not be the son of Mary without being the son of Joseph also, in the putative sense?—It’s all very nice, but it don’t get rid of the difficulty.

There is no difficulty?—No difficulty in being told of a man who had no father, but only a mother?

We are not told of any such man?—I say we are. Your Jesus was such a man, if language means anything.

Jesus had Joseph standing in the relation of a human father, so far as the family circle was concerned, though Joseph was not his actual father in the genital sense. His real father was God, as he always proclaimed, and as the account of his begetting makes plain?—You only make the contradiction worse. You give us a man who had a mother but no father, and after a bit two fathers.

Perfectly true, Mr. Bad Laugh, that Jesus had no actual human father, but a human mother; yet having Joseph for his putative father and God for his real father, he had two fathers. It is not the first time, in the history of the world, that complex truth has seemed an incomprehensible paradox. It is not for me to say in whose eyes it has so appeared. The right perception requires a discernment and a candour that I fear are beyond your range. What are your other contradictions?—I object to your impertinences. I shall not put up with your insults.

Be calm, Mr. Bad Laugh?—I shall be nothing of the sort if you choose to question me like an indecent donkey.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I think my friend exceeds the bounds of professional liberty in the remarks he makes to the witness.

His Lordship: It is well to abstain from comment as much as possible.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: Let me have your next so-called contradiction, Mr. Bad Laugh?—They are real contradictions if you please.

Well, let us have them?—It is of no use. I have given you several, and you pitch them on one side.

I show they are no contradictions. That is the object of my examination?—Then I will not be examined any further.

You must answer the questions?—Only if the Court rules I must.

His Lordship: The witness has already been told he must answer all questions put to him.

Witness: But this person has no right to insult me.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: I have no wish to insult. You make my task difficult by your obstinacies?—I protest against the remark.

I must ask you for the next contradiction?—Well, the New Testament tells me that Christ's mother's husband had two fathers.

You mean Joseph?—Of course.

Where does it tell you that Joseph had two fathers?—You know as well as I do.

I am not aware of such a statement?—You have two genealogies—one in Matthew, and one in Luke. They are different lines, and yet Joseph is in both.

Do you know how that comes to be the case?—Oh, I suppose you have some hocus-pocus way of getting over it.

Are you not aware that one line (Matthew's) is Joseph's, and the other (Luke's) is Mary's, but that Mary having become legally merged by marriage in Joseph could only, by Jewish custom, be represented by her husband, who, therefore, appears in his own line and Mary's too, by which he appears to have two fathers, while one of them is only his father-in-law?—I call that a miserable wriggle out of a difficulty.

Well, we will leave it to the Jury. Have you any other contradictions?—Lots of contradictions, but what is the use? It is only a waste of time to go through them. It will be the same in every case. You do not take them honestly. You quibble out of them.

Never mind, let us have them?—It is no use.

Do you withdraw them?—No, I don't withdraw them.

Are any of them stronger than those you have brought forward?—Those I have brought forward are strong enough in all conscience?

Very well, Mr. Bad Laugh, we will pass from that, and we will now take the Old Testament. You said something to the effect that it was impossible to glance into the Old Testament without seeing the absurdity of calling it a divine revelation. You said it was full of contradictions and absurdities?—I do say so.

You said it was inconsistent with science?—Yes, I do say so.

Were you in Court during the examination of Mr. Shrewd Observer?—Yes.

You heard his concessions on this point?—Yes, he was too easy a witness by half.

You would not have been so candid?—I object to the question.

Well, we will not go over the scientific ground again. The case, on this point, was fully developed in the cross-examination of Mr. Shrewd Observer?—He was no scientific witness. I could have made a better figure myself.

Never mind. We will leave that. You said the Bible was inconsistent with itself?—I did.

In what way do you make that out?—As I have already said, the acts it records of the God it professes to reveal, are inconsistent with the character it imputes to him.

I must trouble you for some proof of that allegation?—There is lots of proof, but it does not seem of much use giving proof to some people.

Never mind, let us try. You must either withdraw your statement that there are contradictions, or you must give us cases?—Well, the Bible calls God invisible, and yet you have Jacob saying, "I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved." If that is not a contradiction, I don't know what is one.

Let us see: things are not always what they seem?—That's what I say.

Do you know what Jacob is referring to when he says, "I have seen God face to face"?—God is God, I suppose.

Yes, but do you not know that God may be exhibited in various relations?—I know nothing about relations.

Do you not know that the name of God may be placed upon or in a being that is not God in the uncreated sense?—I tell you I know nothing of such stupid distinctions.

Then I must inform you. In Exo. xxiii. 20, we read of God saying to Moses: "Behold, I send *an angel* before thee . . . beware of him and obey his voice: provoke him not: he will not pardon your transgressions: for MY NAME IS IN HIM." If an angel bore the name

of God, would not that angel be God to Israel?—How could an angel be God?

I am showing you: are you not aware that, in this same way, Moses was God to Pharaoh." If Moses was a God to Pharaoh, in Scripture phraseology (and it is the usage of Scripture we have to consider) would not an angel with the name of God on him be God to Israel?—You can, of course, twist it into any form you like.

Suppose, therefore, an Israelite were to have seen this leading, guiding, God-representing angel, could he not say, "I have seen God"?—That is a mere suggestion to get out of the difficulty.

I beg your pardon; you will find it is the specified truth of the case. Are you aware that the very personage to whom Jacob referred when he said he had seen God face to face, is declared in the Scriptures to *have been an angel*?—I am not aware of such an extraordinary fact, and if I were, I should not believe it.

In Hos. xii. 4, there is this allusion to the incident: "By his strength he (Jacob) had power with God, yea, he had power *over the angel* and prevailed." If you turn to the account in Gen. xxxii., in which you found your allegation of contradiction, you will find it agrees with this allusion?—I have no inclination to turn to it.

At verse 24, you read, that "there wrestled a man with him (Jacob) to the breaking of the day." The man wants to get away, but Jacob retains him by superior strength until his visitor shows his divinity by disabling him by the exercise of occult power, and releasing himself from Jacob's muscular grasp. Jacob becomes aware of the angelic nature of his visitor and says, "I have seen God (Elohim) face to face, and my life is preserved"?—A very nice story.

Whatever you may think of the story, is it not evident that, according to the Scriptures, it was an angel that Jacob saw when he said, "I have seen God face to face"?—The thing is mixed up.

The moon looks mixed up to a man in his cups?—None of your insults.

Where is the contradiction between an invisible God and visible angels?—The contradiction is between invisible God and visible God.

That is your contradiction?—I beg your pardon: it is the Bible's.

Not when you understand it?—I fancy I understand it. Just so, you fancy your understanding it when you don't.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Keep to the question, please.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: I am keeping to the question pretty closely. Now, Mr. Bad Laugh, let us have another of the contradictions?—Oh, there's no end of them. The Bible not only reveals a God, who could be seen, and who could not be seen, but a God who knew everything and did not know some things; a God unchangeable, continually changing; a God all-wise, repenting and grieving at the unanticipated failure of his plans; and a God who was everywhere, but who lived somewhere above, and who came down occasionally.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: That ought to satisfy my friend!

Witness: I could smother them in contradictions.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: Yes, it is very easy to rattle off assertions. What are the assertions worth? That is the question. We have seen how much they are worth on the seeing and not seeing point. Let us take the others one by one?—Keep the angels out of it.

I shall keep nothing out of it that belongs to it. The elements of the subject must be taken into account before the subject can be understood?—It is something new to me to mix up angels with God in the way you do.

It may be new to you, but it is the key to the so-called contradictions you have referred to?—I don't admit it has anything to do with the subject.

Then I shall compel you to admit it. I have already done so in the case of Jacob's "seeing God," and now for "a God who knew everything, and did not know some things." Presumably your reference is to what is recorded in Gen. xviii. 20, 21, "And the Lord said, Because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great, and because their sin is very grievous, I will go down now and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it which is come unto me, and if not I will know"?

—Yes, I say that is a God who did not know some things, and the God of the Bible is said to know everything.

Have you observed who the speaker is?—The Lord.

Aye, but the Lord speaks in “divers manners”?—I know nothing about that.

You ought to know it if you know the Bible as much as you profess?—Of course I know what it says.

Does it not say that God spoke at sundry times and divers manners (Heb. i. 1)?—Very well?

Very well: the question is, what was the manner of speech in the case in question. Who communed with Abraham in the utterance recorded in Gen. xviii.?—It says the Lord.

It says more: It says, “three *men* stood by him” (ver. 2); and further on (chap. xix. 1), when two of these men had gone towards Sodom, it says, “Two *angels* came to Sodom”?—That only makes the matter worse. It makes men unto angels, and angels unto men. That is a contradiction I had not noticed before. I am obliged to you.

Angels are like men, or rather men are like angels, in whose image they are formed: and therefore, angels not known to be such—which they were not in this case, Abraham taking them for wayfarers (verses 4 and 5)—would naturally be described as men. They are in fact immortal men; and saved men are described by Jesus as men into angels, and angels into men. That is a contradiction (Luke xx. 36).

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: We are not here to listen to a lecture on angels.

Mr. Discerner-of-facts: I am answering your witness's remark. The point lies here: Was not the speaker an angelic speaker who said, “I will go down and know,” etc.?—So you want to make out.

Was it not so?—The narrative speaks for itself.

It does, and, with that we may leave it to the Jury. Now, the speaker being an angelic bearer of God's name, where is the contradiction between his not knowing some things, and God's knowing everything?—Ah, but I don't admit that distinction.

Perhaps you don't, but is not the distinction a matter of fact for all that?—I don't see it.

Are you aware that Christ expressly alleges the limited knowledge of the angels (Mark xiii. 32)?—I don't know much about angels. Their visits are few and far between.

Does he not say in reference to a certain matter that “No, not the angels in heaven” know it?—Suppose he does?

Are not the angels limited ministrant intelligences, whose attitude David represents as “doing God's commandments, hearkening to the voice of His words” (Psa. ciii. 20), and of whom Paul says: “They are ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation” (Heb. i. 13, 14)?—What has that to do with the matter?

It has to do with those instances of limited knowledge apparently attributed to the Almighty, but in reality pertaining to the instruments employed to execute His purpose in its details?—I call it a get-out.

You may call it what you like. It is the natural explanation of the matter at which you cavil. The angels plainly appear in a variety of sayings and transactions attributed to God, for the simple reason that when so appointed they are God to man. The apparent identity between the angels and God is illustrated many times over; for example, we are informed that *Jehovah* rained fire upon Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. xix. 24). Yet the angel urging Lot to escape, speaks of it as his work, saying, “Haste thee, escape thither, for *I cannot do anything till thou be escaped thither*” (verse 22). Again, GOD said to Abraham, “Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac, and offer him for a burnt offering” (Gen. xxii. 1): yet afterwards, “*the angel of the Lord* called out of heaven, saying . . . thou hast not withheld thine only son from ME” (verses 11, 12). Again, Jacob says, “*The angel of the Lord* spake unto me, saying . . . I am the God of Bethel” (Gen. xxi. 11-13). Again, “*The angel of the Lord* appeared unto Moses . . . Moreover, He said, *I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob*” (Exo. iii. 2-6), and so on. The same thing will be found throughout the historic Scriptures generally, and it explains the discrepancies which you so

glibly rattled off, Mr. Bad Laugh?—Yes, I like to rattle them off; they are so telling.

They can only be telling with those who do not understand the subject?—I find them telling with most people.

When their eyes are opened, the effect will be different?—I have been opening their eyes right and left.

I am afraid we should not agree as to the nature of the process. I had intended following up the other points of alleged contradiction, as to changeableness and unchangeableness, repenting and not repenting, omnipresence and localization; but I think I will spare you. Having indicated the principle of their explanation (or most of them), I will leave my friend, Mr. Alltruth, to deal with them more particularly, if he likes, in his speech for the defence, and also the same with your allegations as to the nature of the Mosaic code?—You are done with me?

I think I have done with you for the present.

Sir. F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: High time, too.

—
Re-examined by Mr. Dontwanto Believeanyhow.

Mr. Bad Laugh, you have not suffered much, I hope, from the rack-and-thumb-screw process to which my friend has subjected you?—Oh, no, thank you. I have enjoyed it rather.

He has not shut you up?—It takes a cleverer man than what-do-you-call him to shut me up.

In point of fact, you never have been shut up?

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: It is only an honest man that can be shut up.

The Witness: You shut up.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: What I say is correct. Bring convincing reasons to bear upon an honest man and you convince him, and he has nothing more to say; but your professional agitator, spouter, partizan, hobbyist, or what not, is beyond reach of conviction. You cannot shut him up. The little mind he has is made up; it is set in a certain shape, and all his personal surroundings tend to keep it in that shape. You might as well try to stop a windmill by argument as to shut him up.

Mr. Dontwanto Believeanyhow: Somewhat of an interruption my Lord. I was re-examining the witness.

His Lordship: Proceed.

Now, Bad Laugh, you have been taken all through ecclesiastical history by my friend, and all up and down the Bible, and I know not where. Have you altered your mind as to the character of the New Testament?—Not a bit.

Have you altered your mind as to the character of the fantasies indulged by the defendants?—Not in the least.

You still hold to it that they are fantasies?—Undoubtedly.

And hurtful fantasies?—And hurtful fantasies.

Fantasies for which there is no reasonable foundation?

—I should say no foundation at all.

My friend said something about the literary world being on the side of the authenticity of the New Testament: are you aware that some of the brightest stars of modern scholarship are distinctly against the claims of Jesus of Nazareth?—Oh, undoubtedly: Strauss, in his peculiar way; Renan, in his polished Life of Jesus; the author of *Ecce Homo*; the writers of the *Essays of Reviews*; Gibbon also, the author of the *Decline and Fall*; David Hume; John Stuart Mill, and hosts of others have all in different ways discredited, and in fact utterly exploded the view of Christ exhibited in the four gospels. In fact, you cannot find a fairly educated man anywhere who indulges that view. It has gone out: it is a thing of the past. Science has simply killed it. It only lingers among ignorant well-meaning fellows like the defendants.

The various points raised by my friend, you consider mere quibbles?—Oh, mere quibbles: stale quibbles disposed of long, long ago.

In fact, you do not consider them worthy of notice?—That is my feeling.

That accounts for what my friend seemed to consider the somewhat abrupt manner in which you answered the questions?—Quite so. I am weary of the thrice thrashed-out rags.

An old rag and bone business you consider it alto-

gether?—Nothing else. They have made it so pretty extensively on the Continent, where quite a nice thing has been made out of the sale of relics—bits of bone, teeth, hair, and such like.

Very well; that will do for the present.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Our next, and, I believe, concluding witness, is Professor Bioplasm. Perhaps at this stage your Lordship will take an adjournment?

His Lordship: Will the Professor's examination take long?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: The Professor's examination in chief will be brief enough; but I daresay my friend on the other side may have a few questions to put to him.

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: The next witness, my Lord, is a man of a very different type from the last witness; and I should hope his cross-examination may be brought into reasonable compass.

His Lordship: Very well, we will take him after lunch.

The Court adjourned for lunch.

SIXTH SITTING

PROFESSOR BIOPLASM (called and sworn).

Examined by Mr. British Protoplasm: I have the honour, Professor Bioplasm, of putting some questions to you to-day, touching a matter affecting the public interest?—I shall do my best to answer them.

I regret we should have to call you away from your professional duties at such an inconvenient hour of the day?—We have all to submit to the claims of citizenship.

Thank you for making my duty so agreeable. You are, I believe, professor of biology, physiology, comparative anatomy, and several kindred sciences in one of our leading Universities?—Yes.

A position you have attained by the industrious cultivation of rare abilities?—I have tried to do my duty.

You are author of several scientific works—Yes, sir.

Which, I believe, have commanded a very extensive reading, and have exercised a wide-spread influence?—More than they deserve, I fear.

Your speciality, I believe, lies in the department of anthropology, or the science of human origin and development?—I have given a good deal of attention to that subject.

And I believe you have arrived at conclusions considerably at variance with what were formerly commonly-received ideas on the subject?—I believe so.

May I trouble you to tell us in a word or two what the nature of the divergence is?—The idea that has hitherto prevailed, to a large extent, has been that human exist-

ence upon earth is due to specific creation at a comparatively recent period.

You discredit that view of the case?—I believe the facts of science warrant—nay, compel—the recognition of a much greater antiquity for man upon earth than has been suspected. Indeed, it is quite impossible to assign limits to it. Fifty thousand years is a comparatively small period, in view of the facts brought to light by the researches of the past twenty or thirty years.

Researches in which I believe you have had the honour of taking a distinguished part?—As I have said, I have done my best.

I believe, also, in conjunction with your eminent collaborators in science, you have come to some other conclusions of a revolutionary character on the subject of biology?—Yes.

Will you tell us in brief what these are?—We have not as yet arrived at any definite theory as to the nature of life; but so far as our researches have gone, one or two conclusions we consider tolerably well established. We consider specific creation out of the question. We regard life as the spontaneous organic concretion of the primordial energy of the universe, under the operation of laws we have not yet been able to discover. I do not mean that the various forms of life we now see upon earth have sprung at once into their present form, but that they are traceable backwards to a process which in earlier times began spontaneously in a very small and scarcely perceptible way, and gradually became more complex as ages advanced, assuming new and diversified forms, according to the exigencies of environment, leading to the differentiation of simple parts and powers, and the consequent development of species, or different forms of life.

This doctrine, I believe you designate the doctrine of development by evolution?—It is variously designated, and is now currently known as the doctrine of evolution.

And generally accepted?—As far as I can judge, generally accepted.

You consider that it satisfactorily accounts for the ap-

pearance of the human species upon earth?—I believe so, though you will understand our aim has not been to explain anything, or to get up a theory, but merely to go on amassing facts, and noting the conclusions to which they point.

Quite so: and by that process, you have been compelled to discard the theological theory that man was miraculously formed out of nothing about 6,000 years ago?—We are not so much bent upon discarding theology, as on ascertaining scientific truth.

Quite so: but as a matter of fact, that has been the practical result: to discredit and render completely obsolete the Bible account of the matter?—I cannot speak for others: and as regards myself, I never was much of a theologian.

Now, Professor Bioplasm, we wish to bring your conclusions to bear practically upon the present trial. You are acquainted with the defendants more or less, I presume?—I cannot say that I am acquainted with them. I have heard of them in a distant sort of way.

You may be aware of the peculiarity of their crotchet?—In a general way.

You agree with the evidence that has already been adduced in this trial, that it is a hurtful crotchet?—Of my own knowledge, I cannot say much about it. I should say that any religious crotchet is bound more or less to be hurtful.

You agree that it would be a beneficial thing to put a stop to the public agitation of it?—It would, of course, be a good thing if you could stop a hurtful crotchet. There might be a difference of opinion as to the best way of doing it. I should say the more scientific knowledge you diffuse among the people, the less chance will hurtful crotchets have.

Well, waiving that point for the present, we wish you to give the Court the benefit of your superior knowledge, as to whether there is any possibility of the crotchet of the defendants being founded on truth. You may have discerned in the course of this trial that their reply to our action is, that their doctrine is true: and out of de-

ference to his Lordship's judgment, we have had to deal with this point, and to try to show that the idea of its being true is out of the question. For this reason, we have had to go out of our way, so to speak, and interfere greatly against our inclination, with the privacy and the privilege, shall I say, of a gentleman in your eminent position?—As regards that, I am ready to place my services at the disposal of the Court at any time.

You see the position: What have you to say to the idea of Christ having risen from the dead?—The fact of the matter is, the subject is quite out of my line.

Have you no opinion on the subject?—I never gave it particular attention. I have had enough on my hands other ways.

Can you give the Court no guidance in the matter?—Well, if you ask my opinion, candidly, I should have to say, of course, that—ah—the subject is outside practical investigation, and, therefore,—ah—that it is impossible to entertain a definite opinion. A man can only have knowledge on a subject that he can investigate.

Do I understand you to say, then, that possibly the resurrection of Christ occurred?—I do not say that. The subject is not in my province, you understand.

I must come to the point, Professor; excuse me being personal?—If you ask if I am a Christian, I should say, I am.

That is not specific enough for my purpose. I should have to ask what you mean by being a Christian?—I believe in Christian doctrines or precepts of life.

You mean you believe in Christian ethics—Christian rules of behaviour?—Quite so.

But that is not the question. Do you believe in the doctrines on which the ethics are founded?—Which do you mean? Because there are different versions of the doctrines in Christendom?

I see the difficulty. Well, let me put it to you plainly, thus: Do you believe that Christ rose from the dead?—If you put it in that way, I am bound to say candidly that I do not.

Thank you, Professor. That is the point to which I

wished you to come. Now I wish to draw you out, if possible, Professor, with all deference and respect, and sincerely regretting I should have to put you to this trouble, as to the reasons that lead you to take that position. You will, of course, perceive that that is the issue involved in this trial. The defendants allege the resurrection of Christ as the great justification of the proceedings of which we complain, and if we can exhibit reasons that will convince the jury that that justification is unfounded, we shall render a great service to the community at large?—As I have said, I have not made the subject one of special study, and I do not know that I can assist the Court with an exhibition of specific reasons in support of my non-belief. My reasons are more of a general character.

Would you favour the Court with an indication of them?—Well, they would be something like this: I make what I know, the rule by which I judge of that which I do not know. I know what science teaches. Of this I have no doubt; it is not a subject admitting of doubt. I do not personally know about the things the Bible tells us of; but I know that the knowledge which I am personally sure of is opposed to what the Bible tells us. Therefore I conceive I have no alternative but to refuse what the Bible tells us.

Thank you, Professor: that is highly satisfactory, I am sure?—In fact, I am incapable of believing what is opposed to manifest truth. It is not a question of choice. A man cannot choose what he will believe. He is obliged to believe what is true, if he have eyes to see. There are some reasons why I should be glad to believe the Bible, if it were a matter of choice.

You would believe in the resurrection of Christ if it were logically admissible?—Undoubtedly.

But you cannot?—I cannot.

You hold it to be inconsistent with what you know of the facts of Nature?—The investigation of Nature reveals a state of things totally at variance with Bible cosmical theories; consequently, there is, to my mind, a strong presumption established against everything out of the way

of Nature which it teaches; and, it is unnecessary for me to remark, that the coming of a dead man to life again is entirely out of the way of Nature.

You put it very fairly and very convincingly, as I should think my friends on the other side must feel.

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: We shall see about that presently.

Mr. British Protoplasm: I believe you are not alone in your views on these subjects?—I believe not. In fact, they are generally accepted in educated circles.

Ah, but I mean as regards the scientific support of independent minds?—Oh: yes, there is quite a variety of writers on these subjects now-a-days.

Original writers: not mere purveyors?—Oh, quite so; men of independent thought.

There is Professor Tin Dale?—Yes; he is an original writer of great power; he has written extensively on light and sound as molecular modes of motion.

And Professor Huck's Lie?—Yes; he is quite an authority in my own line—the inventor of protoplasm and bioplasm, and also of something else—I forget—which he has had to abandon as a mistake.

Then there is Professor Hawk Ill?—Yes; he has undoubtedly put the top stone on the theory of evolution. He has proved the descent of man from the simplest forms? and he successfully broached the suggestion that the simplest form of all—the moneron—a simple inorganic living sac became accidentally, or, at all events, spontaneously developed in the primeval play of the primordial life force.

And I have omitted to mention the world-renowned Mr. Leschar Wind?—You mean, Mr. Windar.

Win Dar or Dar Win; we call him Mr. Wind for short?—Oh, quite so; he is a very eminent man: in fact he may claim to be the father of evolution. Most of us have only studied on his lines; and some of us think we have improved on him.

In the company of these men you have no cause to feel ashamed of the conclusions you maintain?—The very reverse. I can desire no better company, though, of

course, you understand, I hold my position independently of any company.

That's understood; but you will naturally feel strengthened in your position by the endorsement of so many able and original, and, I may even say, brilliant, intellectual men?—Oh, undoubtedly.

Their arguments have never been answered in any way?—There have been a few attempts. At first, rather strong things were written in reply to them, but the attempts grew weaker as time went on and facts accumulated, until finally, it may be said, the whole position has been surrendered. There are no more ardent evolutionists than some of the clergy.

Very well, Professor Bioplasm, that is all I have to ask you to-day. We are much obliged to you for giving evidence. I daresay my friend may have a question or two for you.

Cross-examined by Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: Professor Bioplasm, I hope you will pardon me if my questions should appear somewhat intrusive. I wish to show all the respect due from one gentleman to another: but the issue at stake is of such vast importance that it is necessary to probe matters to the very bottom, in what may seem an unrelenting way?—I think I understand. I will promise to be very meek.

Thank you, and I doubt not you will be as frank as meek?—It will not be my fault if I do not answer your questions clearly and candidly.

And I will endeavour that it shall be no fault of the questions as regards such amount of perspicacity as I may be able to command?—We ought to be able to get along.

His Lordship: I have no doubt you will. It is interesting to have a case conducted with frankness and candour on both sides.

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: Now, Professor Bioplasm, I understand you to say that you could not believe in the resurrection of Christ, because it was opposed to science, or something of that sort?—I said it was out of the way of Nature.

Out of the way of Nature: you mean out of the way of your experience of Nature?—We can only know Nature by our experience of it.

But you do not profess to have experienced the whole of Nature?—I should not, of course, make such a profession.

Very well: You mean that your experience of Nature disinclines you to believe in the resurrection of Christ?—That is not the whole of my objection.

But let us take one thing at a time. Do you say that your lack of the experience of resurrection is sufficient reason for saying resurrection is impossible?—I should not, of course, be disposed to take that ground. The more a man knows of Nature, the less is he disposed to dogmatize about what is possible and what is impossible.

You would not say the resurrection of Christ was impossible in the abstract?—As I have said, it is not for me to say what is impossible. What I say is, that resurrection is entirely out of the way of Nature, so far as I have experience of Nature, and therefore a natural presumption presents itself against the reception of the idea.

If you saw a dead man come to life again, you would believe it?—I should, of course, believe it.

If your friends saw a dead man come to life in your absence, should you refuse to believe because you hadn't seen it?—I should, of course, consider their testimony, but with much predisposition against receiving it, I must confess.

Perhaps so, but if it stood the test in all ways, what then?—Well, you put a hypothetical case, you see.

I do, but only to illustrate an actual case. You are aware that a testimony has been delivered to the resurrection of Christ?—I suppose there has.

There can be no doubt about that, can there?—There has been no such testimony in our day.

The testimony exists in our day, does it not?—You refer to the New Testament?

I do?—Yes, I suppose I must admit the testimony exists: but not in the form most convenient for test.

Pass over that just now; here is a written testimony to

the fact, or alleged fact, let me say, to adapt myself to your point of view, that Christ rose from the dead. As a scholar, can you doubt that that testimony is the testimony of the apostles?—You refer now to the authenticity question.

I refer to a question of fact; does not every rule by which we ascertain the authenticity of any book or document, establish the authenticity of the apostolic writings?—I have not given the question a very close attention, but, I admit that I know of no reason to dispute the authenticity of public documents so long in the hands of Christendom. I think, had they not been authentic, the fact would long ago have become apparent.

Do not these writings contain intrinsic marks of authenticity?—I think so, so far as I am acquainted with them.

Very well; if these documents are authentic, does it not come to this: that we have the written depositions of the apostles to 'the fact of Christ's resurrection?—I suppose it must be admitted.

As actual a testimony as if it came orally from the lips of the men who wrote these documents?—Well.

Have you considered how explicit the testimony is?—Not particularly.

You were in Court during the examination of the last witness?—Yes, not a very satisfactory performance.

You heard the citations from the New Testament on this point?—Yes.

It is not necessary to read them again, but you will allow me to indicate a salient point or two, in addition to the testimony then adduced. Paul, in 1 Cor. xv., after citing the evidence of Peter, the twelve, and sundry others, says, "Last of all, HE WAS SEEN OF ME, ALSO." In another part of the epistle he asks, "Have I not SEEN Jesus Christ, our Lord?" (1 Cor. ix. 1). In his speech in the synagogue of Antioch, he expressly says: "*God raised him from the dead*, and HE WAS SEEN MANY DAYS of them which came up with him from Galilee to Jerusalem, who are his *witnesses* to the people" (Acts xiii. 30, 31). Paul finally found himself in custody in consequence of

the agitation caused by his testimony to the resurrection of Christ. When so in custody, Festus, the Roman governor of one of the Syrian provinces, had occasion to state Paul's case to King Agrippa. His statement lays hold of this very feature. He says, "Against whom (Paul), when the accusers stood up, they brought none accusation of such things as I supposed, but had certain questions against him of their own superstition, and *Jesus, who was dead, WHOM PAUL AFFIRMED TO BE ALIVE*" (Acts xxv. 18, 19). These features of the apostolic narrative are, of themselves, sufficiently explicit as to the place occupied by the resurrection of Christ in the apostolic testimony; but I desire to call your attention to one very large and fruitful department of evidence on the question, one on which it is impossible to lay too much stress. I refer to the casual allusions and declarations throughout the letters of the Apostle Paul. I apprehend you recognize the authenticity of these letters?—I have no reason to doubt that the epistles were actually written by the Apostle Paul.

You do not share the reservations of the last witness?—I do not. To tell the truth, I do not think, from the way he treated the subject, that he had any real reservations himself. It is impossible to have any real doubt on the point. Whatever we may think of what Paul teaches, it seems to me the height of folly to attempt to deny that he wrote the letters bearing his name.

That being so—(and I thank you for so full and frank an admission, though it is but the admission of palpable truth)—I desire to call your attention to the constant way in which the resurrection crops up in these letters, as a matter of notorious fact within the writer's personal knowledge, and which he also takes for granted in the most natural way: "*Now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first fruits of them that slept*" (1 Cor. xv. 20). This is his postulate in arguing with the Corinthians as to the truth, or otherwise, of the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. The ground of this postulation is as strong as it could be: "*I have seen him*" (ver. 8). Then he speaks of Christ who "died for

them and *rose again*" (2 Cor. v. 15); of believing on "*him who raised up Jesus from the dead*" (Rom. iv. 24). He states that Christ "*was raised again* for our justification" (ver. 25). In chap. vi. 4, he says, "*Christ was raised up from the dead* by the glory of the Father"; speaks of Christ as "*him who is raised from the dead*" (vii. 4); refers to "*the Spirit of him that raised up Christ from the dead*" (viii. 11), and God as "*He that raised up Christ from the dead*" (Ib.). In 1 Cor. vi. 14, he plainly says, "*God hath both raised up the Lord Jesus, and will also raise us up by his own power.*" In 1 Cor. xv. 15, he says, "*We have testified of God that He raised up Christ from the dead*"; in 2 Cor. iv. 14, "*He that raised up the Lord Jesus*"; Eph. i. 20, "*God raised him from the dead, and gave him glory*"; 2 Tim. ii. 8, "*Jesus Christ, the seed of David, was raised from the dead*"; 1 Thess. iv. 14, "*Jesus died, and rose again*"; Rom. xiv. 9, "*Christ both died and rose, and revived.*" I might also quote from the epistles of John in the same way; also of Peter; also from the Apocalypse, where is the unusually distinct exhibition of Christ as "*He who was dead and is alive.*" But I should probably only weaken my argument by further citations. My question is this: seeing the authenticity of the New Testament is a fact to be admitted by every man recognizing the most ordinary canons of literary criticism, and seeing the New Testament abounds with assertions of Christ's resurrection, does not the existence of the New Testament in our day amount to the existence of the testimony of personal witnesses to Christ's resurrection?—Such as the testimony is, no doubt it is as you say.

Could the testimony be stronger?—I don't know that it could, as a matter of words.

In what way could it be stronger?—As I have said, it would have been open to test had the witnesses been alive.

What test could you have applied?—It is impossible to say just on the spur of the moment.

To what could your tests have been directed?—I cannot exactly say.

Must they not necessarily have been directed to two

points—the capability of the witnesses to give evidence, and their trustworthiness in a moral sense?—Doubtless these would be leading points.

If a man is able and honest, you would accept his evidence?—Most of us would, I think.

Do you think the writings constituting the New Testament are tolerable evidence of capacity?—In a certain sense, no doubt.

Could muddle-headed men produce such writings?—So far as you can judge a man by writings, I should say the writers of the New Testament were men of fair average intelligence.

Do not the writings show they were much more than men of average intelligence?—It is a matter of opinion.

Could a man of only average intelligence write an account which should combine such conciseness with such amplitude of information; such brevity with such lucidity; and such simplicity with such majesty of diction, as you find exemplified in any of the four gospels?—You put it strongly.

I do; the facts warrant it?—Well, as I have said, the writers were evidently men of considerable mental vigour.

Should you not consider the question of their capability as decisively settled by the nature of these writings alone, as it ever could be by any test you might apply if they were alive?—I should not like to go so far as that.

Should you like to say that men not capable could produce such writings?—I must, of course, allow that incapable men could not write such a book.

And now consider the nature of the fact which they bear witness to. Should you not consider that the writers of such a book would be able enough to judge as to the evidence of their senses?—I do not know that I quite apprehend your meaning there?

Is not a very ordinary human being able to give evidence of what he sees?—In ordinary circumstances, of course.

There is no great depth of penetration required for a man to be sure whether he sees a thing or not?—It depends on the nature of the subject.

Well, the question of whether a man was seen on the street, you would not consider a very recondite question, or one calling for special gifts of discernment?—It would depend.

If you coachman or your abigail informed you they had seen your friend Mr. Protoplasm passing on the road, you would not think of doubting their word?—If I knew my friend was somewhere else, I should doubt it, of course.

I don't know that you would doubt even in that case. I think it much more likely that you would fall back upon some supposition that your friend had unexpectedly returned?—Perhaps.

Especially, if not only your coachman but your scullery maid, and not only they, but several persons in the street, all separately and independently, testified to the fact that your friend had both walked down the road and had spoken to several persons?—I should of course think there was something in it.

Should you not consider the appearance of a person on the street and his talking with passers-by, the simplest of all subjects on which witnesses could give evidence?—There certainly could not be anything much simpler.

You would not consider that evidence on such a point would require any profound sort of qualification?—Of course not.

Any ordinary sort of man you would consider quite capable of giving reliable evidence to a fact of that sort?—Quite so.

Should you consider the men who were able to write the New Testament, able to judge of the truth in such a case—as to whether your friend Mr. Protoplasm really walked down the street?—You are becoming needlessly precise, are you not?

I think not. The very evident matter in question is so generally and systematically denied or ignored, that we require to be precise. I must repeat my question. Would not men able to write the New Testament be able to judge whether they saw a man or not?—There is but one answer of course.

And that is "yes"?—Yes.

Now, have you considered that that is just the nature of the fact they bear witness to—that Christ, with whom they were on terms of close and loving intimacy, after being put to death by Pontius Pilate, appeared to them again alive, hale, and sound?—That is what they say.

And you admit they were able to judge?—Well, of course they knew whether they saw him or not, but they might be mistaken.

Do you really think so?—I think so. I have been mistaken myself often, when I supposed I have seen so-and-so in a crowd, or passing along on the street. It has turned out afterwards that it was not the person at all.

Ay, there might be a mistake in that case, where it is only one occasion that is in question, and only one witness (yourself), and where the thing is hurried and momentary; but suppose you saw the person several times, and that you saw him deliberately, and talked with him; and that other friends were with you, and saw and conversed with your friend also, could there be any mistake in such a case?—Well, of course, it would make a difference.

Are you not aware that this was the state of the case with regard to Christ?—Yes, so far as the New Testament account goes.

It is the New Testament account we are considering, and you have admitted that that account is the account of personal eye-witnesses, and competent eye-witnesses. Their trustworthiness we shall come to presently. I return to my question: are you not aware that as Paul expresses it in the words I quoted a moment back, "Christ was seen *many days*" of them who accompanied him to Jerusalem—that is, his disciples—"seen of them *forty days*," as Luke has it (Acts i. 3), "showing himself alive by *many infallible proofs*"?—It is so stated.

Are you not aware that Peter states that they, "the disciples—*ate and drank with him*, after he rose from the dead" (Acts x. 40-41)?—I suppose it is so stated.

Are you not aware that there are accounts, in the New Testament, of several deliberate interviews at which Jesus talked with his disciples on the subject of his crucifixion,

and of his resurrection, and of the course they were to pursue when he should leave them (see Luke xxiv., John xx., and Acts i.)?—I cannot deny that there are such accounts, of course.

Now, assuming these accounts to be true, did the case admit of any mistake, such as you have illustrated in the case of your friend in the crowd?—Ah, you ask me to assume a good deal.

At present, it is only for the sake of argument that I ask you to assume the truthfulness of the account. You have admitted that the account is an authentic account, that is, an account actually written by the professed writers, who were disciples of Christ; and you have admitted their capability of judging of such a simple matter as whether they saw Christ or not; and my question is, suppose that in addition to capable men, we prove them truth-speaking men, does it not follow that the facts to which they testify are of such a nature as to preclude the possibility of mistake?—I don't know about that.

In what other way could the fact of Christ's resurrection have been made apparent to them?—It is not for me to say.

I think it is, if you take a position of antagonism to their testimony. Suppose a friend of yours whom you knew to have died, were to present himself alive to you, in what other way could he satisfy you of his reality and identity than by coming to see you, and not once, but coming often; and talking with you freely of matters that you both knew; and allowing you to handle him and examine him, especially as to marks on his body that you knew to be there; and dining with you, and making appointments with you for a period of over a month. Could you possibly have any doubt after such an experience?—If I really had such an experience, I could not, of course, entertain any doubt; but, you see, I am not happy enough to have had such an experience.

But we are dealing with a case where such an experience is testified?—Well?

In admitting the authenticity of the New Testament, you have admitted it is the testimony of the very men

themselves. It is no second-hand account. It is their own actual evidence, as actual as if we saw them step into the witness box and tell us all about it by their own lips. And, remember, it is not the evidence of one. One man might be mistaken; though I fancy that one man (even if it were yourself, Professor Bioplasm, in the case supposed) would feel strongly enough convinced. But here are a number of men—eleven who stand officially related to the matter—men chosen as official witnesses—and not eleven only, but a multitude besides—"five hundred brethren at once," of whom Paul says, "the greater part remain unto the present (the time of his writing), but some are fallen asleep?"—But does it not say that "some doubted" (Matt. xxviii. 17)?

Yes, at the first: and the statement that they doubted is really an evidence of the most valuable kind when properly construed?—You have such a facility for turning anything to account.

Nay, do not pay me that compliment, Professor. I deem it a reflection on the subject itself. It is not a matter of ingenuity: it is a matter of logical construction. Look here: Why was it written that they doubted? Is not such a record an evidence of candour in the narrative? Would a partizan writing without regard to truth have recorded such a fact? And, if not a partizan writing, it is a true writing, and therefore this follows: that it is *not only true* they doubted at first (that is, "some"), but that they afterwards believed? So then you have to consider this: What dispelled their doubts? The doubts were dispelled; for you find these same doubters foremost afterwards in the testimony for Christ's resurrection. What led to this dispelling of their doubts? What led them to believe? For they did believe, and suffered persecution for their belief? If you attach any weight to their doubts, you must attach weight to the dispelling of the doubts. Their doubts were natural in the presence of an unprecedented event, especially in view of this, that Christ's crucifixion, which they had not thought possible, had shattered all their confidence in him; and, consequently, not expecting him to die, now that they knew he was dead, they did not expect him to rise; and when he

rose, it was natural it should be a theme of bewilderment to them, especially to the less quick-minded of them. It was natural that some should doubt; but in view of the fact that all doubt afterwards fled, are we not justified in coming to the conclusion that the facts, of which they were witnesses, were of a character to put an end to all doubt?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: My friend is making a speech.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: I beg pardon, I was answering the suggestion of the Professor: Now, Professor Bioplasm, there is only one more question I have to put at this stage of the subject, and that is this: you have admitted the New Testament is the authentic testimony of the apostles, to a fact of which you have admitted they were capable of judging: have you any reason to doubt the truthfulness of their testimony?—Their testimony is so extraordinary that I confess myself unable to credit it.

Is that the only reason you have for doubting it?—No others occur to me at the present moment.

Do you think they wrote what they knew to be untrue?—I should not like to say such a thing.

Do you not think the truthfulness of their testimony is guaranteed to us?—In what way?

By the results it brought upon them?—Oh, you mean persecution.

Yes?—Well, you see, all religions have been persecuted. I do not see that that proves anything.

Stop a bit, Professor; do you not think that submission to persecution proves the sincerity of the person persecuted?—It may prove their sincerity, but I do not see that it proves the truth of what they believe.

Does not that depend upon what they are persecuted about?—I don't see it. The rule holds good whether the Catholics persecute the Protestants or the Protestants persecute the Catholics. They both have their opinions, and they are both equally sincere.

Ay, in that case, I grant persecution proves nothing, because it is a matter of opinion in both cases. In the formation of an opinion, a man may be wrong, and the sin-

cerity of his conviction is no proof of the truth of his conviction. But suppose it is not a matter of opinion a man is persecuted for, but a matter of knowledge?—I am not sure that I apprehend the distinction.

Well, suppose I were to ask you: is it your opinion that I am talking to you, what should you think of that way of expressing myself?—I should think it a curious way of expressing yourself—inapplicable to the case, in fact.

Quite so: it is not a matter of opinion with you that I am talking to you. It is a matter of knowledge: you know I am talking to you. But if I were to ask you, what is your opinion about the Tichborne case, you would not think the question inapplicable?—Not at all.

The Tichborne case being a matter out of your actual knowledge, you would feel that any view you should entertain must be a mere opinion which, depending on the construction of evidence, might be wrong?—Quite so.

Suppose it became a public law that all who believed in Thomas Castro as Sir Roger Tichborne should be hanged, and you allowed yourself to be hanged for that opinion (if that is your opinion), your hanging would prove you to be sincere in your opinion; but it would not prove your opinion to be right?—Quite so.

But suppose it should become an important question in some way, some time after this, whether you were in this Court to-day, and it should be contradicted that you had been here, and you should maintain that you had, and you should be threatened with imprisonment if you persisted in that statement, and you persisted, notwithstanding, and were actually imprisoned; and not only you, but a number of gentlemen who are here to-day, and who should give evidence that you were here, on the ground that they had seen and heard you; suppose they also joined you in your imprisonment, and in submission to heavy penalties; would not your imprisonment prove something more than sincerity?—I see your point. It would prove we were pretty well convinced about the matter in dispute.

And the matter in dispute being a matter of which you

had actual personal knowledge, and could not be mistaken about, would not your submission to imprisonment be proof to other people that your statement was true?—Doubtless there is some force in that.

Have you realized that the apostles were not persecuted for a matter of opinion, but for a matter of personal knowledge?—It never occurred to me particularly to think of it in that light.

Let me direct your attention to this most important feature of the case. Take the first collision of the apostles with the authorities, as recorded in the authentic Acts of the Apostles. Peter, addressing a crowd of Jews in the temple enclosure, delivered himself thus concerning the crucifixion—then a recent event: “Ye denied the Holy One and the Just, and desired a murderer to be granted unto you; and killed the Prince of Life, whom God hath raised from the dead, whereof we are witnesses.” We read further on that as the apostles “spoke unto the people, the priests, and the captain of the temple, and the Sadducees came upon them, being grieved that they taught the people, and that they preached through Jesus the resurrection from the dead” (Acts iii. 14, 15; iv. 1-3). And it goes on to inform us that the captain took the apostles into custody, and locked them up for the night. Next day, pretty much according to the modern police routine, they were brought into court, and charged before the magistrates (i.e., the rulers, elders and scribes). The charge was the performance of a certain miracle in subversion of the orthodox doctrine. Mark the defence of the apostles: “Be it known unto you all, and to all the people of Israel, that by the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, whom ye crucified, whom God raised from the dead, even by him doth this man stand here before you whole” (iv. 10). After deliberation, the Bench of judges “commanded them (the apostles) not to speak at all, nor teach in the name of Jesus. But Peter and John answered, and said unto them, Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye. For *we cannot but speak the things which we have SEEN and HEARD*” (verses 18-20). The people were so much in favour of the apostles

at this time, that the authorities, after reprimanding them, were compelled to discharge them. After this, we read (iv. 33) that "with great power gave the apostles WITNESS OF THE RESURRECTION OF THE LORD JESUS." The greatness of the power by which they did so may be estimated from the fact recorded (chap. v. 12) that "by the hands of the apostles were many signs and wonders wrought among the people . . . insomuch that they brought forth the sick into the street, and laid them on beds and couches, that at least the shadow of Peter, passing by, might overshadow some of them. There came also a multitude out of the cities round about Jerusalem, bringing sick folks and them which were vexed with unclean spirits, and they were healed every one." The public effect produced by these occurrences became so great that the authorities again bestired themselves. "The high priest rose up and all they that were with him, and laid their hands on the apostles, and put them in the common prison." From this, the apostles were divinely liberated, and they were then re-arrested next day, without violence, and brought before the authorities. Note the issue upon which this re-hearing of the case turned, as defined by the judges themselves, and note the rejoinder of the apostles: "Did we not straitly command you that ye should not teach *in this name*? and behold, ye have filled Jerusalem with *your doctrine*, and intend to bring *this man's blood* upon us. Then Peter and the other apostles answered and said, We ought to obey God rather than man. The God of our fathers *raised up Jesus* WHOM YE SLEW AND HANGED ON A TREE. Him hath God exalted with his right hand to be a Prince and a Saviour to grant repentance to Israel and remission of sins. And *we are his witnesses* of these things, and so, also, is the Holy Spirit whom God hath given to them that obey him" (Acts v. 28, 32). If you follow the narrative of the apostolic persecutions throughout, you find this same feature is constantly prominent: that *it was not for their opinions but for their testimony to a matter of fact within their personal knowledge* that they were persecuted. Now, in view of this, I return to my

question. Do you not think that the truthfulness of the apostolic testimony, that they had seen and spoken to Christ many times since his crucifixion, is guaranteed to us by the sufferings to which the apostles submitted on account of that testimony?—I now see your drift.

What do you say to the question?—I do not know exactly what to say. There is, of course, considerable force in it.

Do you not think you are logically bound to surrender to it, and admit that the testimony of the apostles is true?—I might think so if the road were perfectly clear in all other respects.

What am I to understand by that?—Well, you see, there are the scientific difficulties.

What scientific difficulties? I understand you to say that you were not prepared to hold that the resurrection of Christ was impossible?—I said so, and from that I do not go; but there are other difficulties besides the question of the possibility or impossibility of resurrection in the abstract.

What are they?—I referred to them in answer to Mr. Protoplasm.

You mean the modern scientific theories of human origin?—Quite so. There is such a hopeless chasm between the Bible and the results of modern biological and anthropological research, that I cannot but conclude there must be some great mistake at the bottom of the Christian movement.

Do you think that is quite a logical position to take, Professor?—I think so.

You cannot set aside the evidence of Christ's resurrection?—I admit, as you put it, it is rather strong.

In point of fact, it is unanswerable in any reasonable treatment of the facts?—I admit it is very strong.

Could a historical case be stronger?—I don't know that it could.

Does it not amount to demonstration?—I should hardly like to go so far as that.

Is it not as near demonstration as such a subject is capable of?—I might admit as much as that.

Can the facts be explained apart from the hypothesis

of Christ having risen?—I should not like to be called upon to explain them apart from that hypothesis; still—

Still what?—There is the invincible barrier of modern science.

We shall see about modern science directly; but do you not think, Professor, it would be more logical to accept a demonstrated truth, even if it appears to conflict with our conception of some other truth, than to shut the mind to its reception because of our assumption that something else is true, or that the first truth cannot be reconciled with the second?—There is some weight in that suggestion.

Very well; now, Professor, we will go from that. I now wish to put some questions to you as to these scientific difficulties of which you make so much.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Are the scientific difficulties likely to take long?

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: They will take a little time.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I thought your cross-examination of the professor was to be short?

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: I could not speak positively: I expressed the hope it might be so.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: If my memory serves me, it was something more than a hope.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: Well, let us say an expectation. I was presuming on the ease with which we should get on with such a candid witness.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I hope you have not been disappointed.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: I have nothing to complain of, but the subject is large. If your witness would admit the facts, we should make quick work.

His Lordship: I understand the cross-examination of this witness is still likely to occupy some time?

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: I fear so, my Lord.

His Lordship: Probably it will suit parties to take an adjournment till to-morrow?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: That would be convenient, my Lord.

The Court adjourned till next day.

SEVENTH SITTING

PROFESSOR BIOPLASM (Re-called).

Cross-examination continued by Mr. Discerner-of-facts: Professor Bioplasm, you were good enough yesterday to admit the reality and the strength of the apostolic testimony to Christ's resurrection: but you spoke of the conclusions of modern science forming an invincible barrier to your reception of that testimony?—Yes.

To what branch of modern science do you refer as presenting this invincible barrier?—A variety of sciences, I think.

Not all sciences?—No, not all sciences.

The science of chemistry, for example?—No.

Mathematics?—No, not mathematics, unless we take them as astronomically applied. I refer particularly to anthropological and biological science.

In what way do those sciences present a barrier to the reception of the resurrection of Jesus Christ?—Well, they teach us the gradual development of life by evolution during incalculable ages past, in such a way as to exclude the possibility of specific creation, or of such a miracle as the resurrection of Christ.

Are you sure of the theory of development by evolution?—As sure as we can be, of anything we have not seen.

Should you call biology and anthropology demonstrated sciences?—As near as we can come at demonstration in such matters.

Near demonstration is not demonstration?—We cannot attain to absolute demonstration in the problems of a past development.

If there is an absence of absolute demonstration, is it not possible the theory of evolution may be a mistake?—Mistake is, of course, not impossible: but I think the theory is a fair induction from accumulated facts.

Are you aware that the originators of the theory are not agreed among themselves?—I am aware of some slight divergences.

Should you call a difference of opinion as to the beginning of life a slight divergence?—It depends upon how you view it. Men may substantially agree as to the cause of biological development and differ as to the start.

But is not the question of the start a vital question in its bearing upon the idea of a Starting Power?—Granted.

You are aware that Mr. Leschar Wind holds, as the only rational hypothesis, that God miraculously formed the first organisms, “the primeval parents of all other organisms,” and breathed into them the vital spark which constituted them living creatures, and that God therefore was the start of life?—I am aware that that is his view.

Professor Hawk Ill, on the other hand, rejects the idea or necessity for a God, or any other intelligent power in the universe, and holds that the primitive or first form of life, from which all other animals, including man, have sprung, arose by “spontaneous generation out of inorganic matter”?—Yes, that is Professor Hawk Ill’s idea, which, I may say, is an idea coming into general favour, as more scientific than Mr. Wind’s idea.

Should you call the denial of God a slight divergence from the recognition of God?—Of course, if you put it that way, the difference seems great.

Is not that the actual difference between Mr. Wind and Professor Hawk Ill?—I cannot deny it.

And yet Mr. Wind is the father of evolution, and Mr. Hawk Ill its popular expounder?—Yes; men will differ, as is proverbial.

If the two pillars of evolution are disagreed as to the initial principle of the system, do you not think it estab-

lishes a strong doubt as to the soundness of the system?—The circumstance is to be deplored. It doubtless carries with it, to most people, the sort of feeling you refer to.

Are you aware that the system has been very roundly and thoroughly attacked in a work recently published,* which is attracting a great deal of attention in America?—I have heard something of such a work.

Do you know that, in that work, the arguments of the evolutionists are overhauled in detail in a very thorough manner?—I have not read the work.

Are you aware that, in the opinion of many competent persons, including a number of scientific professors, that work hopelessly overthrows the whole evolutionist theory?—I suppose some people think so.

You say you have not read it?—I have not.

I should advise you to read it?—Perhaps I will.

Let me submit to you some of the points the author raises and urges—I may say with a vigour and spice quite phenomenal. You are presumably *au fait* with the subject sufficiently to defend the theory of evolution from attack?—I know something about it, of course.

I think you acknowledged to a learning in favour of Professor Hawk Ill’s version of evolution?—I am inclined to coincide with his views.

Very well; for the purposes of my cross-examination, we will take it that you make Professor Hawk Ill’s theory your own?—I think I need not be afraid to do so.

Then you would be prepared to maintain that life commenced upon earth by spontaneous generation?—I say such a hypothesis certainly seems the most probable in the present state of our information.

The idea of spontaneous generation is not very old?—No; the idea itself is older than the formulated theory. It did not at first obtain adherents on account of the composite structure of the simplest organisms then known.

What has happened to remove that difficulty?—The discovery of tiny, nearly organic, creatures, which have

* *The Problem of Human Life*: Hall & Co., 26 East Ninth Street, New York.

been styled *monera*. They are the simplest of all known organisms, as well as the simplest of all imaginable organisms. They are mere lumps of pure albumen, without organs or heterogeneous parts. They are no larger than pins' heads, and inhabit the bottom of the ocean.

In what way has the discovery of the *monera* removed the difficulty lying in the way of spontaneous generation?—Because we here have a creature in which all traces of organization is wanting—a creature in which all the vital phenomena are performed by one and the same homogeneous formless matter. The organless simplicity of this creature makes it an easy matter to imagine its origin by spontaneous generation.

"Imagine!" you don't bring imagination into science surely?—I use "imagine" for want of a better word.

But why should you imagine this creature originated by spontaneous generation?—Because only homogeneous organisms composed of one single substance could arise by spontaneous generation.

There is a little scientific dogmatism there, is there not?—I think not. All scientific schools are agreed that creatures of heterogeneous parts could not originate by spontaneous generation.

But why do you say homogeneous organisms could so originate?—That is the hypothesis.

It is a hypothesis out of which I hope to take the bottom before my cross-examination is done?—If you can do so legitimately, I shall be the last to complain. I only desire truth.

Do not suppose I cast a reflection?—I do not suppose it for a moment.

Now let us see: how do you know this moneron is composed of a single substance?—Because, on chemical analysis, it yields only albumen.

Can you distinguish between albumen and fibrine on chemical analysis?—To some extent.

Can you distinguish positively between albumen and fibrine in chemical analysis?—I am not quite sure as to the extent to which that discrimination can be carried.

Are you not aware that eminent physiological au-

thorities (Carpenter and Liebig, for example), have laid it down that no chemical difference exists by which albumen and fibrine can certainly be distinguished?—I have some memory to that effect.

Are you prepared to lay down a contrary doctrine, and to assert that there is a marked chemical distinction between these two substances?—I am not.

How can you be sure, then, that there is no fibrine in the constitution of the moneron?—I cannot, of course, be absolutely certain.

If not certain on that point, how can you be sure the moneron is a creature of a homogeneous or single substance?—We cannot, of course, be absolutely certain.

May there not be other substances besides fibrine in the constitution of the moneron?—I think not.

Does it contain water?—Of course. In all living bodies, without exception, there is a certain quantity of water.

Is it not a fact that all animals and all plants, in fact all organisms consist in great measure of water, combined in a peculiar manner with other substances?—I cannot take exception to that proposition.

Very well, if water as a vital ingredient combines with various substances, since there is water in the living moneron, why are you so sure that there are not other substances besides albumen and possibly fibrine in its constitution?—They have not been discovered.

Are you prepared to say that they are not there?—I do not believe they are there.

May they be there?—It does not become a scientific man to dogmatize.

You are prepared to assert that they are not there?—I am not prepared to go further than I have gone.

Very well, then, they may be there, since water is there, and if there, what becomes of the theory that the moneron, being of a single substance, may have spontaneously generated?—That is a matter for argument.

Well, so much for that. Now, you say that the moneron is a creature without organs?—Yes, it is itself an organism, but not in any way built up of distinct organs. It consists solely of a single chemical combination.

You are quite sure it has no organs?—I think so.

Why?—Well, there the creature is; you can examine it under the microscope and no organs are visible.

Do you make the fact that no organs can be seen, a reason for the assumption that there are no organs?—It seems a reasonable assumption in the circumstances.

Are you aware that there are creatures with organs too small to be visible under the most powerful microscope?—I suppose there are.

And yet whose existence is recognized from the functions performed by the creature?—I suppose there are such cases.

The rotifer, for example, or wheel animalcule, whose head is finished off with a circle or crown of very small hairs, which bend in regular succession all round, with the effect of giving it the appearance of a revolving wheel?—I have heard of the rotifer.

Are you aware that that revolving wheel of hairs is only visible under a powerful microscope?—Yes; it cannot be seen with the naked eye.

Are you also aware that while the hairs are visible, no muscular or other organs are visible by which these hairs are bent?—I suppose that is the case.

As a scientific man, would you say that because no structural arrangement can be seen at the base of these minute hairs, by which their motion is produced, therefore there is no such arrangement?—I don't suppose I should. The fact of the movement of the hairs may be taken as proof of the existence of an apparatus capable of producing the motion.

Quite so: very well, you say the moneron has no organs, because they are not visible. Does it not perform motions involving the use of organs?—The moneron performs motions of course.

Does it move itself?—Yes.

In what way?—It forms on its upper surface, shapeless, finger-like processes, or very fine radiated threads, which we call pseudo-podia, or false feet.

Does it eat?—It absorbs nutrition.

Does it grow?—Yes, it grows from a smaller to a larger size.

Does it propagate?—It propagates, but it is by simple self-division. At a certain stage of its growth, a pinching-in takes place, contracting the middle of the globe on all sides, and finally leads to the separation of the two halves. Each half then becomes rounded off, and appears as an independent individual, which commences anew the simple course of vital phenomena of nutrition and propagation.

And do you mean gravely to maintain, Professor Bioplasm, that all this is done without organs?—No organs are apparent.

Neither is there a rotatory apparatus apparent in the rotifer. Do you think when the moneron moves by thrusting out its finger-like processes, as you have termed them, that there are no muscles or analagous organs to cause the projection to take place?—Something must cause the projection to take place, of course.

Can you conceive of the moneron growing by nutrition, without organs to assimilate the nutriment to its own being?—I have never thought of it in that way.

Can you conceive of propagation by self-division taking place without an apparatus, invisible to us though it may be, leading organically to such a consummate structural feat as breaking up a living creature into two, without destroying either?—I confess I had not thought of it in that way.

Is it not inevitable that the moneron, performing all these organic operations, must possess organs, though we have no lenses powerful enough to make them visible?—It would seem a reasonable conclusion, I confess.

Now, if the moneron be possessed of organs, it is "a creature of heterogeneous parts," of course; and how then am I to understand your application of what you said was the universally accepted scientific postulate, that "no creature of heterogeneous parts could originate by spontaneous generation"?—There you place me in a difficulty.

Not wishing to press you too severely, let me pass to another point. You have said that scientists have been able to "imagine" the spontaneous generation of the moneron, on account of its simplicity of structure (though

we have seen that that simplicity of structure is by no means so simple as they have assumed)?—I have said so. The discovery of the moneron has imparted to the hypothesis of spontaneous generation a degree of probability which it lacked previously.

Very well, simple or complex, have you ever known a case of a moneron being spontaneously generated?—No.

Is it not a fact that experiments have been conducted with a view to test this matter, and that living forms will not generate in liquids from which all germs have been excluded?—I believe that is the fact. In fact, it is generally conceded that spontaneous generation is not now possible.

Why not?—Because the general conditions of life upon earth under which spontaneous generation is assumed to have taken place, are so entirely altered. Spontaneous generation, which now is perhaps no longer possible, may have taken place at a time when enormous masses of carbon impregnated the atmosphere before they were condensed into coal in the primary coal mountains.

“May have!” You don’t call that scientific, do you?—We are obliged to postulate possibilities in forming a hypothesis.

What can carbon have to do with it? Are you not aware that the theory requires that spontaneous generation should have taken place millions of years before the carboniferous period commenced?—My memory fails me a little on that point.

Does not Professor Hawk Ill date “the first and longest division of the organic history of the earth,” “from the first spontaneous generation to the end of the Silurian system of deposits”? He adds: “During this immeasurable space of time, which, in all probability was much longer than all the other four epochs taken together, the three most extensive of all the Neptunic systems of strata were deposited” (*History of Creation*, vol. ii., p. 9). Thus this immense period, at the beginning of which he assumes spontaneous generation to have taken place, ended millions of years before the carboniferous age began?—Yes; I had forgot that point; but I know

the same authority suggests the excessive presence of carbon in the air as a probable cause of spontaneous generation.

The excessive presence of carbon 50 millions of years before the carbon period began?—It would seem so.

Are you prepared to stand by that?—It is a little perplexing I admit. Still the conditions of life must have been different in these remote ages, and may have admitted of spontaneous generation which is impossible now.

Are you content to call that “demonstrated science,” and to make a nebulous, hypothetical, and uncertain theory, a reason for rejecting the evidence of Christ’s resurrection, which you admit cannot be set aside?—I think I did not exactly admit that.

Well, never mind; to return to the point, why do you assume that the conditions of life differed in these remote ages from those now prevailing upon the earth?—It is a reasonable assumption in view of the changes that have been in progress.

Are you not aware that there is evidence of the condition of life having been exactly the same in these primeval times as they are at present?—I should like to know it.

Are you not aware that species of fishes and molluscs, which lived long before the carboniferous period, in the Devonian, and the Silurian ages, not only continued to live all the way through the carboniferous period, but have continued to the present time without the slightest change in their organic structures?—Perhaps you can mention illustrations?

Yes; our still existing ganoids and numerous species of shell-fish?—I had overlooked the fact.

Do you doubt it?—I am not prepared to take positive ground.

Perhaps you will accept the evidence of Mr. Leschar Wind: “Some groups (of molluscs), as we have seen, have endured from the earliest known dawn of life to the present day . . . In the genus *lingula*, for instance, the species which have successively appeared at all ages must have been connected by an unbroken series of generations

from the lowest Silurian stratum to the present day"?—The authority is good.

Does it not amount to positive proof that the conditions of life, instead of being entirely different, have been exactly the same all the way down from the beginning of life upon earth, millions of years before the age of carbon began?—I am bound to admit the cogency of the argument.

The conditions have been the same all the time. I return to the question: why should spontaneous generation take place then and not now?—I simply cannot answer the question.

If we substitute special creation for spontaneous generation, the difficulty would vanish?—To a certain extent.

Altogether, wouldn't it?—Perhaps, in a certain direction, but it might lead to difficulties in other directions.

Now let me take you a stage further. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the moneron was spontaneously generated, how do you connect the existence of the moneron with the development of species?—Our theory is, that once life had a start, it would perfect itself in the forms of its manifestation by a process of development through use. A process of natural selection would take place by the laws of inheritance. It is a slow process, but it acts surely. It accumulates slight successive variations from generation to generation, according to the necessities imposed by environment; so that simple forms of life would in process of time grow more complex, and lead to the diversification of species.

That is the theory?—That is the theory.

Do you think it is a theory substantiated by the facts?—I think so.

By all the facts?—By some of them.

How long, according to the theory, would it take a moneron to advance to a higher form of life?—It is impossible to tell.

How long ago is it since the original supposed spontaneous generation of monera took place?—We can only approximate roughly.

Can you approximate to a million or two of years?—It

must be countless millions of years since monera first spontaneously generated.

Countless millions?—I should say so.

There can be no doubt of that, can there?—No doubt, I think.

Very well, can you tell me whether there are any monera now?—Oh, yes.

Many?—I believe they are found in enormous numbers at the bottom of the ocean.

Is it not a fact that they are to-day the most numerous of all living creatures?—It is probable they are.

And I believe, after all these millions upon millions of years, they are still "the simplest of all imaginable organisms"?—Yes.

The same "one single substance" they were at the beginning of the Laurentian period, long before the carboniferous or coal age began?—The same.

This simple moneron, which your theory regards as "the parent of all other organisms," continues as destitute of parts and organs, after existing countless millions of years, as when it was first ushered into being out of inorganic matter, as you assume?—That is the fact.

Well now, Professor Bioplasm, how do you account for the present existence of the moneron at all on your theory?—It has remained undifferentiated.

Ay, but the theory is that the improved descendants of any organic species in their gradual development towards a higher grade of structure, must invariably supplant and exterminate the unimproved or parent form, in the struggle for existence. Is not that so?—That is the doctrine of evolution.

It is the doctrine of evolution we are trying?—Yes.

Is it not laid down as a principle by all evolutionists that it is only by the extermination of the unimproved individuals, through "survival of the fittest," that "natural selection" gradually advances to more perfect forms?—That I believe is the principle.

Evolutionists hold that "new and improved varieties will inevitably supplant and exterminate the older"?—I believe they do.

Then I want you to explain why the monera, which you hold to be "the primeval parents of all other organisms," have not been exterminated?—I have never addressed myself to the consideration of that problem.

Is it not a difficulty in the way of the theory?—It looks like it.

Can you explain, or suggest an explanation, or approximate to the suggestion of an explanation, in harmony with the theory of evolution, how it is that the very lowest organism,—the weakest, the most defenceless, the best adapted as the food of others, and consequently the most unfit for survival, should, instead of becoming "rarer and rarer, and finally extinct," as the theory requires, exist in countless millions, while the thousands of its supposed varieties, which were unavoidably necessary for transmutation to higher species, should all have succumbed without a specimen remaining to indicate such transitional gradations?—I should require to give the question some thought before I could venture upon an answer.

Very well, I will take you to another part of the subject. Do you really believe, Professor Bioplasm, that all the complex forms of life now upon earth, originated with this pin-head sized globule of jelly you call the moneron?—That is the most recent suggestion as to the origin of life.

How do you conceive the process of development began?—By improvement in the development of the moneron, I apprehend.

Have you really succeeded in conceiving of the possibility of improvement in a pin-head sized globule of jelly, composed of a single substance, as you say, and lacking all organism as you assume?—I apprehend it is facts, and not conceptions, with which science deals.

But we are trying the facts—the alleged facts—by the conceptions: you recollect you admitted that supposed spontaneous generation countless ages ago, was largely a matter of conception—imagination, I think, you said?—Yes.

Very well, I want to see your conception, if possible. Does not the theory of variation and development of

species require the co-relation and interaction of various substances and organs in the creatures varied and developed?—Undoubtedly.

Then, how do you succeed in applying the idea of variation and development to a creature like the moneron, with no organs, and of a single substance?—We are obliged to assume the fact of such development without being able to define exactly the *modus operandi*.

What! assume the fact of such development in the presence of myriads of monera that have undergone no modification or development for countless ages?—Your question, I admit, has considerable pertinence. I am not able on the spur of the moment to meet it.

Let me direct your attention to another point. You are, of course, aware that the theory of evolution holds that development by natural selection can only work by *inheritance*?—Yes, that is generally held by evolutionists.

The founder of evolution has said, has he not, that "unless favourable variations be *inherited* by some, at least, of *the offspring*, nothing can be effected by natural selection" (*Origin of Species* p. 9)?—Yes.

He lays it down, does he not, that "natural selection acts only by the preservation and accumulation of small *inherited modifications*" (p. 75)?—Quite so.

Very well, how do you apply the law of development by inherited modifications, to a creature which has no heirs?—I do not quite understand you there.

You are aware that the moneron has no offspring?—You refer to the mode of propagation.

I do: is it not the fact that the moneron, at a certain stage, simply divides into two, after "pinching in," and that the two halves grow each to the size of the one before it divided, and again divide?—That I believe to be the fact.

Then what I want to know is how such a creature could transmit improvements by the law of heredity. Inheritance implies parent and offspring, but when a moneron splits up, there is neither parent nor offspring, but simply a duplication of the original individual—each half being as much an essential and identical part of the original

moneron as the other; and how in that case could an improvement be transmitted?—I do not exactly follow the difficulty.

Well, supposing it possible for a moneron to take on an additional organ by some law of improvement, or the rudiments of one, when the splitting up moment came, would not the added organ be halved, and thus reduced at the very start?—I think I see your question.

Suppose it were two eyes, for example, the first division would give one eye to each half or both eyes to one half; and in either case, nothing would be done to extend the improvement to other individuals of the race. The improvement would remain and perish with the individual moneron in which it originated?—There is some force in that.

How is it possible then that the moneron can be “the primeval parent of all other organisms,” seeing that the mode of its propagation, by the self-division of its body, shuts the door against the possibility of improvement by transmission of inherited qualities?—You present a difficulty I confess I had not thought of.

Now, Professor Bioplasm, let me put before you the fundamental maxims of evolution, and see how they are affected by the facts elicited in *your* cross-examination. Will you admit that without natural selection, there can be no evolution or transmutation of one species into another?—Yes.

Will you admit that without the inheritance of variations in a species, there can be no natural selection?—Yes.

Will you admit that inheritance is impossible among monera, which propagate by the self-division of their bodies?—That is a new proposition to me, but I confess I do not see how to evade it.

Does it not follow that, as a scientific demonstration, monera cannot be “the primeval parents of organisms,” developed by inheritance?—I should require time to consider that sweeping conclusion. I admit its plausibility.

Would not the acceptance of that conclusion involve the overthrow of the entire theory of evolution?—I don’t know about that. There are other facts in Nature, quite

independent of the moneron, that seem to require that hypothesis.

Such as what?—Such as the anatomical resemblance and typical graduation of organic beings, as shown in the fossil record of the geological strata.

In what way does that necessitate the theory of evolution?—It shows a gradual improvement of species as ages went on, on what I might call a common groundplan.

Would not the gradual improvement of species upon a common plan be quite consistent with the special creation of each species?—That would be a miracle you see, therefore unscientific.

Do you call a miracle unscientific if proved?—Ah, if proved, that is the question.

Must there not have been a miracle at the start, if the theory of the *Win Dar* school of evolutionists be the true one?—As I have admitted, they assume the miraculous infusion of life to in a few original organisms.

Are you prepared to assert that that idea is an untenable one?—I have indicated pretty freely, I think, to what school I belong.

The spontaneous generation school?—Quite so.

But I think, too, you have admitted the shakiness, to say the least, of the spontaneous generation hypothesis?—I admit it is not a demonstrated hypothesis. From the nature of things, it cannot be demonstrated. On the other hand, it cannot be disproved.

I think you nearly admitted it was disproved by the objections I raised?—Your objections were pretty tough, I allow.

Probably, on a thorough consideration of them, you will admit they are fatal?—I don’t know, of course, what conclusion I may come to on a re-consideration of the subject.

Let us suppose you hold on to spontaneous generation, should you not consider that as wonderful as any miracle?—I don’t know.

What? the appearance of a living creature (however small and simple) with parts intelligently contrived to enable it to move, grow, and propagate without any intelligent power existing before it to contrive it: should you

not consider that very marvellous affair?—I admit that, putting it in that way, there is a certain amount of marvel about it, of course.

“Putting it in that way,” Professor Bioplasm: is that not the simple fact of the case, if your theory be correct, that a living creature was made, and nobody made it: that an intelligent contrivance of parts to fulfil functions came about without intelligence to contrive it: that organic life spontaneously generated, or came itself of and by itself, without any pre-existing life to initiate or give it form?—I admit it looks a little extraordinary.

Is it not quite extraordinary?—Well, perhaps it is.

Quite as extraordinary as any miracle—A miracle, you see, is unscientific; it is out of the range of experience.

Did you ever know of spontaneous generation occurring within the range of your experience?—No.

Did you ever know it occur within the experience of any other man?—No.

Did you ever hear of its occurring in the experience of any man anywhere, at any time?—I have admitted it is not possible now.

And yet you call it scientific—a thing that never occurred within known experience, which you admit cannot occur; which you think may have occurred certain millions of years ago; and yet against the occurrence of which, there are reasons and objections which you cannot answer; you call such a hypothesis scientific?—It is an induction of science.

That is, a suggestion, a guess by men who call themselves scientific. But miracle, of which the world has heard, which has been credibly testified in many cases, which is the only explanation of the system of things existing in Christendom, and which, even in the domain of Nature, the most eminent naturalists of the day hold to be the only satisfactory explanation of the start of life upon earth, you call that unscientific?—I cannot help the choice of terms which express my ideas.

Very well, it will be for the Jury to judge, Professor Bioplasm?—It will be for the Jury to judge, and of course, each man for himself.

Quite so: I return to the question: Would not the gradual improvement of species, upon a common ground plan, as I think you described it, be quite consistent with the fact of the special creation of each species as it appeared?—It would not, of course, be absolutely inconsistent.

It would be characteristic of wisdom, would it not, to observe a common plan in the multiplication of varieties?—It might be so.

Can there be any doubt about it; why should wisdom vary for variation's sake?—I don't know what you mean by wisdom.

I mean the Eternal Power, in whatever form it may exist, from which all things have come?—We know nothing of such a power in science.

You must, Professor Bioplasm, recognize some sort of power, or force, or energy, as the antecedent of Nature?—I look at Nature in itself.

But you allow, I presume, that Nature did not always exist?—Not in its present condition.

Did it exist at all in those inconceivable ages past, when things had not begun to travel towards the present wonderful order and beauty manifest in the universe?—As a system of Nature it did not, of course, exist.

Very well, but something existed: because, if nothing existed, nothing could ever have come?—Force existed, I doubt not.

Do you know what force it?—I know it as a fact.

Do you know what it is in itself?—I admit that we cannot know it in that sense. It is unknowable.

Very well, whatever it is, you must recognize wisdom as its attribute in view of the system of order, and adaptation, and beauty that has come out of it?—I cannot, of course, demur to that, but wisdom is so essentially connected with the idea of personality that I cannot understand it as applied to the force of the universe.

Wisdom doubtless involves the idea of personality; and may not that force which exhibits such admirable wisdom in the concretion of itself, if I may so say, have a personal nucleus, and be, in fact, the illimitable exten-

sion of that personal nucleus after the analogy of the irradiation of light?—That would be the idea of God at once.

Perfectly so; and what objection?—Well, I say it is not scientifically demonstrated. It is outside the range of scientific observation.

That I grant; but does it follow that it is inconsistent with scientific observation?—That is another matter.

Is it not the fact that the universe is too great for science to skim even in the most superficial way?—It is doubtless greater than we can conceive.

Is not human observation of the universe, and human capacity for reflection, too puny to allow of the faintest conception of the problem of its derivation and mode of subsistence?—I must admit the truthfulness of that observation.

Very well, returning to the point: wisdom is manifestly in the universe, though science cannot tell us how it acts; and that being so, my question is—is it not characteristic of that wisdom to work on one general plan?—That I cannot deny.

Then if that wisdom specifically created each species as the time for its appearance arrived, is it not to be expected that it would work on the plan of typical graduation on a common anatomical plan, and not introduce a new plan with each new species?—Of course, if it was so, it was so.

I am claiming that there is nothing in typical graduation of species inconsistent with the idea of specific creation?—But specific creation is unproved.

Never mind, if it is unproved, which I do not admit. I am showing there is no force in your contention that evolution is necessitated by the fact of a gradual perfection of species in the order of their occurrence in the geological strata. Is it not the fact that the species in the strata are all distinct, and that there is no such perfectly ascending chain of development as ought to exist on the hypothesis of the transmutation of one species into another?—I admit we have not yet completed all the links.

Have you completed any?—Not absolutely.

Can you show any perfect gradual shading off of one

species into another in the case of any single genus?—Not so perfect as we should like.

Can you show a perfection at all? Is it not the case that between the most closely allied species, there are gaps and breaks which would require ages of slow modifications on the evolution hypothesis to pass from one to the other?—I should be glad to be able to contradict you.

But you cannot?—Not so directly as I should like.

Is it not also the fact that each species found in the fossil deposits is found at its best when it first (or lowest down) occurs in the stratum where it is found?—That of course is the well-known fact.

Is that consistent with the idea of a gradual transmutation from a prior species to a higher and higher state of development?—It may look the other way a little.

Is it not more consistent with the idea that each species was specially created when the time arrived for its introduction?—I must allow it agrees with that idea.

Is it not perfectly consistent with that idea? Nay, does it not distinctly point to that conclusion, and exclude the hypothesis of a gradual development to a more perfect form?—I know that is the use made of the fact by the opponents of evolution.

A legitimate use you must allow?—I have no doubt they think so.

Have you anything else to urge on behalf of evolution?—Well, in fact, there is a great deal to be urged that I should think you cannot wish me to go into. There are facts connected with embryology and rudimentary organs, and reversions—curious and interesting facts, all tending more or less to establish the hypothesis of evolution. In fact, they place the hypothesis beyond doubt in my mind.

I could follow you in these facts, Professor, and dispose of them as effectually as I think you feel I have done in the case of spontaneous generation?—I should like to see it done, for I only desire truth.

I should recommend you to read Mr. Hall's book (*The Problem of Human Life*), to which I have already referred, and whose guidance I have more or less followed in this cross-examination. He goes thoroughly into all

these points, and in the most effectual manner, as I think, refutes the evolutionist argument upon all of them. Not only so, but he raises quite a host of insurmountable objections to that hypothesis in detail?—I shall take an early opportunity of reading the book.

I think you will find that “the invincible scientific difficulties” you spoke of in the early part of your examination, all disappear, and that you are at perfect liberty to accept the evidence of Christ’s resurrection without feeling that you are coming into collision with truth in any other direction?—I should be glad to find myself in that position: for I freely admit that the doctrines of evolution deprive us of the comfort of those personal hopes which are doubtless such a solace where they can be reasonably entertained.

Re-examined by Mr. Dontwanto Believeanyhow: You don’t admit, Professor Bioplasm, that my friend has overthrown your evolutionistic positions?—No, I only wish I could. I admit he has raised some good points.

Good points can be raised against anything?—I suppose so.

There are always two sides to every case, as the saying is?—Quite so.

You have no doubt in your own mind that the moneron came into existence by spontaneous generation, and that from the moneron have sprung all other forms of life upon earth?—That is our theory.

Including man?—Including man.

And that consequently the cosmogony of the Hebrew Scriptures is a piece of pure speculation?—I have been accustomed for some time to think so.

And that consequently the idea of the resurrection of Christ, which is bound up with it, is an impossible idea?—That would follow.

Whatever amount of evidence may be brought forward in its support?—No amount of evidence can, of course, prove a mythical idea to be true.

My friend made much of the fact that the moneron exists in extensive numbers at the present day?—He laid some stress on that circumstance.

I presume it presents no difficulty to your mind?—I have not been in the habit of regarding it as a difficulty.

My friend asked why they hadn’t developed into a higher form; I presume the explanation, of course, would be, that—ah—the developing influence of—ah—favourable environment—did not come into play in those cases?—That is the explanation put forward by the evolutionist theory.

You consider it a perfectly satisfactory explanation?—Well, so far as it goes, no doubt it is satisfactory.

The others that gradually developed into molluscs and other invertebrate creatures, and then into the various classes of vertebrates,—fishes, alligators, lions, giraffes, hippopotami, elephants, dogs, monkeys, man, and such like—they did so through the favourable effects of appropriate environment?—That is the theory.

And you have no doubt about the theory?—I have not before to-day entertained much doubt.

The theory is entertained by a great many respectable people?—Yes.

And is, in fact, likely to become universal?—The appearances have been that way.

And you do not doubt that the appearances will be realized?—I do not know.

I do not know that I need put any further questions to you. We are exceedingly obliged to you for your attendance here to-day.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: My Lord, that is the case for the plaintiffs. It might be convenient were I to draw the case to a focus, so to speak, in a few remarks at this stage; but I prefer to defer doing so till after my friend shall have developed the case for the defence.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: My Lord, you will not expect me at this hour to commence my address to the

Court on behalf of the defendants. It will probably be agreeable to your Lordship to adjourn.

His Lordship: Your speech will probably take some time.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: I have a considerable amount of ground to travel over, but I will be as concise as I consistently can with my duty to the defendants.

His Lordship: Very well; we will adjourn.

The Court adjourned.

EIGHTH SITTING

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: My Lord, and Gentlemen of the Jury: The duty now devolves upon me of endeavouring to lay before the Court the case upon which the defendants rely in answer to the application of the plaintiffs, for an injunction restraining their liberty of speech and action in the important matters of conviction which they entertain. In proceeding to the discharge of that duty, I confess to the overpowering presence of one feeling in my mind. I am burdened with a fear that I shall fail to do justice to the momentous cause that has been placed in my hands. It is not without reason that I entertain this fear. The matters affected by the trial are so gigantic and far-reaching, that I feel to stagger under their weight. They ramify so extensively into almost every department of human knowledge; and the issue that hangs on them is so momentous—I do not mean the possible abridgment of the personal liberty of the defendants—for that is a comparatively small matter—but the question of whether or not their convictions are true, and whether, therefore, there is any hope for human life in its present chaotic and enigmatical condition upon earth—such hope, I mean, as is germinally contained in the fact of Christ's resurrection. I say, the whole issue is so stupendous, and of so varied and intricate a complexion, that you may well understand the misgivings with which I essay to represent the case for the

defendants to the Court. I fail even in these expressions, my Lord, to indicate the particular nature of the feelings that oppress me at the outstart. If you can realize that, to the very depths of my heart, I am convinced the defendants entertain no phantasy in believing in the resurrection of Christ, but hold that which is an undeniable and glorious truth, containing within it the most blessed possibilities for every man laying hold of it, you may understand my fear that I may fail to make that adequate exhibition of the case which will carry conviction.

My Lord, I might object to the jurisdiction of the Court on the ground that it has no power to grant an application inconsistent with the whole spirit of the British constitution. I might contend that nothing but a special statute, passed by both Houses of Parliament, and endorsed by the royal assent, could empower the Court to restrain that freedom of speech which is the glory of the British citizen, and has been the most powerful weapon in the achievement of British greatness. But, my Lord, I am content to leave unsaid all that might be forcibly said on that subject. I am content to assume the competency of the Court, which the action of the plaintiffs takes for granted. I prefer to come fully in front of the issue they have raised, and to argue, on the broadest grounds, that their application is inconsistent with the plea on which they profess to establish it, and that the defendants, instead of being injurers of society, are the greatest benefactors it has anywhere, in seeking to rivet attention upon a matter which—more than all others put together—concerns its welfare, and contains the hope and the means of true advancement in that well-being which the best of mankind have always desired. In doing so, I am content to drop the question of whether the defendants have injured themselves in the course they have pursued, or the question of the specific injury which the plaintiffs say they do to society.

I admit that, judged by the limited standard of present experience, it might appear as if there was a certain amount of injury arising out of the proceedings of the defendants. They are individually isolated, without

doubt, from much that is gratifying and advantageous to life, in a certain way; and the world is doubtless deprived of a co-operation on their part which might be to the world's advantage, to the extent of the ability and goodness of the defendants. But, even were I disposed to discuss this part of the question, I could not admit that injury, and nothing else, results from their course. I would contend that, as regards themselves, they are gainers by the views they entertain, in so far as the attainment of moral and intellectual satisfaction is a gain to human life, and in so far as a man is a gainer who gains a power of moral elevation and ennoblement that he lacks in the state of aimless life that belongs to the doctrines of the plaintiffs. And I would contend that, as regards the world, the adoption of their views by any considerable section of society could not fail to be real advantage to the world, in so far as it would render the world a more friendly, trusty, and pleasant world than it is under the reign of unregulated self-interest that prevails under the present system.

But, my Lord, and Gentlemen of the Jury, I leave all that. I am anxious to concentrate the whole attention of the Court. I am anxious to devote the whole of my strength to one point, or rather, one aspect of the case, which involves many points. I am anxious, above all things, my Lord, to urge that, whatever consequences may be shown to spring out of the course pursued by the defendants, as regards the present bearing of these consequences, they are not for one moment to be considered side by side with the momentous fact, that the course of the defendants is justifiable on the ground that the belief which impels them to that course is a true belief, and no lie: that Christ really rose from the dead, and is now alive, and vests in his own person the purpose of Eternal Wisdom concerning the earth we inhabit, and the at present unhappy, though in many points noble, race to which we belong.

And now, my Lord, I confess I feel somewhat at a loss how to proceed in developing this stupendous proposition before you. I shall call some of the defendants,

who will briefly lay before you the reasons of their procedure—the grounds of their conviction that Jesus Christ, of Nazareth, now lives, will re-appear on the earth at the appointed time to consummate the divine purpose of which he is the instrument and executioner. Those grounds have already, in large measure, become apparent in the course of the questions which we felt it our duty to address in cross-examination of the witnesses called on behalf of the plaintiffs. They involve matters of a palpable and historical character. They are not matters very recondite. They are not matters in a corner. They are not matters of speculative opinion: they do not depend upon any profoundly-reasoned philosophical system. They relate, rather, to affairs of a very practical character, and of a very world-wide notoriety.

To begin with, my Lord, we have the name of Christ in our midst. We live in a widely-extended geographical area, which is known as *Christ-endom*. Here is a fact before our eyes everywhere—the name of Christ ingrained in the system of things by which we are surrounded—the name of Christ indelibly written in the constitution of the world—the name of Christ so inwrought with the fabric of our daily life, that we cannot even issue an invoice, or execute a deed, or even write a letter, without Christ appearing on the face of it in the date, which tells to what A.D. (year of *our Lord*) the matter pertains. Now, my Lord, this fact calls for explanation. It must have an explanation. Such a fact as the ascendancy of one particular name in all the realms of civilization must be due to circumstances of such an extraordinary character as to adequately account for it. The ascendancy of that name could not come of itself. It has not sprung out of the ground: it has not come mysteriously out of the atmosphere: it must have a history. My Lord, it has a history, and it is on that history that I rely, as furnishing both a rational explanation of the ascendancy of the name of Christ during all the centuries of the Christian era, and the irrefragable ground of those convictions which impel the defendants to the course complained of by the plaintiffs.

I would not, however, wish your Lordship to understand that the convictions of the defendants depend wholly upon that history. Far from it. Their convictions are justified—nay, necessitated—by a variety of other matters and facts to which I may have to advert. But what I say here is, that the history of the matter alone is sufficient to warrant that conviction.

That history we derive from a variety of sources: but, my Lord, I am content with one form of that history alone. I am content with the official history of the matter, which as far transcends all other histories as the sun at noonday transcends the gas lights on the streets at night. I refer, as your Lordship may be aware, to the New Testament, and in referring to the New Testament, I refer to another matter of world-wide fact and notoriety. The New Testament is a public document. It is a numerously circulated document. It is a document to be found in every decent house throughout Great Britain and her extensive empire. It is a book to be found in every country, and translated into every tongue: consequently, here again we stand in the presence of a very real matter-of-fact, having a logical bearing on the issue before the Jury.

In preferring the New Testament history of this matter to all others, your Lordship will allow that I only show a reasonable preference. It is to official sources that men always go for reliable information. It is those who have to do with the start of an affair who are able to tell us the facts connected with it. And the New Testament is the history of this matter, as written by those who had to do with the start of it. There is no mistake on this point, my Lord. My friend, Mr. Discerner-of-facts, put a variety of questions to one of the plaintiffs' witnesses for the purpose of showing this. Though a very unwilling witness, he drew from his mouth a variety of admissions which prove that in the New Testament, we have the authentic writings of the apostles. There is the uncontradicted tradition of the Christian community from the very beginning, which carries more weight with it than even the express testimony of individual witnesses,

for the New Testament is of that character that would have inevitably ensured the detection of any attempt in the beginning to palm upon the Christian community as apostolic productions, writings not written by them, but the writings of literary forgers, or literary fictionists of any class whatever. I refer to the fact that the New Testament is mainly composed of the epistles of Paul, addressed not to persons, but to churches. These letters were preserved and read habitually by the various churches to whom they were addressed, which is the best evidence of authenticity that could be produced. Besides being preserved and read by these, they were copied and circulated among all the Christian communities. They were equally used in Alexandria, and Carthage, and Gaul. They are cited by the writers of the second century as commonly and familiarly as by preachers and writers in our own day. The uncontroverted writings of Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, and Clement Alexandrinus prove this; and the fact is conclusive evidence of their previous currency for a long time, and establishes their authenticity by proving them to have been received by the various communities to whom Paul's letters were severally addressed in the first instance. No demonstration could be more complete than this. It is not in the least affected by the fact that literary forgeries were abundantly perpetrated in the second and third centuries. These forgeries only go to show that there were genuine writings in existence, commanding the confidence and influencing the lives of the Christian community from the very commencement of its existence. The forgeries, are, therefore, indirect evidence in support of the authenticity of the New Testament.

Now, my Lord, the New Testament being the authentic production of the apostles and their companions, see what follows: we have an account at first hand of the circumstances that led to the establishment of Christianity—an account by those who knew all about those circumstances, whose competency to give the account is shown by the nature of the account itself, and whose probity and sincerity are abundantly demonstrated by the adverse conse-

quences to which they steadily submitted for a lifetime, on account of their testimony.

What is that account? I ask your Lordship's attention particularly to this point. It is not an account of "conversion." In brief, it is this, that the writers were companions of Christ for a certain number of years; that they accompanied him in his journeyings, and heard his teaching, which they reproduce in these documents; that they saw his miracles, which they narrative with great chasteness and simplicity; that he was arrested by the authorities, and condemned to be crucified: that he was in fact crucified and buried; that they regarded his crucifixion as an upsetting of all their hopes in him, but that a certain number of days after his crucifixion, **he appeared** to them alive—appeared several times; spoke to them coherently and connectedly; ate and drank with them; allowed himself to be handled; exhibited marks of crucifixion; made appointments for meeting, which he kept, and, finally, after about six weeks of this kind of intercourse, and that after telling them that it would be their duty, after his departure, to bear testimony to all the world to these things, he took formal leave of them on the summit of the Mount of Olives, and went away from the earth.

Their account does not stop here. They tell us that just before his departure, he told them not to commence their testimony for his resurrection until he should send power upon them to work miracles in proof of their testimony to his resurrection. He told them to stay in Jerusalem till this power should come. The account goes on to inform us that they did so; that on the day of Pentecost, the tenth day after Christ's departure, being assembled together in one place, the Holy Spirit came upon them with the power of a rushing mighty wind, filling all the place where they were, manifesting itself in a fiery appearance resting on each, and imparting to them a supernatural knowledge of languages they had not learned, and power to work various miracles. They then proceeded to proclaim the resurrection of Christ, in accordance with the command they had received; exhibiting

the miracles in token of the truth of their testimony. The effect was to cause multitudes who witnessed these things, to believe. To these multitudes was extended the same power to work miracles, so that the testimony of Christ's resurrection spread far and wide. The authorities who had put Jesus to death naturally felt themselves compromised by these proceedings, and strove to suppress the movement. In attempting to do so, they resorted to legal proceedings. They imprisoned the apostles, and raised a great persecution against all believers everywhere. The apostles, divinely liberated, were re-arrested and re-charged with the offence of proclaiming Christ's resurrection. Their answer was, "We cannot but speak *the things we have seen and heard.*" Believers everywhere were steadfast under similar tribulation: the number of believers increased greatly.

Such is the account of this most important matter, and it is an account confirmed in its main features by all second-hand allusions to it. What are we to make of it, my Lord? There is no question that Christ was crucified. Jews and unbelievers are agreed on this. But neither is there any question that his disciples afterwards preached his resurrection. How came they to do so, and how came thousands of those who had crucified him to believe? If Christ rose, there is an answer. If Christ did not rise, the apostles declared what they knew to be false. Then what motive could they have? It brought them into collision with Jew and Pagan, and exposed them to incessant disadvantage. If it he said they may have sincerely believed that Christ rose though he did not, we are asked to believe something inconsistent with the facts. They did not expect Christ to die. When he died, they did not expect him to rise. When he rose, they did not believe it. All this is stated in this account, and it shows there was no predisposition to entertain a fantasy on the subject. What, then, led them to believe and preach the resurrection of Christ? The reason given for the change is a reasonable account of the change: Christ appeared to them, spoke to them, ate with them, asked them to handle him, stayed with them six weeks,

and finally sent power to work miracles upon them. If this occurred, there is an explanation of all that transpired afterwards. If this did not occur, there is no explanation of the great fact that a few poor men, whose doctrine was that they should not resist their enemies, succeeded in subverting Judaism and Paganism in the teeth of the organized opposition of both, and the effect of whose work is a fact of the present moment, inwrought with the life of all civilized nations.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I could prove Mahomedanism by the same line of argument. Mahomedanism is inwrought with the life of civilized nations.

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: My friend says the same line of argument would prove Mahomedanism. Surely it is not possible my friend, on reflection, can seriously maintain such a proposition. The existence of Mahomedanism is no doubt a proof of effectual means having been taken to establish Mahomedanism in the world. We examine the facts, and we see the nature and operation of these means at once. As has been truly said, Mahomet took the way to succeed. He gave his followers a commission to exterminate the infidel, and offered life and protection to everyone who should embrace Islamism. The system is embodied in the Koran. This Koran is in the hands of millions of Mahomedans in the present day which proves it to be Mahomet's work, for no other than Mahomet's work could have obtained currency amongst them at the start, and none but the book current at the start could have obtained currency among their succeeding generations. Thus the existence of the Mahomedans with the Koran in their hands is a proof of the authenticity of the Koran; and an examination of their history and their documents explain their rise and success, and proves them not divine, for Mahomet in the Koran admits the divinity of Abraham, the prophets, and Christ, and thereby destroys his own claim, even if there were no other disproof; for the divinity of Christ excludes the divinity of any other "prophet, priest, and king," which Mahomet was probably unaware of.

Now, when the history and literature of Christianity

are examined in the same way, its divinity follows as a logical result. The present existence of Christianity is only the first step in the argument. It is a great fact, calling for explanation. The explanation is contained in the Book in the hands of Christians, the authenticity of which is proved exactly in the same way as the Koran (only that there is a large amount of collateral evidence, which is wanting in the case of the Koran). No other than the genuine writings of the apostles could have obtained universal currency among Christians at the start, and none but the writings universally current at the start could have obtained universal circulation among the succeeding generations, from which it follows that the book now in the hands of universal Christendom is the authentic work of the apostles. The testimony of early and doubtful Christian writers can be dispensed with in this argument. When, in the next place, we come to look at the facts connected with the rise and progress of the system established by them, we have no such explanation as exists in the case of Mahomedanism. While Mahomet took the way to succeed, Christ took the way to fail, if no miracle was employed; for he prohibited his disciples from using the sword, and taught them to avoid, in every form, the use of physical resistance of their enemies. As a matter of fact, they did not resist, but fled from persecution, and suffered themselves, when caught, to be slain in large numbers. The State authorities employed their whole power against them; yet, in spite of this, they finally planted Christianity in the world on the ruins of Paganism. Now, as a mere matter of common reason, there must have been a cause equal to this success. It cannot be found in the nature of the principles inculcated, for these are opposed to the natural tendencies of human nature. But it is found in that which they allege in their writings to have been the cause: their testimony that Christ rose from the dead, and endowed them with supernatural gifts in attestation of their testimony. The first fact explains the constancy of the apostles, during years of suffering for their testimony. The second fact explains the great and wide-spread conviction produced

by the testimony. Take away these facts, and there is no rational explanation of an undoubted historic fact, constituting the greatest revolution the world has ever seen.

My Lord, up to this point, I have relied on the evidence of the immediate disciples of Christ, and I say that on that alone I might rest the case for the defence, substantiated as that evidence is, in the most palpable way, by the manifest fact of Christianity's establishment in the Roman Empire in the teeth of opposition, and in the hands of a few powerless and, on the whole, illiterate men. I say that nothing short of the facts they allege can explain that extraordinary event of history. Nothing else could account for the fact of thousands of people, Jews and Gentiles, accepting the resurrection of Christ in the face of public penalty, and private ruin, and death. But, my Lord and Gentlemen of the Jury, I have to bring under your notice, a case which is not only one of the most powerful corroborations of which such a case is susceptible, but the weight of which I do not exaggerate, when I say that it is sufficient of itself to establish the fact of Christ's resurrection, even if we had no authentic life of Christ, and no testimony to his resurrection by those who were his actual companions before his crucifixion. It is the case of one who at first took a leading part in persecuting and destroying the believers in Christ's resurrection, and who, in the midst of a career of implacable hostility to the name of Christ, suddenly became a preacher and defender of the faith he so zealously sought to destroy. It is the cause of the change on which I lay the greatest possible stress. Had the man in question been convinced by argument, I should not have had a word to say about his case, because, though he became one of the most energetic, indomitable, enterprising, and successful of the apostles, still if that energy and success were due to a mere alteration of opinion, produced by arguments presented by others, they would merely be evidence of his sincerity, and not of the truth of his new convictions. But because he was convinced and changed by the evidence of his senses, I claim his case as affording one of the strongest evidences of Christ's resurrection: it is possible to imagine.

I refer, as you may have surmised, to the case of the Apostle Paul, first appearing on the scene as Saul of Tarsus, the agent and emissary of the party of the Pharisees in their opposition to the Christian movement. This Saul of Tarsus, of world-wide fame as the Apostle Paul, is a man whose individuality stands out more distinctly from the back-ground of antiquity than almost any man of similarly remote times, with the single exception, perhaps, or Jesus his Master. We not only have his biography written clearly, concisely, and distinctly, by a fellow-voyager of his, but we have a compilation of authentic letters from Paul's own hand, written under a variety of circumstances, and dealing with a variety of matters, in which even the minute shades of his character and tendencies are visible. Between the two, we are able to form a very distinct picture of the man, and to justly estimate the bearings of his case on the matter which became the enterprise of life.

First let me show you the evidence of his original attitude—an enemy of Christ. Luke informs us, in the Acts (viii. 3), that “Saul *made havoc of the Church*, entering into every house, and haling men and women to prison.” And, in another place (ix. 1), he speaks of Saul “*breathing out threatenings and slaughter*, against the disciples of the Lord.” These representations Paul himself confirms in several parts of his epistles. Thus in Gal. i. 13, he says: “Ye have heard of my behaviour in times past, how that, beyond measure, *I persecuted the Church of God*, and wasted it.” Again, in 1 Tim. i. 12, he says: “I was before a *blasphemer and a persecutor*”; and again, in 1 Cor. xv. 9: “I am not meet to be called an apostle because *I persecuted the Church of God*.”

The fact that Paul's change from a persecuting to a defending attitude towards Christ, is notorious to all the world. The point I wish to emphasize is, *the cause that led to the change*. Of this a most clear account is given, both by Luke, his fellow-voyager, and several times by Paul himself, in his speeches and epistles. Let us take one of Paul's speeches—one of the most interesting, perhaps, on account of the circumstances under which it was

delivered. It was delivered in Jerusalem in the midst of a public tumult directed against himself. He had been recognized in the city on his return from a preaching absence of a good many years, and a cry had been raised, “Men of Israel, help! This is the man that teacheth all men everywhere against the people, and the law, and this place.” This cry led to the gathering of a crowd, who seized Paul and were assaulting him, when the Roman garrison, hearing of the riot, hastened to the spot, and rescued Paul from the crowd, which had grown to great dimensions. The Roman captain asked what was the matter. Some cried one thing and some cried another. In the confusion, the captain could not make anything out distinctly, so he ordered Paul to be conveyed in custody to the castle. While ascending the stairs of that building, followed by an increasing and excited crowd, Paul asked and obtained leave of the captain to address the people. It is the address he delivered on that occasion to which I refer. It is recorded in Acts xxii. After alluding to the fact that he had been brought up amongst them, he says, “I was zealous toward God as ye all are this day; and I persecuted this way unto the death, binding and delivering into prisons both men and women; as also the high priest doth bear me witness, and all the estate of the elders, from whom also I received letters unto the brethren, and went to Damascus, to bring them who were there bound unto Jerusalem, to be punished. And it came to pass that as I made my journey (on the persecuting errand before referred to), and was come nigh unto Damascus, about noon, suddenly there shone from heaven a great light round about me. And I fell unto the ground, and heard a voice saying unto me, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? And I answered, Who art thou, Lord? And he said unto me, *I am Jesus of Nazareth, whom thou persecutest*. And they that were with me saw indeed the light, and were afraid, but they heard not the voice of him that spake to me. And I said, What shall I do, Lord? And the Lord said unto me, Arise, and go unto Damascus, and there it shall be told thee of all things which are appointed for thee to do.

And when I could not see for the glory of that light, being led by the hand of them that were with me, I came into Damascus. And one Ananias, a devout man according to the law, having a good report of all the Jews which dwelt there, came unto me, and stood, and said unto me, Brother Saul, receive thy sight. And the same hour I looked up upon him; and he said, The God of our fathers hath chosen thee, that thou shouldst know His will, and SEE THAT JUST ONE, and shouldst *hear the voice of His mouth*, for thou shalt be His witness"—*His witness*: it was not a matter of opinion; it was not a matter of theory which Paul was called upon to embrace. It was a matter of fact of which he was allowed to be a personal witness: the fact of the existence of Christ who had been crucified. It is, therefore, a question of evidence we have to consider: "Thou shalt be his witness unto all men of what thou hast SEEN AND HEARD. And now, why tarriest thou? Arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins."

When Paul, later on, was arraigned before King Agrippa, he rehearsed these matters again. Like all truthful men who are detailing a truthful matter, although he substantially tells the same things, he does not tell them in the same words; though if the book were a concoction or an imposture, very great care would have been taken to make the story exactly the same whenever told. "I said, Who art thou Lord? and he said, I am Jesus, whom thou persecutest; but rise, and stand upon thy feet, for *I have appeared unto thee* for this purpose, to make thee a minister and a witness both of THESE THINGS WHICH THOU HAST SEEN, and of those things in the which I will appear unto thee." From this, it follows that Paul saw Christ, and not merely something from which he inferred his presence. If there could be any doubt upon this point, it is set at rest by Paul's explicit declaration in 1 Cor. xv. 8: "Last of all (the apostles), he (Christ) was SEEN OF ME also, as of one born out of due time." There is something in this expression "as of one born out of due time," deserving attentive consideration. It touches on the nature of apostleship as

involving a qualification that brings with it a powerful element of the evidence of Christ's resurrection. Paul says his apostleship was conferred "out of due time"—after the proper time, like a birth delayed beyond nature's period. We may understand this when we realize that it was necessary to apostleship that a man should have been a contemporary of Christ during his natural life, and a personal witness of the various facts of his case. This comes out in the rule laid down in Acts i. 21 by the apostles, for their own guidance in the selection of a successor to Judas: "Of these men which have *companied with us all the time that Jesus went in and out among us*, beginning from the baptism of John, unto that same day that he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be A WITNESS *with us of his resurrection*." As Paul was appointed after all these things, he declared of himself that he was as one born out of due time. But he had the essential qualification of having seen the Lord, and thus enabled to give personal witness to the fact of his having risen. This is the strong point of his testimony: "*he was seen of me also*." Now, those of the plaintiffs' way of thinking may be disposed to laugh at this, but, my Lord, one man's evidence as to what he has seen and heard is as good as another man's evidence, and better, when it is supported in so many collateral and powerful ways as it is in the case of Paul. Paul's seeing Christ was not a matter of isolated curious experience. It did not stand alone in the midst of his life, without practical, effective, or logical sequel. It was followed by a career of forty years' length, during which Paul's particular business was to declare these things, and to apply them in a definite manner for the eternal benefit of those by whom they were received; for doing which work, recollect, he "suffered the loss of all things."

It was not like the case of a man turning a remarkable experience to his temporal advantage. As he says to the Philippians: "I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord, *for whom I have suffered the loss of all things*, and do count them but dung THAT I MAY WIN CHRIST."

It is impossible to explain such an attitude except on the hypothesis of Paul's conviction that he had seen Christ. And this conviction rested upon so many grounds, that the possibility of mistake or hallucination, reason must hold to be out of the question, when all the facts are considered. The incidents connected with the revelation itself (on the road to Damascus) were such as to leave no room for deception or mistake. The whole occurrence happened exactly in the way to exclude the possibility of mistake. It happened, not at night, but in the full blaze of noonday. It did not happen when Paul was by himself, but when he was in the midst of a retinue of officials, who were witnesses of the strange phenomenon. It did not affect him only, but threw them all to the ground. It was not a sensation limited to himself; they were all overpowered by the light, and heard the voice that addressed Paul, though they could not make out the words. It did not pass off and leave no effect; it sealed Paul's eyes, and left him blind. It did not remain isolated from a logical sequel, as a hallucination might be supposed to do: for on Paul's arrival in Damascus (led by the hand), Ananias, the leading professor of the faith of Christ in Damascus, visited Saul, while yet with closed eyes, and cured his blindness; and this logical sequel was independent of Saul's volition or knowledge (and, therefore, unconnected with any such hallucination as his enemies suppose him to have been the subject of): for the said leading professor—Ananias—came independently of any message from Saul, and purely as the result of supernatural instruction from Christ to do so, to which he raised objections in the first instance, on the ground of Saul's notorious enmity to Christ.

Then, my Lord, consider how the conviction resulting from the evidence of Paul's eyes on the way to Damascus (and surely, my Lord, as the proverb has it, "seeing is believing"), see how this conviction was confirmed subsequently in the miraculous power of which he became possessed, in common with all believers as already adverted to. His possession of this power comes out, in the most casual but explicit manner, in the course of his

epistles. For example, he says (1 Cor. xiv. 18, 19): "I thank my God, *I speak with tongues more than ye all.*" He says this in the course of an argument tending to depreciate the importance of speaking with tongues. Let me read it to you: "I thank my God I speak with tongues more than ye all: yet in the church I had rather speak five words with my understanding, that by my voice I might teach others also, than ten thousand words in an unknown tongue. Brethren, be not children in understanding: howbeit in malice be ye children, but in understanding be men." Now as to the nature of this speaking with tongues, I incidentally alluded to it in my opening remarks as to the beginning of the movement. You may recollect it is connected with the fulfilment of Christ's promise to his disciples that (waiting in Jerusalem) he should send upon them power to give witness of his resurrection. The first manifestation of this power, when it arrived, was the speaking with tongues. We read the account in Acts ii. 11: "And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit, and began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance. . . Now when this was noised abroad the multitude came together, and were confounded, because that every man,"—every man of the multitude spoken of in the 5th verse: "devout men out of every nation under heaven,"—"every man heard them speak in his own language. And they were all amazed, and marvelled, saying one to another, Behold, are not all these which speak Galilæans,"—not only Galilæans, but illiterate fishermen, who knew no tongue but their native dialect—"And how hear we every man *in our own tongue, wherein we were born?* Parthians, and Medes and Elamites, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judæa, and Cappadocia, in Pontus, and Asia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia, in Egypt, and in parts of Lybia about Cyrene, and strangers of Rome, Jews and proselytes, Cretes and Arabians, WE DO HEAR THEM SPEAK IN OUR TONGUES the wonderful works of God." Therefore this speaking with tongues in the apostolic days was no matter of gibberish; it was no matter of what is understood in our day by "unknown tongues"; the *tongues*

spoken in those days were "known"; they were the spoken languages of mankind. And therefore the question to be answered is, how came illiterate men, without previous instruction, to be able in a moment to speak the current languages of mankind? Paul says, "I thank my God that I speak with tongues more than ye all," yet he counts it as a matter of little importance, which shows how real an experience it was in the apostolic day; for men don't talk this way about a thing that is not happening. If it was real, it was miraculous; and if miraculous, we have another evidence of the truth of Paul's testimony of Christ's resurrection: for these miracles were expressly declared to be God's confirmation of the testimony of the apostles. Then beside the speaking with tongues, we have other miracles. In Acts xix. 11 we read: "And God wrought special miracles by the hands of Paul: so that from his body were brought unto the sick, handkerchiefs or aprons, and the diseases departed from them, and the evil spirits went out of them." Again, Acts xvi. 25: "And at midnight Paul and Silas prayed, and sang praises unto God"; this is when they were made prisoners for teaching the word of God, "and the prisoners heard them. And suddenly there was a great earthquake, so that the foundations of the prison were shaken; and immediately all the doors were opened, and every one's bonds were loosed." In Acts xiii. 9-12, you have the account where Paul struck with blindness a man who was opposing him before the Roman deputy. In Acts xiv. 8-10, you have a case where he cured a man who was crippled from his infancy, in consequence of which the people of the city wanted to do him, and his companions, the honours supposed to be due to the gods, which they declined, saying that the works done were not their works, but done by God, through them, in attestation of the fact that His Son was risen, and was offered to all men for faith, that they might obtain forgiveness of sins and a title to another and a glorious life, which Christ is to develop upon the earth at his second coming.

The presence of miraculous power in the Christian community, is recognized as a fact in the most natural

way in Paul's letters. Thus, in his argument to the Galatians about the law, he asks: "He that . . . *worketh miracles among you*, doeth he it by the works of the law or by the hearing of faith?" (Gal. iii. 5). A man does not found an argument on an experience that is non-occurrent, or that is not well-known. Again, "To another (is given) . . . the *gifts of healing* by the same spirit; to another THE WORKING OF MIRACLES; to another *prophecy*; to another, discerning of spirits; to another, *divers kinds of tongues*; to another the interpretation of tongues. But *all THESE worketh that one and the self same spirit*, dividing to every man severally as he will" (1 Cor. xii. 9-11). Again, of the gospel, he says it "began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him, God also bearing them witness *with signs and wonders and gifts of the holy spirit*, according to his own will" (Heb. ii. 3, 4).

My Lord, and Gentlemen of the Jury, I confidently contend, upon this evidence of miraculous activity in the midst of the original Christian community, that Paul's seeing of Christ on the way to Damascus (which of itself, under all the circumstances, was a sufficient ground of belief) was confirmed in such a way as to leave no room for doubt of the fact, or the divine meaning of the fact. And I further contend, my Lord, that it is impossible to dispose of Paul's whole case in harmony with the opinions of the plaintiffs. It is a case of historical fact. It is a case which must have an explanation, and I contend that it is impossible to explain it on any principle, except the simple one that Christ rose from the dead and appeared, not only to his disciples, but also to Saul, their enemy, turning him into a friend and apostle.

Paul's case is so important that I hope the Court will excuse me if I seem prolix in calling your attention to the considerations involved in it. No reasonable man can maintain that Paul was an impostor, aiming by falsehood at selfish ends, because, as a matter of fact, his testimony cost him everything dear to man; fortune, friends, reputation, and, at last, life itself. His demeanour is inconsistent with the character of an impostor. Here is a fair

specimen: "And as we tarried there (at Cæsarea) many days, there came down from Judea a certain prophet named Agabus. And when he was come unto us, he took Paul's girdle and bound his own hands and feet and said, Thus saith the Holy Spirit, so shall the Jews at Jerusalem bind the man that owneth this girdle, and shall deliver him into the hands of the Gentiles. And when we heard these things, both we and they of that place besought him not to go up to Jerusalem. Then Paul answered, *What mean ye to weep and to break mine heart? For I am ready not to be bound only, but also to die at Jerusalem for the name of the Lord Jesus.* And when he would not be persuaded, we ceased, saying, The will of the Lord be done" (Acts xxi. 10-14). Anyone who can imagine an impostor enacting this part has no acquaintance with human nature. Again, take the speech which Paul addressed to the elders of the Ephesian Church at Miletus, on the occasion of parting from them for the last time: "Ye know that from the first day I came into Asia, after what manner I have been with you at all seasons, serving the Lord with all humility of mind, and many tears and temptations which befel me by lying in wait of the Jews. And how I kept back nothing that was profitable unto you, but showed you, and have taught you publicly, and from house to house, testifying both to the Jews, and also to the Greeks, repentance towards God, and faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ. And now, behold, I go bound in the Spirit unto Jerusalem, not knowing the things that shall befall me there, save that the Holy Spirit witnesseth in every city, saying that bonds and afflictions abide me. But none of these things move me, neither count I my life dear unto myself, so that I might finish my course with joy, and the ministry which I have received of the Lord Jesus to testify the gospel of the grace of God. . . I have coveted no man's silver or gold or apparel. Yea; ye yourselves know that these hands have ministered unto my necessities, and to them that were with me. I have showed you all things how that so labouring, ye ought to support the weak, and to remember the words of the Lord Jesus:

how he said, It is more blessed to give than to receive" (Acts xx. 18-24, 33-35). These are not the words of an impostor. Neither were Paul's doctrines by possibility the doctrines of an impostor. For a fair example of them, the 2nd chapter of his epistle to Titus may be read.

Perhaps, my Lord, my friend would admit that Paul was no impostor, but might suggest that he may have been a self-deceived enthusiast, a man victimized by a feverish mental illusion, which impelled him, in a state of semi-madness, to declare things that he thought true, but which were not true. The facts, my Lord, are against such a theory. The convictions Paul embraced were not such as the laws of hallucination would have predisposed him to entertain, if he were of that temperament. The conviction that a crucified claimant of the Messiahship was really the Christ, was opposed to his education as a Jew and a Pharisee, and opposed to his natural bent as a combative and energetic upholder of the law of Moses. His education as a Jew would implant the view that the Messiah, when he appeared, would be immortal, and that, therefore, Jesus, as having been crucified, could not be he; while, on the other hand, his conviction that the law of Moses was divine, and his ardent desire to signalize himself in its defence, would incline him strongly to set himself against a doctrine that a crucified Christ was the end of the law. To oppose the apostles would naturally appear to such a man to be doing God service. Hallucination in a case like Paul's, according to the law of that disease, would have taken a form in harmony with these Judaic proclivities. The vision seen, as the result of hallucination, would have been a vision instructing him to extirpate the Christians, and championize the cause of Judaism throughout the world. Instead of that, he was arrested in the very act of giving effect to all his cherished convictions. On an expedition to destroy the Christians, he saw something which went directly in the teeth of his education—something that was in direct opposition to his purpose, and which diverted his whole energy into the very opposite channel, becoming a preacher of the faith which formerly he destroyed.

Then the nature of the work to which he set himself was not what a self-deceived enthusiast would have undertaken, and certainly one he would not have succeeded in. He sought to turn the pagans from idolatry, the Jews from their stereotyped and lifeless Judaism, and all men from sin, with the object in all cases "that they might receive forgiveness of sins and inheritance" in the kingdom to be set up by Christ at his return. In the execution of this work he showed none of the egotism of an enthusiast. He did not seek to bring attention to himself. On the contrary, he objected to those among the Corinthians who said, "I am of Paul." His remark on this point was, "Who is Paul, and who is Apollos, but ministers by whom ye believed?" (1 Cor. iii. 5). Paul's success is evidence that he was no mere enthusiast. That he was successful cannot be denied. The modern existence of Christendom is evidence of it. His success involved the bringing over of "a great company of the priests," of the temple (Acts vi. 7), and the turning away of all the lesser Asia from idolatry (Acts xix. 26). How could an enthusiast, with nothing else than ignorant heated words have achieved such results? But if Paul saw Christ, and had a word of salvation from him, and if "God wrought special miracles by the hands of Paul," the success is accounted for, and, in that case, Paul was no mere enthusiast. His words are not the words of heated enthusiasm in any case. We have them in his letters and speeches written and delivered under many circumstances, and they are all cool, sober, logical words, such as a man who had seen Christ, and who was endowed with the spirit of God would write, and never such as the victim of hallucination would write.

His doings and saying are those of a clear-headed, courteous, reasonable man, accommodating himself to circumstances as the interest of the object he had in view required, which is an entire contrast to the deportment of a self-deceived victim of a deranged imagination. Thus he is personally respectful to Felix, Festus, and Agrippa, and temperate and coherent in the defence he was called upon to offer in answer to the accusation of

the Jews. Let any one doubting this read the 24th, 25th, and 26th chapters of Acts. Thus, also, he adapted himself to the various classes with whom he came in contact, in such a way as their several cases required, in regard to their acceptance of the gospel. His testimony on this point is this: "Though I be free from all men, yet have I made myself servant unto all, that I might gain the more. And unto the Jews I became as a Jew that I might gain the Jews; to them that are under the law as under the law, that I might gain them that are under the law. To them that are without the law as without law . . . that I might gain them that are without law. To the weak became I as weak that I might gain the weak. I am made all things to all men that I might by all means save some" (1 Cor. ix. 19-22). These are not the tactics of an enthusiast, but of a sensible man with an important work in hand. Enthusiasts, who are so to the extent of being victims of self-deception, do not work in this rational way.

The same feature of calm good sense is illustrated by his avoidance of the martyrdom which the Jews were prepared to bestow upon him. The Jews formed a plot for his destruction, at the time he was a prisoner in the hands of the Romans (Acts xxiii. 12). Paul got to know of it, and informed the Roman captain. The captain sent him to Cæsarea under guard, transferring him to the jurisdiction of Felix, and afterwards of Festus. Festus sent for the Jewish council to prefer their accusation against Paul at Cæsarea. When they came, they asked Festus to try Paul's case at Jerusalem, intending to kill him on the way thither. Paul said he was not unwilling to die if he was proved worthy of death; but he objected to be given into the hands of the Jews, and appealed to be reserved to the hearing of Cæsar at Rome. This was not the action of an enthusiast, who would have rushed with bravado into the jaws of death. It was the action of a reasonable man, who felt and tried to avoid the calamities incident to his position as an apostle, but who, nevertheless, persevered in the testimony that brought them, because he knew it was true. The same remarks

apply to the case in which he made use of his status as a Roman citizen to avoid examination by scourging (Acts xxii. 25). It was the act of a cool, and astute, and sensible man and not of an enthusiast, who would simply have blundered himself into difficulties in a heated and irrational manner, and lacked capacity or desire to extricate himself in a sensible way. Enthusiasts are usually vain, and have a conceit of their personal importance in relation to whatever hobby they have in hand. Paul's letters exhibit the reverse of this. He says of himself that he "was not meet to be called an apostle" (1 Cor. xv. 9), and this not in a mawkish spirit of self-depreciation, but for a reason which he immediately adds, "because I persecuted the church of God." For the same reason he styles himself "less than the least of all saints" (Eph. iii. 8), and also "the chief of sinners" (1 Tim. i. 15). In 2 Cor. xi. he apologizes for having to indulge in self-vindication in defence against the slanders of traducers. These are not the expressions of a self-deceived and egotistic enthusiast: they are just the sort of expressions to be expected from a capable man who had committed a great mistake through ignorance, but who, with all his faculties about him, had seen his mistake, and, under a deep sense of humiliation, was striving to undo the mistake of a lifetime of exertion.

If Paul was not an enthusiast, deceived by his own imagination, he certainly was not deceived by others. The occurrence which changed him from a persecutor into a defender of the Christian faith, was of such a nature as not to admit of the operation of third parties in the way of deception (Acts ix.; xxvi.). As already referred to, Paul said to Agrippa, it was a thing "not done in a corner," but in the presence of a band of officers, and in the full blaze of the noonday sun. Paul and the whole company were struck to the earth by a light "above the brightness of the sun." A communication was made to Paul in their presence, audible to them all, but intelligible only to Paul, as it was made in "the Hebrew tongue." They heard the voice, but saw no man. The attempt to make a contradiction between the account,

which says they heard the voice, and the account which says they did not hear the voice, is futile. They heard the voice, but could not make out the words. So also with the difficulty of the fact that one account says they all fell to the earth, and another that "they stood speechless." The two statements are perfectly reconcilable if we suppose the company were felled to the earth by the first burst of the brightness, and afterwards rose and stood speechless while Paul received the communication addressed to him. This is not a gratuitous supposition; for that they did rise to their feet after falling in certain, seeing they afterwards led Paul by the hand to Damascus. Two truthful accounts must be consistent with one another, even if they appear contradictory; and the lover of truth is not to be scared away from the endeavour to establish their consistency by the irrational dogmatism (unconcerned to find the truth), which says there ought to be nothing to reconcile. When the incident was at an end, Paul was found to be blind, and remained blind for three days, and only had his sight restored by the healing interposition of one of the Christian disciples of Damascus whom he had come to destroy. Thus, evidence of the reality of the revelation to Paul was left behind in a way that made doubt impossible. The whole event was of a character that did not admit of third parties interposing as deceivers of Paul.

There is only one hypothesis left, my Lord, and that is, that Paul was a true man, who relates what actually occurred, to whom Christ actually appeared, who really wrought miracles, and who is, therefore, a true witness of the resurrection of Christ. I have dwelt thus at length on his case, because I feel that when rationally construed in all its elements, it affords an evidence of the resurrection of Christ that cannot be set aside, and is the best justification I can offer for the conduct of the defendants.

I have other matters to submit to the consideration of your Lordship; but it will probably be agreeable to your Lordship and the Jury, after the length at which I have been compelled to address you, to adjourn till to-morrow.

His Lordship: We are much obliged to you for your

entertaining address; but probably we shall be able to deny ourselves the pleasure of listening further at this time.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: There is prospect of a lengthy defence, my Lord.

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: The subject is a large one.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: We shall see the end of it some day, I suppose.

The Court adjourned.

NINTH SITTING

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: My Lord, and Gentlemen of the Jury, I yesterday had the honour of submitting, on behalf of the defendants, a general view of the historical evidence which satisfies their minds of the fact that Christ rose from the dead. To-day, I desire to advert to several collateral matters which powerfully sustain that evidence, and in the absence of which I might have to admit the historical evidence to be liable to a feeling, at all events, of insufficiency. First, my Lord, I would ask you to consider the surroundings of the event—this event of the resurrection. By this I do not mean its dramatic surroundings, but its surroundings in a much larger sense—the surroundings in the sense of what came after—the surroundings as regards the system of teaching of which the resurrection was put forward as but the central point or pivot.

It will help the Court to rightly estimate the importance of this aspect of the matter if we imagine, for a moment, that the attested resurrection of Christ had no such surroundings—I mean, my Lord, if that resurrection were an isolated prodigy—a marvel believed in by his friends and admirers, and, perhaps, having a powerful array of evidence on its side, but having no relation to anything going before or after, standing alone as an individual marvel that in no way bore upon the world in general. I say that, in such a case, the fact, or reputed fact, would lack many claims to the attention of succeeding ages. And I will say, my Lord, that, accord-

ing to my conception of the matter, such must have been the position of the case if the contention of the plaintiffs were correct. According to their contention, the resurrection of Christ did not occur in reality, but was a mere afterthought, or imagination, on the part of his disciples; though with what conceivable object they imagined, and still less agitated such a notion, they do not explain.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Leave the plaintiffs to state their own case.

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: It is sufficient for me that the plaintiffs deny the resurrection of Christ. Certainly, according to their hypothesis, it did not occur; and, therefore, according to their theory, the idea of his resurrection was all a mistake, in which case, I contend, the doctrine of his resurrection must needs have stood alone in the hands of its preachers as an isolated, meaningless fact. Instead of that, what do we find? That the doctrine of the resurrection of Christ stands firmly embedded in a system of teaching, going back thousands of years before Christ, to the very beginning of things, as recorded in the Hebrew archives, and expanded to a great and consistent amplitude in the writings of the apostles, who give it a place and a bearing as wide as human hope and human destiny. Let me explain myself, my Lord.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Much need, I think.

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: Do not interrupt. His Lordship will understand me, if you don't. I was saying my Lord, that this doctrine of the resurrection of Christ, besides being a matter of historical attestation, stands logically related to a body of teaching existing long before the days of Christ, and is made in the hands of the apostles to have a world-wide application as regards the hopes of men, and consequently is not an isolated marvel, as it must have been if the theory of the plaintiffs is correct, namely, that it did not happen, but was merely imagined to happen, by some superstitious persons. You may understand what I mean, if I draw your Lordship's attention to Christ's own allusions to the connection that existed between himself and those Scriptures, which had been in the hands of the Jewish nation for ages before

he appeared. Jesus said briefly concerning those Scriptures, that they "could not be broken" (John x. 35). He spoke of them as "the word of God" on the same occasion, and declared frequently that "they must be fulfilled" (Matt. v. 17; xxvi. 54; Luke xxi. 22; xxiv. 44; John xiii. 18; and many other places). Now, he says concerning those Scriptures "they TESTIFY OF ME" (John v. 46). After his resurrection, he said to his disciples, "These are the words which I spake unto you while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled which were written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the Psalms CONCERNING ME" (Luke xxiv. 44).

Now, my Lord, I could easily occupy the whole day in exhibiting these "things," which Christ here said were written in these ancient Scriptures concerning him. But I feel I should trespass unduly on the patience of the Court in taking such a course. I must therefore content myself with having pointed to the fact that a connection exists in Christ's own teaching between his appearance upon earth, and what had been written beforehand in the Scriptures, treasured in the hands of the Jewish nation for ages, from the time of Moses downwards. Those things written beforehand required the various incidents and experiences which were realized in his life. They required that he should be born of a virgin (Isa. vii. 14), at Bethlehem (Micah v. 2); that he should be a preacher (Isa. lxi. 1); that he should be unpopular and rejected (Isa. liii. 3) though the subject of a temporary ovation (Zech. ix. 9); that he should be arrested by the authorities and condemned (Isa. liii. 7-9); that he should be crucified (Psa. xxii. 16; Zech. xii. 10); and that he should rise from the dead (Psa. xvi. 10, 11; xlix. 15; xxi. 1-6; Isa. liii. 9-12). That these things were all realized in him is what the authentic history of his life most plainly attests—a most weighty circumstance in confirmation of the historical evidence to which I have already adverted.

But, my Lord, there is a deeper and wider matter involved in these Scriptural antecedents, which must be taken into account, in order to see clearly the logical relation of the resurrection of Christ to the ages before and

after. The prophetic features to which I have just referred, are mere details, in a general scheme of a far-reaching character. To this general scheme I would now desire to draw your Lordship's attention. It is in the New Testament it appears most clearly, but the foundations of it exist in the Old, and it is from the Old that the New Testament writers derive it. I shall blend the teachings of both, in seeking to present to the Court that view of the surroundings of Christ's resurrection, which so powerfully strengthen the historical testimony for that resurrection.

The scheme I refer to is presented in its simplest form, perhaps, in a saying of the apostle Paul, to be found in his 1st Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. xv. verses 20, 21. These words are, "Since *by man came death, by man came also* the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive." In this statement, my Lord, we have the Old and New Testaments blended together. We are indebted to the Old Testament—and in the very earliest chapter of it—for the information concerning Adam to which Paul here alludes. On that information, my Lord, I now desire to rivet particular attention. It is not fashionable to rely on it, but I have shown reasons, and will show further reasons, why we should rely upon it. The information is that death began its reign among men through the disobedience of the first man—Adam—to whom it had been exactly laid down—(Gen. ii. 17)—that if he disobeyed in the particular matter concerned, death should be the result; death, my Lord, in a sense which is placed beyond misconception by the terms in which the sentence was afterwards passed (Gen. iii. 19): "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till THOU RETURN *unto the ground: for out of it wast thou taken, for dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return.*"

It is not my purpose, my Lord, to enter upon any metaphysical disquisition on the nature of human existence, or to enter upon any discussion on its relation to immortality. I believe that, as a philosophic or scientific problem, it is impossible to reach any decisive conclusion

in such a controversy. Ancient philosophy plausibly argued the possession of a native immortality by man: modern science points to death as the natural portion. My aim is to fix attention on the fact that the Bible teaches that man has come under the dominion of death by sin. No one can deny that fact, in the face of the 2nd and 3rd chapters of Genesis, even if they had not been supplemented by Paul's express declaration that, "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin" (Rom. v. 12).

My reason for adverting to it, as I have already hinted, is to show the logical relation of the appearance, death, and resurrection of Christ to the system of teaching that had been in the earth for thousands of years before those events. His appearance, death, and resurrection are exhibited in the New Testament as the divine remedy for the state of things inaugurated by Adam's disobedience. Thus Paul, in 2 Tim. i. refers (ver. 9) to the divine purpose having existed from the beginning to introduce this remedy, and adds that this purpose had been "now (in the apostolic age) made manifest *by the appearing of our Saviour, Jesus Christ, WHO HATH ABOLISHED DEATH AND BROUGHT LIFE AND IMMORTALITY TO LIGHT THROUGH THE GOSPEL.*" Writing to the Romans he refers to the matter thus: "As by one man's (Adam's) disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one (Christ) shall many be made righteous" (chap. v. 19). And again, "The wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life THROUGH JESUS CHRIST, OUR LORD" (vi. 23).

My Lord, I might quote very extensively from the New Testament in illustration of this feature; but I do not desire to needlessly burden the argument with quotations. I will but refer further, in support of this argument, to Christ's own allusions to this scheme, which links Adam and himself (and, therefore, the whole human race) together in a common plan. As you are aware, my Lord, we have his discourses abundantly reported to us in the authentic histories written by the apostles and their companions. I do not propose to quote extensively from them, but just to cite a sentence or two illustrative of the

fact that he regarded himself as the pivot of an immense scheme, involving the highest ultimate well-being of the human race, and requiring his resurrection, to which he frequently referred. He was much addicted to parabolic forms of speech. In harmony with this style of speech, but with a perfectly evident meaning, in the sense I have indicated, he says, "I am the living bread which came down from heaven. If any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever; and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world" (John vi. 51). A little more plainly, he says: "I am come that they (my sheep) might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly. . . I lay down my life for the sheep. . . No man taketh it from me. I have power to lay down my life, and I have power to take it again. This commandment I have received of my Father" (John x. 10, 15, 18). Still more plainly, "I am the resurrection, and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live" (John xi. 25). "For the Father loveth the Son, and showeth him all things that Himself doeth: and He will show him greater works than these, that ye may marvel. For as the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them; even so the Son quickeneth whom he will. For the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son: that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father. He that honoureth not the Son honoureth not the Father which hath sent him. Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my word, and believeth on Him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life. Verily, verily, I say unto you, The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God: and they that hear shall live. For as the Father hath life in Himself; so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself; and hath given him authority to execute judgment also, because he is the Son of man. Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming in which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life;

and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation" (John v. 20-29).

I might also, my Lord, refer to Christ's plain intimation of his then approaching death and resurrection (Luke xviii. 31-34); but these will suffice to establish my contention, that there is a logical harmony between the fact of Christ's resurrection and the teaching that he delivered before his crucifixion, that, in fact, that teaching required his resurrection if true, and that it is impossible to contemplate his resurrection as an isolated fact or idea, such as it must have been, if the theory of the plaintiffs is true.

The appearance, death, and resurrection of Christ are connected with what went before him in another way. What went before him, my Lord, I must presume you are well acquainted with. I refer particularly to the law of Moses under which he was born (Gal. iv. 4), and which had been in force nearly 1,500 years. This was a system of ritual based upon sacrifice. It was a system divinely appointed in the beginning of the Hebrew nationality, and delivered through the mediation of Moses. Paul, the apostle, has given us an explanation of the object of that ritual. If we had not been favoured with that explanation, we should, I admit, have been somewhat in the fog in this part of the argument. We should have plainly perceived—that since the breach made between God and man by sin, man had only been allowed to approach God at a distance, with a token of the most abject submission in his hand in the form of a bleeding lamb: but we should not have understood the divine intentions in the establishment of such a system. By the light of the apostolic explanations, we are able to form a conception of the divine aim in the case, and to see Christ more distinctly still as the culmination of a divine plan in operation ages before his appearance. Paul, then, informs us that "the law was a schoolmaster (leading) *unto Christ*" (Gal. iii. 24). He further tells us that Christ was the "end of the law" (Rom. x. 4), the subject of all its typical significance (Col. ii. 17; Heb. x. 1) the reality contemplated in all its shadows, and that in Christ has been

accomplished that removal of sin, which never could be taken away by the blood of bulls and goats (Heb. x. 4); that in him, reconciliation and peace and life everlasting are established for man's acceptance, if he will, on the conditions imposed (Rom. v. 6-11; 2 Cor. v. 18-21; Acts xiii. 38, 39).

And now, my Lord, let me point to the practical application of the work of Christ to the times coming after his resurrection—the application, I mean, made to those times in the teaching both of the apostles and of Christ himself. If the contention of the plaintiffs were correct, there could have been no provision of a cosmopolitan character in the use made of the resurrection of Christ. Because, according to their contention, his resurrection did not happen; it was the mistaken notion of superstitious men, and consequently, must have been allied with all the narrowness and short-sighted limitations which belong to such a state of mind. Instead of that, what do we find? That the apostles preached it with objects of world-wide benefit. Christ's last words to them were that they were to give testimony to his resurrection to the uttermost parts of the earth (Acts i. 8). The object is defined in his words to Paul, when he appeared to him: "To turn the Gentiles from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, *that they may receive forgiveness of sins*, and INHERITANCE AMONG ALL THEM THAT ARE SANCTIFIED THROUGH THE FAITH THAT IS IN ME" (Acts xxvi. 18). He instructed the apostles to command those who should receive their testimony "to observe all things whatsoever he had commanded" (Matt. xxviii. 20), and, among others, to break bread and drink wine in remembrance of him, until he should return again to the earth (Matt. xxvi. 26-29; Mark xiv. 22-25; Luke xxii. 19). The apostles carried out these instructions. Paul "delivered to" the Corinthians "that which he had received of the Lord" (1 Cor. xi. 23-26), viz., the ordinance of the breaking of bread, concerning which he said, "Do this *until he come*." Christ's words were, "Occupy *till I come*." Peter told one of the earliest crowds to which the resurrection of Christ was proclaimed, that Jesus

would remain away a certain time, indicated in the prophetic writings (Acts iii. 21), and the hope he held out to them all, as the result of their acceptance of the testimony, and submission to all the present disadvantageous results to which that would lead, was, that when Jesus should re-appear, they would receive life everlasting, and an entrance into the Kingdom he should establish (1 Peter i. 7, 8, 13; 2 Peter i. 10, 11).

My Lord, this branch of the argument is susceptible of indefinite enlargement; but I must be content with this brief indication of a very important consideration, as going to show that the resurrection of Christ cannot have been the illusory after-thought of mistaken men, as my learned friend contends, but must have been a very real and serious fact, before it could have come to have such a sober and such a serious practical application in the most real and serious movement by which, under circumstances of great difficulty and affliction, the apostles succeeded in establishing the doctrine of the resurrection in the principal parts of the Roman Empire, in spite of the formidable opposition of Jew and Pagan.

My Lord, I now take the liberty of introducing another argument which I conceive to be of great pertinence and force. It may not at first sight appear to have much to do with the fact, or otherwise, of Christ's resurrection; but I shall hope, my Lord, to show that it is a powerful buttress to the affirmative contention. I refer, my Lord, to the relation of this matter to the Jewish nation and the Jewish history. It is impossible to separate Christ from the Jews: for he was born a Jew (though the Son of God) in the very last days of the Jewish national existence. Now, my Lord, it is the phenomenon of Jewish history to which I refer. I refer to the nature of that history as exhibited in the Scriptures of Moses and the prophets, which were in circulation in the days of Jesus, and which are proved authentic by his endorsement of them, even if we had not the uncontradicted voice of the Jewish nation. This history, like the history of Christianity, is only intelligible with God in it. This will be seen by anyone fairly looking into it. With such a view

only can we understand the entire absence of any endeavour in any part of it, to ascribe the law to Moses or any credit of any part of the transactions to him, or to the Jewish nation. So far from taking credit, Moses expressly said to the people, "I have not done these things of mine own mind" (Num. xvi. 8). It is a popular habit to ascribe the Jewish law to the wisdom of Moses as if he were the author of it. This habit is totally at variance with the Scriptural representation. God is always kept in the foreground, and Moses appears as His servant only. This peculiarity is not confined to the language of Moses, but belongs to the events connected with the organization of the nation. It is particularly manifest in the incident on which Moses based his claim to Israel's submission to the law. He did not, like an impostor, merely report that so-and-so had happened to him privately, and that the result was this law which they had to obey. He based his claim to their submission on an open and public event of which they were all witnesses. "He brought forth the people out of the camp *to meet with God*, and they stood at the nether part of the mount. And Mount Sinai was altogether in a smoke, because the Lord descended upon it in fire, and the smoke thereof went up as the smoke of a furnace, and the whole mount quaked greatly" (Exo. xix. 17). The people were afraid at the manifestation. "And all the people saw the thunders and the lightnings and the noise of the trumpet and the mountain smoking, and when the people saw it, they removed and stood afar off. And they said unto Moses, Speak thou with us and we will hear, but let not God speak with us lest we die" (Exo. xx. 18, 19). Afterwards referring to this, Moses asks them to remember it: "Specially the day that thou stoodest before the Lord thy God in Horeb when the Lord said unto me, Gather me the people together and I will make them HEAR my word *that they may learn to fear ME* all the days that they shall live upon the earth. . . and the Lord spake unto you out of the midst of the fire. Ye heard the voice of the Lord, but saw no similitude: only ye heard a voice . . . Did ever people hear the voice of God as thou hast heard and

live? . . . Out of heaven, He made thee to hear His voice that He might instruct thee: and upon earth He showed thee His great fire and thou heardest His voice out of the midst of the fire" (Deut. iv. 10-12, 33, 36). It was this public demonstration that laid the foundation of the authority over a rebellious nation, like Israel, of Moses, whom they several times sought to destroy. This was the object of it. It is so stated: "The Lord said unto Moses, Lo, I come unto thee in a thick cloud, *that the people may hear when I speak with thee* AND BELIEVE THEE FOR EVER" (Exo. xix. 9). When the event was over, "The Lord said unto Moses, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, *Ye have seen that I have talked with you from heaven*" (Exo. xx. 22).

The great fact connected with these transactions lies here: *they base the authority of the law on the command of God and never on the wisdom of Moses*. And the argument arising from this fact is that such a thing is inexplicable on the hypothesis of the Mosaic proceedings being proceedings of a merely human origin. The Mosaic writings written with a human origin would have been written with a human aim like all other human writings; and the aim would have been to show that the law was due to the superior sagacity of Moses, and to set forth the constant loyalty of the Israelites to it.

The nature of the sentiment pervading the law, is inconsistent with the idea of a human origin. We know what human nature is in the thousand instances of experience, history, and political institutions. To glorify the leader, or the nation, is the tendency of all men in every country and age; and the Jews, as we know them in their speeches and literature, are no exception. But the Mosaic institutions offer a complete contrast to this tendency. Instead of boasting in ancestry and the exploits of their armies, they were taught, for instance, to speak depreciatingly of their origin on the presentation of the first-fruits; and to refer their deliverance to God. They were taught to say, "A Syrian ready to perish was my father, and he went down into Egypt and sojourned there with a few, and became there a nation great, mighty, and

populous. And the Egyptians evilly entreated us and afflicted us, and laid upon us hard bondage. And when we cried unto the Lord God of our fathers, the Lord heard our voice, and looked on our affliction, and our labour, and our oppression. And *the Lord brought us forth out of Egypt* with a mighty hand, and with an outstretched arm, and with great terribleness, and with signs and wonders, and he hath brought us into this place" (Deut. xxvi. 5). The deliverance of Israel is never ascribed to Israelitish prowess. The style of allusion is well illustrated in Psalm xlv. 1-3: "We have heard with our ears, O God: our fathers have told us what work Thou didst in their days, in the times of old, how Thou didst drive out the heathen with Thy hand, and plantedst them: how Thou didst afflict the people and cast them out. For *they got not the land in possession by their own sword, neither did their own arm save them*; but THY RIGHT HAND AND THINE ARM and the light of Thy countenance, because Thou hadst a favour unto them."

This peculiarity is intelligible enough if God spake to Moses and did all the mighty works by which Israel was delivered from Egyptian thralldom. On any other principle, it is unintelligible. Particularly is this the case with certain matters of detail. There are features in the law which could not have originated with men legislating out of their own heads. For instance, Israel was commanded to let the land lie untended and unsown every seventh year; and we read this in connection with it: "And if ye shall say, What shall we eat the seventh year? Behold, we shall not sow nor gather in our increase. Then I will command my blessing upon you in the sixth year, and *it shall bring forth fruit for THREE YEARS*" (Lev. xxv. 2). What man or men would have been mad enough to append to a public law a provision beyond all human control (affecting the weather and the crops), and subject to the test of experience once in every seven years? For inventors to have enacted such a law would have been to make the detection of their imposture inevitable; and that in a short time, for once in every seven years it would be found whether, as a matter of fact, the en-

hanced production took place. Take God out of this law, and its enactment is inexplicable; but if God spake by Moses, it is perfectly intelligible.

So with the attendance at the periodical feasts exacted of all Israel. Three times a year were they all to assemble at the chosen centre. In the natural order, obedience to this would expose their country to the danger of invasion, while they were absent, but this assurance was associated with the law. "Neither shall any man desire thy land when thou shalt go up thrice in the year to appear before the Lord thy God" (Exo. xxxiv. 24). If God gave the law, this is intelligible, because, as with the weather and the crops, so with the matter of human desires, it is in His power to regulate their operation; but if this law was a human invention, it is impossible to conceive how a promise came to be introduced as to affairs beyond human control, and the truthfulness of which was open to test every year.

There is a variety of incidents and other matters of detail to which the same general remarks apply, viz., that their record is inexplicable on any theory short of the narrative being a true one. Prominent among them is the reason given for Moses not being allowed take the children of Israel over Jordan into the Land of Promise and not being allowed to enter there himself. Moses alluding to this reason in his rehearsal on the plains of Moab, says: "The Lord was *angry with me* for your sakes, saying, Thou also shalt not go in thither. But Joshua, the son of Nun, which standeth before thee, he shall go in thither; encourage him, for he shall cause Israel to inherit it" (Deut. i. 37). The incident to which Moses alludes is described in detail in Num. xx. 7-13; and expressly referred to in Num. xxvii. 12-14. On the reading of these parts, it will be found that the incident in brief was this: under the irritation caused by the continual discontent and insubordination of the people, Moses, when directed by God to bring water for them out of the rock, struck the rock twice with his rod, and took the credit of bringing out the water. "Hear now, ye rebels," he exclaimed, "*must* WE fetch you water out

of this rock?" This was an offence to God in standing between Him and Israel, and is thus condemned by God: "Because ye believed Me not, to sanctify Me in the eyes of the children of Israel, therefore ye shall not bring this congregation into the land which I have given them" (Num. xx. 12). Let there be read in connection with this matter the account of the death of Moses in Deut. xxxii. 48-52 and xxxiv. 1-6: such a story is intelligible if true: but if not true, for what purpose could it have been invented? We must judge of the theory of invention in such a case by the history of invention universally. Invention is resorted to always with an object: and in a case like this (the leader of a nation), the object is to establish the credit and reputation of the man concerned. But here is an incident having the opposite effect. Here is an account of the death of Moses, showing his career cut short in punishment for the unfaithful use of divine power in a certain matter. The man who can believe such a story to have been invented must either have a very poor acquaintance with mankind, or a poor capacity for judging of the simplest facts. Invention, in such a case, if required to account for the death of Moses before the completion of his work, would be likely to have taken the form of representing that God had told him he (Moses) was too good and great a man to be allowed to enter upon the hard and bloody work of conquering the Canaanitish nations; and that, therefore, he would let him go to rest. The "patriotic" inventor would never have represented Moses an offender against the majesty of God, and still less, that he became so through the inveterate stubbornness of the people he was leading from Egypt. Such a story is self-evidently a true one; and is evidence that God wrought with Israel, and that, therefore, the resurrection of Christ, as part of that work is a solemn truth, and not a cunningly devised fable.

Other incidents of a like nature are the death of Aaron's sons, Nadab and Abihu, by fire, for non-compliance with a divine command (Lev. x. 3); and the discouraging report of the spies sent to search the land; the people's endorsement of it; their proposal to stone Moses, and ap-

point another captain, under whom they might return to Egypt; the sentence that they must, as a punishment, wander forty years in the wilderness, till the whole of the adults should be worn out by death (Num. xiii. and xiv., the whole of the chapters); the murmuring of the people for flesh, and the distress of Moses at the burden of his position over them (Num. xi. 1-15); the insurrection of Korah, Dathan and Abiram, and the people's sympathy with them, even after their destruction (Num. xvi.)—all of these, and others which will occur to the reflective reader of the Scriptures, are passages in the history of Israel that are inexplicable as to how they came to be recorded, except on the one simple principle that they happened; for the tendency of them is to blacken the national character of Israel, and to take away all ground of even the commonest human satisfaction in the contemplation of their history. The invention of records having such a tendency is inconsistent with the universally known character of man, Jew and Gentile. Where invention is resorted to, it is to heighten the credit of nation or its leaders. These things cannot have been invented. They are recorded because they happened; and, in that case, God wrought with Israel in all their generations, from Moses to Christ, and, therefore, the resurrection of Christ is established on a foundation which would be sufficient, even without the unanswerable evidences which it has been my duty to bring forward.

This argument, my Lord, touches upon another, which I trust you will pardon me for adverting to a little. I have had occasion to call your attention to Christ's references to the Scriptures as an authority. My Lord, the divinity of these records established would of itself establish the resurrection. I am not afraid to contend for that view, notwithstanding that it has gone so much out of fashion, through the combined influence of the class represented by Professor Bioplasm, and men high in ecclesiastical dignity, who have brought to bear the refinement of a subtle, but by no means unanswerable, criticism, to undermine the credit of the book upon which they professedly stand. The divinity of the Bible, my Lord, I

hold to be established by its internal constitution. The Bible itself is the strongest evidence of its own divinity. This argument is the least capable of being made palpable, especially to those unacquainted with the Bible, and unaccustomed to the line of thought which it involves. The proposition falls at first with little weight upon the ear; but its weight will increase with increasing experience of human nature and human literature, until at last the thinking mind can dispense with all other evidence of the Bible's divinity. Its contents are found sufficient. Its revelations concerning God are first in rank. This is distinguished from all human conceptions of deity, as reflected in the polytheisms of confessedly unenlightened men. The gods imagined by men were limited like men. The God revealed in the Bible is declared *unsearchable*. The different powers of Nature were, by the ignorant, attributed to different gods, which superficially seemed probable. The Bible attributes all to ONE GOD. Science has confirmed the Bible revelation of God, to this extent, that it has shown all power to be ONE at the root, and that root "unknowable," which is only another word for the Bible term "unsearchable." Then as to man: the philosophers taught that man was constitutionally an immaterial immortal being, underlying and distinct from the body, and capable of existence apart from it, a fallacy from which came their doctrine of *post-mortem* rewards and punishments in the Elysian fields and tartarus, and a consequent rejection of the doctrine of the resurrection. This notion, succinctly defined as "the immortality of the soul," was, like their polytheism, a plausible deduction from appearances—universal among the ancients, beginning with the Egyptians, notwithstanding his association with whom Moses, by the admission of Gibbon, is untainted with the notion. The prophets and apostles are likewise free of this philosophic speculation, and, on the contrary, teach human mortality as expounded by Tyndall and other scientists of the modern era. The doctrine of immortality which they teach is the hope of resurrection to a future existence on the earth. Science does not teach this, because science only deals with *what is*, and can

throw no light or what is to be. With the doctrine of human mortality all Scripture agrees, consequently, the Bible is in harmony with science on the subject of man as well as God: that is, as regards his present constitution. That the Bible should teach a doctrine in harmony with science in an age when all the world was dreaming about natural immortality of speculative induction, in another proof of the Bible's divinity. This argument has been obscured by orthodox religion, which accepts the Pagan view, and, by consequence, teaches the eternal torment of the unrighteous—a doctrine which gives the argument for unbelief an advantage that does not belong to it.

The Bible's depreciation of human nature, and exaltation of God, stamp it as of divine origin. The sentiments are foreign to human nature. Their prominence in the mouths of the prophets explain the Jewish treatment of the prophets; and that treatment reacts in confirmation of the divine origin of the sayings of the prophets. Jesus refers to it thus; "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, *which killest the prophets and stonest them that are sent unto thee,*" etc. (Luke xiii. 34). There was a class of prophets that received different treatment, to which Jesus also refers: "Woe unto you when all men speak well of you, for *so did their fathers to THE FALSE PROPHETS*" (Luke vi. 26). The false prophets spoke smooth or pleasant things, which ensured popularity: the true prophets spoke things that were disagreeable to human nature, and brought destruction on themselves. Yet the Scriptures of the disagreeable prophets, which testify against the wickedness of Israel, are preserved, while the scriptures of the false prophets have perished: in which, also, there is evidence of God at work.

The aversion of Israel to the teaching of the true prophets, and their relish for those who led them to idolatry, is very effectually illustrated in the case of Elijah, who, on Mount Carmel, single-handed, confronted four hundred prophets of Baal. This case may be taken as the history of the subject condensed into a single incident. The Jews have always been on the side of those who drew

them aside from the One God, and against the few faithful men who in different ages have striven, under divine command, to bring them back to the paths of Moses. This is in harmony with the work of the prophets being a divine work, and inconsistent with the notion that they acted on their own uninspired volition; for a human volition merely would have led them in a human and popular direction. Why did the Jews prefer idolatry to the divine institutions? This brings us to another argument. The Mosaic worship was contrary to human inclinations. It called on them to serve *an invisible God*; it required faith at their hands. Other nations had gods they could see, and whose worship they made the occasion of licence and delight. To these foreign gods, Israel turned aside from the beginning of their history, as soon as Joshua and his contemporaries were dead (Judges ii. 11-13), which is proof that their God was no invention of their own—no outcome of a national idiosyncrasy. Other nations have always been faithful to their invented gods, because they continued subject to the taste and fancy that led to the invention. Such a thing as a nation changing its gods is unknown. This very fact is made the basis of expostulation by God with Israel, through the prophet Jeremiah: "Pass over to the Isles of Chittim and see, and send unto Kedar, and consider diligently, and see if there be such a thing: *hath a nation changed their gods*, which are yet no gods? But my people hath changed their glory for that which doth not profit" (Jer. ii. 10). This fact of itself—that the Jews as a nation continually departed from the God of their fathers, while no other nation deviated from their traditional idolatries—goes a long way, in a logical process of treatment, to prove that the religion of the Jews was not a religion of Jewish origin, in the sense of its being the invention of the Jews; but was higher than they, namely, what it professes to be: a system divinely communicated to them by the hand of Moses.

There is next the agreement of one part of the Bible with another throughout, notwithstanding the long intervals during which its different parts were produced. If

it were a human production, each successive contributor would have imparted his own sentiments to it, and we should have that diversity of character which belongs to every human work in which many actors have been engaged during a series of ages. Instead of this, the book is absolutely one. Whether you take Moses, Malachi, or Christ, there is the same depreciation of human nature; the same supreme exaltation of God; the same stern enunciation of duty; the same uncompromising rebuke of departure from the way of right. The spirit of the book in this respect, is identical throughout, and this cannot be said of any literature under the sun, in which a variety of writers of different ages have been employed, nor is there any book under the sun characterized by the sentiments just enumerated. The Bible stands absolutely alone in this respect, like a majestic mountain among hillocks of rubbish.

Then there is the same hope, in all the books of the Bible, of a coming age in which Christ, as King of Israel, shall rule on earth universally, and mankind be blessed. A few illustrations of this must suffice. Genesis speaks of a promise to Abraham, that in him and his seed (a great personage who should possess the gate of his enemies), at a future time, should all the families of the earth be blessed (Gen. xxii. 17, 18). Moses speaks of a prophet like unto himself, whom God should raise up to Israel whom they should hear (Deut. xviii. 15-18). Isaiah speaks of a king who should rise in the line of David, and reign over all nations, with the result of abolishing the art of war from the studies of mankind (Isa. xi. 1-9; ii. 4; xxxii. 1-8). Daniel speaks of one like the Son of Man who should appear, and whom all peoples, nations, and languages should serve and obey (Dan. vii. 14). Paul speaks of a day in which God should judge the world in righteousness by Christ (Acts xvii. 31), and when the people of Christ would reign and judge the world with him (1 Cor. vi. 2; 2 Tim. ii. 12). Revelations speaks of the kingdoms of this world becoming the kingdoms of God and His Christ, who shall reign for ever and ever (Rev. ii. 26; xi. 15). If the Bible were a merely human

production, there would not be this absolute identity of hope among writers, extending over three thousand years. The existence of this identity is a proof of the controlling presence of a common guidance in all the writers, even the guidance professed in the book itself: "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit" (2 Pet. i. 21). The force of this argument will be appreciated by those who realize the endless and contradictory diversities of human authorship of different ages. Its force is somewhat hidden by the corruptions of orthodox Christendom, which has long ago abandoned the one apostolic "hope of Israel," common to the whole Scriptures, and embraced the miserable substitute of an imagined *post mortem* beatification of an imaginary personal invisibility, in regions above the stars.

Then there is evidence of divinity in the Bible scheme of future life. This scheme defers all reward till an appointed era, to be inaugurated by the personal re-appearance of Christ in the earth, when many generations shall have yielded—first, to the grave and then to the resurrection—their quota of tried men—tried in necessary times of evil. The vastness and splendour of this scheme stamps it as divine. Man would never have invented such a scheme.

Next there is the perfect candour of the Bible narratives, which is never characteristic of human histories. David's crime is chronicled in sober and merciless truth, although he was king when the record was written. So with the fathers before him. The naked truth is told. The very things which Mr. Bad Laugh makes use of against the Bible, are in this respect one of the highest evidences of its genuine character; for had the Bible been written by king-flatterers and sycophants, as his senseless tirades imply, there would have been a suppression of things that do not stand to the credit of those for whom they are supposed by him to have been written. Then the writers say things that never would have been said by men writing to prop up a pretended revelation. Matthew, for instance (as Professor Bioplasm reminded the Court), records that at an interview with Christ after his

resurrection, some of his disciples "doubted" (Matt. xxviii. 17). A bolsterer up of a pretended revelation would never have written this. It is written because it is true; and the fact that some doubted is an element in the self-evident truthfulness of the narrative, for it is just what would happen with real living men who, not expecting Christ to die, had seen Christ crucified and now saw him alive. In their partly-enlightened state, his death was a puzzle and his resurrection a puzzle also, and "doubt" the natural consequence. And had there been no farther evidence, the doubt of the "some" might have continued. But their doubt did not continue; all doubt vanished with the outpouring of the Spirit and display of miraculous gifts. The fact that they previously "doubted" made their subsequent confidence all the more reliable, because it showed the reason of their doubt had disappeared. Certainly, a forger, writing a fictitious narrative to obtain credit for Christ's resurrection, would never have represented any of the disciples in the act of doubting but rather in an ecstasy of adoring confidence, after the style of Roman Catholic fables.

Similar remarks apply to the statement of John that, at a certain time, "many of his disciples went back and walked no more with him." This is a candid record of a fact which there could be no object in publishing, but rather in suppressing, as the fact itself was capable of yielding a damaging effect to some who might argue like Mr. Bad Laugh: "If men who saw his miracles deserted him, how can you expect me to believe," etc. Its record is an evidence of truth; and the occurrence of the fact recorded is in harmony with our acquaintance with human nature. Men get accustomed to anything. Marvels cease to be marvels when they are of common occurrence. It is easy to understand that men, drawn after Christ in the first instance by the sensational attraction of his miracles, would easily become disaffected when doctrines unpleasant to human nature were propounded for their acceptance. It is human nature to the life. A fictitious writer would never have imagined it possible for any human being to desert the Christ of his narrative: he

would be certain to represent every one as awe-struck and spell-bound for ever. And even if he could have imagined another possibility, he would have been careful to conceal it from a narrative intended to create confidence in a Christ that never existed. The record that many ceased to be his disciples is one among many strong proofs of the genuineness of the narrative. There is a number of such candid statements. In fact, they abound throughout the Scriptures, and constitute an evidence in the very opposite direction to that to which such as Mr. Bad Laugh make them point. We must be content with the two examples cited.

Then the literary character of the Bible is evidence of a more than human authorship. Its diction is chaste, dignified, vigorous, free of redundancy, or irrelevant details. It is unlike all other books in the nature of its historical narratives. It never puts on record the kind of occurrences that come under the category of story and adventure. It never shows any regard for the curiosity of the reader. It never ministers to the taste that finds pleasure in the mere knowledge of what happens. It confines itself to matters having relation to the main purpose in hand. If it ever diverges from its condensed historical style, and enters into personal particulars, it is because those personal particulars have a bearing on some subsequent event of public importance, or to illustrate the operation of some truth important to be known. The story of Amon and Tamar is an example: it led up to the rebellion of Absalom. The story of David and Uriah is another: it led to a public revolution in the punishment of David. The story of the Ephraimite and his concubine is another: it led to the near extirpation of a tribe, and the slaughter of multitudes in Israel in punishment of their sins. In no case is a story told for its own sake. In this the Bible differs from all human books: and the difference is inexplicable if the Bible be a human book; because, if a human book, it would show the universal taste for mere incident, in the liking for which Jew and Gentile are alike, as shown by the writings of Josephus. The following is a good specimen of the

Bible's historical conciseness: "Then were the people of Israel divided into two parts; half of the people followed Tibni, the son of Ginath, to make him king; and half followed Omri. But the people that followed Omri prevailed against the people that followed Tibni, the son of Ginath; so Tibni died, and Omri reigned" (1 Kings xvi. 21). A human account of this matter would have entered upon the intrigues and the fightings, and the adventures incident to the triumph of Omri, with a due admixture of trumpet blowings over this one's intrepidity, and that one's wonderful generalship, etc. This argument in its full force will only be appreciated by those who possess a thorough acquaintance with human writings of all ages. With such it is of great weight, to others, it may be evident by a comparison between the Bible itself and all imitations that have been attempted, such as the Apocrypha and Apocryphal New Testament.

Finally, the character and precepts of Christ, as displayed in the New Testament, are themselves conclusive evidence of his divinity. No man could have imagined such a character; no man could have invented such precepts, least of all such men as those who wrote the gospel narrative—poor fishermen, "unlearned and ignorant men." The only way such a narrative could come to be written (even if men who are called "learned" had been the writers)—is by the appearance of such a man as Christ, and the presence with the writers of such a guidance in the writers as Christ promised he would send them after his departure—the guidance of the Holy Spirit, which should "bring all things to their remembrance, whatsoever he had said unto them."

The very circumstance which Mr. Bad Laugh cited in opposition to their testimony is a proof of its reliability. He says: "I will show you that when Jesus was in danger, his disciples ran away, and his most trusty disciple denied him over and over again." It is true that the disciples fled when the officers came to apprehend Jesus, and that Peter denied him three times. Yet all the disciples (and Peter in particular) afterwards bore witness to his resurrection, and suffered for their testimony,

as the same account tells us. This leads to two questions, which cannot be reasonably answered without affording proof of the truth of Christ's resurrection. How came men who deserted Christ in the presence of danger, to afterwards brave death by their testimony to his resurrection? Such men must have had a good reason for taking a course which amounted to walking into the jaws of death itself. If Christ rose and appeared to them, there is a reason which explains all. If Christ did not rise, we have the inconceivable phenomenon of proved cowards acting the part of heroes on behalf of a lie, and succeeding, without the use of force, in establishing the Christian faith, in the face of armed opposition on the part of the two great religious organizations of the age—Judaism and Paganism. The other question is, How comes the New Testament to record that "the disciples ran away, and his most trusty disciple denied him over and over again"? If the apostolic work was not divine, it was a human work conceived with human objects, and established by human means. In that case, the New Testament was written for the purpose of establishing the credit of the apostles and the prestige of their work, from a human point of view. On such a supposition, it is impossible to understand the chronicling of the desertion of the disciples and the unfaithfulness of Peter. It is an unknown thing in the history of imposture or fanaticism, that pretenders, labouring to establish the credit of an imposture, should publish facts tending to throw discredit on it; least of all, that the leader of the movement should be held up, at one time, as a traitor to the cause, in the very documents intended to establish its reputation! But if Christ rose from the dead, all is explained. We then see that these things are placed on record: first, because they happened, and, secondly, because their occurrence was wholesome to be known, both as regarded the apostles themselves, who were liable, in their privileged position, to be exalted above measure; and believers in general who might be tempted to regard the apostles as free from human frailty.

My Lord, if Christ did not rise from the dead, why

was his dead body not produced at the very incipency of the apostolic testimony? The Jews, to this day, say the disciples of Christ stole the body of Christ, and then raised the report that he had risen. What is this but an admission that the body could not be found? If the body of Christ could have been found, would this story, which dates away back to the very beginning of the "Christian Era," have been invented? On the contrary, would not the body have been produced, to the utter confutation of the apostolic testimony in that and all subsequent times? This question acquires increased force, in view of the fact that the apostles were apprehended and imprisoned by the very council of priests that obtained the crucifixion of Jesus. When the apostles were brought before them as prisoners at the bar, what did the apostles say? "The God of our fathers raised up Jesus, whom YE SLEW AND HANGED ON A TREE. Him hath God exalted with His right hand to be a Prince and a Saviour, for to give repentance to Israel and remission of sins. And *we are witnesses of these things*, and so is also the Holy Spirit, whom God hath given to them that obey Him." The apostles accused their judges of being the slayers of Jesus. Their judges, it is added, "were cut to the heart, and took counsel to slay them" (Acts v. 33). Now, in such a state of mind, would not their judges have obtained possession of the body of Jesus had it been obtainable, and, by its production, have silenced for ever the intolerable testimony of the disciples, who fled from Christ in the hour of darkness, but were now so bold? The fact that they did not do so, is in itself proof that the body of Christ could not be found.

It is made an objection to Christ that John the Baptist sent disciples to Jesus to know whether he were the Christ or no, and it is customary to ask how this is consistent with John having heard a voice from heaven at the Jordan, declaring, at Christ's baptism, that he was the Son of God. No better proof than this very circumstance could be given that the New Testament narrative is an unconcocted and true narrative. A concocter of such a story would have imagined and represented

John the Baptist as, of course, animated by a sublime and indomitable confidence that no circumstances could affect. But the narrative being true, we find John subject to the weakness of human nature. Shut up in prison at a time when, in common with all the disciples, he "thought the kingdom of God would immediately appear" (Luke xix. 11), the overpowering effect of confinement and hope inexplicably deferred, is seen in an embassy to Christ to re-assure himself. And Christ's answer, instead of being inconsistent with truth, must appear in the opposite light to every reflecting mind. Mr. Bad Laugh asks why he did not remind John of the heavenly voice at his baptism. Jesus did better than that. He did not appeal to faltering human memory of an event already doubted; he appealed to *what was actually transpiring*. "Go and tell John WHAT YE SEE: how that the dead are raised," etc. If the story had been concocted, no doubt the narrative which, in the first place, would never have represented John in doubt, would, in the case of that supposition, have made Christ appeal triumphantly to the events of the Jordan.

The same train of confirmatory thought is suggested by the most painful scene in the history of Christ, viz., the agony of his expiring moments, when he exclaimed: "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" The unbeliever asks how such an exclamation could come from the lips of a man who knew that his death was to be the salvation of the world; and whether the words are not a confutation of his professed character. The question derives its piquancy from the assumption that the tranquility and mental composure of the Saviour ought to have been imperturbable. No doubt, in the case of an invented Christ, it would have been so represented. We should have had the sort of demeanour imputed to him that is alleged to the canonized "saints" of Roman Catholic fable. We should have had the spectacle of a transfixed man, looking placid and at ease, and delivering himself, in beatific trance, of an unnatural speech, calling upon heaven and earth to witness his confidence and submission, without murmur or wince, to a death which was

necessary for the salvation of men. Instead of that, we have "the man Christ Jesus," showing all the susceptibilities of a human being. We have him approaching death, the day before, with a fearful apprehension that caused him to "sweat as it were great drops of blood." We have him praying earnestly that if it were possible, the cup might pass from him: "yet not my will but Thine be done." After this, we have him unresistingly submitting to apprehension and condemnation, and crucifixion. And then we see him transfixed on the cross, suspended in the most agonizing position in which it is possible for a human being to be placed, with the whole weight of his body bearing upon his out-stretched and lacerated hands and feet. We see him endure for six hours the fierce agonies of crucifixion, and at the end of that time, it is no unnatural sound we hear when, with a loud wail of agony, he exclaims, "My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me?" Is such a wail inconsistent with his previous knowledge in hours of calmness that God required him to die? Nay, is it inconsistent even with the continuance of that knowledge? Was it not the fact that God had forsaken him in the sense of leaving him in the hands of his enemies, and in the sense, too, of withdrawing from him that overshadowing and immeasurable presence of the Spirit that had been with him during all the days of his ministry? The "why" may seem to express surprise where expectation ought to have excluded it, but we have to think that although the fact of his death was known to him beforehand, it may be that he did not realize to himself all the horrors of the ordeal till the dark cloud actually came upon him; and that in the weakness of the hour (for he was crucified through, in, or out of weakness—2 Cor. xiii. 4), his mental vision may have become clouded with the shadow of death, and caused him to ask what he would not have asked in the calm prospect of the event itself. The whole picture is thoroughly unartificial. It is such as men depicting an imaginary or invented Christ would never have drawn. No stronger evidence exists of the truth of Christ's profession and mission than those very dying words.

My Lord, I feel I have trespassed at great length on the attention of the Court. There are other matters with which I had purposed to deal. It would not be foreign to the issue before the Court if I were to dwell on the prophetic feature of the Hebrew Scriptures. On this subject, very much could be said, having a most material bearing; but I feel I must forbear. I must be content to point to the wonderful fact that these Scriptures abound with prophecies that, without exception, have been fulfilled, leaving out of consideration those that belong to a still future age—the age of Christ's return to the earth, in power and great glory. My Lord, I need not dwell on the significance of this fact of fulfilled prophecy—a significance not to be jeered away by the cry of staleness or any vague reference to the prophetic pretensions of pagan antiquity in general. The prophecies I refer to are not the incoherent mutterings of augurs and astrologers. They are the plain and explicit declarations of events to come—events out of all human calculation. The predictions which belong to the Bible have to do with the futurity of countries, the fortunes of races, the destinies of individuals, which all depend upon so many unknown contingencies that only a Power having control of those contingencies could say what will happen. They are not matters admitting of the action of human discernment. The notion that Moses and the prophets were only astute men, who, by a large discernment of human affairs, were able to foretell what should happen centuries afterwards, is not only absolutely gratuitous, but it is opposed to all experience of men. There are probably as astute men living in our day as in any age, and where is the man that can tell us a day ahead what shall be? On the natural discernment theory, there ought to be better prophets now than at any time, because there is so much larger a stock of human experience to go by than at any former time. Yet, in point of fact, there is not the least ability anywhere to foretell the future. The future is a dead wall to the human eye. No man can forecast even the markets for a day ahead, let alone political destinies which are so peculiarly liable to unknown

contingency. This inability to penetrate the future is appealed to in the Scriptures as the evidence of imposture on the part of those in Israel who falsely pretended to be divine. The challenge is put in this form: "Let them bring forth and *show us what shall happen . . . SHOW THE THINGS THAT ARE TO COME HEREAFTER* that we may know that ye are gods" (Isa. xli. 22, 23). In contrast to this, we have the following declaration from God: "I am God, and there is none like me, *declaring the end from the beginning* and from ancient times, *the things that are not yet done*, saying, My counsel shall stand and I will do all my pleasure." "Behold the former things are come to pass, and new things do I declare: *BEFORE THEY SPRING FORTH, I TELL YOU OF THEM*" (Isa. xli. 9; xlii. 9). Moses and the prophets foretold the fate of the Jews thousands of years ahead, and also the leading developments of Gentile power in their relation to God's further purpose on earth. It cannot be said that the ability to do this was a Jewish faculty: for the Jews are as helpless to-day as their Gentile neighbours. They have had no prophets among them since God forsook them for their iniquities, and dispersed them through the countries. There is only one possible explanation of the prophecies in the case, and that is the explanation given by the prophets themselves, when they represent that God spoke to them what they said and wrote, and in that case, Christ has risen from the dead; for his resurrection is required by them.

With this brief indication of a great, and pregnant, and powerful argument on behalf of the resurrection of Christ, I must hasten to the close of my address. My Lord, I have proved my case in every way in which it is possible for such a case to be proved. I have proved the defendants justified in the course from which the plaintiffs would restrain them, by proving that Christ rose from the dead. I have proved this by the testimony of eye-witnesses. I have proved these eye-witnesses capable eye-witnesses, and trustworthy eye-witnesses. I have proved that their testimony is true, by the effect of the work done by these eye-witnesses. I have proved it

by the nature of the testimony they gave, as regards its bearing on those receiving it. I have proved it by proving the divinity of the whole national scheme, in which the resurrection of Christ was but an item in a divine programme. I have proved it by the nature of the national writings produced in connection with that programme; and I have proved it by the fulfilment, and the still continuing fulfilment of the word of prophecy delivered in connection with the whole work throughout.

And what is the answer, my Lord, to this incontestable argument? Science, my Lord, science; nothing but science. The opposition of the Bad Laugh school may pass without consideration as the mere raving dogmatism of a reckless hostility which has neither concern for truth nor capacity for weighing evidence. It is different with the opposition of men of the stamp of Mr. Shrewd Observer and Professor Bioplasm. Their opposition is at least what we may call a respectable opposition. It is an opposition that springs from a candid inability to reconcile the resurrection of Christ with certain other conceptions of truth. It is an opposition, to a certain extent, worth arguing with. But what does it amount to, my Lord? I make bold to affirm, on the strength of much that has already transpired in the course of this trial, that it is an opposition that is bound to give way before the application of true reason. It is an opposition to evidence that cannot be overthrown on the grounds of scientific assumptions that are not only undemonstrable, but which there are many reasons for doubting, and which, even if there were no reasons for doubting them, cannot safely be placed against manifest truth, in view of the unstable and changeful nature of all human conceptions of the universe. My Lord, what is science? It is but the most we know at any given moment. But can we ever be sure we know enough to dogmatize? Is it not the fact that much of even what we call knowledge is hypothesis, which acts as a disintegrating ingredient, crumbling the finest scientific edifice to ruins with the advance of time? The knowledge of to-day discredits the science of yesterday; and to-morrow the knowledge of to-day seems incomplete and even fallacious and far behind.

It is true that the resurrection of Christ involves the mystery of a personal God, and brings with it all that comes with a supernatural revelation; but I submit, my Lord, there is nothing in true science inconsistent with these. Science reduces no difficulty, lessens no mystery, dissipates none of the incomprehensibility that may be felt to attach to a theistic view of the origin of things. No one has more clearly recognized or more forcibly expressed this fact than the leading scientific intellect of the present age. Professor Tyndall in his inaugural address at the meeting of the British Association, at Manchester, says: "Science does not in any degree lessen the wonder with which we look at the material universe. At best it only marshals the phenomena of Nature under the head of all its sequences, which are called law; but the great ocean of the unknown simply recedes as we advance, and all the researches that science may make to the end of time will never abridge by one hair's-breadth the infinite expanse of mystery across that boundless ocean. The curiosity of the intellect will always sail towards an ever-vanishing horizon. The region of mystery lies not merely in the distance, but also at our very feet." He said when he has looked at the spring-tide, at the sprouting leaves, and grass, and flowers; when he has seen the general joy of opening life, he has asked himself, "Can it be that there is no being or thing in Nature that knows more about these matters than I do? Can it be that I, in my ignorance, represent the highest knowledge existing of these things in the universe?" And his answer is: "The man who puts that question to himself, if he be not a shallow man; if he be capable of being penetrated by a profound thought, will never answer it by professing that creed of Atheism which has been so lightly attributed to me."

Consequently, my Lord, whatever objections may be entertained against the resurrection of Christ, on the ground of its assumed inconsistency with the modes of Nature's subsistences, are evidently without scientific foundation, in so far as science itself can explain nothing to us, and give us no information as to the ultimate spring of Nature's operations. As the learned authority I have just quoted says, we can only know the phenomena of

Nature; we cannot know the power that educes them. Under the thin surface of our deepest knowledge, there lie the eternal foundations of the unexplorable absolute, on which the highest intellects are obliged to write "mystery," "unknowable." If Nature's ultimate *modus in esse* be incomprehensible, how can a man maintain that Christ's resurrection is inconsistent with it? It is a question of whether it happened, and not of whether it could happen. It is only veritable idiocy that would draw the boundary line of the possible. It is fact, not theory; truth, not philosophy, that must govern mortal vaticinations. The resurrection of Christ is a fact attested by every law of evidence. At the bidding of what are we to reject it? At the bidding of a theory that is undemonstrated? that is undemonstrable? yea, worse, that is inconsistent with many of the most palpable scientific elements of the case? At the bidding of a theory, whose originator says a few miracles were wrought to begin life on earth, but none to guide and finish it? and whose principal apostle says there was no miracle at all, except the astounding miracle of life generating itself before it existed to generate? and who lays down the extraordinary scientific dogma that this self-generation of life, though possible countless ages ago, under conditions that he has to imagine, is now no longer possible on earth? My Lord, the man who on such slender grounds of scientific speculation—such fantastic speculation—who at the bidding of such monstrous scientific dogmatism and presumption, can throw overboard the palpable and invaluable historic verities of the Christian faith—I say such a man can only be excused on the ground that he must be but imperfectly acquainted with the facts connected with those verities, or has failed to estimate and weigh them at their proper value. My Lord, the tide has already begun to turn against these evolutionistic extravagances, and I make bold to predict that it will not be long before the bare mention of them will be hailed with shrieks of laughter.

I have contended that true science is not inconsistent with the resurrection of Christ. I will now go further, my Lord, and contend that true science requires such an

opening of hope in the horizon of human life. True science, my Lord, deals with all knowledge in a manner as large as the universe itself. It does not consist of collecting specimens, and classifying genera, and discoursing technically on some special branch of knowledge, such as botany, entomology, zoology, geology, to wit. Nature is one: and true science deals with it as a whole, and notes those general inductions which the sum total of her general phenomena yield. Now, if there is one thing more obvious than another, it is this, that human life is the highest, and most interesting thing upon the earth at the present time. Every man capable of thinking instinctively feels that all other things exist for this. But there is another thing, my Lord, equally obvious, unhappily, and that is, that human life, though the noblest thing upon earth at the present time, is also in such a state as to be least in harmony with his constitutional needs, capacities, and aspirations. Other creatures fulfil the object of their being; but man is unsatisfied, mal-developed, aborted in his life, frustrated in his schemes and aspirations—weak in himself, confused and unhappy in his social relations (speaking of these in the highest sense), and under a universal burden of mortality which, despite desires and adaptations for immortality, sink him into the grave. My Lord, I am leaving out of account the explanation furnished by revelation of this state of things. I am dealing with it as a natural phenomenon patent to every man. And I say that as a problem of Nature, there ought to be discoverable a solution, or at least an explanation, of it. I mean, more particularly, that there ought to be some possible exit discernible or conceivable in the system of Nature from this lamentable situation. Nature, in her stupendous powers and possibilities, ought to yield some suggestion of hope that man, her highest work, is not a mistake—that a creature with such wonderful and beautiful possibilities indicated in his constitution, has some sphere corresponding to his aspirations—some destiny answering to the yearnings and desires, and moral, and intellectual potentialities of his nature.

Where is there such token of hope in the system of

the plaintiffs? My Lord, there is none. They point to the million-numbered ages of the past, and they say, "Behold an endless variation and succession in the forms of biological force; this force eternal, but the individual forms of it evanescent, disappearing generation after generation, never more to re-appear," "And see," say they, "in this the picture of the future in which life will go on interminably manifesting itself according to environment, but giving no ground of expectation that vanished forms will be repeated, or individual lives reproduced." My Lord, in this system, there is no hope: no faith: no Father: no motive power for individual circumspection: no resource upon which individual solicitude can draw for comfort or joy. Is it a wonder, my Lord, that under the influence of such a system, society should be turning gloomy, as an eminent public writer testified only a week or two ago? The wonder would be, if it should be otherwise: for as man is constituted, he requires the lever of external hope to keep his mental machinery in effectual motion. Take away hope and aim, and a high ideal, and human nature inevitably gravitates earthwards to the condition of intellectual stagnation and debasement from which he has been elevated in any little measure of his attainment by the very faith which the plaintiffs would destroy.

I say, my Lord, that in this view of the case alone, the position of the plaintiffs is not a truly scientific one. It is inconsistent with those general inductions that the intellect instinctively draws from the spectacle of matchless wisdom and power around us in heaven and earth. It is not reasonable to suppose that the stupendous system of the universe exists for no higher end than the feeble gratification of an ephemeral and decaying race of animals. It is not reasonable to suppose that the aspirations of the noblest of mankind are without a counterpart in the region of the possible. It is not reasonable to suppose that the earnest upliftings of the human heart in agonizing desire towards a Higher than man are without a meaning in the universe of being. And, because these things are not reasonable, the system of the plaintiffs, which involves these terrible postulates, is in the highest degree unrea-

sonable, and unphilosophic, and unscientific. True science ought to leave room for, even if it could not show us the complement of, Nature's own fundamental indications. I do not mean that, seeing men hungry, it ought to conclude that all men will be fed; but, in the presence of hunger, it ought to admit the existence of food, and the possibility, by the right exertions, of obtaining it. The system of the plaintiffs denies this in relation to the highest of all food for which man craves. It denies the possibility of a future life; it denies the attainability of perfection; it denies a Father with power and intelligence guiding all things after the counsel of His own will; it does all this on the puny grounds of its own weak and finite impressions of truth on matters with which the human intellect is unfitted to cope, while it refuses to accept truth that is demonstrated—historic truth, that cannot be rejected without doing violence to every maxim of evidence.

My Lord, on all points, the position of the defendants presents a complete and striking contrast to that of the plaintiffs. The resurrection of Christ brings with it the glorious counterpart of every induction which the universe yields to the ear of reason. It brings with it the pledge of the Eternal Father's existence and love; for it was the Father who raised him from the dead, and we need a Father. It ensures to us the loftiest ideal for the elevation and comfort of the mind; for his resurrection introduced him to a priesthood in which he stands as the Father's representative, beseeching us to be reconciled to God, and to become his friends, in the forgiveness and abandonment of our sins and the adoption of his commandments; and such a priesthood is exactly suited to human need. It offers us a theme and object of unbounded personal hope of good to come: for the risen Christ promises to come again, and raise from the dead all who receive him, and introduce them to a state of perfection identical with that in which he himself now exists; and, surely, the mind rusts and despairs, and sinks to inanity, for want of some assured prospect of perfect good. It gives us the guarantee of well-being for all mankind; for the risen Christ, when he so comes, comes as

King, to establish a new and universal government—the government of himself and his immortal friends, under which, when the rickety and wretched systems of the present era shall have been suppressed by his strong arm, the human race will wake to a new and well-ordered life, in which existence will no longer be a drudge and a vanity, but the joyous effectuation of every rational object of life, in “glory to God in the highest, peace on earth, and goodwill to men.” It affords us the much desired and securely established vision of an endless future of unclouded peace and untarnished glory upon earth, when the mission of the risen Christ shall have culminated, after a provisional reign of a limited period, in the complete removal of sin and death from every denizen of the habitable globe.

My Lord, I have done. I protest against, and oppose, with all my heart, the mistaken application of the plaintiffs. It would become them, rather, as good and truly scientific men, to ask the Court to place all the facilities which the resources of this kingdom may afford, at the disposal of the defendants, that, with trumpet voice, they might proclaim to the ends of the world, the joyful news that Christ has risen from the dead, and comes anon to bless all families of the earth with righteousness, plenty, wisdom, joy, and peace.

(A pause followed the conclusion of Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth's speech, which had evidently produced a deep impression on the Court).

His Lordship: The Court has listened with great interest to your masterly address, Mr. Alltruth. What course do you now propose to take?

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: We propose, my Lord, to call one or two of the defendants. We shall be very brief in our examination of them.

His Lordship: Do you propose to take them now?

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: Probably it would be more acceptable to the Court if we take them after the adjournment.

His Lordship: Very well.

The Court adjourned.

TENTH SITTING

TITUS WORKFELLOW (called and affirmed).

Examined by Mr. Discerner of Facts: You are one of the defendants in this action?—Yes.

You have heard the evidence and arguments of the plaintiffs?—Yes.

They propose to restrain you from propagating your convictions on the subject of Christ's resurrection?—That, I understand, is their object.

What do you think about that?—They propose an impossible thing.

In what sense impossible?—I mean to say that whatever the decision of the Court might be, it could not in any way affect the obligations which impel the defendants to testify of Christ's resurrection.

They consider themselves bound to speak of that resurrection at all hazards?—Nothing but death or imprisonment could silence their tongues on the subject.

On what grounds do they conceive this obligation so strongly?—First, on the ground of conviction that it is true; and secondly, because Christ has required such a testimony at the hands of everyone believing in him.

Of the grounds of your conviction that it is true, you are satisfied?—Perfectly. I have not the least doubt. If I doubted at one time, it was merely for want of acquaintance with all the facts.

You refer to the facts that have been placed before the Court?—Yes, the argument so ably outlined in Mr. Alltruth's speech, and so skilfully elicited by yourself in the

cross-examination of Mr. Bad Laugh and Professor Bioplasm. With these facts and arguments I was but imperfectly acquainted at the beginning, and consequently, though persuaded in a traditional way of Christ's resurrection, I did not feel that certainty and strength of conviction which I later acquired.

How do you find the lapse of time affect your convictions? Do they become weaker at all, as time goes on?—On the contrary, they increase in strength with the progress of years. Many evidences unseen at the beginning become visible as time goes on. It is like a ship approaching port. At first the outline of the coast tells the voyager that he is near the end of his voyage, This outline of coast might turn out to be a trail of cloud on the horizon, and no land at all: but as he gets nearer, he sees the details of the shore, and at last, the form of buildings and so has no doubt.

You find it so in your acquaintance with this subject?—I do. There are details that the mind cannot become acquainted with all at once, but which, with increasing attention to the subject, become so palpable and unmistakable as to leave no more doubt on the mind than the passengers in a steamer entering in a harbour have of the fact of their arrival.

The plaintiffs have much to say about injury arising from the entertaining of such convictions: does this answer at all to your experience?—It depends upon what is meant by injury. I have, of course, experienced a kind of injury—the injury that arises from the loss of estimation and friendship—and of what are considered more solid advantages; but I cannot admit that this kind of injury has any place at all in the argument as to whether or not the resurrection of Christ should be preached. Paul said he had suffered the loss of all things for Christ, and counted all things as the vilest rubbish in comparison to the excellency of attaining to Christ's recognition and friendship. This, I apprehend, represents the sentiment of reason in the case. I share it fully. It is a question of whether Christ rose, and not of whether one suffers from believing it.

Have you suffered injury in any other sense?—On the contrary, I have reaped great advantage.

In what way?—Well, I consider the tranquility of mind that comes with the conviction of so glorious a fact as Christ's present existence, and all that springs out of that, a great advantage. I fully endorse what the apostle Paul says, that the truth of Christ "hath promise of the life that now is, as well as of that which is to come." Life without a hope and without a purpose is to me a vanity and a failure—worse, a curse and a burden intolerable. Such I have found it to be in time past; such I perceive it to be in many of my former acquaintance. Science gives no hope and no purpose. A few years of activity—aching activity—feverish and fretful activity in many cases, and all must end in the darkness of night—in the grave that surely waits every man. Such a moral environment is depressing and demoralizing. It gives no rule of action—no purpose of life, and leaves us a prey to our uncertain feelings. With the entrance of the faith of Christ, all this completely changes. The future, which, in a state of nature, is the darkest, becomes the brightest direction of life. It is no exaggeration to say that the forward horizon becomes lit up with glory. Mortal life is short: in the grave there is no interval to consciousness, though there may be much to chronology. Consequently, it is but a few steps forward, so to speak, to reach the goal of blessedness presented in Christ. It is in this form the matter stands to individual hope; and hope is one of the most powerful levers in the human constitution. This one feature of hope alone I consider outweighs all the disadvantages it is possible to endure on account of the faith of Christ.

Is it the only advantage?—By no means. The acceptance of the faith of Christ gives a man a simple rule of action and a simple boldly-drawn purpose in life, which are entirely lacking in merely secular systems of education.

How would you define this rule of action?—The rule of action is simply the will of Christ, as expressed in his written commandments apostolically transmitted to us.

The acceptance of this rule brings great peace, and relieves the mind of a world of perplexity if at all of philosophic bent.

And the purpose?—Well, the purpose may be expressed as the determination to secure the approbation of Christ, and a place in his everlasting and glorious inheritance at his coming.

Is the securing of such results placed within the volition of those desiring them?—To a certain extent. It is Christ's message to them that he will esteem them his friends if they do his commandments (John xv. 14), and that he will give to every man according as his work shall be (Matt. xvi. 27; Rev. xxii. 12). Consequently, a man believing in Christ has a very simple purpose in hand, and a very simple rule in the working of it out. His purpose is to use the present life in conformity with Christ's expressed desire, with a view to an inheritance in the kingdom of God. And such a purpose, and such a rule, yield great advantage, even in this present time.

Have you exhausted the definition of the advantage?—Not altogether. Those who accept of Christ become objects of the Father's special regard, and the subjects of His providential dealings. Consequently, they are not exposed to the uncertainties of chance as other men, but have their affairs divinely directed for their benefit.

Do you mean that good is secured to them now in this present time?—I do not mean that exactly. Evil may be allowed to befall them, and, what is more, may be divinely contrived for them; but their consolation is, that all things are made to work together for their real good—for the promotion of their spiritual education—for their preparation for the exalted destiny to which the gospel invites them; and that even the worst circumstances may be made to serve this purpose. Their confidence is, that evil will be regulated with a view to results, and not be permitted to encroach to their destruction. Peace of mind naturally results from such a state of facts; and peace of mind is a great advantage. The loss of friends and temporalities is not to be mentioned with this.

My learned friend on the other side spoke of injury

to the world?—That must be a mere theory. I am not aware of any injury to the world from the attitude of believers in Christ. We do not associate with the world, it is true; but they would not thank us if we did. They could not find in us the society they wish.

Why do you not associate with the world?—Because Christ has forbidden it. It is not a matter of choice, though it is not altogether against our choice; for it seems to me morally impossible that any earnest friend of Christ could identify himself with the world, even if Christ and his apostles had not forbidden it.

But even if your non-association with the world injured the world and brought injury on yourself as well, you should not consider that a sufficient reason for altering your course in view of Christ's resurrection?—Quite so: if Christ rose, Christ is coming again: and when he comes again, the present order of things will be as entirely superseded as Paganism was by State Christianity when Constantine became supreme. It would, therefore, be manifestly the highest form of unwisdom to make any present consequences a reason for acting in opposition to the will of Christ, who predicates our future acceptance with him in our performance of that will during his absence.

Cross-examined by Mr. Dontwantobelieve Anyhow: Mr. Workfellow, I will not follow you in the matters of sentiment you have introduced. I presume you do not find everybody take life so gloomily as you do?—I do not think I take life gloomily.

I rather think you do?—I take it as I find it. If it was other than I find it, I should rejoice.

That is what I say, you find it gloomy. Don't you know that many others find it cheery and gay?—There is plenty of gaiety no doubt.

And if some men don't join the gaiety, it is not the fault of life, is it?—I think so.

It is the fault of their livers, isn't it?—I think not.

Doesn't a man with a sound stomach and liver take

cheery views of life?—To a certain extent, it is so; but there is much to put the stomach and liver out of order.

Excesses, you mean, or bad bacon?—No I don't mean that.

What do you mean?—Bad state of things among men everywhere.

Bad trade?—No, not bad trade; the badness I refer to prevails even when trade is very good.

Sentimental badness?—I am afraid you do not understand it.

It will be your fault if you do not make yourself understood?—I mean to say that the general position of the human race, considered in the light of what ought to be—the aversion to wisdom, the indifference to God, the unconcern about Christ, the unmercifulness of man to man, the poverty of the million, their intellectual destitution, their moral degradation, their lowness of taste and inclination, the general barbarism that prevails in association with the sublimest complacency and self-conceit,—I say, the whole spectacle engenders a sadness that will afflict a reflecting mind, quite independently of the state of the stomach.

I am afraid there are not many men so afflicted?—I am afraid not.

You consider yourself a sort of Lot in Sodom?—I do not care to put the matter personally.

If the majority—the overwhelming majority—are in a cheery mood, is it not probable that your sourness may be due to some special cause, personal to yourself?—I wish I could think so.

Try to think so, Mr. Workfellow, and cheer up a bit?—We cannot alter facts. It is the facts that are wrong. A man on the brink of ruin cannot get rid of the fact by logic and force himself to be cheery. The world is in a bad way. Paul calls it “the present evil world.” John says, “it lieth in wickedness.” Jesus said he did not belong to it, and that he prayed not for it. Its condition has not changed since these things were written.

I am afraid it is a jaundiced view altogether?—I would rather be jaundiced with Christ than in sound health with those who condemn him.

It is strange that nobody discovers this dreadful state of things?—A man requires to be educated before he can detect ignorance.

You think we are rather far behind, then?—Not in the way you take it. I mean that a man must know the divine mind before he can rightly estimate the state of things in the world. And where the great mass—the overwhelming majority, as you rightly called them—are in total ignorance of the divine mind, and under the sway of the merely natural mind—which is a barbaric mind at the bottom—I say in that case it is not wonderful that they do not know their state, and are now perfectly well pleased with one another. The lower animals, you know (pigs, for example) do not know their state, and cannot discover it.

The lower animals are very good in their way. However, we are rather straying from the line of things before us. As I said, I do not concern myself with the sentimental matters in which you have been dealing. I wish to ask you a question or two on matters of fact. I think you said you felt great confidence in the resurrection of Christ?—I did.

You consider that confidence well grounded?—I do.

Does it not rest on mere documents whose originals—whoever wrote them—are not now extant?—It does not rest wholly on these, though largely, I allow.

It rests largely on the New Testament?—Largely.

Do you consider that a good foundation?—I do.

In view of the prevalence of the forgery and literary fiction that prevailed in the ages that witnessed the production of the New Testament?—The prevalence of literary forgeries in those ages in no way lessens my confidence in the New Testament, but rather strengthens it.

A strange effect certainly from such a cause?—Not when all things are taken into account. Forgeries presuppose genuine and influential documents to be imitated; and if the New Testament be not those genuine and influential documents, where are they?

It is not for me to say?—But the mind will demand an answer, in the serious consideration of the matter and the facts admit of only one answer.

There might be a difference of opinion as to the facts?—There may be different ways of viewing the facts, but I cannot conceive of any difference of opinion as to the facts themselves.

To what facts do you refer?—The facts that properly come within the range of literary criticism as applied to any document.

You mean the number of original copies and such like?—I mean all the facts that decide whether a document is genuine or no. Sometimes these are independent of any great number of copies. For example, you may be aware that in the case of *Quintillian's Institutions of Oratory*, an ancient Roman work, the copies current before the 15th century were all set aside on the strength of a single perfect copy discovered in a monastery at Constance, lying beneath long-neglected lumber.

I have not much acquaintance with the matter?—That is the fact. The MS. was subject to the examination of critics, collated with existing copies, compared with the references of ancient authors, and ascertained to be genuine and uncorrupted. Previously known copies were thus discovered to have been much corrupted and mutilated by the ignorance or presumption of copyists.

There cannot be many cases of that sort?—There is the *Abridged History of Rome* by Paterclus, which has been preserved only in a single MS.; and it happens that this history is quoted by only one ancient author—Prescian, a grammarian of the sixth century. Yet, with all this scantiness of evidence, the genuineness of the work is fully admitted by scholars.

But you do not class the New Testament with such writings?—The New Testament stands amenable to the same rules of judgment as regards literary genuineness: and I say that if only a single MS. containing the Acts of the Apostles, and the Epistles of Paul, had been preserved, even if no quotations from these writings were to be found, competent and unprejudiced scholars (judging apart from the special issues involved) could never doubt that these writings are in fact what they professed to be. There are minute and indescribable tokens of genuine-

ness discernible to the instructed eye in every sentence, and the internal accordances of the history and the letters would be conclusive, even in the absence of all external proof.

Well, you wrap it up very nicely, and to your own satisfaction, I doubt not?—It is a question of judgment on facts. What I maintain is that the grounds of authenticity on which you receive the classic authors exists with ten-fold more force in the case of the New Testament. Herodotus, for example; only about fifteen manuscripts of his history are known to critics, and of these, several are of no higher antiquity than the 15th century; whereas, in the case of the New Testament, to mention any fixed number of existing ancient MSS. would be impossible. It is enough to say that on the revival of learning, copies of the Scriptures were found wherever any books had been preserved. The number hitherto examined by editors cannot be much under 800.

But how do you know they have not been corrupted as in the case of *Quintillian's Institutions*?—We have a guarantee against any supposition of that sort in the great number of the MSS.; in the great antiquity of some of them; in the extent of the earth's surface over which they were diffused at an early date; and in the bitter schisms that arose early in the Christian church, establishing a jealous watch of rival sections one upon another, as to any interference with the sacred text upon which they all relied in controversy.

It sounds all very well as a matter of argument, but you know people cannot live on arguments. They cannot live on the New Testament?—Perhaps you may find some day they can.

I should not advise you to try the experiment?—I am afraid your advice will have little weight. The words of Christ in the New Testament will give life to myriads yet, when his rejectors will be rotting in their graves.

It would be all very well if we could be sure they are the words of Christ?—There is every ground of surety to those who have capacity to discern it.

You make it a question of capacity?—Well, we cannot expect cows and horses to understand.

Do you think we have capacity?—I cannot be sure, but the acumen with which you conduct this examination would seem to indicate capacity enough to perceive the evidence of the genuineness of the apostolic writers.

Have you given us all the evidence?—Not all. It would not be possible to give you all in a brief extract like this.

Is there anything else you would like to mention?—I have referred to the divisions of the Christian church as affording security for the uncorrupted transmission of its apostolic standard. But there are collateral evidences that are positively unanswerable. There are the visible effects of the Scriptures, from age to age. They have left their marks in all public history. The public history of no period since the first publication of these writings is at all intelligible, without the supposition of their existence and diffusion. These Scriptures have been unlike classical literature in the part they have played, the influence they have exercised, the sphere they have occupied. The Greek and Latin authors were known only in schools and halls of learning. The world in general knew nothing of them for many centuries; while, as regards the Scriptures, they marked their way not in the regions of learning and politics only, but in the entire condition of the western nations. They influenced the common people, as well as the great. Persons of all ranks occupied themselves in the assiduous re-production of copies—a work which, in times of persecution, was the source of consolation. Take the Jewish nation itself; it is a living monument of the Hebrew Scriptures through a well-known and uncontested period of 2,500 years. Their history during the time is unintelligible on the supposition that the Scriptures did not exist among them.

Many eminent men differ on these topics?—Any one having experience of mankind will expect differences on everything; but truth exists for all that.

But how to find it?—That is the question with which earnest men will concern themselves. The truth on this matter is certainly easy to find when men set themselves earnestly to search. No other proof is necessary to es-

tablish the antiquity, genuineness, and integrity of the Scriptures than the existence of a variety of ancient versions—translations in several unconnected languages, and in languages *which have long ceased to be vernacular*. The Old Testament exists, independently of the original text, in the Chaldee paraphrases or Targums, in the Septuagint, or Greek version, in the translations of Aquila, of Symachus, and of Theodosian; in the Syriac and the Latin or Vulgate versions, in the Arabic, and in the Ethiopic, not to mention others of somewhat later date. The New Testament has been conveyed to modern times, in whole or in part, in the Pexhito or Syriac translations, in the Coptic, the Sahidic in several Arabic versions, in the Ethiopic, the Armenian, the Persian, the Gothic, and in the Latin versions. I say that, in the presence of this proof, every other kind of evidence may be pronounced superfluous. If a crowning evidence were needed, it would be found in the fact that the languages, or idioms, in which the Scriptures were originally written, have been extinct for ages. The pure Hebrew, such as it existed before the Babylonish captivity, has never been spoken since the removal of the Jews to Babylon. The commentaries of the Rabbis, since that time, are all written in the dialects vernacular in their times. This is proof demonstrative of the antiquity of the Old Testament. Then, as regards the new, it is written in a style of Greek, which differs both from the classic authors and the Septuagint, and the later Christian writers. The idiom of the New Testament, in the original Greek, is altogether peculiar to itself. It embodies phrases and forms borrowed from almost all surrounding languages. It resulted from the peculiar education and circumstances of the writers, which made their dialect unlike any other, in many particulars. This dialect was limited to the apostolic age, and very soon became extinct. This is demonstration of the origin of the New Testament in that age, and other things taken into account, it proves its authenticity, from which its credibility follows. There are subtrefuges and evasions enough, by means of which we may obscure from our minds, the plain inference which fol-

lows from an admission of the antiquity and genuineness of the Christian Scriptures. But contradiction may boldly be challenged when it is affirmed that, with a competent knowledge of human nature, of ancient history, and of ancient literature, no one can admit, and in all its particulars realize the fact, that the Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, the Epistles of Paul, of Peter, of John, and of ancient literature, no one can admit, and in all and were immediately diffused throughout Palestine, Asia Minor, Africa, Greece and Italy, and then reconcile himself to any supposition except that the facts affirmed were true.

Mr. Workfellow, you have it all off very "pat": are you not merely repeating what you have read?—Not "merely repeating."

Well, giving us a *resume*—a re-hash of the substance?—Whatever I state is true, from whatever source derived.

It strikes me as very like what you may read in Taylor's *History of the Transmission of Ancient Books to Modern Times*?—Taylor has treated on such topics, and in a very masterly way: and, perhaps, there may be some reflex of his arguments in what I have said.

But you are here to give your own evidence?—I have endeavoured to do so, I do not see that I am precluded from setting forth facts that others have used before me.

If I want Taylor, I can send for him to the library; if I ask you a question, it is your evidence I want?—And I give you my evidence. It is not with me an important question where I get truth: the important point is to get it. It is literary pedantry that stickles for original references.

Do not lecture me, please; when a witness is called, we expect him to give original evidence.

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: Have you any other question to the witness?

Mr. Dontwanto Believeanyhow: No.

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: Very well: we call Mr. Timothy Faithson.

Mr. Dontwanto Believeanyhow: Don't you re-examine Mr. Workfellow?

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: No: your cross-examination has not hurt us much.

TIMOTHY FAITHSON (*called and affirmed*).

Examined by Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: Mr. Faithson, you are one of the defendants?—Yes.

I believe you have taken a prominent part in the work of promulgating the convictions which have given rise to these proceedings?—I take pleasure in the work.

You are not ashamed of your connection with the defendants?—I have no cause to be ashamed, but otherwise.

You consider the work in which they are engaged, a good work?—I consider it the only work of lasting consequence in which men can be engaged.

On what ground do you entertain that view?—It would not be easy, in one sentence, to answer that question. The answer has been well indicated in the evidence of Mr. Workfellow. There is no other work upon earth that has such immense promise. There is no advantage that men can desire, or conceive, but what will be realized in connection with it.

Would you illustrate your meaning in detail?—I should have to give a long answer were I to do so.

It will be necessary to do so to some extent. For example, tell the Court whether the advantages you refer to are realized in the present prosecution of the enterprise?—In the strict sense, I should say, No. There are advantages now in connection with the faith of Christ's resurrection—the advantage a man reaps in the peace of mind it brings, and the simple and purifying rule of life it affords him. These have been amply defined by Mr. Workfellow. But it is not to these I particularly allude. I allude to advantages not to be realized in connection with the present phase of the matter.

Advantages future?—Advantages future.

Future definite or indefinite?—Very definite as regards order of events, though indefinite in the chronological sense.

How would you define the definite?—Christ has promised to return to the earth again at an epoch prospectively defined as “the times of the restitution of all things”—times identified as those spoken of by the prophets of Israel (Acts iii. 21). The definite future in the case I would define as the time marked by the fulfilment of the promise. When Christ returns to the earth again, the time will have arrived for the attainment of those advantages to which my answer had reference. When I speak of this future as indefinite, I mean that the date of its arrival has not been definitely revealed.

Do you think any drawback attaches to the chronological indefiniteness of the matter?—I think not: because, when a man dies, the point of advantage is reached so far as he is concerned, for this simple reason, “that the dead know not anything” (Ecc. ix. 5); they, therefore, know not the interval that lies between death and resurrection, which will pass to them as quickly as the ages before their birth. A man will have to be out of his grave at the resurrection before he is aware he has died. As the day of death is a day of uncertainty with us all, it follows that the uncertainty of the time of Christ’s arrival is of no practical disadvantage. Standing practically as near as death, it stands near enough to be a constant practical calculation.

And what is the advantage that comes with the coming of Christ?—I might ask in reply, what is the advantage that does not come?

I am not under examination: it is for you to explain the matter?—Well, to begin with, Christ has promised to change our present nature from its present constitution of weakness and corruptibility, and inefficiency, and mortality: and to make it like his own—strong, incorruptible in substance, glorious and effectual of faculty, and absolutely immortal: a nature that cannot die, ensuring a life that shall never end. In such a nature, enjoyment of being will reach its highest pitch, and be subject to no deterioration from the lapse of time: and enjoyment of being in its highest form, faculty and relations. This of itself—the possibility of attaining this,—I should con-

sider of itself sufficient reason for preferring the faith of Christ to everything else upon earth. There is no such possibility within the range of human effort in any other direction; and there is not a man anywhere who would not give all he possessed to attain to such a condition of life, even if it were restricted to his own individual case, and involving no change in his ordinary surroundings or in the affairs of mankind.

But I understand you to say the advantage is not limited to the change of nature you describe?—No it is not limited to that, though that would be a great attainment. It extends to other circumstances of a most desirable character. In the first place, it involves the simultaneous exaltation of myriads of the excellent of the earth to the same great dignity. The change to the incorruptible state would be an unspeakable happiness if it had to be enjoyed in solitude: but how greatly will the glory of it be enhanced by the fact that multitudes (embracing the accepted of all ages and generations) are to be admitted together to such a glorious climax of tried worth. There will be a joyous bustle on that great occasion, such as the world have never known—not in its highest feasts.

That does not exhaust the excellence of the thing?—No. The multitude of the immortalized, at the return of Christ, could have great peace and joy among themselves, apart from mankind, like some brotherhoods and close corporations of human experiments; but one of the glories of the occasion lies here, that the multitude then developed and glorified (mystically styled the body of Christ) have a mission affecting the whole earth. Their mission is to govern the earth in conjunction with Christ, their head, who is “King of kings and Lord of lords.” To accomplish this mission, they must remove the governments that now exist among mankind, which it is revealed they will do by power put forth in war. The war so arising will be the means of teaching the world righteousness by judgment. The war will end in the complete overthrow of human power everywhere, and the substitution of an universal empire, having its seat in the Land of Promise, already honoured in time past by the

presence of the Son of God, but to be more honoured when he reigns where he was crucified. In this universal empire, his friends will "reign with him." They will be distributed throughout the earth as the divinely-appointed heads and governors of mankind, whom death cannot remove, and whom no weakness will characterize in their administration of the authority of Christ. They will be a blessing everywhere, loved and honoured of the people, whom they will lead into ways of righteousness and wisdom, plenty and peace, and thankful joy, which everyone will render back to the God of their rulers in unfeigned and hearty praise. God they will honour in blessings showered upon the heads of the immortal members of the body of Christ, to whom the glory, and honour, and wealth, of the whole world will belong.

What do you contemplate as the aim and upshot of such an arrangement?—The object will be to lead all mankind into enlightened submission to God. The object will be accomplished, for the machinery of the Kingdom of God will be powerful. When accomplished, the inhabitants of the earth in general will be admitted to the immortal state enjoyed by their rulers; and the mission of Christ will have been accomplished in the extirpation of sin and death from the earth.

When you say all mankind, do you mean every individual of the race?—No. It is revealed that as always, so then, there will be numbers of mankind who will not discern their privileges, but, through use and custom, will claim them as rights in an unthankful spirit, and refuse submission to the commandments of God, promulgated by Christ and his co-ruling people. It is the destiny of such to be finally rooted out of the earth, leaving only the reasonable, the loving, and the obedient as the immortal occupants of the globe.

In how long a time will this result be reached?—A thousand years of divine government will be sufficient to develop an adequately tried population of the right and tried disposition. It is revealed that this is the period appointed, at the end of which death will be destroyed.

The population so developed will be sufficient to people

the earth?—Doubtless, to the extent divine wisdom sees to be best.

But will it not be an increasing population?—No: propagation is a provisional arrangement adapted to the necessities of this preliminary state. Jesus says, "In the resurrection (state) they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven."

In what way do you make a connection between these things and the present action of the defendants?—In this way: when Christ sent out the apostles to proclaim his resurrection, and all the things connected with it, it was with a view to developing a people for himself, or, as Peter expresses it, "to take out a people for his name." Now, this people are developed by the belief and obedience of the gospel. Men are invited to believe the testimony given concerning Christ (which embraces things accomplished and things to be done), and to put on his name in baptism. Those who comply, become his servants. As his servants, they have certain duties to perform, of which he has left ample specification in the apostolic writings, and concerning which, in the general, he says, "Occupy till I come." Consequently, it is no matter of choice with those who accept the apostolic invitation, as to whether they will do the things commanded or not. They must. If they refuse, they sow for themselves a harvest of disgrace and anger in the day of Christ's return. If they comply in an excellent manner (as to which Christ will be the judge), they will be comprehended in the gladdening words which Christ says he will address to his accepted servants in that day: "Well done good and faithful servants: ye have been faithful in a few things: I will make you rulers over many things." You will, therefore, perceive the connection which you have asked me to define. The acceptance of the defendants with Christ depends upon their faithful and patient continuance in the course objected to by the plaintiffs.

Of the truth of all these things, you have satisfied yourself?—I have. I have no doubt of them. The grounds of my confidence have been amply indicated in the speech of Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth. It is not a matter of

speculative opinion. It is a matter of hard fact. Peter himself had occasion to say before his death (2 Pet. i. 16), "We have not followed cunningly devised fables": and I cannot help strongly feeling that such must be the verdict of everyone who looks calmly, broadly, and competently at all the facts.

Cross-examined by Mr. Lover-of-the-present-World:
Mr. Faithson, where did you take your degrees?—I have no degrees.

Where did you matriculate?—I have not matriculated.

Where were you educated?—My schools and schoolmasters have mostly been of the sort that Hugh Miller writes about.

Do you mean to say you have not graduated at any of the Universities?—I am obliged in truth to confess to that.

Nor passed through any of the schools?—Nor passed through any of the schools. I have been at work since early boyhood.

You mean to say you only know what you have picked up?—I make no pretence to erudition. I have had a desire for knowledge; but I have not had all the opportunities I should have liked. I envy those who have enjoyed an university education.

And how dare you, in such a state of intellectual destitution, to set up your judgment against the trained and ripe intellects of the country?—Perhaps I may not suffer from intellectual destitution, though lacking in some scholastic furnishings.

Well, I will say scholastic destitution: how dare you, lacking the scholastic qualifications necessary for the investigation of such matters, put yourself forward in opposition to men of the first standing in the world of education and culture?—First, because much scholastic qualification is not necessary to enable a man to judge of such a world-wide matter as the apostolic testimony to the resurrection of Christ. It is a matter "known and read of all men," and only requires the application of a little common-sense to come to a just conclusion.

Was not that testimony, as you call it, delivered in Greek?—Probably it was, as regards most of it.

And how can you presume to judge of it without a thorough mastery of the Greek tongue?—Because it has been translated out of the Greek tongue into English by those who have attained the thorough mastery in question, and because with so many facilities as now exist, it is not difficult for men to obtain an acquaintance with the Greek tongue without an university education.

But are you not aware that those who possess that education are all agreed in doubting the resurrection of Christ?—I am not at all aware of any such thing. In fact, I am aware of the very reverse—that only a small proportion of the class you describe are unbelieving as to the resurrection of Christ. Hundreds and hundreds who have passed through the universities accept the apostolic testimony to Christ's resurrection. Besides, you seem to forget that some of the defendants are among that class, if I am not. Luke, Physicus, Titus Workfellow, and others, are quite as qualified, in an educational sense, as any you may quote on the other side.

Never mind: I am not dealing with them?—I do not use it as an argument, except in so far as it is an answer to yours. As a matter of fact, I believe much of the learning (so-called) of the present day to be wrong on divine questions. I hold this conviction on good grounds. I am strengthened in my conviction when I notice that, according to Christ and Paul, it was so in the apostolic age. Christ said, "These things"—the things appertaining to God—had been "*hid from the wise and prudent*, but revealed unto babes," and he added, "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in Thy sight." Paul said, "The world by wisdom knew not God." He further said: "The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God," and that any man wishing to be really wise, must be willing to become a fool in popular estimation. So it is now.

Do not give us a lecture?—My remarks are pertinent, I believe.

Your duty is to answer the questions?—Yes; but mat-

ters my arise out of the questions calling for remark.

Let the remarks alone just now; I want to ask if you have considered the bearing of Egyptian chronology upon the credibility of the Bible?—I have given it some thought.

Are you not aware that the chronological records of the Egyptian kings discovered in recent years in tombs, on papyrus rolls, etc., in various parts of Egypt, carry the history of Egypt thousands of years further back than the Bible does?—That I suppose is the case.

And how do you reconcile faith in the Scriptures with that fact?—It is a conflict of authority. We have to make our choice between Hebrew and Egyptian. In all the surrounding circumstances, I prefer the Hebrew.

Oh, that is how you get out of it, is it?—It seems to me the only way out of the difficulties that belong to the Egyptian side of the subject; in fact, an inevitable decision. Both authorities cannot be true. It, therefore, comes to a choice; and I choose that which is, in many ways, guaranteed as reliable, in preference to that which is not only not guaranteed, but is self-manifestly unreliable.

What do you mean?—I mean that the Egyptian records are self-condemned by their contents. The latest and the oldest papyrus discovered was a servile and sycophantic exaggeration of the virtues and exploits of the monarch whose reign it described. Its character in this respect challenged the unfavourable criticism of even the secular press at the time it was reported. There is no such sycophancy manifest in the Hebrew records; and, therefore, on such a limited consideration as this, I feel justified in according a readier faith to the representations of the Hebrew than the Egyptian records. We are quite sure God was not in the manipulation of the Egyptian records; but, in the case of the Hebrew records, we are face to face with a claim that they were divinely superintended. This claim is supported in so many ways, that I cannot disregard it in deciding the Egypt-chronological question.

That is all very nice; but Egyptian chronology is not to be so easily disposed of as that?—I do not think a wise man would take his stand on Egyptian chronology as

against the Bible. As a whole, it is a confused and self-multifaceted record.

That is not the view entertained by those who have special knowledge on the subject?—I think you will find it is. For example, in the latest work on the subject (*History of Ancient Egypt*, by the Rev. Professor Rawlinson), the author, who is a well-known authority on the subject, says: "It is a patent fact, and one that is beginning to obtain general recognition, that *the chronological element in the early Egyptian history is in a state of almost hopeless obscurity*. . . Bockh gives for the year of the accession of Menes (M'na), the first supposed Egyptian king, the year B.C. 5702; Unger, the year B.C. 5613; Mariette Bayand Lenormant, B.C. 5004; Bougsch Bey, B.C. 4455; Lanth, B.C. 4157; Lepsius, B.C. 3152; Bunsen, B.C. 3623 or 3059; Stuart Poole, B.C. 2717; and Sir Gardiner Wilkinson, B.C. 2691. . . . When the difficulties of Egyptian chronology are stated in this broad way, it may seem at first sight that the entire matter is hopeless, and that historians of ancient Egypt had best drop out the ancient chronological element from their narratives altogether, and try the experiment of writing a history without chronology. But it is not necessary to adopt quite so violent a remedy. . . . We propose, therefore, in the remainder of this chapter, to mark the limits of the uncertainty with respect to each of the three periods, into which it has been customary, from the time of Manetho, to divide the history of ancient Egypt. *The chronological riddle is insoluble. The historian of early Egypt must set it aside*. But he needs not, therefore, to set aside that immense mass of material, possessing the highest interest, which the toils of travellers and explorers, and the patient labour of philologists, have accumulated during the last century."

You need not occupy the time in reading extracts?—I cannot better answer your remarks as to the satisfactory state of Egyptology. It is in far from a satisfactory state, and will never weigh in a serious estimation of the claims of the Bible.

That is part of your dogmatism. It has had great

weight with the most cultivated minds of the age?—I prefer looking at the facts themselves, and leaving the cultivated minds out of account. It is easy to make a mistake in estimating the cultivation of a mind. The question is, How stand the facts?

That is the question: and it is to that I am calling your attention. And now for another fact: Is it not a fact that a bishop of the Church of England has completely taken the bottom out of the Mosaic account of the exodus?—You allude to Colenso?

I do?—He has written a book against the Pentateuch.

And is it not an unanswerable book?—I think not: it has been answered.

By whom?—Well, by several, but notably by Dr. McAusland—a fellow-bishop.

Are you not aware that thousands of the best educated men in England consider Bishop Colenso's arguments unanswerable?—That may be; I do not see that we need consider that.

What! Is the suffrage of intellect to go for nothing?—In the way you put it, I think it is well left out of account. There is a predisposition in the minds of most men to disbelieve in the Scriptures, whether educated or uneducated. Consequently, there is a ready response to any hostile attack that may be made. If the attack is clever and specious, and especially if it is under respectable auspices, it is readily accepted as conclusive by many who have no acquaintance with the subject itself, and who have neither the ability, nor the inclination, to detect the fallacies that may exist in the argument. The concurrence of such minds has no weight whatever in true logic.

It may not have weight with you, but it will certainly have weight with the bulk of reasonable men?—With the bulk of men, it doubtless goes for something.

But not with your superior self?—I choose to ignore it, and to go a safer way. I don't ask what another man's opinion is: I ask what are the facts.

And, of course, you think nobody else looks after the facts?—That is a matter not material to the question. It only cumbers the subject to entertain any concern about

the operation of other men's minds. It is not a question of anybody's mind; it is a question of the facts themselves. And I say, looking at the facts themselves, when all are taken into account, it is impossible to agree with Dr. Colenso. He leaves out of account the principal fact.

What is that?—The co-operation of divine guidance in all the events of the exodus.

Why, my dear sir, that is the point in question. That is the matter in debate! You are an amazing logician! You would have us admit, in the course of our argument, the very fact which our book is written to contradict and confute?—Don't go quite so fast, Mr. Lover-of-the-present-World. There is more logic in my demur than you may just perceive.

Oh, of course, all the logic is with you. You are so modest, so charitable?—I say that if you are to correctly judge of the pretensions of any matter, you must take all the pretensions into account, and not leave one of them out, and that the most material of the whole.

You are very lucid, I must allow?—You will understand me directly, perhaps. Suppose, for example, the things done by electricity, in our own day, were to come into debate in some age or country where they were unknown as a matter of experience; in judging of their credibility, these people would make somewhat of a mistake if they were to discuss them without reference to the power of electricity that produced them.

I should rather think so! They would be queer people that could make such a mistake?—It would not be so impossible a mistake as you seem to imagine. The people in question would naturally judge by their own knowledge of what was possible, and supposing them ignorant of electrical powers, hearing of a message going a thousand miles in a minute, or of blinding light being drawn out of charcoal points without fire, and of one man speaking audibly to another at 50 miles distance,—they would be liable to conclude that such statements were mythical. With all the facts in their hands, they would measure and discuss them in the light of their own knowledge of things, and think they were coming to a very sapient con-

clusion in dismissing the whole story as an invention; while, in fact, they were acting the part of presumptuous blunderheads, in discussing facts apart from the governing element in the whole case—the presence and activity of the wonderful, invisible, and inscrutable power which men have named electricity.

Very well, what has that to do with the subject?—That is the mistake that Colenso makes.

I beg your pardon?—I think you will find it is so. He discusses the Mosaic transactions in the light of what would be modern experience in a similar situation. Now, there can be no parallel; modern experience is an experience without God in it, for God is neither working nor speaking in the present age, as He spoke and wrought in the Mosaic and prophetic ages.

A suspicious admission?—By no means.

Why isn't God speaking and working now as of old? Is there not as much need?—God is the Judge of the need, and as to the "why," it is sufficient that, as a matter of fact, it is foretold in the prophets that, during these times, which are in Scripture styled "the times of the Gentiles," God would not speak or work as in days of old (Micah iii. 6, 7; Amos viii. 11, 12; Deut. xxxii. 20). What I contend is, that you cannot reasonably judge of the events of the Israelitish exodus without assuming, for the sake of argument, the presence of a divine co-operation. The presence of this divine co-operation was the most conspicuous feature of the whole transaction as recorded, and as referred to over and over again throughout the Scriptures, both of the Old and New Testaments.

I don't see what you want to make out by that?—Well, for example, the Colenso argument assumes that there must, in an assembly of "600,000 men, besides women and children," have been a percentage of infirm and sick people, amounting, in the aggregate, to a large number; and he raises the difficulty about the disposal of such a helpless band on the night when the children of Israel marched out of Egypt. Now, allowing the presence of the divine co-operation, that is no such difficulty. On the hypothesis of the narrative, the exodus was a divine per-

formance, for which there must have been a divine provision in matters of detail, and for which, in this very particular, we are expressly informed, there was divine provision. "He made them stronger than their enemies. . . . *There was not one feeble person among their tribes*" (Psa. cv. 24, 37). "Their clothes waxed not old and their feet swelled not" (Neh. ix. 21). Now am I to believe that the Israelites came out of Egypt at all, and not to believe that they were strengthened against all the difficulties that would be naturally incident to such an enterprise?

I don't know?—I say that reason demands that I should take the whole narrative in judging of it, and not a part only. It is part of the narrative, and the most material part of it, that God was the mighty Performer of the events connected with the exodus. If you have God in view, there can be no difficulties, because divine power is equal to anything. And if you keep God out of view in judging of the narrative, then I say you are like the people who would dismiss the prodigies of electrical science as impossible, because judging of them without reference to that which explained them. This is the great flaw in Colenso's argument throughout.

Perhaps you will write to him about it?—If God preserved the district occupied by the Israelites in Egypt from the plagues which devastated and destroyed all other parts of the dominions of Pharaoh, why should it be supposed a difficulty with Him to cope with the minor difficulties of the enterprise?

That is what I should call a Sunday-school-way of getting out of the difficulty?—There is logic in it, whatever you may call it. And, perhaps, I may remind you that it is a declaration of Christ's, that these things have been "hid from the wise and prudent, and revealed unto babes."

I am afraid it is a baby affair altogether?—In the spiritual sense, I do not object to that. Christ says a man must become as a little child in order to inherit the kingdom of God.

I don't ask your information on these topics. Confine

yourself to the answering of my questions?—On the whole, I am doing so.

I had thought of putting some further questions, but I don't see that it is of any use. You twist round and slip out of things?—I could not slip out if the knot was tight.

I don't know: eels can get out of tight places?—I hope I rank a little higher in your estimation than an eel?

I am not so sure. A slippery fish would fairly describe you?—Well, I must allow you any satisfaction you may get out of that. I suppose you would not have called me a slippery fish if you had caught me and got me in your basket.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: My Lord, we had thought of calling other of the defendants, but, probably, their case is sufficiently represented in what has been elicited in the examination of Mr. Workfellow and Mr. Faithson.

His Lordship: You have finished the case for the defence?

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: Yes, my Lord.

His Lordship: Mr. Unbelief, have you anything to add by way of reply before the summing-up?

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: If it will suit your Lordship's convenience, I shall have a few words to address to the Court to-morrow morning; and, probably, my colleagues may wish to follow me.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: It is an unusual course for several counsel to address the Court.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: There has been so much that is unusual in the course of this case, that I do not see that we need be afraid of a finishing innovation. It would be a convenience to me if the Counsel who assist me were allowed to address the Court on the several phases of the case to which they have severally given special attention.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: I have no particular objections, if my friend will consent to the assisting Counsel on the other side following one by one.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: You mean one on each side alternately?

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: I do.

His Lordship: A kind of sandwich arrangement?

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: Yes, my Lord.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Very well; provided you allow me the last word I have no objections.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: His Lordship must have the last word.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Of course; I mean last before his Lordship.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: I believe the last word belongs of right to you.

His Lordship: You are agreed, gentlemen?

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: Yes, my Lord.

His Lordship: We meet again to-morrow.

The Court adjourned.

ELEVENTH SITTING

CONCLUDING ADDRESSES OF COUNSEL.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: My Lord, and Gentlemen of the Jury. I shall not detain the Court beyond a few moments, with the few concluding observations I have to make in reference to this case, which has already occupied the attention of the Court for a length of time out of all proportion to its importance. I consider it a scandal that in the 19th century, we should have to waste so much of the public time over such a matter of private fanaticism, or that anyone should be found ready to defend such a public nuisance as this unceasing agitation of a crotchet, which can do no possible good to any human being in the world. The Scientific Era Protection Society have done no more than discharge the simplest of public duties in asking the Court to interpose the strong arm of the law for the abatement of this nuisance. A great deal has been said in answer to our application—a great deal that is utterly irrelevant to the question before the Court. We have had disquisitions on all imaginable topics. We have been taken back into the pre-historic ages, and entertained with the most fanciful and extraordinary theories of cosmical changes; we have been dragged through geological strata; we have been conveyed through the universe; we have been entertained with curious Malthusian statistics; literary antiquity has been explored, and all manner of uncouth and forgotten writers dragged into the arena; nay, science itself has been laid under tribute in the most fantastic manner; and the brightest of

scientific reputations has been trailed in the mud, and science itself profaned by the most flippant of interrogatories and the most arrogant of suggestions, by both witnesses and counsel. And all to what end? What has all this to do with the simple enquiry, whether or not the agitation of the dogmas of these defendants is hurtful to society? The hurtfulness is admitted.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: I beg your pardon; we deny the hurt.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: It has certainly been admitted, more than once, that the doctrine of the defendants have had an injurious effect upon their own standing and prospects at least.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: Only in a limited sense.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Well, that is enough for me. Hurtfulness is admitted. I don't care whether it is limited or unlimited. Hurtfulness is admitted: and it is upon this fact that we take our stand, that these misguided people are hurting themselves; and if they are hurting themselves, of course they will hurt everyone who comes under the influence of their principles. It is on this ground that we ask the interference of the Court. We want the Court to say to these people, "You shall no longer afflict society with this interminable talk about matters which have no practical bearing upon human welfare. You shall no longer disturb the serenity of the scientific 19th century, by arguments and agitations of defunct dogmas which may have served their purpose in their day and generation, but which are altogether out of place now that the superstitions of a dark-minded past have dissolved before the advancing noon-tide of scientific knowledge, like the darkness of night before the sunrise. You shall neither hurt yourselves nor anybody else. You shall hold your peace about this mischievous matter, or you shall learn, in the solitude and duress of prison walls, the duty of conforming to the supreme requirements of the community." In making such a request, we are following the dictates of reason and of common prudence. We show a care for the well-being of the community at large. What answer is it to indulge in long harangues

about matters of ancient history, which have no more to do with modern life than the mummies of Egypt? History is all very well in its place, and there may be a time for moral reflections, just as there is for the contemplation of the muse; but, my Lord and Gentlemen of the Jury, they are out of place in the consideration of practical questions; we have nothing to do to-day with matters long past and dead; we cannot be governed by sentimentality in the regulation of public affairs. The speeches and cross-examinations of Counsel on the other side have been directed to matters of history and sentiment. I wondered sometimes whether we were in a church or in some assembly room, listening to the treatises on the ethics of antiquity, or some similarly drowsy topic. I say that the efforts of the defence have been altogether irrelevant and away from the point.

His Lordship: They have had some bearing on the question whether the doctrines believed by the defendants are true.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: There has been some attempt, no doubt, to make out the resurrection of Christ, but what has it amounted to? We have had arguments about documents, whose originals have long since perished in the dust of antiquity, and about the supposed characters and doings of men whom no living man ever saw, and whose very dust must long ago have been scattered to the winds. How can we base serious conclusions upon such flimsy premises? A case of this alleged importance ought to be susceptible of test. But, in the nature of things, no test can be applied: it is past and gone. If there ever was anything *bona-fide* in it, it is beyond recall. It has become to us unknowable. We haven't even the advantage of a practical test applied at the time, and reported to us; there would have been something in that; but the age in which the thing is alleged to have occurred was of such a character as to exclude all practical test. The spirit of scientific enquiry had not set in. It was the age of credulity and superstition. Had the matter been put to a practical test at the time—such a test, my Lord, as an alleged case of resurrection would be sub-

jected to in our own day, there can be no doubt that it would have worn a different complexion from what it is made to possess in the documents of which so much has been made. One has only to attend a scientific lecture, or even glance through a daily paper, or I will say, my Lord, pass through the busy streets of any of our great towns to feel how utterly unnatural and fictitious this whole matter is. It is totally out of keeping with the experience of actual life as we find it. It is out of harmony with the spontaneous drift of human thought. It is destructive of the free and healthy developments of normal human life. On these grounds, I earnestly pray the Court to grant the prayer of our petition. I ask you, Gentlemen of the Jury, to find that our allegations of detriment to society are proved; and with the most profound respect to the Court, I implore your Lordship to give effect to the finding of the Jury in the exercise of that executive power with which, in the interest of society, the law has armed you, and to issue to the defendants that mandate of restraint for which I have the extreme honour to apply on behalf of the plaintiffs.

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: My Lord, having already at great length occupied the time of the Court, I do not now propose to detain you for any length of time in reply to my friend who has just sat down. I take issue with him as to the importance of the case. In my judgment he altogether underrates it. In fact, he does not seem to me to have any adequate sense of its magnitude, or to have at all grasped the interests so immensely involved in it. So far from the time occupied being out of proportion to the importance of the case, I have a feeling quite to the contrary effect. Many things have only been partially treated which are capable of powerful and extensive elaboration: some things have only been adverted to which ought to have been thoroughly gone into. However, I am satisfied with the treatment the case has received. I am content to rest the case for the defendants on the evidence adduced, and the

argument that has taken place upon it. It has been far from irrelevant. It only indicates the obtuseness of the opposition, that my friend should have suggested the idea of irrelevancy as characterizing any part of the argument employed. If widely divergent departments of human knowledge have been laid under tribute, it is only because the enemies of Christ have sought and found the weapons of a versatile hostility in all quarters. It is necessary to fight the battle wherever ground is taken by the enemy; and, for that reason, it has been necessary to show that none of the facts of either geology, or biology, or anthropology, or any other "ology," are in antagonism to Christ, when rightly interpreted, while some of them are distinctly in his favour. As for "ancient history," I am a little surprised at the efforts of my friend to minimize and hide, under this contemptuous phrase, the invincible phalanx of historic evidence that has been marshalled in proof of Christ's resurrection. And yet I ought not to be surprised. It is only by this style of treatment that he could hope, with good countenance, to get over the unpleasant duty of having at all to allude to this invulnerable part of our case. My Lord, we stand in an impregnable fortress, when we stand upon the historic evidence of Christ's resurrection. No one feels this more than those who attempt to storm the position. Their assaulting columns recoil before the withering shower of grape and canister that meet them from the ramparts. Few men return alive to their trenches who have the temerity to attempt the bristling heights. I will not repeat what I have said on this question. It would bear saying again, but time does not allow. I suspect a man of one of two things—perhaps I ought to say one of three—who decries the historic argument in the style my friend has done. Either he is ignorant of the strength of the said argument from non-acquaintance with the facts; or he suspects its strength and shuts his eyes, preferring to be wilfully ignorant; or he lacks the capacity to discern a strong case when it is presented to him. I will not hurt my friend by saying to which of these three classes I suspect he belongs. I will but say that, with

his gifts of discernment, he ought to be able to say something more edifying on the subject than to talk contemptuously of "ancient history." My friend made, or tried to make, a strong point on the subject of practical test. He said, if the fact of Christ's resurrection had been made the subject of practical test, such as would be applied in our own day, that the matter would have stood in a different position, or something to that effect. But, said he, the spirit of scientific enquiry had not set in. My Lord, I am wondering whether my friend is aware that a test was applied, or what sort of a test he would consider a practical test. I might rely on the general incidents attendant on the first blush of the resurrection of Christ, as affording in themselves a sufficient amount of practical test. Those incidents were pretty thoroughly rehearsed in the course of the examination of the witnesses. I refer to them now very briefly. Christ first appeared to certain women; then to Peter; then to two disciples on the road to Emmaus, holding with them a long conversation. These three sets of witnesses all one by one reported their experience to the apostolic band, who were met within closed doors for fear of the Jews. What was the result? It is very plainly stated. First, as to Mary's report: "She went and told them as they mourned and wept, and they, when they had heard that he was alive, and had been seen of her, *believed not*" (Mark xvi. 11). Then as to the two that went to Emmaus, "They went and told it unto the residue, *neither believed they them.*" "Afterwards, he appeared unto the eleven as they sat at meat, and *upbraided them with their unbelief.*" Now, what dispelled this unbelief with which they at first received the reports of Christ's resurrection? It was Christ's own appearance in their midst: and that appearance was not a passive appearance, as a ghost in a play, but an appearance as a living man, who invited them to satisfy themselves of his reality by test. Consider, my Lord, what is involved in the incident thus described: "He said unto them, Why are ye troubled? and why do thoughts arise in your hearts? *Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I MYSELF. Handle me and see, for*

a spirit hath not FLESH AND BONES *as ye see me have*. And when he had thus spoken, he showed them his hands and his feet. And *while they believed not* for joy and wondered, he said unto them, HAVE YE HERE ANY MEAT? And they gave him a piece of broiled fish and a honey-comb, and he took it and did eat before them" (Luke xxiv. 38-43). My Lord, what more practical evidence would it be possible for a dead man come to life, to give to his doubting friends than to offer himself to their handling, and eat food provided by them? This last point—eating before them food provided by themselves, is most important. Men might distrust the evidence of their eyes and ears (though few men would), but if a dead friend come to life, not only showed you marks of identity and suffered you freely to handle him, but ate something you brought out of your cupboard, WHICH something, after he was gone, WAS GONE, TOO, in what more palpable way would it be possible for such a dead friend to prove his reality? I defy my friend to suggest any mode of test that would be more practical and complete than that. But, my Lord, this is not the test to which I referred when I said a test had been applied. I referred to a case which seems to have been allowed to occur, and to have been put on record expressly to meet the sceptical temper of such men as my friend and his clients in after ages. I referred to the case of the apostle, Thomas, who was absent at the first interview between Christ and his disciples. After the interview Thomas came, and the disciples told him of it, saying, "We have seen the Lord." It is the way Thomas received this intimation that I particularly wish to call my friend's attention to. He received it pretty much in the spirit of my friend's own remarks. He said, in effect, "Except I can apply a practical test, I will not believe." His actual words were, "*Except* I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my fingers into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, *I will not believe*." Now for the sequel to this, my Lord. "Eight days afterwards, his disciples were within, and Thomas with them: Then came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in their

midst, and said, Peace unto you. Then saith he to Thomas, *Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands, and reach hither thy hand and thrust into my side*, and be not faithless but believing. And Thomas answered and said unto him, My Lord and my God. Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed. Blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed" (John xx. 25-29). Here we have Thomas, a typical sceptic, convinced on his own ground. The fact of such a case happening—the fact of Thomas taking a position of dogged unbelief till he should have the evidence of his senses, and then ceasing his unbelief when that evidence was presented—supplies the very element of the case which my friend said was awaiting—the element of practical test; and contradicts the allegation of my friend that the age was one of credulity. I think we have seen that unbelief rather than credulity was the spirit in which the resurrection of Christ was received, and that unbelief was dissipated by evidence that is logically as satisfactory to-day as at that time.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: My friend assumes that all these things happened just as they are recorded in the New Testament.

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: I have already proved that the apostolic narrative is the honest and capable narrative of eye-witnesses. I am, therefore, entitled to treat its statements with, at least, the respect and confidence that my friend would show to statements sworn on affidavit in this Court, and, in truth, with a great deal more: for the truth of the apostolic narrative is guaranteed to us on something more reliable than the oath of a witness, who may be perjuring himself. It is sealed with the blood of many witnesses, and evidenced in its triumphant establishment in the civilized world. I might follow my friend in his allegation that the resurrection of Christ is out of harmony with the spirit of modern times. His allusion to the impression made by a scientific lecture, or a perusal of the daily press, was really amusing—amusing from its utter shallowness. Did it not occur to my friend that, in the revolution of time, the modern era will soon

be the ancient era, and that new thoughts and new ways will displace all that now goes to make up the modern conception of things? And what if it should turn that the modern conception is as superficial and false as Thomas Carlyle held it to be, and that the philosophy of the laws is a conceited skimming of the eternal facts, which it is not in the power of mortal intellect to grasp? May it not turn out, even as a matter to be reckoned by experienced thoughtful men as a possibility, and something more than a chance, that Jesus Christ is higher than the mathematicians of a distressed and puzzled age, and that he, and no one else, is the key to the divine purpose with the earth which we inhabit? And how, in that case, when the hour of destiny arrives—when Jesus Christ again honours and blesses the earth with his presence—how then, I say, will my friend's scientific lectures and daily papers appear?—No, my Lord; I emphasize all I have formerly said. I maintain, on the strength of the many and varied evidences I have submitted—evidences that cannot be overthrown, that Christ is true, and that my friends, in fighting against Christ, are fighting against the solution of the world's woes, and standing in the way, if it were possible to do so, of the only blessedness there is in store for a distracted world and the afflicted human race.

Mr. German Mysticism: My Lord, I have not before this been called upon to speak to the Court in this case. It is a wonderful case, altogether, my Lord; it is true and false, my Lord. The plaintiffs wish to evolve the harmonious development of all phenomena (?) and the defendants take one phenomenon—wonderful phenomenon, this of Jesus Christ—and they would by means of it, putting it out of its place, break the harmony of the universal soul. They are in reason so far as they go, but they are behind reason in so far as they don't go. Jesus Christ is part of universal truth; but we must have all truth. And what is truth, my Lord?

This is the difficult question which makes the people knock their heads one against another. If they could all see, there would be no disagreements. There would be no defendants disturbing the harmony of the soul, and there would be no plaintiffs seeking to put an end to the disturbance, in the interests of the moral equilibrium of the universal ME. My Lord, there are fundamental mistakes at the bottom of all this commotion. If those mistakes could be rectified in the minds of the defendants, what peace there would be. They are mistaken as to the nature of matter. Matter has no existence except as a phenomenon (?) Were we not here, matter would not be here. It is a mere relation, or rather the result of relation, between our living souls and the First Cause. It is a subjective impression: intrinsically, it is nothing. Our impressions are the realities. If the defendants could see this, they would understand that the most opposite things can be true. My impressions are truth to me: their impressions are truth to them: let us not impose our impressions upon others to their disturbance. Let us in charity and patience hold our own views, but not bore and pester other men with them, as the defendants are doing. Time and space themselves are not external but internal entities: they have no outward existence: there is no time, and there is no space out of the mind: they are mere forms of man's spiritual being. The material creation is but an appearance. The unseen world is a reality—the only reality. It is near us: it is here: it is in us and about us. Nature is but the garment of the unseen—the voice with which the Deity proclaims himself to man. Poetry, virtue, religion, are the everlasting basis of the universe. To live in the light of reason is the sole duty of man. The Bible is a problem of authorship: but the universal soul is higher than the Bible. The Bible could have no existence except in our perceptions of its existence: and, therefore, our perceptions are superior to the Bible. There is a large ingredient of Nature in the Bible. It is not the highest perception of man. Nature is a machine of death—ever fruitful—with monstrous revolution—inexplicable vor-

tices of movement: a kingdom of devouring: a baleful immense—an appalling night—palsying all observers. We strive to fathom the gigantic mechanism and grow giddy: the excitement is an increasing whirl, which gains full mastery, if we give in to it, and hurls us into the fearful night. Only inward disunion among the powers of Nature has preserved men hitherto; nevertheless, that grand epoch cannot fail to arrive, when the whole family of mankind, by a grand universal resolve, will snatch themselves from this sorrowful condition, and by a voluntary abdication of their terrestrial abode, redeem their race from this anguish, and seek refuge in a happier world with their ancient Father. Men, like the defendants, look at Nature as a sort of calm immovable platform for the evolution of objective facts, which they mistake for absolute truth. They know not that this so-called Nature of theirs is a sport of the mind—a waste fantasy of their dream—a horrible monster—the grotesque shadow of their own passions. Oh, if they but understood! The significance of the world is, Reason. The subjective ME is king. He will to infinitude grow more and more harmonious with himself: at every step, he will behold the all-efficiency of a high moral order in the universe, and what is purest of his will come forth into brighter and brighter clearness. The primitive separation in the absolute philosophical activities is a deeper-lying separation in his own nature, which separation indicates, by its existence as such, the possibility of being adjusted—of being joined. Nature is but an encyclopædical systematic index or plan of our spirit—the mere catalogue of our treasures. Our bodily life is a burning: our spiritual life is a being burnt; death, therefore, a change of capacity. There is but one temple in the world, and that is the body of man. Nothing is holier than this high form. Bending before men is a reverence done to this revelation in the flesh. We touch heaven when we lay our hand on the human body. We need not the body of Jesus Christ to get at the temple divinity. It is wherever man is. Man is a sun: his senses are the planets. He has ever expressed some symbolical

philosophy of his being in his works and conduct: he announces himself and his gospel of Nature. He is the Messiah of Nature. He consists in truth. If he exposes truth, he exposes himself. If he betrays truth, he betrays himself. He is a spirit-seer: all appears to him as spirit. If our organs were not weak, we should see ourselves in a fairy world. All fabulous tales are but dreams of that home-world, which is everywhere and nowhere. Religion, my Lord, contains infinite sadness. Martyrs are spiritual heroes. Christ was the greatest martyr of our species: through him martyrdom has become infinitely significant and holy: but the defendants put him out of his place. He is a light among lights. And, as for miracles, can miracles work conviction? Is not the real conviction the only true God-announcing miracle? My Lord, I could add much more; but, perhaps, I have said enough to convince the Court that the defendants are good men, misapplying truth by offering their subjectivities as the objectivities of other men, who have subjectivities of their own. The action of the Court petitioned will, doubtless, have a wholesome effect.

The Foreman of the Jury: My Lord, the Jury have not been able to follow the last speaker exactly. Could your Lordship give us some idea of his meaning?

His Lordship (smiling): We shall see what Mr. Discerner-of-Facts may have to say. Perhaps his remarks may give you an inkling.

Mr. Discerner-of-Facts: My Lord, and Gentlemen of the Jury, I have tried to follow my learned friend who has just sat down. If I may have succeeded in apprehending his arguments, I am, at the same time, not altogether surprised at the difficulty which the Jury say they have experienced. My friend's style was by no means so lucid as is desirable in addressing mortal men. It was obscured somewhat by the intellectual mist which, passing for philosophical profundity, seems to dim the eyes of the German mystical school. There is, however, a method in their philosophy which I shall try to define,

in however small a measure I may succeed. It has its basis in the theory that nothing exists but a universal mind, sub-divided into a multitude of minds. What we see, and hear, and feel, they understand to be mere impressions on the mind, and not facts subsisting in themselves. A mountain, according to them, is no mountain in reality, but an idea of a mountain in the mind that thinks about the mountain: and so with everything else. According to this, every mind is its own standard of truth. Absolute truth is denied. Everything is what they call subjective. On this ground, they would say that the defendants are right to their own thoughts; but that though Christ's resurrection is true to them, it is not true to those who cannot see it, or refuse to believe it, and that, therefore, they have no right to try to produce conviction in the minds of others. I think I fairly represent my friend's contention (*Mr. German Mysticism nods*). Now, I do not think it requires many words to dispose of this curious way of looking at the subject. There is one fact that for ever disposes of all transcendental theories of the universe, that is, so far as their being turned to any practical account is concerned; and, of course, it is to a practical account that my friend turns his theory, in unity with the plaintiffs, in asking the Court to interfere with the action of the defendants. That fact is this, that on whatever principle soever it may be, there is an inflexible sequence to all action in our experience: an universal and immutable connection between cause the effect, and absolute uniformity of experience among all men on this point. If a man has not money, he cannot buy food, and, if he cannot get food, he starves, and dies everywhere. If a man falls over a precipice, he gets mangled, and perhaps killed, in all countries, and in all cases absolutely alike. If a man gets into the fire, he is burned, and suffers the agonizing pain inflicted by the flames. If a dynamite bomb is thrown among his feet, he is blown to atoms, whoever he is—peasant or emperor—in Britain or Russia. Now, does it matter in these cases what theory you frame on the subject? Does it avert the pangs of hunger? Does it repair the shattered limb? Does it allay the

fierce burning pain? Does it restore the mangled frame, to say that these experiences are not realities in themselves, but only impressions on the mind? Will the sufferers listen with patience to any theory on the subject? Are not the experiences real to them and real to all else who have to do with the sufferers, or who knew about their sufferings? My friend's hypothesis would not alter the practical bearings of facts, and it is the practical bearings of things that are of consequence to mankind, and not abstract theories we may form. But, my friend's theory is altogether inadmissible; according to that theory we ought to find people taking it into their heads that their legs were fractured, when, according to the perceptions of everybody else, there was no fracture. There ought to be cases in which it should be true to some people in the train that there had been a railway accident, and not true to others in the same train. To some shareholders a bank ought to fail, while to others it continued sound and solvent. There ought to be endless discrepancies in the impressions of men as to palpable facts. But there is no such discrepancy. All the people on a sinking ship know she is going down, and all drown if there are no means of rescue. Is it not playing with us, and mocking us, to ask us to believe that all these experiences are affairs of individual impressions and not of absolute fact? Theories are of no use in this connection. Whatever theory people please to entertain, all facts are common to all, and reasonable to each individual in detail. Consequently, for practical purposes, they are absolutely and wholly objective—that is, outside of ourselves. Now, my Lord, applying these principles to the matter in hand, it is easy to see where we are. Christ's resurrection, if a fact, is a fact in spite of any theory we may form of the fact. And if, in the divine wisdom, it is appointed to have a practical bearing upon our future well-being, it will have that practical bearing whether we like to call it a subjective impression or anything else. And if it is the duty of all who believe in Christ to preach his resurrection, that duty cannot be neutralized and arrested by any theory of moral rights we may choose to

conceive on the basis of a subjective philosophy? Practically, and in reality, the case stands absolutely as it appears to stand objectively. No other form or relation of truth is known to man than what is expressed by the word objective. All subjective conceptions are the result of impressions objectively derived. This is universal experience. Consequently, the question is, how stands the case objectively, for this is how it stands practically. There is but one answer, on the evidence. Christ rose from the dead, and has received power from God to deal with mankind in a coming age, in accordance with certain laws and principles that have been revealed. It matters not what philosophic theory we may apply to it, the facts in their practical relation remain the same. My friend has but to apply to it the principles that guide him in the regulation of his own private affairs. He has a banking account; if he exhausts the funds, or oversteps the limits of overdraw, he cannot get his cheques honoured, and the fact is no less inconvenient if he call it a subjective impression, than if he adopt a more materialistic philosophy. He has his house burnt down; will calling it a subjective impression deter him from recognizing the practical urgency of the fact, or interfere with his taking the necessary steps to provide other shelter, or rebuilding the destroyed tenement? Facts are facts, whatever we may call them, or conceive them to be, in a theoretical sense; and no fact is of more substantial attestation, or of more urgent practical bearing on the well-being of mankind, than the fact that Christ rose from the dead, and is to mankind the only hope of deliverance from the countless practical evils of the present state of existence.

Mr. British Protoplasm: I agree with my friend who has just addressed the Court, as to the nature and bearing of facts; but the difficulty is, we don't agree about what are facts. There ought not to be any difficulty. There would not be any difficulty if the great inductive principle of scientific investigation were adopted. The

Court is aware that Lord Bacon inaugurated a new era in the intellectual history of mankind, when he laid down the principle of induction—the principle of suspending theories and collecting facts, and letting facts teach knowledge. By the application of that principle, and that principle alone, the wonderful discoveries of this scientific age have been achieved, and knowledge of all kinds advanced and systematized. Astronomy has been opened out: the hidden lessons of the rocks have been unlocked: the elements of Nature has been analysed and mastered: the mechanical powers of the earth explored and applied in a wonderful manner, and the secret force of the universe itself discovered, and made serviceable to man in the wonderful element of electricity. Lastly, the very *modus operandi* of all life has been detected, and the material of all vital phenomena discovered in the wonderful cellular tissue that has been so appropriately named protoplasm. My Lord, the world has entered a new era with the adoption of scientific principles of study. By the employment of these, the domain of fact is clearly and sharply defined. There is no longer any of the haze that overspread the face of Nature in old times, distorting natural phenomena into the most fantastic and empirical forms, and giving rise to the various monstrous conceptions made familiar to us, in the shape of fairies, hobgoblins, genii, sprites, prophets, magicians, priests, seers, miracle workers, and so on. It is in the interest of this glorious emancipation of the human intellect that we oppose the proceedings of the defendants. Their crotchet is a survival of the effete age of the unscientific past—an age when scientific lectures, experiments, and demonstrations were unknown—when the institutions of learning had not as yet begun to exist—when professorships, and chairs of philosophy, and such illustrious assemblies as the meetings of the British Association had not as yet begun to shed their light on the world. The hurtfulness of their crotchet has been sufficiently established. My Lord, the question is beyond all discussion. These Christian doctrines are altogether out of place in the age of protoplasm. The defendants might as well

begin to seriously preach Hamlet's ghost. The modern world is not to be guided by the echoes of tradition, and by the tales of barbaric ages long since past and dead—ages of ignorance, and bigotry, and intellectual cramp, when men neither saw much nor were able to judge correctly of what they saw. Let us have facts by all means, as my friend who last addressed the Court insisted. I agree with him in dismissing the philosophical vagaries of poetical dreamers; but I cannot agree with him in embracing tenets which are only vagaries of another description. I claim to repudiate everything that is without a scientific foundation—whether it be the Chinese fables, the metaphysical speculations of mystics, or the impossible traditions with which the defendants would arrest social progress and human joy. I claim to stand on the solid rock of that which cannot be contradicted.

Mr. Ardent Hope-for-a-Reason: My Lord, and Gentlemen of the Jury, Mr. Protoplasm's ideal is good in the abstract. It is well to stand on an unmovable foundation. It is well to stand upon facts; but it will be something new to me in this crooked and chaotic world, to be acquainted with something that cannot be contradicted. Is protoplasm uncontradicted? Are scientific men quite agreed whether life precedes the protoplasm, or protoplasm generates the life? Is it quite settled whether the first forms of life upon earth were miraculously produced, or developed through countless ages from some kind of a life-jelly that, in some wonderful way, was deposited at the bottom of the ocean? Are the very fathers of evolution themselves quite at one on all points? Are there not two schools of evolutionists? Is there not contradiction and difference in every scientific circle? Are the meetings of the British Association quite happy family meetings? Yes, I like Mr. Protoplasm's ideal: but it is only an ideal. He says he claims to stand on it. It will never be anything more than a claim. Pose how he will, he cannot escape the miserable fate of contradiction. Contradiction must exist so long as ignorance exists, and as

long as knowledge survives in the struggle with ignorance. We are not to be frightened at contradiction. I dare say my friend is not; and we, on behalf of the defendants, are not. You contradict our facts; but can you disprove our facts? Why, you cannot touch them. You cannot even put them a little aside. Our Christendom is a fact, with Christ's name universal: you cannot deny it, and you cannot explain it, on any hypothesis of Christ not having risen. Our New Testament is a fact: you cannot deny its antiquity: you cannot deny its authenticity; you cannot deny its ability; you cannot deny its purity and its probity; and, therefore, you cannot deny its testimony to Christ's resurrection—a testimony advanced in too many shapes, on too many grounds to admit of any theory of mistake or misapprehension. You cannot deny our Old Testament, with an antiquity long prior to our New Testament. You cannot deny its history; you cannot deny its prophecies; you cannot deny the wonderful parallel and fulfilment of both in our own times, and notably in the existence of the Jewish race in a dispersed condition. And another thing you cannot deny—you cannot deny the wonderful adaptability of the whole matter to our moral and intellectual need as rational creatures. We need hope, Mr. Protoplasm; you have none to give us. You point us to a future of darkness. We need stimulus, we need something to lift us out of ourselves; we need something to give us a motive—something to draw us to a higher life. You give us nothing. The Christ-doctrine gives us all. It gives us a future of brightness: it applies to us the stimulus of hope; it gives us the elevating power of a noble standard immeasurably above ourselves, and helps us with the prospect of a responsibility to an unerring tribunal. It gives us, above all things, the prospect of immortality—the deepest desire of our nature—which your protoplasm condemns as an impossible dream, but which the gospel of Christ offers as a certain gift from God through him. You cry out for facts: we give you facts, for these are not cunningly devised fables, but truths authenticated to our age in every way in which authentication in our circumstances is pos-

sible. But you refuse our facts merely because they are inconsistent with what I must call your fancies, for, although scientific facts are facts, the inferences you deduce from them are not necessarily facts. Many of them have already been proved fancies. You turn out to be very nice and partial in your taste for facts. You are very eclectic indeed, but it is the eclecticism of intellectual dogmatism. If I might not be breaching the rules of good taste, I would call it scientific empiricism, this rejection of all facts that don't happen to square with the notions of the scientific school to which we belong. You talk of "scientific foundation": are there no facts that are indubitable facts without having a scientific foundation? Is King John's "Magna Charta" not a fact? Do you not stand upon it to-day? How would you define a scientific foundation for such a fact? Can you test it? Can you bring it on to the lecture table? Can you put it into a crucible? Do you not believe in it, although it is beyond the range of your science and your senses? And if you say to me it comes within the range of your senses through historic evidence—documentary transmission, or what not, why do you refuse the historic evidence and the documentary transmission of the far mightier matter involved in this trial? My dear sirs, this talk about modern science in the way you use it, is only a new species of charlatanry. Give science its due, by all means: let us be thankful for the enlarged acquaintance with Nature's wonderful powers that has come about through the adoption of rules of careful observation and correct reasoning. But, in the name of common sense, let us not throw away the wonderful facts that exist in other directions. Let us not stultify our intellects by shutting our eyes to other evidences that exist, besides those of the laboratory and the lecture hall. Let us not deny the Spirit of God, because we believe in oxygen! Let us not shut our eyes to palpable history, because we can look through telescopes at the stars! Let us not reject miracle, because we have discovered the spectrum analysis. Let us not be so insane as to refuse faith in an uncontradictable Christ, because we have exhumed the

pterodactyl and discovered the moneron. Let us not lay aside the Bible, because we have got daily papers, and scientific text books. All truth is co-ordinate. Different forms of it sometimes appear in conflict; the highest intellect is that which patiently, and humbly, accepts all noted facts, until, in process of time, they are seen grouped in an, at first, unperceived harmony. Such a grouping exists in the facts of true science, and the facts of the Apostolic testimony. We have not only a glorious physical cosmos under our feet, of immense history and unfathomable constitution, on which human inquisitiveness will expend itself in vain: but on this cosmic platform a divine programme is being worked out, which will at last reach results commensurate with the grandeur of this stupendous piece of creative work. The heart of that programme is the resurrection of Christ, which the Court will in vain forbid the defendants to proclaim.

Mr. Lover-of-the-Present-World: My Lord, there is one feature of the case which has been overlooked in the various arguments that have been addressed to the Court. I think we are justified in judging everything by its effects. Anything that does good, that gives pleasure and satisfaction to people, I should say, must be good; and anything that has the contrary effect must be evil. Now, my Lord, I look at the effects of the doctrine of the defendants. Does it make them happier? Quite the contrary. We have it in evidence that they have been made morose and unsociable. They look like it, I am sure, as they stand moping in the box there. It seems to me that such must be the effect of their doctrine; for what is that doctrine, my Lord? We have heard a deal about the resurrection of Christ; but, my Lord, there are other doctrines than that which give quite a different complexion to the system. I find Jesus saying that no man can be his disciple unless he takes up the cross. What does that mean? We shall presently know what it means. He says it is next to impossibility for a rich man to be saved. He says the poor are blessed: and "Blessed are

they that mourn." In Paul's letters there is a deal of this sort of thing. He speaks about crucifying the old man; he deprecates living in pleasure; he condemns the cultivation of the friendship of the world. He inculcates the denial of all ungodliness and worldly lusts. Now what does this amount to when practically carried out? It amounts to asceticism. It amounts to the deprivation of every innocent pleasure. It amounts to the eclipse of every enjoyment. It amounts to a robbing of life of every charm. It amounts to moral suicide. A man might as well be out of existence. He certainly had better retire to a monastery. This is the logical upshot of the principles disseminated by the defendants. If they do not go this length, it is because their better sense comes to the rescue. Then I have to mention another feature in which their principles are blighting to human enjoyment. There is a constant taking down of the dignity of human nature—a constant disparagement of our manhood—a constant inculcation of what I cannot but call a cringing servility. All this is done on the plea of glory to God. It is expressed by Paul as no flesh glorying in His sight, and "he that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord." Illustrative of the same debasing tendency, he says God has chosen weak things, and base things, and things that are despised, yea, and things that are not to bring to nought things that are. Now, my Lord, this may be very sound theology, but what does it mean as regards the development of human life? Development, do I say? I ought to say repressment, stuntment, and blightment; for the effect of such a doctrine is to check the play of all manly sentiments, and to put an end to the invigorating stimulus of ambition. What scope is there for the manly rivalries of public life, and the zest of mutual appreciation and compliment, if the mind is to be internally hung up all the time with this crape of a sentiment, that man is to have no credit, and to strive for none of the rewards of ambition, because of this incessant glory to God, as it is called? I contend that, on this ground alone, a sufficient reason exists for interference with the proceedings of the defendants. See how

different is the aspect of things with the plaintiffs. They place before the community the noble liberty of natural life, wherein every man is free to avail himself of whatever lawful pleasure he may choose to enjoy. Of entertainment of all kinds, he has the freest range of choice; companions he can select just to his taste; distinction of all sort he can compete for in the healthy tussle of public life; he can aim at fame and the rewards of ambition; he can amass wealth till he is as rich as Cræsus if he like; he can indulge in the pleasures of joviality, the refined enjoyments of the musical art in their unnumbered varieties, or the intellectual feast of the drama, without check or hindrance from a living soul. The result is the very opposite to that seen in the case of the defendants. Men who live thus in the freedom of Nature live in the sweetness of a free soul, a tranquil mind, a placid nature, cultivated tastes, developed powers, and the delights of friendship—the pleasures in fact of an unfettered development of all the powers and gifts that belong to the human constitution. I say, my Lord, that what I may call the subjective moral effects produced by the principles of the defendants are sufficient in themselves to justify the most strenuous measures; and I heartily join in the prayer that has been addressed to the Court to issue a prohibitory injunction.

Mr. Dontwanto Believeanyhow: I so entirely concur in what has been advanced by my colleagues that I do not think it necessary to address any independent remarks to the Court. I look upon the doctrine of the defendants as an unlearned, narrow-minded, cramping affair. It is opposed to science, opposed to common sense, opposed to the commonest pleasures of life; opposed to everything that can commend itself to a robust, healthy, manly mind. Even if there were grounds for thinking it might be true, it is not, all things considered, worth looking at. I hope the Jury will come to such a decision as will enable us to put a quietus upon it for a long time to come.

Mr. Wellwisher of Mankind: My Lord, I have the honour of bringing up the rear of the rhetorical procession that has passed before the Court within the last hour or two. It can scarcely be expected, after such an exhaustive elucidation of the question, that I can have much to contribute in the way of fresh argument or suggestion. Perhaps, however, I may try and throw out an idea in answer to Mr. Lover-of-the-Present-World, who last addressed the Court. He seemed to suggest that the enterprise of the defendants was inimical to the moral well-being of mankind. My Lord, I cannot but think that Mr. Lover-of-the-Present-World has but very imperfectly apprehended the scope, and aim, and nature of that enterprise. If there is one ground upon which I would more strongly than another strenuously oppose any interference with the defendants, it is on the ground that the well-being of society, in the most real and comprehensive sense, is bound up with the work of Jesus Christ on the earth. Why, my Lord, even if we look at the matter historically, we must see this. Where were the refinements, and the courtesies, and amenities of European society before the appearance of Jesus Christ, 1800 years ago? Is it not a fact that the world, before then, was steeped in what was barbarism by comparison? I do not ignore the civilization of Greece and Rome; but I say that these civilizations were but barbarisms, side by side with the civilization that has resulted from the diffusion of the influence of Christ even in the diluted form in which that diffusion has taken place. Bad as the state of the world is at the present time—(and I lament the world's woes from the bottom of my heart)—it is infinitely superior to the age in which human life was of no account; mercy to the fallen, an unknown sentiment; forgiveness, an unconceived virtue; and in which the grossest immoralities were publicly practised, and privately nursed. And any superiority that now distinguishes the present time from pagan times, is distinctly traceable to the refining influence of the Teacher of Nazareth, who commanded his disciples to teach all nations to do to others as they would be done by; and

whose teaching, in a certain form, was made providentially influential in the countries of Europe. But, my Lord, it is not on the historical aspect of the case that I rely, though I think some weight attaches to it; it is on the ultimate drift and bearing of the matter that I should wish to lay the special stress. The wise man has said, "In everything consider the end." This is what we have to do in this matter. What is the end of the matter? My friend has spoken of the present draw-backs of the matter—present sadness, present mourning, present poverty, present isolation and self-denial, as the lot of the servants of Christ. It is true, my Lord; I have no desire to conceal or extenuate this point. It was the distinct foreshadowing and appointment of Christ himself that it should be so. But are we to confine our view of the matter to its present aspects in forming a just estimate of its bearings? My Lord, my friends on the other side are not so unwise in other things. They send their sons to school where they are under discipline and restraints—irksome to the lads, and perhaps not altogether pleasing to the parents. Do my friends say the experience undergone at school is a mistake, because it is dreary? Do they confine their view of the case to the dreariness? Do they not look forward to the days of liberty and manhood when, as the result of these restraints, their sons will be qualified to enter upon the responsibilities and enjoyments of life for which, without these preparatory restraints, they would be totally unfitted? Yes, my Lord, and this is what they do if they belong to the class of wise parents. They are governed by ultimate results in their adoption and estimate of present means and conditions. Precisely thus ought they to allow themselves to look at this other matter. It is not for the sake of self-denial, that Christ has made self-denial the rule for his disciples during their passage through the present evil world. It is with a view to results to come after. It is to these results we are to look, my Lord. In looking at these results, what do we see? Why, that the sorrow and the draw-backs, to which my friend referred, are "but for a moment," as Paul expressed it. "Our light afflic-

tion which is but for a moment worketh out for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." Such are his words. And again, "I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us." My Lord, we must look at the glory to be revealed before we can rightly estimate the course appointed for disciples now. What is it? It is well said in the Scriptures that "eye hath not seen nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive what God hath prepared for them that love Him." It may be said, if this be so, there is no use in talking about it. But there is a qualifying addition to the words I have just quoted, namely this statement, "but God hath revealed them unto us by His spirit." So that although human imagination, left to itself, could never have conceived of "the glory that shall be revealed," now that it has been revealed, it is possible to have an idea of it. What is it then? Immortality of nature and perfection of faculty—every joy, and glory, and honour, and satisfaction—every attribute of wealth and power to be conferred, when a certain epoch in the world's history arrives, to be marked and introduced by Christ's return to the earth. When this epoch arrives, Christ's dead friends are reproduced from the grave by the great power God has given him, and his living friends changed and conformed to the body of his glory; conjointly with him, he then enters upon the work of overthrowing the present constitution of the world, and erecting a new order of things, in which he will be head and his friends co-rulers with him of mankind, under the new government to be established in the city of David. Under this new government, mankind—poor, perishing mankind—will know a blessedness they have never known before—a blessedness of plenty, and light, and truth, and peace, and health, which are now only mentioned as matters of chimera. They will, at last, as the result of a sufficiently prolonged operation of this government, know the blessedness of immortality itself, for death itself will at last be obliterated from their midst. These things were defined, I think, in Mr. Faithson's evidence. They

are all promised and pledged by the divine word written in the Scriptures: and the resurrection of Christ is the guarantee God has given that these things will come to pass. Paul so characterises it: "God hath given assurances to all men (of the verity of these things) *in that he hath raised him from the dead.*" Now, my Lord, is it a marvellous thing, that for such a stupendous exaltation, there should be an adequate preparatory discipline on the part of those who accept Christ's invitation to associatship with himself in so great a future? Reason will not falter in the answer. If my friend glooms morosely at the cross and the self-denial, it is only because he lacks faith in the crown and the glory to which they stand logically related. A prospect like what is placed before men in the gospel calls for the schooling of present obedient submission and self-denial. If my friend will see the matter all round, he will see compactness, and symmetry, and beauty, and fitness in that which now presents to him so hideous an aspect. No, my Lord, the interests of mankind are bound up with this matter. What hope have they in any other direction? What comes of the course my friend so beautifully painted? What comes of the pleasurings, and the money makings, and the fame-huntings he so pleasingly indicated as the liberty of a natural life? Does it not all end in vexation, impotence, and death? Is it not all "vanity and vexation of spirit?" What can the professor do in the grasp of death? Where are his accomplishments, his degrees, his honours, his emoluments, his prospects, when the cemetery gives him six feet of clod-covered earth? There is no hope in protoplasm. We want the Maker of protoplasm for a Friend and a Saviour, and then we have hope for our companion, instead of despair. My Lord, the Maker of protoplasm has sent His son to offer this friendship and salvation. It is a matter of history. The record of it cannot be erased from the earth. The defendants are identified with the glorious work. No man can stop it. I advise the Court to let these men alone, lest, haply, they be found fighting against God.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: My Lord, my learned friend, Mr. Alltruth, was good enough to consent to my having the last word. I do not know that it is necessary I should avail myself of the privilege. Everything has been said, I think that can well be said pro and con. The Court has been a long time occupied with the case. Doubtless, we are all pretty well tired of it. I confess that is my own feeling. It would be cruel to the Court, cruel to the defendants, perhaps, and certainly cruel to myself, were I to make any attempt to follow the endless repetitions of Counsel in the concluding addresses delivered on the side of the defence. I am content to leave it where it is, satisfied in the discharge of my duty in asking the Court to grant the injunction for which it is my honour, on behalf of the plaintiffs, to apply, in the interests of the community at large.

Sir Noble Acceptor of Alltruth: I presume your Lordship will take the summing-up after lunch?

His Lordship: That will be convenient.

The Court adjourned.

TWELFTH SITTING

THE SUMMING-UP AND THE VERDICT

His Lordship: Gentlemen of the Jury, you have been engaged, for a number of days, in giving a close and patient attention to the facts and arguments submitted to you by the gentlemen on both sides in this case—a case which, I think I may say, is the most important that ever came before the Court. I must ask your attention for a little longer, while I endeavour to bring to a focus the elements of the case, which are scattered in the statements of the witnesses and arguments of Counsel.

The plaintiffs ask the Court to restrain the defendants from the promulgation of certain convictions which they entertain on the subject of the resurrection of Jesus Christ. They make this application on the ground that injury is calculated to arise, and does, in fact, arise, to society from the promulgation of these convictions. The application in the abstract will strike you as a novel one. It is inconsistent with the public traditions of the British Empire that there should be any restraint of individual liberty, especially in the matter of ventilating private conviction. At the same time, if it can be shown that individual activity, in any form, is hurtful to the public weal, there is a ground of action in restraint thereof, on the part of anyone who chooses to move in the matter—not under any particular enactment to be found in the Statute Book, but in the general jurisdiction which, doubtless, appertains to the Court, as the guardian of the

public interests. If the plaintiffs, who in their corporate capacity have taken a special phase of those interests under their protection, have proved that the enterprise in which the defendants are engaged is detrimental to the public well-being, they have, doubtless, established a ground on which to apply to the Court to interfere. Mr. Alltruth was good enough, on behalf of the defendants, to waive any objection on the score of the competency of the Court to deal with the matter, electing to have the case decided on its merits. It is well, perhaps, he has taken this course. It will save us an amount of needless argument, for there can be no doubt of the power and duty of the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, to interfere with the action of the defendants if that action be proved, as I have said, to be inconsistent with the public welfare.

The question, Gentlemen, which you are called upon to decide is, whether this has been proved or not, and to this question I must ask you to give your most earnest attention. It will be necessary for you to take many things into account before you come to a conclusion. You must not limit your view to any one particular phase of the case. You must allow due effect to all parts of the evidence, and the arguments, which have been addressed to you. It will not be sufficient to ask if the action of the defendants has been hurtful in a given instance, or in a particular direction; you must ask what are its effects on the whole, and in the long run. I need not remind you, Gentlemen, that many good matters appear in an unfavourable light in their initial stages. A town improvement, for example, may involve the pulling down of many houses and the obstruction of important thoroughfares; and if you were to consider the confusion and the obstruction merely, you would be liable to conclude that what will turn out a great boon in the end was really the opposite of a good thing. You have to take the whole matter—in its future as well as present bearings—into account before you can come to a just judgment. On the other hand, you must not confine your attention to any excellence that may have been shown to attach to

the defendants' proceedings, if that excellence is limited and for the time being only, and if the general drift of their action is evidently for the ultimate hurt of themselves and their neighbours. It is not sufficient that their action may be a source of present enjoyment and improvement to them, or those who may come under their influence, if the upshot of the thing in its largest bearing is mischievous. A thing may seem advantageous in some limited way, that in the end may have calamitous results for all concerned. A man who helps himself and partners with borrowed money, may cause a certain amount of well-being which assumes another aspect when the day of reckoning finds them all unprepared. I place these considerations before you, to impress on you the need for exercising the utmost discrimination as to the bearing of the facts that have been brought before you.

What are those facts? The first witness called was Police-constable Steeple, 666. Little light was thrown upon the case by his evidence. He seemed to have an eager animus against the defendants, which of itself would detract from the weight of what he might have had to say; but he seemed incapacitated for the witness box altogether, by the intoxication under which he was evidently labouring, and, on the suggestion of the Court, Mr. Unbelief withdrew him. Then Mr. Town Gossip was called. This witness seemed to have a strong opinion that the defendants had hurt themselves at all events, but he was evidently somewhat hazy in his ideas on the subject. He had known several of them. Paul Christman was the first I think he spoke of. He had known him as an active and sociable good fellow—a breezy, cheery, roystering young man, who took a leading part in all kinds of sport, and in politics of a certain sort at election times; but he had observed a great change. He had become quiet and retiring; he had taken to stopping at home reading, varied only by walks out to attend meetings, or visit those who were unwell. He could not exactly say what the cause of the change was. Paul Christman was not sociable as he used to be. He attributed it to the acceptance of the doctrine of Christ's resurrection and the belief that he

was coming again. He could not agree with those who put it down to softening of the brain; he explained it by the "notions," as he termed them; but as to what the "notions" were, or what ground they had, he did not trouble himself about such matters. He had known, also, Joseph Arimathea, another of the defendants. He knew him as a pleasant young man, welcome everywhere in a large circle of admiring friends; but there had been a change. He had become serious—too serious by half. He did not go into company, as he used to do, and had taken to consorting with a class of people far below him. The change had been produced by "the notions." He considered him quite spoiled. The witness next spoke of Luke Physicus in the same way, who had been diverted from a rising career in the medical profession by the adoption of the faith of the defendants. In cross-examination, the witness would not say the defendants were unsociable among themselves, or that they had become bad in any evil sense. He admitted they bore very good characters. His principal complaint was, that they had given up keeping company with the frequenters of theatres, and pleasure-seeking people in general, and had taken to moping about Christ, as he phrased it. He considered them quite spoiled for all purposes of good-fellowship and sociality.

The next witness called was Mr. Shrewd Observer. He was called to speak to the spoiling effects of the doctrine of the defendants. He was very decided in his views on this point, but seemed to lean somewhat tenderly towards the defendants in a personal sense. He discriminated between the opinions of the defendants and the defendants themselves. He had no regard for their opinions, but he esteemed the men. Their opinions had had an evil effect upon them in his estimation. Their opinions had led them to regard the world as an evil thing, and, as the result of that, they had virtually forsaken the world. The world was damaged by this, in as far as the world was deprived of the value of their good offices, and the comfort of their friendship. He illustrated this in detail. He had known Persis Muchlabour.

He was a young man of great business talent, and high prospects—of handsome and agreeable manners—with a fund of humour and information on all subjects—sought after for his pleasant company. To all this, there had been a great change. He had practically retired from society. He was no longer to be met at the theatre, or at pleasure parties. He had moderated his ideas of business, and had thrown himself away on an obscure lot of people. The cause of the change was the same as in the other cases—the acceptance of the doctrines of Paul Christman. Apart from these, he would be as useful a man as ever. The witness then spoke to the defendant Faithson. He did not so much instance him as a case of a man being spoiled, as of a man prevented from being useful by the operation of the Christman doctrine. He was over head and ears in these doctrines; apart from which, the witness considered him, from his personal qualities, calculated to be a useful member of society in every way. Heber Holdfast-the-Hope was a tradesman of rare capacity and a politician. He used to take an active part in elections, and in the political affairs of the borough generally; but he had imbibed the doctrines of the defendants, since which time he had fallen off as a politician, and gone over heart and soul to Christmanism. He considered him a spoiled man, though thinking as highly of him as ever as regards clearness of mind and truthfulness of life. The witness next spoke of Titus Workfellow. He spoke of him in pretty much the same sense, except perhaps with more feeling. He spoke of him as an unblemished man who had been described as an angelic man. The witness had been one of an admiring circle of friends to whom Titus Workfellow ministered intellectual discourses; and he bemoaned the change of mind that had taken him from their midst, and led him to consort with a people whom Counsel suggested to be low and worthless, but of whom the witness said he did not know much. He considered Titus Workfellow's case the case of a good man being spoiled—not in a moral sense, he was careful to indicate, but spoiled for the present world in every sense. He next spoke of

Urbane Helpful whom also the adoption of the faith of the defendants had arrested in a career of advancement, and turned him into a morose and unsociable man. He mentioned Gaius Hospitable in the same sense.

This in substance is what has been given in evidence touching the hurtfulness of the doctrines agitated by the defendants. The suggestion of Counsel is that what has been hurtful to the defendants will be hurtful to everyone else embracing the same tenets; and that, therefore, the duty of the Court is to forbid the dissemination of those tenets, so that society may be protected from harm. Now, Gentlemen of the Jury, the question for you to consider is, assuming these facts to be proved by the evidence, and adopting the theory of the plaintiffs as to the nature of the facts, do they amount to such a form of injury as would justify the Court in putting forth the power, which it undoubtedly possesses, in restraint of the proceedings of the defendants? In the consideration of this question, the Jury must have fully in view the plea urged by the defendants in justification of their proceedings. The Jury will not be able to come to a reliable decision without the fullest consideration of this plea. What the defendants say is that, even admitting to the utmost the allegations of injury made by the plaintiffs concerning their proceedings, they, the defendants, are more than justified in incurring and producing these so-called injurious effects, on the ground of the obligation they are under to persevere in the proceedings that causes them. This obligation they allege to arise from the fact (which they believe to be a fact) that Christ rose from the dead, and now lives, and has given commandment that they should do as they are doing, and is coming again, at a certain time, to judge his servants, as to whether they have done, while he has been away, what he has commanded them to do. It was to this plea in defence that the cross-examination was mainly directed: and to this plea, Gentlemen of the Jury, I call your most earnest attention. It must be evident, to every man of sense, that if this plea can be maintained, there is the fullest answer to the action of the plaintiffs. If Christ really rose from the dead, and lives for ever-

more, then it would follow that his declaration is true that God has given him jurisdiction in the affairs of men, and that he will exercise that jurisdiction at the time appointed. I need not remind you, Gentlemen, that that jurisdiction, if a fact, extends to matters of most solemn moment for every man to consider, not only for the defendants, but for all of us. We think with pride, sometimes, that the power of life and death vests in the Crown, and on the Court, in so far as the Court is the instrument of the Crown; but what comparison can be made between that power and the power that God has given to Christ in heaven and earth, if it be true, as the defence contends, that Christ has risen from the dead? Who has power to do what Christ in that case will do—to make men immortal—to give them life—and perfect life for evermore? And what Court upon earth can give men over to eternal perdition as Christ can, if the contention of the defendants be correct?

What have Counsel for the defence to advance in support of their momentous plea? They have not called many witnesses themselves—only two I think. Their policy has been to elicit evidence out of the mouths of hostile witnesses—a masterly policy, we must allow, if successful. It is for you to consider what degree of success has attended that policy. I must recall your attention to the features of the evidence thus elicited. Mr. Shrewd Observer was the first witness subjected to this process. He admitted he would have no objections to raise against the defendants, or their proceedings, if Christ rose from the dead. He even went so far as to say that very likely, if he could satisfy himself on that head, he would himself join the defendants. He was candid enough to say he could not so satisfy himself. He had studied the subject somewhat. He had read a good deal on both sides. He thought the evidence in favour of Christ's having risen was very pithy; but he found a difficulty in the way of receiving it, in what he called "the unbridgable contradiction between common experience and what we are asked to believe about Christ." Asked wherein the unbridgable difference lay, he at once fixed

on the miraculous element of the life of Christ as furnishing the chief obstacle. Mr. Alltruth, I think it was, pressed him to define the nature of the difficulty connected with the reception of the miraculous element. The witness said that miracles were so out of the way of ordinary experience, that he could not conceive of their possibility. By ordinary experience he did not mean his own experience in particular, but the experience of men in general. While standing thus on experience, he would not refuse to receive the credibly testified experience of other men. He did this in matters of which he lacked personal knowledge, such as matters of history or astronomy. At the same time, he found it easy to accept the testimony of other men on such points because they were not inconsistent with what he himself experienced. His difficulty in accepting testimony as to miracles, lay in the fact that miracles were inconsistent with his experience. It was contrary to his experience that a few loaves of bread could be so divided as to feed thousands of people. He did not like to make his experience an absolute standard by which to measure what was possible; at the same time, if he found a thing impossible in his experience, he could not help feeling that it established a strong presumption against its possibility in the case of others. Here Mr. Alltruth introduced various illustrations of unusual mode of controlling Nature, and got Mr. Observer to admit that there might be modes of control that he knew nothing of, and that Christ, as the power of God incarnate, might have possession of such modes of control, by means of which he could counterwork without arresting the laws of Nature. Mr. Observer said the idea was new to him, as he had conceived of miracle as a violation of Nature. If miracles were merely a higher form of the work we saw performed every day before our eyes in Nature, it would reduce the difficulty he felt in conceiving the possibility of miracle, and, therefore, the difficulty he found in receiving the resurrection of Christ. Still, he did not see what miracles had to do with religion. This led to the discussion of a question which is very interesting, but which I need not trouble the Jury particularly to

follow, viz., the function ostensibly fulfilled by miracle in the original promulgation of the Christian religion, also as to what religion is in itself, and how it originated. The question of the evidence of Christ's resurrection is not really affected by these interesting topics. And, therefore, I must pass on to what the witness had to say to Mr. Alltruth's questions on the alleged incompatibility of science with the Bible. This has a bearing undoubtedly on the main question which you will have to decide: because, as the Bible is the principal source of the evidence of Christ's resurrection, any successful attempt at showing the Bible is not to be relied upon, would detract from the weight of its evidence on the question in hand. Mr. Observer alleged, as the first discrepancy between the Bible and science, that the Bible taught that the world began 6,000 years ago, while science had established, beyond all contradiction, that the earth had been in existence for incalculable ages. Asked as to whether the Bible really taught that the earth had come into existence 6,000 years ago, Mr. Observer said it appeared so to him. The Bible generally, he thought, agreed with that idea. He had not noticed the statement in Gen. i. 2, that before what was called the work of creation began, "the earth was without form (or order) and void (or empty), and darkness was upon the face of the deep." He admitted that this statement showed the existence of the earth before the work of creation began. The earth could not be empty if there was no earth to be empty: there could be no darkness on the face of the deep if there was no deep. He had not thought of that. If the earth existed chaotically at the epoch of the Mosaic creation, it modified the scientific difficulty considerably: because in that case, there was no Scriptural limit to the pre-existence of the earth. There was room enough for any length of time science might claim. He thought, however, the way was really stopped against this explanation, by the statement that God created the earth at the epoch in question. By create, he understood, to make out of nothing. He did not know any other meaning than this. Mr. Alltruth asked, with considerable force, how the witness (if that

was the proper meaning of create) understood the statement that "God created man *out of the dust.*" To make man of nothing *out of the dust* naturally struck the witness as an odd performance. He admitted the word must have some other meaning than the conventional one. Having asked what it was, Mr. Alltruth informed him that *Bara*, the word translated create, strictly meant to arrange or put in order, and that the re-arranging or putting in order of the earth 6,000 years ago, was not inconsistent with the scientific view; science could not show anything contrary to such a process having taken place. Mr. Observer was inclined to acquiesce in the suggestion, but could not see how the fossil indications were to be reconciled with it. There were fossil remains of extinct animals, which, from their position in the strata, must have existed ages before the Adamic era; and the Bible account was that these animals were made 6,000 years ago. Mr. Alltruth interjected—"not *these* animals," or something to that effect. The Bible taught that certain species of animals were made 6,000 years ago; but not the fossil animals, which must have belonged to a previous age. Mr. Observer thought this a speculation to suit the facts, but Mr. Alltruth rejoined that it could not be a speculation, in view of the fossil proof of the existence of different animals previously, from what came after. The animals found in the fossil state did not exist now. Consequently, there must have been a break in the line of animal existence: that break would coincide with the catastrophe that brought the earth into the chaotic state, in which it was found at the crisis of the Adamic reordering or creating. The Bible statements as to the creation of animals applied to those that were made 6,000 years ago, and not to those that existed in a previous age. The witness complained that the Bible said nothing about the animals of a previous age. Counsel contended that that was no reason why we should reject what it told us of the animals appertaining to our own age. The Bible only professed to give an account of things from the Adamic beginning; and it was idle to object to this account because it did not go back further, and portray the

cosmic revolutions of prior ages. The witness admitted there was some force in these considerations, but did not seem to feel the explanation was entirely satisfactory, especially as he contended the difficulty extended to man himself, as well as the animals. As to this point, he said the Bible certainly taught that man came upon the scene 6,000 years ago; whereas, according to the latest researches of science, man must have been upon the globe 50,000 years at least. On this, some very curious and amusing passages ensued between the witness and the cross-examining Counsel. In the first place, Counsel startled the witness and the Court, by taking up this novel position, that, if a 50,000 years' antiquity for the human race could be established by science, there would be nothing in that fact inconsistent with the Bible account of the origin of the Adamic race 6,000 years ago. Then he startled us still more, and amused us all exceedingly, by a series of questions to the witness, intended to prove that, upon scientific principles, the present amount of human population upon the earth was inconsistent with a 50,000 years' presence of man upon earth, and entirely consistent with the Bible account, that the present race began about 6,000 years ago. The most astounding feature of this arithmetical performance was the contention that, if the view entertained by some scientists were correct, viz., that man had been steadily upon the earth for 50,000 years past, the population upon earth at the present moment ought to be countless myriads of billions, even if the human race had only increased all that time only at the slow rate of twice in 500 years. I confess I at first felt very sceptical as to this suggestion; but I have since taken the trouble of figuring it out, and there can be no doubt it is perfectly correct. The witness was staggered at the array of figures presented by Mr. Alltruth as the sum total; and well he might. It constitutes one of the most formidable obstacles to the human antiquity theory I have heard of. Doubtless the mathematics of the case are in favour of the Bible account. It is for you to judge, Gentlemen. The extent of human population now upon the earth is in harmony with the idea of a beginning tak-

ing place 6,000 years ago; and not at all in harmony with the idea of human generation having been in progress for 50,000 years, if we are to suppose that generation has been uninterrupted all that time. The witness admitted the force of the facts, and contented himself with asking Counsel what he meant by saying that even a 50,000 years' antiquity would be consistent with the Bible account. Counsel's answer you heard. It does not directly bear upon the issue which you have to decide; and, therefore, we may pass on. These various matters, you will perceive, do not involve any direct evidence of the resurrection of Christ. They have more to do with clearing away the difficulties experienced by educated gentlemen of the Shrewd Observer stamp in receiving that doctrine. But though this is of merely secondary value, it may strike you, Gentlemen, as being a kind of evidence of considerable importance in its place. Obviously, if these difficulties were uncleared away, positive evidence would lack much of its force. It would be like a blocked line, on which the most powerful railway train could not run. It is for you to judge whether the cross-examination to which the witnesses were subjected had the effect of clearing the line or not. That some success was realized in the effort, I think most people must have felt, who listened to the questions and answers that passed between Counsel and witnesses.

But the really important part of the case will be found to lie in Counsel's efforts to develop the positive evidence of Christ's resurrection. To this I would bespeak your patient and most serious attention. It is upon the view you may take of this that your verdict must depend. A beginning was made in the questions addressed in cross-examination of the witness Bad Laugh, as to whom I have to say that a more unsatisfactory witness it was never my lot to see in the witness box. His brusque and impatient manners might have been tolerated, on the score of want of culture; but his rudeness to Counsel, and his obstinate and glaring evasions of the issues of his own answers are without palliation on any ground whatever. They are deserving of the severest censure. They could not but ex-

cite the reprehension of all honest men, who witnessed the sickening exhibition. He was the first witness called by the plaintiffs, in compliance with the suggestion of the Court, to prove that the faith of the defendants was a matter of imposture or mistake. I thought it necessary there should be some effort in this direction: because it must be obvious, to every reasonable mind, that it is not enough to show that a certain amount of present disadvantage results from the proceedings. The question is, does that disadvantage lead to a greater ultimate advantage than could be attained if that disadvantage were not incurred? This is the rule by which the nature of all kinds of disadvantage whatsoever is determined. The sowing of seed, looking at the transaction by itself, means the loss of so much grain: and, as a matter of loss, it is a matter of disadvantage. But when we realize that this loss will lead to the gain of a larger quantity of grain than would be possessed if the loss were not submitted to, we are able to see that the loss of the seed is but a temporary evil, which an enlightened man willingly submits to, and would not by any means avoid. Many other examples of the same thing will occur to you. The real question, therefore, is, does the disadvantage at present resulting from the defendants' proceedings lead to advantage hereafter of a greater sort; and this depends upon whether or not their belief is a true one, that Christ rose and now exists with great power in his hands. Therefore, I thought it well to direct the attention of Counsel for the plaintiffs to this part of the case, and to ask them to make some endeavour to show that the defendants were proceeding upon mythical grounds in working in the confidence that Christ had risen. Two witnesses were called in response to this suggestion, and Mr. Bad Laugh was the first of these. As I have said, his performance as a witness was far from satisfactory. Nevertheless, admissions were drawn from his mouth which demand your serious consideration in deciding whether the proceedings of the defendants should be interfered with.

In support of the contention of the plaintiffs, the witness Bad Laugh had nothing to offer but his own con-

fidant assertions. To start with, he denied the resurrection of Christ, on the ground that the idea of a dead man coming to life was an absurdity on the face of it. That there is nothing in this, I should think most of the Jury will be satisfied, on the most casual reflection. To whom would the idea of a dead man coming to life be an absurdity? To mere human power. But the view put forward in the apostolic testimony—of the truth of which you have to judge—is that Christ's resurrection was due to divine power. Would any sane man say that it was absurd to imagine divine power capable of raising a dead man? The argument might, with more cogency, be turned against the appearance of man in life at all. It is agreed, on all hands, that there was a time when human life did not exist upon the face of the earth. At such a time, it must have been intrinsically a more absurd idea that man would appear upon earth than that when man once having arrived upon the scene, a dead man should be brought to life. No, Gentlemen of the Jury, whatever you may think of the evidence of Christ's resurrection, it must commend itself to your judgment that the return of the dead to life is no more incompatible with the power that exists in the universe, than the phenomenon of such a witness as Bad Laugh being permitted by that power to appear alive in the witness box. It is the question of the evidence you have to consider, and not of the possibility, which is beyond all question.

What evidence do the defendants offer in support of their belief in the resurrection of Christ? That is the question. The answer to the question is definite enough when taken in all its parts. To begin with, they produce the New Testament. Now here is a very palpable thing, calling for close and critical attention. It is not a matter to be dismissed lightly. There can be no question about the ancientness of the New Testament—how ancient is a material point you will have to determine. The book is of a somewhat composite character, but its main object is to exhibit the life and sayings of Jesus Christ. It does this in four accounts, professedly written by four men, three of whom were personal disciples and companions of

Christ, and one a colleague of the disciples in the labours by which the Christian faith was originally established in the world. The remaining part of the book—consisting of an account of the transactions of the apostles, and the letters of the apostle Paul and others—it will be important to take into account further on. Meanwhile we look at it as a history of the life of Christ. There can be no doubt the history is written with remarkable simplicity, and yet remarkable power and lucidity. It does not aim so much at artistic effect. There is no effort to paint the scenes in which its transactions were laid. The great aim is to record what Christ said and did, and only so much of the surroundings are noted as are needful to furnish a framework, or setting, for the strictly biographical part. If this biography is to be accepted, there can be no doubt about the resurrection of Christ; for the fact of his resurrection is set down with as much plainness and precision as the fact of his crucifixion. The question is, are we to accept it as a true account? In deciding this question, several points are most important to be considered. Were the professed writers of the New Testament (personal disciples of Christ) the real writers? If the real writers, were they competent to judge of the reality or otherwise of the things they recorded? And have we any guarantee that they were men of probity, who would only record what they knew to be true? Some evidence has been given on these points, and to this I would direct your careful attention.

The witness, Bad Laugh, hazarded the suggestion that the New Testament was not the production of its professed writers, but was a literary compilation concocted in the middle of the second century. He did not venture to call it a forgery, though it will strike most men that a document professedly the writing of one man (any of the letters of Paul, for example), but in reality the writing of another, could not be described or considered as other than a forgery. His theory was that the New Testament was an attempt, in the middle of the second century, to give a literary embodiment to the traditions then in circulation concerning Jesus Christ, of whose his-

torical existence the witness seemed to have no doubt. If such a theory were established, the value of the New Testament, as an evidence of Christ's resurrection, would, of course, be entirely destroyed; because no reliance could be placed on statements made at second-hand, and especially by men with so little moral scruple as to put into circulation as a work of the apostles, a document, or a collection of documents, which had no such authorship. But the attempt to establish this theory must have been, I should think, in the opinion of the Jury a lamentable failure. No sort of evidence was adduced in its support: and, at every step, the theory was in collision with the facts. The Jury may remember the questions addressed to the witness. He was asked why he fixed on the middle of the second century as the time when the New Testament was produced; he could not tell exactly. He said he did not fix upon the middle of the second century as a hard and fast line. He thought it could not be traced earlier. By being traced earlier, he meant no earlier mention could be found in contemporary writers. Asked to mention the writers on whom he relied for taking it so far back as the middle of the second century, after much fencing, he mentioned Clement, of Alexandria; Irenæus, of Lyons; Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and others. These writers all flourished about that time, and mention and cite the New Testament freely in their writings, from which the witness considered we were safe in allowing the existence of the New Testament at that date. You will probably consider such a conclusion too obvious to make it necessary for me to point out its inevitable sequentiality to such a state of facts. What most surprise everyone is that the witness did not perceive, or at least would not allow, that the same facts took the existence of the New Testament rather further back than the age in which it was so quoted as an authority. As Counsel put it to the witness, the very fact that the New Testament was generally quoted as an authority, A.D. 150, shows that it must have been in that position for a considerable time previously; for it is inconceivable that a book, produced at that time, should suddenly be accepted

and quoted as an authority in various parts of the world at the same time. Counsel endeavoured to put this beyond all possible contradiction, by quoting various writers who wrote long before A.D. 150—Polycarp, Ignatius, Hermas, Clement, and others, some of whom were born earlier, in the very first century itself, all of whom quote from the New Testament, in the same way as Irenæus, Tertullian, and the others. The witness had no answer to these cases, except a general allegation that some of the books in question were forgeries. No answer to this can be more complete than the remark of Counsel, that, even if forgeries, it would not affect their value as witnesses to the existence of the New Testament. They were in circulation in the first century, and whoever wrote them could not have quoted the New Testament, if the New Testament had not existed at that time. It seems to me, Gentlemen, whatever we may think of the resurrection of Christ, we are bound to accept the authenticity of the New Testament. It is impossible to conceive that a book universally accepted in Christendom from the beginning as the work of the apostles, can be other than the work of the apostles. The considerations of common sense, derived from experience of the working of affairs among men, will show us that, had it not been the work of the apostles, the fact would have been found out and proclaimed at the very start. It is not as if it were a single book, Gentlemen. It is a number of books; and it is not even as if it were a number of books in the ordinary sense. Many of these books were letters in the first instance, addressed to various communities scattered throughout the Roman Empire. They were the private property of these communities, in the first instance, and make allusion to their private affairs. It is impossible, in view of this, that the fabrication of such a book could have escaped detection. The Christian communities at Rome, Corinth, Colosse, and the other places to which Paul's letters are addressed, would have been the first to rise and say that no such letters had ever been addressed by the Apostle Paul to them; and, hence, the imposture would have been detected and denounced at the very start. But not a

word of such denunciation—not a whisper of doubt—has assailed the circulation of these writings for eighteen hundred years. I think you will be of opinion that there is only one conclusion possible in the premises. Even if it had been what is called a monograph—the private production of a single pen—the uncontradicted reputation of all time would be accepted as decisive of the question of authorship; but, in the case of a heterogeneous and public compilation like the New Testament, it admits of no question. It leaves no room for doubt. It is absolutely and unanswerably conclusive. Counsel next directed the witness's attention to the evidence afforded by the contents of the book itself of the truthfulness of this conclusion. He quoted various extracts, and asked the witness whether, in his opinion, it was possible such things could have been written by a forger or literary fabricator. There is great weight in this line of argument, especially when we come to consider the sayings and the teachings of Christ, and the remarkable style of the apostolic epistles. But it is not necessary we should follow this part of the evidence. The conclusion which such evidence is cited to establish—viz., the authenticity of the New Testament irrespective of the nature of its teaching—is too well established on the grounds already indicated, to make it necessary that we should go into any literary analysis of the contents of the New Testament. Most men will be of the opinion expressed by Professor Bioplasm, that "it is the height of folly to attempt to deny that the apostle Paul wrote the letters bearing his name"; and by Mr. Workfellow—that there is ten times more evidence of the authenticity of the New Testament than of any other book in the world whatsoever.

We have now to consider what follows from the authenticity of the New Testament. On this point, some incisive questions were put to Professor Bioplasm—a candid witness, though unfavourable to the views entertained by the defendants. His attention was called, first, to the formal narratives of Christ's resurrection contained in that part of the New Testament known as "the Gospels," and then to the numerous casual allusions and declara-

tions on the subject, contained in Paul's epistles, and he was asked whether, in view of the authenticity of the documents, these narratives and allusions did not amount to the written testimony of actual witnesses to Christ's resurrection?—testimony as actual as if we saw the writers step into the witness box and give evidence with their own actual lips—the testimony, too, as Counsel pointed out, not of one man only, but of a number of men, who, at various times, and in various places, had interviews with Christ after his resurrection. Professor Bioplasm rather fenced with the question; but still on the whole, he answered candidly that, doubtless, the New Testament was equivalent to the personal testimony of the apostles. Asked why he did not receive it, he said his difficulty was the nature of the thing they bore testimony to. He did not deny the possibility of resurrection in the abstract, but resurrection was so wholly foreign to all available acquaintance with Nature, that he could not help feeling there must have been some mistake. He admitted the evidence was strong; it could not well be stronger. He would not deny the capability of the witnesses. He admitted that men who could write the New Testament were far from muddle-headed. Incapable men could not have written such a book. The writers were evidently men of mental vigour. Counsel next called the attention of the witness to the nature of the thing testified to. He could not but allow that the writers of the New Testament were capable of judging of the evidence of their senses. Very ordinary men were able to tell what they saw. There was no great depth of penetration required for a man to be sure whether he saw a person on the street and talked with him or not. There certainly could not be anything much simpler for a person to be called upon to give evidence of. Any ordinary man would be able to give reliable evidence as to a fact of that sort. Witness could not deny that this was the nature of the evidence the apostles gave—viz., that Christ, with whom they were on terms of loving intimacy, after being put to death by Pontius Pilate, appeared to them again alive, hale and sound—appeared not once, but often, during a period of

forty days—and not to one only but to several at various times, and to many at once—and not in a hurried way, but deliberately, talking with them on the subject of his crucifixion, and of his resurrection, and of the course they were to pursue when he should leave them. He admitted the explicit nature of the evidence: that it was the evidence of many witnesses: that it was evidence to a fact easy to judge of—a fact of seeing and hearing. He was also disposed to admit it was an honest testimony. All he had to say in extenuation of his disbelief was, that the testimony was so extraordinary that he confessed himself unable to credit it.

Now, Gentlemen, it is for you to judge whether this is a reasonable or a tenable position. In doing this, it is only fair that you should take into account the witness's explanation of his inability to take any other. He said he might find himself logically compelled to surrender to the testimony of the apostles, if the road were perfectly clear in all other respects. Here he explained that he referred to scientific difficulties. There was such a hopeless chasm, he said, between the Bible and the results of modern biological and anthropological research, that he could not but conclude there must have been some great mistake at the bottom of the Christian movement. He admitted the evidence of Christ's resurrection was strong: he did not know that a historical case could be stronger: still there was the invincible barrier of science. Counsel suggested that it would be more logical to accept a demonstrated truth, even if it appeared to conflict with our conceptions of scientific truth, than to reject it because of those conceptions which might turn out to be mistaken, or at all events—when we were better acquainted with science—not inconsistent with the first demonstrated truth. Professor Bioplasm admitted there was some weight in the suggestion, but confessed his inability to apply it in view of the teachings of biological and anthropological science.

Here Counsel proceeded to put some questions by way of testing the claims of the sciences in question. It may be worth while, Gentlemen, just to follow the line of examination for a moment or two; because if you entertain

any decided leaning towards the doctrine of the evolution of species with which those sciences are principally associated in the popular mind, you will, doubtless, share Professor Bioplasm's difficulty in receiving the evidences of Christ's resurrection. There can be no doubt if man has appeared upon the earth as the result of a gradual development of species from the lowest forms, during countless ages, the Bible account that he was specifically created 6,000 years ago—an account endorsed by Christ—must be wrong; and, if so, it would be difficult to resist the feeling that Christ's endorsement of error as truth, would militate against his claims in all other directions. This part of the case, therefore, deserves as close a consideration as you can bestow upon it.

The Professor had first to admit that the two leading teachers of the theory of evolution were at issue with regard to the initial principle of the system. Mr. Wind, the father of evolution, holds that the first forms of life were miraculously created, while Professor Hawk III contends that the first form of life, from which all others have sprung, came into existence by spontaneous generation. Such a discrepancy between the two pillar-advocates of evolution certainly must have the effect of creating the feeling that the theory is not on a stable footing. The one believes in God, and the other does not; the one believes in specific miraculous creation, and the other does not. It would be difficult for the divergence to be greater. Professor Bioplasm avowed a preference for the second of these views, and his readiness to defend Professor Hawk III's views from attack. I think it was generally manifest—and even to the witness himself—that he found his task difficult before he got through. He based the argument on the discovery of the moneron—a tiny creature without any apparent organization, consisting, to all appearance, of a little bit of pure albumen, and found at the bottom of the ocean. He did not say it had been proved that this creature developed into higher forms. The position he took was that its organless simplicity made it easy to "imagine" such a thing taking place. Asked if it was scientific to intro-

duce the element of imagination into a scientific process, the witness said he used the word "imagine" for want of a better word. Still, he did not remove the impression that at the most vital point of the whole theory—the starting point—the believers in spontaneous generation had to resort to mere hypothesis. Counsel's aim in the questions that followed was to show that the hypothesis was inconsistent with the facts of the case. The hypothesis was that the creature was without organs (as only an organless creature could be conceived to spontaneously generate); but the witness had to admit that the moneron performed functions necessitating organization. It moved; it absorbed nutrition; it assimilated the same to its substance, and grew larger in consequence; and, finally it propagated by self-division at a certain stage. Witness admitted it was reasonable to conclude that a creature must have organs to be capable of performing these organic functions. No organs were apparent, and this was the ground for the idea that it had no organs; but Counsel recalled his attention to the fact, which he admitted, that there were creatures which undoubtedly possessed organs, which were invisible under the microscope. And, therefore, the invisibility of the organs could have no weight in presence of the performance of functions evidently involving the use of organs. Now, it is an accepted maxim with scientific men of every school, that no creature with organs (technically styled "heterogeneous parts") could originate by spontaneous generation. Consequently, the difficulty for the witness was, how to maintain the spontaneous generation of the moneron in the face of its evident possession of organs. The witness felt the pinch, but Counsel quickly passed to another and equally damaging point. He asked the witness if he had ever known a case of spontaneous generation. The witness had to answer in the negative, and volunteered the admission that spontaneous generation was not now possible. *Not now possible!* Counsel quickly seized the advantage. If not now possible, how could there be any certainty about its possibility at any time? The answer revealed the slenderness of the ground

on which the theory stands: "The general conditions of life upon earth, under which spontaneous generation is *assumed to have taken place*, are so entirely altered. Spontaneous generation, which now is, perhaps, no longer possible, *may have taken place* at a time when enormous masses of carbon impregnated the atmosphere, before they were condensed into coal, in the primary coal mountains." "Assumed," and "may have" don't look well in a theory which makes pretensions to such certainty of truth, as to be made a ground for refusing credence to authenticated evidence—the evidence of Christ's resurrection—evidence which the witness said his only reason for not accepting was the teaching of this same scientific theory. Counsel emphasized on this, and then went on to point out what had apparently escaped the witness, that carboniferously-impregnated atmosphere could have nothing to do with the supposed possibility of spontaneous generation, for the simple reason that the moneron, according to Professor Hawk Ill, existed millions of years before the carbon age began. The witness was taken by surprise, and confessed his perplexity. Counsel increased his perplexity by challenging the idea that the conditions of life had altered since the first beginning of life upon the globe. He called his attention to the fact that certain species of fishes and molluscs were extant at the present time, without the slightest change having taken place in their organic structures, though they had lived long before the carboniferous age, as shown by their fossil presence in the lowest silurian stratum, and had continued down to the present time unchanged. The witness, being pressed on the point, admitted that the fact looked like positive proof that the conditions of life, instead of being entirely different, had been exactly the same all the way down. Being asked why, in that case, spontaneous generation should take place at the beginning and not now, the witness candidly confessed his inability to answer. Pressed further, he admitted that the moneron existed at the present time in vast numbers, with the same apparently organless simplicity that characterized it at the epoch of its supposed spontaneous generation. Asked why the creature should

exist at all now, on the evolutionist hypothesis that new and improved varieties inevitably supplanted and exterminated the older, he confessed he had never addressed himself to the consideration of that problem. He said he would require considerable time for reflection, before he could suggest an explanation of the fact (in harmony with the theory of evolution) that the very lowest organism, the weakest, the most defenceless, the best adapted for the food for others, and, consequently, the most unfit for survival, should, instead of becoming "rarer and rarer, and finally extinct," as the theory required, should exist in countless millions, while all the thousands of intervening variations between this, the supposed first form of life and the higher developments, should have disappeared without leaving a vestige behind. Then followed certain very cogent suggestions of difficulty in the way of the idea of such a creature beginning to improve itself, and transmitting the improvements to descendants. These we need not follow particularly. Suffice it that at every step, the development theory (on the strength of which the evidence of Christ's resurrection is put aside) became more and more lame, until the witness himself manifestly felt it could not walk. The most trenchant part of the examination, perhaps, was that in which Counsel asked the witness whether spontaneous generation would not be quite as wonderful as a miracle. Witness answering that a miracle was out of the range of experience, Counsel made a telling point when he asked if spontaneous generation was within the range of experience? The witness admitted that it was not within the range of experience, because it was not now possible, according to the hypothesis. It was no wonder that the witness seemed fairly crushed when upon this, Counsel rejoined "and yet you call it scientific—a thing that never occurred within known experience, which you admit cannot occur: which you think may have occurred certain millions of years ago, and yet, against the occurrence of which, there are reasons and objections which you cannot answer?" The case for the plaintiffs was certainly made to look quite hopeless when Counsel added: "But miracle, of

which the world has heard, which has been credibly testified in many cases, which is the only explanation of the system of things existing in Christendom, and which even, in the domain of Nature, the most eminent naturalists of the day hold to be the only satisfactory explanation of the start of life upon earth, you call that unscientific?"

It will not be necessary, Gentlemen, to follow the further arguments against evolution which Counsel elicited in the course of his examination of Professor Bioplasm. If you think the points already noticed have, in the least, shaken the pretensions of evolution to be considered a demonstrated science, you will feel yourselves at the greater liberty to allow due weight to the facts and arguments submitted to you in proof of Christ's resurrection. There remain but a few more of these to be glanced at. They were very fully brought out in the speech which Mr. Alltruth addressed to the Court, and they have, to some extent, been looked at in our review of the evidence. They were, in the main, summed-up in Counsel's contention that the resurrection of Christ, as a doctrine, stands firmly imbedded in the Hebrew system of teaching that preceded the Christian era for many centuries. This idea, Gentlemen, deserves to be looked fairly in the face. If it can be established, it unquestionably constitutes a powerful argument in support of the position occupied by the defendants, for, as Counsel argued, you have not only, in that case, to consider the actual evidence of Christ's resurrection, but you have to look at, and find a reasonable explanation of, a system of teaching and expectation going before for ages. Could that system of teaching and expectation have been of merely human origin, which anticipated, foreshadowed, and required the events realized in the life of Christ ages after? And if not of merely human origin, is not the resurrection of Christ established by that system itself, even if we lacked the evidence of its actual occurrence? And if you say it was of merely human origin, then Counsel asks, with a cogency calling for your most earnest and careful attention, how you account for the origin of the Jewish nation; for the character of the Jewish law; for the anti-Jewish

sentiment of the messages delivered by the prophets; for the utterance of hundreds of prophecies, which have all come true, and are now fulfilling before our eyes, and for the peculiar, unique, non-human character of the Bible as a whole, and its wonderful agreement one part with another, though produced by over forty disconnected writers, scattered over an immense period of time. These points were elaborated at some length, and with some force, and they deserve your serious consideration. Counsel also spoke of the application that was made by the apostles of the resurrection of Christ as a proof of its reality. It was pointed out that it was preached as a matter of world-wide importance, having a cosmopolitan bearing, and extending through all time. The argument on this was, that it was not conceivable that a matter existing only in the imagination of narrow-minded and superstitious men, could ever have come to assume such a shape, and, still less, that it could ever have come to be received by multitudes of people in the face of the opposition set up by the authorities. It was contended that the only reasonable explanation of the form in which the resurrection was promulgated, and of the extraordinary success of the preaching of it (unsupported as it was by physical force of any kind) lay in the fact that it really happened, and was a divine event, forming an important link in the world-programme that is being worked out on the face of the earth in the course of the ages. This argument was powerfully supported by the case of Paul, the apostle, the facts connected with whom were very fully presented to you. You may be of the opinion that there was force also in the concluding argument, that the mental constitution of man requires us to recognize immortality and perfection as a possibility in the universe—not necessarily at the present moment—at some epoch or other, of which we can know nothing, by scientific investigation, and under conditions which, it may be, human imagination could not prescribe; indefinite in that sense, but definite enough, as a matter of general induction. The application of this argument is pointed enough. The defendants point to the system of faith founded on

the resurrection of Christ; and they say: "See, here is the complement of the inference of philosophy; here is hope for human life in its individual relations now, and the prospect of an unclouded futurity for the race—in an age and order of things which Christ is able to establish, and will establish upon earth." And they turn to the system of the plaintiffs, and they say, that, with all the intellectual pleasures and social enjoyment of the scientific era, and the scientific system, there is no hope in it, and no prospect but that of an eternal objectless repetition of abortive life of men and animals upon earth.

Now, Gentlemen, it is for you to take all these things into serious account. You will give the whole matter your earnest consideration, and return a verdict in accordance with the convictions that may commend themselves to you in the case. I need not remind you of the long-established maxim of the law, that, if you have the least doubt that the defendants are in the wrong, you will give them the benefit of that doubt, and set them at liberty to renew the labours from which the plaintiffs would interdict them; and all men at liberty to embrace their doctrine, which is a glorious one, if true. If, on the other hand, you really think that the defendants are following a phantasm to their own hurt, and the hurt of society in general, you will find for the plaintiffs, and it will then be for the Court to consider how best to give effect to your decision. Gentlemen, consider your verdict.

THE VERDICT

The Jury retired at the eleventh hour (modern time, 5 p.m.) to consider their verdict. As it was expected the deliberations of the Jury would take a long time, the Court rose, and adjourned till the next day, leaving the Jury to their work. Meanwhile, many people hung about the place, and heard the sounds of fierce debate issuing every now and then from the jury room. Next day had dawned, and the Jury, many of whom had fallen asleep, had not arrived at a verdict. At the re-assembling of the Court, they were still at it. A messenger from his Lordship brought word that agreement was impossible. The Jury were then sent for, and entered the Court.

The Clerk of the Court: Gentlemen of the Jury, are you agreed upon your verdict.

The Foreman: No.

His Lordship: I understand there is no prospect of your coming to an agreement?

The Foreman: No, my Lord, it is impossible. We are just as far from agreement as when we began.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I apprehend, my Lord, there is nothing for it but to discharge the Jury.

Juryman Hearty-in-everything: And have a new trial?

His Lordship: The way would, of course, be open for a new trial: but I do not see what would be gained by a new trial.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: No, my Lord; we have had quite enough, I am sure. I should have been glad if the Jury could have come to an agreement—on the side of the plaintiffs, of course—but, under the circumstances, the best thing that we can do is to all go home.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: I agree with my learned

friend that a new trial could serve no good purpose, and that the only course is to discharge the Jury; but I beg to suggest that, before the Jury depart, they be allowed to give each man his own verdict. It will be interesting to the Court, and may be some guide to the thousands of people who have taken an interest in the trial.

His Lordship: Such a course would be very unusual.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Most unusaul, my Lord, and contrary to all precedent we ever heard of.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: I admit it would be contrary to precedent: but it is in the power of the Court to establish a new precedent. Or, perhaps, my Lord, you would allow my request, without making it a precedent. Let it be an odd incident peculiar to this case, not to be followed in any other.

His Lordship: It is a peculiar request.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: The case is peculiar, my Lord, and affects the outside public to an unprecedented extent. I am sure it would be an acceptable deviation from precedent, so far as the public are concerned.

His Lordship: Perhaps so.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: It would do no harm.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: I am not so sure about that.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: I appeal to my friend not to stand in the way. A full record of the individual verdicts of the Jury will enable my friend to see how far his acumen has prevailed with them.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: A very plausible suggestion. I suspect it is not the effects of my acumen that my friend is so anxious to discover.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: I don't particularly want to discover anything, but merely to see what these men think.

Sir F. C. Partialfact Unbelief: Very well; have your way, if his Lordship consents.

Sir Noble Acceptorof Alltruth: My friend withdraws his objection. Will your Lordship allow my request?

His Lordship: It is a very novel one. However, all parties consenting, there can be no harm in recording.

THE INDIVIDUAL VERDICTS OF THE JURY

The Clerk of the Court: Gentlemen of the Jury, answer to your names, and you shall each of you, as your names are called, a true deliverance make touching the matters you have had in charge.

The Jury then answered to their names, and delivered their verdict as follows:—

Mr. Christ Admirer: The evidence establishes Christ's resurrection beyond a doubt, and the verdict ought to be for the defendants.

Mr. Honest Doubter: Perhaps Christ rose, and perhaps he did not. It is for better men than me to say. I think, on the whole, the evidence is in favour of the defendants.

Mr. Science Dabbler: The glorious scientific achievements of this enlightened century require a verdict for the plaintiffs, whatever may be the evidence on the side of the defendants. Experiments made with retorts and other appliances, in my own possession, convince me of the ultimate reductibility of all phenomena to the differentiation of the impassive absolute through the affinities evolved in the molecular combinations of the primitive atomic constituents of primordial force.

Mr. Dissipation Follower: What does it matter? Of course Christ didn't rise: how could he? A drop of the creature would do the defendants lots of good.

Mr. Smartsophist: You see, it is plain that if we are to admit this sort of evidence, there is nothing on earth but what we could prove. We all want money; I suppose, according to the defendants' arguments, we shall all

get some. I hope so: but I prefer waiting before I am quite sure. If we are to believe because it is written, I for one, shall not know what to believe: for, in point of fact, everything is written. I can go into a bookseller's shop and find books on every imaginable subject. So much for the New Testament; and as for the state of things on the earth, I can find all kinds of state of things—Buddhism, Mahommedanism, Confucianism—all sorts of "isms." No, I give my verdict for the plaintiffs.

Mr. Sheer Stupidity: I have tried to follow the case. I think I understand it a little. It is about Christ and Pontius Pilate. I always used to think it was true about them, from what I used to hear at church. The other people—about protoplasm as they call it, and such like, I don't exactly know what to make of them. I have wondered about monkeys sometimes. I think the defendants should be let off if they promise to behave.

Mr. Hopeful: The glory of the universe convinces me there must be hope for man. I find no hope among the plaintiffs; I see a good hope well proved with the defendants. Therefore I give my verdict for the defendants.

Mr. Observer-of-Facts: I cannot shut my eyes. The Jews and Christendom, the New Testament, and the Old Testament tell me there has been a something at work higher than man. I believe the defendants are right, and give my verdict accordingly.

Mr. Lover of Truth: How can I doubt? Christ rose assuredly: verdict accordingly.

Mr. Indignant-at-Shams: I like the genuine article. Science is genuine so far; Christ is genuine altogether. If there is any shamming, it is in the assumed indignation at the so-called deformities of Bible narrative. I give my verdict for the defendants.

Mr. Pleasure Hunter: I don't see as all this fuss can do a fellah any good. What does it matter one way or the other? The thing is to enjoy yourself. I give my verdict both for the plaintiffs and the defendants.

Mr. Actor-out-of-his Convictions: I certainly think the defendants have made good their case, and I shall lose no time in making their acquaintance, and seeing what I can do to help them.

Mr. Diligent-in-Everything: I am of the same opinion as the last Juryman. I think the defendants are in the right, and I would advise them to do more than ever to let men know that Christ rose from the dead.

Mr. Worshipper-of-Protoplasm: I am considerably disgusted to stand in the same box with gentlemen who give the verdicts we have just heard. The whole affair is a revival of antiquated fanaticism, which cannot but have the effect of obstructing the progress of science, and arresting the splendid developments that are going forward in the direction of the discovery and utilization of the cosmic forces, whether we consider them in their abstract primordial aspect, or concentered in the protoplasmic ladder of life, exhibited in the department of physical development from the moneron up to man. I give my verdict for the plaintiffs, of course.

Mr. Befogall: The mists that arise on the profound consideration of any abstraction like the cause of the differentiation of form and life in the several classes of mammal and other life, contemplated embryologically; or the probable origin of those moral subjectivities that have found expression in the propagation and establishment of the Christian faith, interfere with a clear verdict on such a matter as has been brought before the Court; I remain neutral.

Mr. Hearty-in-Everything: Unquestionably, Christ rose, I give both my verdict and myself to the defendants.

Mr. Promoter of Political Improvement: I can see a fine prospect for human affairs, if we get a ruler such as Christ is said to be: immortal, omnipotent, infallible—especially assisted in the administration of an universal empire by co-rulers of the same sort. I am charmed, I admit, by the idea of such a possibility. The evidence

of Christ's resurrection seems to me more than fairly established. I give my verdict for the defendants.

Mr. Hater-of-Lies: I detest imposture; I hate sham and shammers; but I love truth as well, and I cannot for the life of me see where there is any ground for doubting the probity of the apostles, or the truth of the testimony. They seem, to me, thoroughly genuine men. I vote for the defendants.

Mr. Appreciator-of-Beauty: I cannot but recognize the peerless excellence there is about everything pertaining to Christ. Even if we hadn't evidence of his resurrection, I could not help feeling that where there is so much beauty in all his aspects—his actions, his words, his attitude to mankind—there must be much truth. Having the evidence in addition, I am satisfied. My verdict goes for the defendants.

Mr. Believer-of-Evidence: I cannot refuse to believe what is so manifestly proved. I give my verdict to the defendants.

Mr. Candour: I have listened attentively to both sides. I believe there is truth in science; but I cannot see that what truth there may be in science is contradicted by what has been proved true of Christ. I cannot give my verdict for the plaintiffs.

Mr. Care-for-Reputation: I do not exactly see my way, your Lordship, to give a definite verdict. You see there are difficulties on both sides; and I am sure all the Gentlemen concerned are highly respectable in every way.

Mr. Fearer-of-God: It is not compatible with the character of the Maker of all things, as we see it reflected in the constitution of heaven and earth, that He should intend the present imperfect life of man as a finality for such a being. I am compelled to believe He would purpose something more in harmony with the high aspirations with which He has endowed us; and, also, that He would tell us of His purpose. The evidence shows that

He has done so in Christ, and I give my verdict for the defendants.

Mr. Euthusiastic-in-Good: How is it possible that a man could hesitate in his verdict? I see nothing on one side but cold intellect, proved fallible by its changes every ten years; on the other, I see every form of excellence, and every form of beneficence that man could hope for or desire, guaranteed to us in the proved and uncontradictable resurrection of Christ. I give my verdict for the defendants.

Mr. Sublimity: Amazing wisdom! Astounding goodness! Stupendous might! I thank God He has delivered human life from its pettiness and inanity, and human futurity from impenetrable gloom, by such a glorious chapter in history as the life, death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ. Without hesitation, I give my verdict for the defendants.

Mr. Trier of Dreams: I think it is possible to discriminate between phantasy and reality by the application of well-known and universally-accepted tests and principles founded on experience. I have carefully tested every phase of this case by the application of these principles. I do not say the plaintiffs are wrong in the high place they give to science, but I do think they are not justified in dismissing the apostolic testimony as a thing founded on delusion. It stands every test by which reality is determined. In my judgment, it is neither a dream nor a hallucination, nor a mistake, nor an imposture, but a matter of plain and sober historic reality. I cannot, with such a view, record my verdict for the plaintiffs.

Mr. Cloudy Thoughtful: I don't know how to look at it, exactly. It is a thing that no person can see through quite, so as to be right square sure about it either way. I have sometimes thought the plaintiffs had it, and then I have thought it was the defendants, upon my word; there may be something in what they say, but I cannot tell—not so as to be justly sure, you know.

Mr. Lover of Debate: My Lord, we have had a rare treat. I have enjoyed the discussion all round amazingly. I should like it all over again. I rather like the idea of a new trial. I don't so much care about a verdict. The arguments are to my taste. I think there is about as much on one side as on the other. No doubt every man will be of his own opinion.

Mr. Paul Brother: In my judgment there is only one way of it. The defendants are in the right. It is as clear as noon-day. The evidence cannot be put aside. Christ unquestionably rose from the dead. And we may all be thankful for it, my Lord, for I see some interesting prospects for us all if Christ is coming again.

And so the trial ends for the present.